1996 JTR(SC) 1067
1996 3 AICLR 225 ; 1996 AIR(SC) 2449 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 3009 ; 1996 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 358 ; 1996 33 AllCriC 641 ; 1996 2 ALT(Cri)(SC) 702 ; 1996 2 APLJ 87 ; 1996 3 CCR(SC) 85 ; 1996 CriLR 770 ; 1996 3 Crimes(SC) 257 ; 1997 CriR(SC) 109 ; 1996 CrLJ 3495 ; 1996 2 EastCrC(SC) 824 ; 1996 6 JT 621 ; 1997 1 LLJ 565 ; 1997 MLJ(Cri) 436 ; 1996 5 Scale 382 ; 1996 5 SCC 329 ; 1996 SCC(Cri) 1026 ; 1996 Supp3 SCR 572 ; 1996 3 SLJ 9 ; 1996 KHC 897 ; 1996 2 KLT(Online) 1112 ; 1996 5 Supreme 616
1996(5) Supreme 616
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Faizan Uddin and S.P. Kurdukar. JJ.
State of Tamil Nadu -Appellant
versus
A. Jaganathan -Respondent
Criminal Appeal Nos. 725-728 of 1996
Decided on 15-7-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : S. Siva Subramanian, Sr. Advocate., K.V. Venkataraman, V. Krishnamurthy, R. Nedumaran, V.G. Pragasam, T. Raja, and Ms. Revathy Raghavan, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Discretionary power to suspend conviction either u/s 389(1) Cr.P.C. or u/s 482 Cr.P.C. should not have been exercised where accused, a Police Inspector was convicted u/s 392, 218 and 466 I.P.C.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.389(1), S.482
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.392, S.466, S.218
A) The impugned orders invoked Sections 389(1) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Sections 374 of the Code, against convictions under Sections 392, 466 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court examined the interplay between the inherent powers of the High Court and the specific safeguards in the Code regarding suspension of conviction and sentence during appellate review, particularly where public servants are implicated for moral and disciplinary offences. The decision in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang was distinguished on the basis that the present cases involve moral turpitude and potential disqualification, requiring stricter scrutiny.
B) Key legal principles include that suspension of conviction and sentence is an extraordinary power under Sections 389(1) and 482 Cr.P.C., exercisable only when the appellate court records reasons and is satisfied that the accused would suffer irreparable damage. The inherent power under Section 482 is broad but must be exercised sparingly, especially where public servants face disqualification, and moral conduct is a critical factor. Trivial or pecuniary disadvantages do not justify suspension when the same can be remedied if the revision is allowed.
Facts of the case:
Four government employees were convicted by a Judicial Magistrate and their sentences were affirmed by the Sessions Judge. They moved to the High Court under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of conviction and sentence, relying on Rama Narangs case. The High Court suspended both conviction and sentences, considering only the risk of irreparable loss of stipend.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in not considering the moral conduct of the respondents, especially given convictions under Sections 392, 218, 466 IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court also misapplied Rama Narang by treating mere pecuniary loss as sufficient grounds for suspension.
Issues:
Whether the High Court could properly suspend the conviction and sentence of public servants convicted for moral and corrupt offences on the ground of pecuniary loss alone, without assessing moral conduct.
Ratio Decidendi:
The extraordinary power to suspend conviction under Sections 389(1) and 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised where the impugned offences involve moral turpitude or corruption, and where the sole claimed hardship is financial, which can be remedied upon allowance of the revision.
Result:
The appeal succeeds and the impugned orders setting aside the convictions are set aside; however, the order suspending the sentences is confirmed.
A) The impugned orders invoked Sections 389(1) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Sections 374 of the Code, against convictions under Sections 392, 466 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court examined the interplay between the inherent powers of the High Court and the specific safeguards in the Code regarding suspension of conviction and sentence during appellate review, particularly where public servants are implicated for moral and disciplinary offences. The decision in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang was distinguished on the basis that the present cases involve moral turpitude and potential disqualification, requiring stricter scrutiny.
