1996 JTR(SC) 604
1996 AIR(SC) 2519 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 3129 ; 1997 2 AllCJ 1079 ; 1996 28 AllLR 98 ; 1996 2 APLJ 43 ; 1997 2 BLJR 1678 ; 1996 2 CCC(SC) 106 ; 1996 87 CompCas 881 ; 1996 2 CPJ(SC) 31 ; 1996 2 CTC 93 ; 1996 2 CurCC(SC) 106 ; 1996 2 CurCC(SC) 39 ; 1996 2 GLH 405 ; 1996 3 ICC 552 ; 1996 4 JT 288 ; 1996 2 PLR(SC) 315 ; 1996 3 Scale 609 ; 1996 8 SCC 655 ; 1996 3 SCR 527 ; 1996 8 SLR 170 ; 1996 WBLR 239 ; 1996 KHC 1142 ; 1996 3 Supreme 602
1996(3) Supreme 602
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
State of Orissa -Appellant
versus
Divisional Manager, LIC & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appel No. 7092 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9577 of 1996)
Decided on 18-3-1996
Act Referred :CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT : S.2(1)(o), S.2(1)(4)
A) Sections 2(1)(o) and 2(1)(4) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, define 'service' to encompass facilities in sectors such as banking, financing, insurance, transport, and supply of energy, while expressly excluding services rendered free of charge or under a contract of personal service. In this appeal treated as a special leave petition, these statutory provisions determine whether a government servant can claim compensation for alleged deficiency in service rendered by the State, with the Acts scope hinging on the exclusion of free services and personal service contracts.
B) The key legal principles are that a contract of personal service, involving a master-servant relationship akin to civil servants, company managing agents, or university professors, falls outside the definition of 'service' under the Act; and services provided free of charge are similarly excluded from the Acts coverage, rendering such claims non-maintainable under this statute.
Facts of the case:
A respondent who was a government servant sought damages under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for a deficiency in service. The State was alleged to have provided services without charging any fee, and the respondent was bound by service conditions as a government employee.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the respondent was a government servant and that the services were rendered free of charge, thereby excluding the claim from the purview of the Act under the exclusionary clauses.
Issues:
Whether the appellant is liable to pay compensation under the Consumer Protection Act and whether the claim is maintainable under the Act when the service was provided free of charge to a government servant.
Ratio Decidendi:
Since the services were provided free of charge to a government servant, they fall under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(1)(o), and the claim for compensation under the Act is not maintainable.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and no costs are awarded.
A) Sections 2(1)(o) and 2(1)(4) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, define 'service' to encompass facilities in sectors such as banking, financing, insurance, transport, and supply of energy, while expressly excluding services rendered free of charge or under a contract of personal service. In this appeal treated as a special leave petition, these statutory provisions determine whether a government servant can claim compensation for alleged deficiency in service rendered by the State, with the Acts scope hinging on the exclusion of free services and personal service contracts.
B) The key legal principles are that a contract of personal service, involving a master-servant relationship akin to civil servants, company managing agents, or university professors, falls outside the definition of 'service' under the Act; and services provided free of charge are similarly excluded from the Acts coverage, rendering such claims non-maintainable under this statute.
Facts of the case:
A respondent who was a government servant sought damages under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for a deficiency in service. The State was alleged to have provided services without charging any fee, and the respondent was bound by service conditions as a government employee.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the respondent was a government servant and that the services were rendered free of charge, thereby excluding the claim from the purview of the Act under the exclusionary clauses.
Issues:
Whether the appellant is liable to pay compensation under the Consumer Protection Act and whether the claim is maintainable under the Act when the service was provided free of charge to a government servant.
Ratio Decidendi:
Since the services were provided free of charge to a government servant, they fall under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(1)(o), and the claim for compensation under the Act is not maintainable.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, and no costs are awarded.
ORDER
This appeal is treated as special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
2. This appeal arises from the order dated February 17, 1995 in FA No. 510 of 1992 of the National Consumer and Redressal Commission, New Delhi. The respondent-Haribandnu Setha filed a claim before the State Commission, Orissa under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, the Act ) for damages. The State Commission awarded damages against the first respondent-LIC. The appeal, the appellant was impleaded as party-respondent and the National Forum awarded damages against the State in a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) land directed to pay compensation within a period of three months. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
3. The only question is : whether the appellant is liable to pay compensation to Haribandhu Setha under the Act and whether the claim is maintainable. Section 2(1)(o) of the Act defines service as under :
" service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board of loading or both housing construction entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service."
(emphasis supplied)
4. A reading of the definition would indicate that the services contemplated thereunder alone are the services within the meaning of the Act except excluded services mentioned thereunder. The excluded services are "service free of charge or under a contract of personal service". The concept of contract of personal service was considered in a recent judgment of this Court in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors.1 This Court had held therein that the expression "personal service" has a well known legal connotation and has been construed in the context of the right to seek enforcement of such a contract under the Specific Relief Act. For that purpose, a contract of personal service has been held to cover a civil servant, the managing agents of a company and a professor in the University. There can be a contract of personal service if there is relationship of master and servant between a doctor and the availing of his services and in that event the services rendered by the doctor to his employer would be excluded from the purview of the expression under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act by virtue of the exclusionary clause in the said definition. The other excluded service is service rendered free of charge.
5. It is not in dispute that the respondent was a Government servant and, therefore, he is bound by the service conditions and the State was rendering services free of charge to the contesting respondent. Under those circumstances, the Government servant has been excluded from the purview of the Act to claim any damages against the State under the Act. Therefore, if any claim arises for the contesting respondent, it would be open to him to claim, in any other forum, but not under the Act. If the claim is barred by limitation, time taken during the entire proceedings shall stand excluded.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
Appeal allowed.
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