1996 JTR(SC) 644
1996 AIR(SC) 1611 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 1879 ; 1996 2 CLT(SC) 62 ; 1996 5 JT 566 ; 1996 2 RRR 660 ; 1996 3 Scale 65 ; 1996 2 SCC 749 ; 1996 3 SCR 782 ; 1996 2 UJ 1 ; 1996 KHC 740 ; 1996 1 KLT(Online) 1022 ; 1996 3 Supreme 51
1996(3) Supreme 51
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.S. Verma, N.P. Singh & K. Venkataswami, JJ.
Mohd. Aslam -Petitioner
versus
Union of India & Ors. -Resondents
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 135 of 1996
Decided on 22-3-1996
IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is not available to assail the correctness of a decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration.
2. Deficiency, if any, in the statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured by reading into a penal provision something which is not enacted therein.
3. There is nothing in the judgment in Manohar Joshi, (1996) 1 SCC 169, to give rise to any such apprehension that it can enable misuse of religion for making an appeal for votes in an election.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.32
REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT : S.123(3)(a), S.123(3)
A) The petition arises under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging the correctness of the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil concerning the interpretation and application of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 123(3) and Section 123(3A) regulate corrupt practices in election campaigns, specifically addressing the use of religion, race, caste, community, or language to appeal for votes. The petitioner argues that the earlier decision misconstrued the statutory prohibition and enabled misuse of religion in electoral matters, invoking the constitutional remedy under Article 32 to seek reconsideration.
B) The Court held that Article 32 is not a tool to challenge the merits or correctness of a decision on facts. It reaffirmed that constitutional remedies cannot be used to re-litigate factual or legal determinations already made by competent courts. The judgment in Manohar Joshi was distinguished from the Bommai decision, as the latter did not address the construction or scope of Section 123 provisions. The Court emphasized that any deficiency in the statutory framework must be remedied by legislation, not judicial reinterpretation, and expressed hope that legislative action would dispel existing misgivings.
Facts of the case:
A writ petition was filed under Article 32 challenging the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, which dealt with allegations of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petitioner contended that the earlier decision was incorrect and misread the law, potentially enabling misuse of religion for electoral appeals.
Findings of Court:
The Court observed that the petition was based on a misreading of the earlier judgment, which was grounded in prior Constitution Bench decisions and the evidentiary standard required for proving corrupt practices. The Court clarified that the Manohar Joshi judgment did not conflict with secularism or the Bommai decision, and its application in subsequent cases reinforced that it did not permit religious appeals for votes. The alleged reliance on a police report and the absence of admission or legal evidence further undermined the petition's merits.
Issues:
Whether Article 32 can be invoked to challenge the correctness of a prior judgment on merits; whether the Manohar Joshi decision misconstrued the scope of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act; and whether the judgment could enable misuse of religion in electoral campaigns.
Ratio Decidendi:
Article 32 is not available to re-litigate factual or legal merits of a prior decision. The Manohar Joshi judgment, grounded in clear legal principles and evidentiary standards, does not warrant reconsideration. Any statutory deficiency must be addressed by legislation, not judicial intervention, and the judgment does not undermine secular principles.
Result:
The writ petition is dismissed.
A) The petition arises under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging the correctness of the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil concerning the interpretation and application of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 123(3) and Section 123(3A) regulate corrupt practices in election campaigns, specifically addressing the use of religion, race, caste, community, or language to appeal for votes. The petitioner argues that the earlier decision misconstrued the statutory prohibition and enabled misuse of religion in electoral matters, invoking the constitutional remedy under Article 32 to seek reconsideration.
B) The Court held that Article 32 is not a tool to challenge the merits or correctness of a decision on facts. It reaffirmed that constitutional remedies cannot be used to re-litigate factual or legal determinations already made by competent courts. The judgment in Manohar Joshi was distinguished from the Bommai decision, as the latter did not address the construction or scope of Section 123 provisions. The Court emphasized that any deficiency in the statutory framework must be remedied by legislation, not judicial reinterpretation, and expressed hope that legislative action would dispel existing misgivings.
Facts of the case:
A writ petition was filed under Article 32 challenging the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, which dealt with allegations of corrupt practices under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petitioner contended that the earlier decision was incorrect and misread the law, potentially enabling misuse of religion for electoral appeals.
Findings of Court:
The Court observed that the petition was based on a misreading of the earlier judgment, which was grounded in prior Constitution Bench decisions and the evidentiary standard required for proving corrupt practices. The Court clarified that the Manohar Joshi judgment did not conflict with secularism or the Bommai decision, and its application in subsequent cases reinforced that it did not permit religious appeals for votes. The alleged reliance on a police report and the absence of admission or legal evidence further undermined the petition's merits.
