1996 JTR(SC) 1103
1996 AIR(SC) 2586 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 3221 ; 1996 3 CCC(SC) 280 ; 1996 3 CLT(SC) 216 ; 1996 3 CurCC(SC) 280 ; 1996 11 JT 84 ; 1996 5 Scale 549 ; 1996 5 SCC 386 ; 1996 Supp3 SCR 850 ; 1996 KHC 1509 ; 1996 6 Supreme 238
1996(6) Supreme 238
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Sri Nripati Ghoshal, First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. etc. -Appellants
versus
Premavati Kapur (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. etc. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 227 of 1992
with
Civil Appeal No. 3790 of 1992
Decided on 23-7-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S. Muralidhar, Rathin Das, Advocates.
For the Union of India : Praveen Swarup, Advocate [Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate (NP)].
For the Respondents : A.K. Ganguli, Sr. Advocate, Parag P. Tripathi, Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Sumita Mukherjee, Indeever Goodwill, Abha R. Sharma, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINTS
1. In Land Acquisition cases, so long as the public purpose subserves, it cannot be characterised to be mala fide.
2. All the Government should necessarily streamline the process of taking decision in time to file appeals considering apathy or absolute indifference on the part of the concerned officers in pursuing the proceedings.
Act
Referred
:LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.11, S.54, S.4, S.11(a), S.4(1), S.6
WEST BENGAL PREMISES REQUISITION AND CONTROL TEMPORARY PROVISION ACT : S.3(1)
A) The West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 was invoked for requisitioning premises under section 3(1) on defence grounds during the Bangladesh war, while the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 governed subsequent acquisition proceedings initiated via notification under section 4(1), enquiry under section 5-A, and declaration under section 6, culminating in a final award and compensation tender; delay in filing appeals and substitution of parties was addressed alongside contempt directions and statutory duties to expedite disposal.
B) Public purpose must be genuine and contemporaneous; acquisition remains valid if proceedings are initiated in good faith for defence needs despite administrative laches; court cannot retrospectively hold acquisition mala fide once public purpose crystallises; delay in appeals and substitution requires condonation; possession by authorities under requisition or acquisition does not automatically confer right to deny compensation or rental adjustments.
Facts of the case:
Premises at No.7, Chappel Road, Hastings, Calcutta were requisitioned on November 29, 1971 under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Act due to Bangladesh war, taken into possession by the Indian Navy, and acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were initiated in 1975, with notification published on November 26, 1981, enquiry conducted, declaration published on November 25, 1982, and the acquisition became final after the award was made on September 21, 1983 with notice under section 12 on September 23, 1983; subsequent writ petitions, contempt proceedings, and a substitution application followed with delays in rent payments and compensation.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench found no public purpose and mala fide acquisition, but the Supreme Court held the acquisition valid for defence purposes with laches on the part of officers; it allowed appeals, directed rental deposit at Rs.7500 per month from January 1, 1992, and instructed the Land Acquisition Collector to adjust amounts and compensate the respondents, while criticising indifference and directing systemic reforms.
Issues:
Whether the findings of mala fide and lack of public purpose by the Division Bench were correct in law; whether delay in filing appeals and substitution could be condoned; whether rent and compensation amounts should be adjusted against deposits and dues; whether officers should be held accountable for procedural delays.
Ratio Decidendi:
Where acquisition is initiated in good faith for a public purpose such as defence, subsequent administrative delay or mala fide cannot be retrospectively imputed; the court must consider the overarching public purpose and validity of acquisition before examining procedural lapses; substitution and condonation of delay are permissible without costs when justified by public interest and systemic failures.
Result:
Appeals allowed; acquisition upheld as valid for defence purposes; rent to be deposited at Rs.7500 per month from January 1, 1992; Land Acquisition Collector directed to adjust amounts payable and compensate; no costs awarded; systemic directives issued to expedite government appeals.
A) The West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 was invoked for requisitioning premises under section 3(1) on defence grounds during the Bangladesh war, while the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 governed subsequent acquisition proceedings initiated via notification under section 4(1), enquiry under section 5-A, and declaration under section 6, culminating in a final award and compensation tender; delay in filing appeals and substitution of parties was addressed alongside contempt directions and statutory duties to expedite disposal.
