1996 JTR(SC) 1335
1997 1 AllCJ 225 ; 1996 3 CCC(SC) 382 ; 1996 4 CLT(SC) 2902 ; 1996 3 CurCC(SC) 382 ; 1996 DNJ 417 ; 1996 4 ICC 351 ; 1996 Supp JT 499 ; 1996 6 Scale 370 ; 1996 6 SCC 100 ; 1996 Supp5 SCR 227 ; 1997 1 SCT 485 ; 1996 5 SLR 674 ; 1996 6 Supreme 717
1996(6) Supreme 717
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy, B.L. Hansaira and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.
Rameshwarlal -Petitioner
versus
Municipal Council, Tonk & Ors. -Respondents
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 16339 of 1996
Decided on 27-8-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Petitioner : B.D. Sharma and Piyush, Advocates.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226
LIMITATION ACT : S.14
A) The petitioner invoked Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to enforce a salary claim for the period from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988. The High Court determined that the claim was recoverable only through a civil action and not via a writ petition, concluding that the discretionary power under Article 226 was not exercisable for such claims. The petition was dismissed, a decision confirmed by the Division Bench. Given that the relief was ultimately pursued in civil court, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, became relevant to exclude the period during which the writ petition was pending, as the limitation period for a civil suit had expired by the time the writ was instituted. The court permitted an adjusted timeline for filing the suit, acknowledging the diligence of the petitioner.
B) The exercise of power under Article 226 is discretionary and not available for claims recoverable in civil actions. When a writ petition is dismissed and the party is directed to approach civil courts, the limitation period for the civil suit may be extended to exclude the duration of the writ proceedings. The remedy of filing a civil suit remains available even after the expiry of the limitation period if the delay was attributable to the pendency of the writ petition.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner claimed salary arrears for the period from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988 for work allegedly rendered in the Municipal Council, Tonk. He filed a writ petition in the High Court in February 1990, which was dismissed on the ground that the claim was not maintainable by way of a writ petition. The dismissal was upheld by the Division Bench in 1996. The limitation period for a civil suit had expired by the time the writ petition was filed.
Findings of Court:
The High Court and the Division Bench correctly held that the claim was not maintainable under Article 226. The petitioner was not left remedyless, as he was directed to pursue the claim in civil court. The limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was held to exclude the period of the writ proceedings, subject to the condition that the suit was filed diligently and bona fide.
Issues:
Whether a salary claim recoverable only through a civil action can be pursued through a writ petition under Article 226. Whether the limitation period for a civil suit should be extended to exclude the period of a dismissed writ petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
A claim for salary falling within the domain of civil law is not maintainable through a writ petition under Article 226. When a writ petition is dismissed and the party is sent to civil courts, the limitation period for the civil suit is extended to exclude the duration of the writ proceedings to prevent the petitioner from being denied a remedy.
Result:
The special leave petition is dismissed. The petitioner is permitted to file a suit against the Municipality within two months after giving notice within four weeks, and the civil court will decide the merits of the claim, excluding the period of the writ petition from the limitation period.
A) The petitioner invoked Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to enforce a salary claim for the period from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988. The High Court determined that the claim was recoverable only through a civil action and not via a writ petition, concluding that the discretionary power under Article 226 was not exercisable for such claims. The petition was dismissed, a decision confirmed by the Division Bench. Given that the relief was ultimately pursued in civil court, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, became relevant to exclude the period during which the writ petition was pending, as the limitation period for a civil suit had expired by the time the writ was instituted. The court permitted an adjusted timeline for filing the suit, acknowledging the diligence of the petitioner.
B) The exercise of power under Article 226 is discretionary and not available for claims recoverable in civil actions. When a writ petition is dismissed and the party is directed to approach civil courts, the limitation period for the civil suit may be extended to exclude the duration of the writ proceedings. The remedy of filing a civil suit remains available even after the expiry of the limitation period if the delay was attributable to the pendency of the writ petition.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner claimed salary arrears for the period from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988 for work allegedly rendered in the Municipal Council, Tonk. He filed a writ petition in the High Court in February 1990, which was dismissed on the ground that the claim was not maintainable by way of a writ petition. The dismissal was upheld by the Division Bench in 1996. The limitation period for a civil suit had expired by the time the writ petition was filed.
Findings of Court:
The High Court and the Division Bench correctly held that the claim was not maintainable under Article 226. The petitioner was not left remedyless, as he was directed to pursue the claim in civil court. The limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was held to exclude the period of the writ proceedings, subject to the condition that the suit was filed diligently and bona fide.
Issues:
Whether a salary claim recoverable only through a civil action can be pursued through a writ petition under Article 226. Whether the limitation period for a civil suit should be extended to exclude the period of a dismissed writ petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
A claim for salary falling within the domain of civil law is not maintainable through a writ petition under Article 226. When a writ petition is dismissed and the party is sent to civil courts, the limitation period for the civil suit is extended to exclude the duration of the writ proceedings to prevent the petitioner from being denied a remedy.
Result:
The special leave petition is dismissed. The petitioner is permitted to file a suit against the Municipality within two months after giving notice within four weeks, and the civil court will decide the merits of the claim, excluding the period of the writ petition from the limitation period.
ORDER
The petitioner claims that he has been denied the salary for period from September 10, 1987 to August 18, 1988. He claims to have worked in the office of the Municipal Council, Tonk. He filed writ petition in the High Court in February 1990. The learned single Judge held that since it is a claim recoverable in a civil action, the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution is not exercisable. Accordingly, he dismissed the writ petition. The same came to be confirmed in the impugned order of the Division Bench made on May 6, 1996 in Special Appeal No. 218/96. Thus, this special leave petition.
2. It is not necessary for us to go into the question of the legality of the order of the High Court in refusing to grant the relief. It is axiomatic that the exercise of the power under Article 226 being discretionary, the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench have not exercised the same to direct the respondent to pay the alleged arrears of salary alleged to be due and payable to the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the only remedy open to the petitioner is to avail the action in the suit. Since the limitation has run out to file a civil suit by now, which was not so on the date of the filing of the writ petition, the civil Court is required to exclude, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the entire time taken by the High Court in disposing of the matter from the date of the institution of the writ petition.
3. Normally for application of Section 14, the Court dealing with the matter in the first instance, which is the subject of the issue in the later case, must be found to have lack of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature to entertain the matter. However, since the High Court expressly declined to grant relief relegating the petitioner to a suit a civil Court, the petitioner cannot be left remedyless. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court and this Court, obviously pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded. The petitioner is permitted to issue notice to the Municipality within four weeks from today. After expiry thereof, he could file suit within two months thereafter. The trial Court would consider and dispose of the matter in accordance with law on merits.
The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.
Petition disposed of accordingly.
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