Issues:
Whether Article 32 can be invoked to challenge the correctness of a prior judgment on merits; whether the Manohar Joshi decision misconstrued the scope of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act; and whether the judgment could enable misuse of religion in electoral campaigns.
Ratio Decidendi:
Article 32 is not available to re-litigate factual or legal merits of a prior decision. The Manohar Joshi judgment, grounded in clear legal principles and evidentiary standards, does not warrant reconsideration. Any statutory deficiency must be addressed by legislation, not judicial intervention, and the judgment does not undermine secular principles.
Result:
The writ petition is dismissed.
Secularism - Distinguished as not relating to construction of Section 123(3) and (3A) of the Representation of the People Act, thus inapposite in the context of the present case.
Jurisdiction - Relied on for the proposition that Article 32 is not available to assail the correctness of a decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration.
Precedent - Referred to as the decision which was explained in Khoday Distilleries, used to support the dismissal of the writ petition.
CorruptPractice - Referred to as an example of the application of the Manohar Joshi decision, showing consistency in election law jurisprudence.
Evidence - Referred to in Manohar Joshi to indicate the standard of proof required for proving a corrupt practice.
Election - Referred to as a subsequent case applying the principle from Manohar Joshi, indicating its correctness.
Election - Referred to as another case applying the principle from Manohar Joshi, showing the consistency of the rule.
CorruptPractice - The judgment under reconsideration; its correctness is challenged but the petition is dismissed; the judgment is explained and defended in the order.
ORDER
The prayer in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is for reconsideration of the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil and Another1. The petitioner s contention, in substance, is that the judgment is incorrect.
2. It is sufficient to say that Article 32 of the Constitution is not available to assail the correctness of a decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration. This has been clearly reiterated in the recent decision in Khoday Distilleries Limited & Anr. v. The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India2, wherein the decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S Nayak & Anr.3, has been explained. This alone is sufficient to dismiss the writ petition.
3. However, in view of certain apprehensions expressed by the petitioner, we deem it proper to make some further observations now, which we had considered unnecessary to incorporate in the judgment in Manohar Joshi. We may observe that the decision of this Court in S.R. Bommai and others v. Union of India and Others4, did not relate to the construction of, and determination of the scope of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, nothing in the decision in S.R. Bommi is of assistance for construing the meaning and scope of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of Representation of the People Act. Reference to the decision in S.R. Bommi is, therefore, inapposite in this context.
4. We may also add that the challenge in the writ petition to the correctness of the decision in Manohar Joshi is based on a misreading of that decision. In the judgment, the decision on the question of law is based on earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court by which we are bound; and the observation therein which is challenged as incorrect in this writ petition, is not the basis of the decision but an opinion expressed on an assumption if the making of the alleged statement of the hope of Maharashtra becoming a Hindu State, in the speech is held to be proved, without recording a finding that it was so proved. This allegation was based on a police report and Manohar Joshi did not admit the making of such a statement in his speech. Moreover, strong disapproval was expressed of such a statement, if actually made. This is clear particularly from paras 62 to 67 of the decision in Manohar Joshi reported in 1996 (1) SCC 169. Specific reference has been made for this purpose in paras 64 to 67 (SCC) to the decision in Jamaat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India5, to indicate the standard of proof required for proving a corrupt practice which had not been satisfied in Manohar Joshi in view of the absence of legal evidence to prove the corrupt practice alleged in the case.
5. A careful and dispassionate reading of the decision would show that the apprehensions and misgivings expressed in the writ petition, are imaginary and baseless. There is no occassion to read in the judgment in Manohar Joshi, something which is not said or to say that it conflicts with the concept of secularism in S.R. Bommai where this question relating to the meaning of sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act neither arose, nor was decided. The application of the decision in Manohar Joshi in cases like Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Others6, Shri Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Smt. Saroj Sandesh Naik (Bhosale)7, and Mohan v. Bhairon Singh Shekhwat8, is another pointer to indicate that there is nothing in the judgment in Manohar Joshi to give rise to any such apprehension that it can enable misuse of religion for making an appeal for votes in an election.
6. We may add that the deficiency, if any, in the statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured by reading into a penal provision something which is not enacted therein. The proposal was made at one time to perform the legislative exercise of anacting a provision to prevent any possible misuse of religion during elections, but it was, unfortunately, abandoned. We do hope that at least now there would remain no misapprehension in the mind of anyone.
7. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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