B) Public purpose must be genuine and contemporaneous; acquisition remains valid if proceedings are initiated in good faith for defence needs despite administrative laches; court cannot retrospectively hold acquisition mala fide once public purpose crystallises; delay in appeals and substitution requires condonation; possession by authorities under requisition or acquisition does not automatically confer right to deny compensation or rental adjustments.
Facts of the case:
Premises at No.7, Chappel Road, Hastings, Calcutta were requisitioned on November 29, 1971 under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Act due to Bangladesh war, taken into possession by the Indian Navy, and acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were initiated in 1975, with notification published on November 26, 1981, enquiry conducted, declaration published on November 25, 1982, and the acquisition became final after the award was made on September 21, 1983 with notice under section 12 on September 23, 1983; subsequent writ petitions, contempt proceedings, and a substitution application followed with delays in rent payments and compensation.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench found no public purpose and mala fide acquisition, but the Supreme Court held the acquisition valid for defence purposes with laches on the part of officers; it allowed appeals, directed rental deposit at Rs.7500 per month from January 1, 1992, and instructed the Land Acquisition Collector to adjust amounts and compensate the respondents, while criticising indifference and directing systemic reforms.
Issues:
Whether the findings of mala fide and lack of public purpose by the Division Bench were correct in law; whether delay in filing appeals and substitution could be condoned; whether rent and compensation amounts should be adjusted against deposits and dues; whether officers should be held accountable for procedural delays.
Ratio Decidendi:
Where acquisition is initiated in good faith for a public purpose such as defence, subsequent administrative delay or mala fide cannot be retrospectively imputed; the court must consider the overarching public purpose and validity of acquisition before examining procedural lapses; substitution and condonation of delay are permissible without costs when justified by public interest and systemic failures.
Result:
Appeals allowed; acquisition upheld as valid for defence purposes; rent to be deposited at Rs.7500 per month from January 1, 1992; Land Acquisition Collector directed to adjust amounts payable and compensate; no costs awarded; systemic directives issued to expedite government appeals.
ORDER
Delay condoned.
Substitution allowed.
2. These appeals by special leave arise from the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated July 31, 1990 made in Appeal from Original Order No.T.3734/86.
3. The undisputed facts are that the premises bearing No.7, Chappel Road, Hastings, Calcutta was requisitioned on November 29, 1971 under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (for short, the Bengal Act ) due to Bangladesh war. The Indian Navy had taken possession thereof and has remained in possession of the said premises. Subsequently, it would appear, the respondents had filed Matter No.1295/79 in the Calcutta High Court questioning the legality of the requisition. It would appear that proceedings were initiated as early as in 1975 for acquisition of the property and the correspondence between various Departments was going on. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1984) (for short, the Act ) was published on November 26, 1981. Enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted. Thereafter, declaration under Section 6 was published on November 25, 1982. The writ petition pending in the High Court came up for hearing. A learned single judge by his order dated April 8, 1983 had held that though there was no public purpose for requisition under the Bengal Act, since the acquisition was initiated under the Act, four months time was granted for completing the award enquiry and to pass the award; in case of default, he directed the appellants to hand over possession of the premises to the respondents. In the meanwhile, the acquisition proceedings were completed by making award on September 21, 1983. Notice under Section 12 was issued to the respondents on September 23, 1983. Thus the acquisition under the Act had become final. An oral application came to be made before the learned Judge for extension of time on July 22, 1983 since the time was to expire on August 8, 1983. But the learned Judge declined to extend the time by his order dated August 2, 1983. Since the possession was not delivered, the respondents had filed another writ petition in the High Court which the learned single Judge had dismissed on November 12, 1986. On appeal, in the impugned order the Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single Judge and issued mandamus as indicated in the order. The primary findings recorded by the Division Bench were that there was no public purpose and that the acquisition was mala fide.
4. The question, therefore, is : whether the two findings recorded by the Division Bench are correct in law ? Shri Ganguli, learned senior counsel for the respondents, sought to support the findings of the Division Bench on the ground that there are no bona fides on the part of the appellants in pursuing the matter. In fact, when the respondent had pointed out in the High Court that there was no public purpose in requisitioning the property, they came forward with the acquisition under the Act; when the learned single Judge had directed the appellants to have the award enquiry completed and the award made within four months, the same were not done within the prescribed time. In spite of initiation of contempt proceedings, the possession was not delivered. These circumstances could be considered to show that the acquisition was mala fide and that, therefore, in the light of the above background, the High Court was right in reaching the conclusion. We find no force in the contentions.