B) Key legal principles include that suspension of conviction and sentence is an extraordinary power under Sections 389(1) and 482 Cr.P.C., exercisable only when the appellate court records reasons and is satisfied that the accused would suffer irreparable damage. The inherent power under Section 482 is broad but must be exercised sparingly, especially where public servants face disqualification, and moral conduct is a critical factor. Trivial or pecuniary disadvantages do not justify suspension when the same can be remedied if the revision is allowed.
Facts of the case:
Four government employees were convicted by a Judicial Magistrate and their sentences were affirmed by the Sessions Judge. They moved to the High Court under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of conviction and sentence, relying on Rama Narangs case. The High Court suspended both conviction and sentences, considering only the risk of irreparable loss of stipend.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in not considering the moral conduct of the respondents, especially given convictions under Sections 392, 218, 466 IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court also misapplied Rama Narang by treating mere pecuniary loss as sufficient grounds for suspension.
Issues:
Whether the High Court could properly suspend the conviction and sentence of public servants convicted for moral and corrupt offences on the ground of pecuniary loss alone, without assessing moral conduct.
Ratio Decidendi:
The extraordinary power to suspend conviction under Sections 389(1) and 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised where the impugned offences involve moral turpitude or corruption, and where the sole claimed hardship is financial, which can be remedied upon allowance of the revision.
Result:
The appeal succeeds and the impugned orders setting aside the convictions are set aside; however, the order suspending the sentences is confirmed.
ORDER
Leave granted.
Counsel for parties are heard.
2. The respondents in these four appeals are the Government employees. All the four were convicted by the Judicial Magistrate, Erode for various criminal offences and setenced to undergo various sentences. The said conviction and sentences were affirmed by the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Erode. The respondents then approached the High Court in Criminal Revision accompanied with an application under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. for suspension of convictions as well as the sentences. The High Court after considering the ambit and scope of the provisions contained in Sections 374 and 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the relevant provisions of Law and relying on the decision of this Court rendered in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and others1, took the view that for the reasons to be recorded in writing by the appellate Court, the conviction or order of sentence can be suspended during the pendency of the same. The High Court also took the view that the power of the appellate Court or the High Court to suspend the conviction or sentence is always inherent and can be exercised at any stage, subject to the condition that the appellate Court should be approached and satisfied with the reasonings to be recorded in writing and further, if any one wants to stop the proceedings which have been initiated for disqualification or removal from service or reduction in rank in respect of a public servant one has to look into the moral conduct very much involved in such a case and only when the Court is satisfied with such conduct, then the remedy provided under different statute cannot at all be stopped. After taking the aforesaid view and on consideration of the fact that the respondents will loose the meagre stipend, if the prayer for suspending the conviction during the pendency of the revisions is not granted, passed the impugned orders suspending the conviction as well as the sentences awarded to the respondents. It is against these orders that the State has filed these appeals. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the State is that the High Court has passed the impugned orders relying on the decision in Rama Narang s case (supra) wherein this Court took the view that in appropriate cases the conviction and sentences can be suspended in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. After going through the decision referred to above and the facts of the present case we find that the decision relied upon has no application to the facts of the cases before us. In Rama Narang s case (supra) the conviction and sentences both were suspended on the reasoning that if the conviction and sentences are not suspended the damage would be caused which could not be un-done if ultimately the revision of the appellants of that case was allowed. But in the present case, we find that in the event the revisions against their conviction and sentences are allowed by the High Court the damage, if any, caused to the respondents with regard to payment of stipend etc. can well be revived and made good to the respondents. If such trifling matters are taken into consideration, we think, then every conviction will have to be suspended pending appeal or revision involving the slightest disadvantage to a convict. That being so the facts of the decision relied on have no application to the present case. This apart, the High Court though made an observation but did not consider at all the moral conduct of the respondents inasmuch as respondent Jaganathan who was the Police Inspector attached to Erode Police Station has been convicted under Sections 392, 218 and 466 IPC, while the other respondents who are also public servants have been convicted under the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act. In such a case the discretionary power to suspend the conviction either under Sections 389(1) or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not have been exercised. The orders impugned thus cannot be sustained.
3. For the reasons stated above the impugned orders are set aside to the extent of suspension of conviction. The order with regard to the suspension of sentences, however, is maintained. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
Appeals disposed of.
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