1996 JTR(SC) 394
1996 1 AICLR 752 ; 1997 35 AllCriC 399 ; 1996 2 AWC 957 ; 1996 1 CCR(SC) 170 ; 1996 CriLR 247 ; 1996 1 Crimes(SC) 173 ; 1996 1 EastCrC(SC) 652 ; 1996 3 JT 30 ; 1996 1 KLT(SN) 28 ; 1996 2 RCR(Cri) 183 ; 1996 2 Scale 380 ; 1996 7 SCC 492 ; 1996 SCC(Cri) 484 ; 1996 2 SCR 735 ; 1996 KHC 195 ; 1996 2 Supreme 390
1996(2) SUPREME 390
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Union Terriotory of Chandigarh -Appellant
versus
Charanjit Kaur -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 253 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2224 of 1995)
Decided on 15-2-1996
IMPORTANT POINT
High Court had committed grave error of law in directing pre-mature release of the life convict on the lapse on the part of the appellant-State in filing the counter affidavit.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136, Art.226
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.482, S.433
A) Relevant laws and sections are not explicitly cited in the judgment.
B) The Government has the power to commute sentences and order premature release of a convict under Section 433, clause (b), which provides for imprisonment for life reduced to a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine. The Court may direct the appropriate Government to consider commutation only after the prisoner has served the mandatory minimum sentence, and the Government must act based on conduct and relevant circumstances.
Facts of the case:
A respondent was convicted for murder, sentenced to life imprisonment, and had been in custody since before conviction. An application for premature release was pending before the High Court, which directed release on the ground that the State failed to file a counter-affidavit despite multiple adjournments.
Findings of Court:
The High Court committed a grave error of law by directing release based on the State's failure to file a counter-affidavit, as the power under Section 433 is discretionary and contingent on the prisoner having served the mandatory minimum term and other relevant circumstances.
Issues:
Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 or Section 482 of the Code to direct premature release of a prisoner where the State has not filed a counter-affidavit.
Ratio Decidendi:
The High Court cannot direct premature release on the basis of the State's procedural default; it may only direct the Government to consider commutation after the mandatory minimum sentence is served, leaving the final decision to the Government based on conduct and circumstances.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside.
A) Relevant laws and sections are not explicitly cited in the judgment.
B) The Government has the power to commute sentences and order premature release of a convict under Section 433, clause (b), which provides for imprisonment for life reduced to a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine. The Court may direct the appropriate Government to consider commutation only after the prisoner has served the mandatory minimum sentence, and the Government must act based on conduct and relevant circumstances.
Facts of the case:
A respondent was convicted for murder, sentenced to life imprisonment, and had been in custody since before conviction. An application for premature release was pending before the High Court, which directed release on the ground that the State failed to file a counter-affidavit despite multiple adjournments.
Findings of Court:
The High Court committed a grave error of law by directing release based on the State's failure to file a counter-affidavit, as the power under Section 433 is discretionary and contingent on the prisoner having served the mandatory minimum term and other relevant circumstances.
Issues:
Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 or Section 482 of the Code to direct premature release of a prisoner where the State has not filed a counter-affidavit.
Ratio Decidendi:
The High Court cannot direct premature release on the basis of the State's procedural default; it may only direct the Government to consider commutation after the mandatory minimum sentence is served, leaving the final decision to the Government based on conduct and circumstances.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order of the High Court is set aside.
ORDER
Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana made on January 6, 1995 in C.M. No. 6872/95. The admitted facts are that the respondent was convicted for an offence of murder and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Admittedly, she was convicted on June 2, 1984 for an offence committed on September 24, 1983. She has been in custody from September 17, 1983. An application has been filed in the High Court for her premature release. In the impugned order,the High Court has directed the release of the respondent on the ground that the State had not filed the counter-affidavit, in spite of that fact that the case was adjourned on more than three occasions. The question is: whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the "Code") to release the prisoner.
3. Section 433 of the Code empowers the Government, in an appropriate case, without the consent of the person sentenced, to commute the sentence and to prematurely release the convict. Clause (b) thereof provides for a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Indisputably, she did not even complete 14 years which is a minimum mandatory sentence required to be served under the Code. At best the Court, in an appropriate case, where the prisoner has served the mandatory minimum sentence, may only direct the appropriate Government to consider the commutation of the sentence and prematurely release a particular convict. They can do no further. The Government would consider such direction based upon the conduct of the prisoner and other relevant circumstances and act upon it.
4. Thus considered, we are of the view that the High Court had committed grave error of law in directing release of the convict on the lapse on the part of the appellant-State in filing the counter-affidavit.
5. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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