5. It is seen that the acquisition proceedings under the Act were initiated no doubt after the first writ petition was filed challenging the requisition under the West Bengal Act. But the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act became final before the learned single Judge had passed the order on April 8, 1983. Thereby the public purpose, namely, defence purposes, got crystalised before the judgment was rendered by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge accepting the legal position, quite rightly, had given time to complete the award enquiry and to pass the award. Unfortunately, due to lethargy on the part of the authorities to have the funds made available, award could not be made for non-depositing of the amount. The question, therefore, emerges : whether the acquisition is mala fide ? So long as the public purpose subserves, the finding that the acquisition is mala fide is exfacie unsustainable. No doubt there are laches on the part of the authorities, but so long as the acquisition proceedings were legal and the defence personnel remain in possession of the premises for the defence purpose, the acquisition is for public purpose. Therefore, it cannot be characterised to be mala fide. It is seen that by the time the second writ petition, which is the subject matter ultimately in this appeal, came to be filed, the acquisition had become final; the award had become final and the compensation was tendered. Under those circumstances, the High Court, without going into the validity in that behalf, was not right in setting aside the acquisition on the specious finding that it is mala fide. Therefore, the High Court has not properly considered that aspect in the correct perspective in deciding the matter.
6. Pursuant to the interim direction granted by this Court appellants have deposited rent at the rate of Rs.7500/- per month beginning from 1.1.92. Shri Ganguli has brought to our notice that the payments were not alleged to have been paid for the earlier period of requisition. It is also brought to our notice that the amount of compensation was not received by the respondents. Under these circumstances, it would be open to the Land Acquisition Collector to vary and, if found correct, to adjust the amounts, deposited as per the orders of the Court, towards the amount payable, if not already paid for the period of requisition. If there is any further amount due, that amount may also be directed to be paid to the respondents within a specified time. The amount deposited pursuant to orders of this court, if found excess, may be adjusted towards the amount payable as compensation for the acquired premises.
7. It is unfortunate that in spite of peremptory direction to pass award and on non-compliance of order to deliver possession of the building, no prompt action has been taken. The officers have not shown diligence required in this case. Even though the contempt proceedings were initiated for non-delivery of possession, yet no steps had been taken even to file appeal in this Court within the prescribed limitation. That would show apathy or absolute indifference on the part of the concerned officers in pursuing the proceedings. It would be obvious that since they do not have personal interest in the Governmental matters, they do not show the required dispatch. It is out sad experience that invariably, all cases of the Government, be that of Government of India or State Governments, except presently in the case of the Government of Punjab, are being filed with abnormal delay. It would, therefore, be high time that all the Governments should necessarily streamline the process of taking decision in time to file appeals. The lack of responsibility and indifference further gets compounded from the fact that though the writ petitioner (3rd respondent in this case) died on September 18, 1993 and notice was given by her counsel to the counsel for the Union on October 4, 1993, no steps were taken to bring the legal representatives on record till August 19, 1994. In August 1994 the application for substitution came to be filed but unaccompanied by the application to condone the delay which came to be filed in September 1994 but still without any explanation. These facts do indicate the absolute lack of diligence and apathy or indifference in pursuing the matters on behalf of the Union of India.
8. It is unfortunate that we have come across that even the State Governments adopt the same indifferent attitude in pursuing the public causes in filing the appeals in this Court as well as in the High Courts and the Courts below, It is high time for the Government of India through the Cabinet Secretary to constitute a legal cell centralising all the cases to decide whether appeals should be filed and if so have them filed in time or with utmost dispatch. The officers responsible should be made accountable for the delay. Same process is equally required to be adopted in case of appeals to be filed in this Court or in the High Courts by the respective State Governments and/or the Union of India.
9. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Cabinet Secretary and also to all the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments; so also to the Attorney General of India and the Advocates General of the concerned States so that appropriate measures could be taken in this behalf.
10. The appeals are accordingly allowed, but, in the circumstances without costs.
Appeals accordingly allowed.
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