1996 JTR(SC) 1421
1996 AIR(SCW) 4030 ; 1997 Supp AllCriC 143 ; 1996 CriLR 617 ; 1996 4 Crimes(SC) 27 ; 1997 CrLJ 212 ; 1997 CrLJ 272 ; 1997 10 JT 469 ; 1997 MLJ(Cri) 209 ; 1996 1 Scale 769 ; 1996 6 Scale 769 ; 1996 6 SCC 263 ; 1996 SCC(Cri) 1310 ; 1996 1 SCC(Cri) 1310 ; 1996 Supp5 SCR 771 ; 1997 KHC 2627 ; 1996 2 KLT(Online) 1146 ; 1996 7 Supreme 157
1996(7) Supreme 157
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy, Faizan Uddin & G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Shatrughna Prasad Sinha -Appellant
versus
Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi & Ors. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1696 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1369 of 1991)
Decided on 10-9-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Indrajeet Roy, Sr. Advocate, P.N. Misra, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Sushil Kumar Jain, Advocate (A.C.) and Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Before the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence on complaint so as to take other steps, the complaint shall contain all the necessary facts constituting the offence for which the complaint was laid.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136, Art.226
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.190(1)(a), S.204, S.482, S.200, S.196
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.499, S.500, S.295(a)
(A) The appeal is governed by provisions under the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908, read in relation to the Constitution of India. Section 295-A of the IPC penalizes acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by words, signs, or representations, while Section 500 defines and punishes defamation. Section 499 of the IPC clarifies that defamation involves imputations that harm, or are likely to harm, the reputation of a person or class, and includes explanations that cover imputations against companies or associations. Sections 190(1)(a) and 200 of the Cr.P.C. outline the procedure by which a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, requiring that the complaint contain all necessary facts constituting the alleged offence. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and Article 136 and 226 of the Constitution of India provide the High Courts and Supreme Courts respective powers to grant leave to appeal and to quash complaints. Section 204 Cr.P.C. and Section 196 Cr.P.C. relate to examination of witnesses and formal complaint procedures. The instant case examines whether a complaint discloses an offence under Section 295-A or defamation under Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and whether a Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance and issuing process.
(B) Key legal principles include that a complaint must contain all facts constituting the alleged offence for a Magistrate to take cognizance; Section 295-A requires proof of deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings; defamation under Section 500 requires an imputation that harms the reputation of a person or class; and a Court must read the complaint as a whole to determine if a prima facie offence is made out before issuing process. The High Courts discretion to quash a complaint at the cognizance stage is limited to cases where no offence is apparent.
Facts of the case:
A complaint was filed by a social activist of the Marwari Community against an appellant and a magazine editor/publisher alleging that during an interview published in a film magazine, the appellant made statements outraging the religious feelings of the Marwari community and defamed them as a class. The complaint sought action under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The respondents were served and appeared once but did not appear later, leading to the appointment of an amicus curiae. The High Court quashed the complaint under Section 295-A but allowed the complaint under Section 500 to proceed, prompting this special leave appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the complaint did not contain the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 295-A. It further held that the complaint did not contain any allegations amounting to defamation as defined under Section 499 read with Section 500, because it did not allege imputations that lowered the moral or intellectual character or credit of the Marwari community, or caused it to be believed that the community was in a loathsome state. Consequently, the process issued under Section 200 Cr.P.C. was not justified. However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 500, and quashed the complaint filed at Pune, while declining to quash the complaint filed at Nasik on the ground that it was not the province of the Court at that stage to assess the evidence or the meaning of the allegations, as the prima facie completion of the offence was a matter for the Magistrate to determine at trial.
Issues:
1. Whether the complaint disclosed an offence under Section 295-A of the IPC.
2. Whether the complaint disclosed an offence of defamation under Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
3. Whether the Magistrate was justified in issuing process against the appellant on the complaint as filed.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that the complaint must contain all the necessary facts constituting the alleged offence for a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 295-A, as it did not specify the essential ingredients of that offence. Similarly, the complaint did not allege facts amounting to defamation under Section 499 read with Section 500, because it did not allege imputations that harmed the reputation of the Marwari community in the required manner. Therefore, the Magistrate was not justified in issuing process, and the complaint was quashed. The Court distinguished between the two complaints, allowing quashing of the Pune complaint but declining to interfere with the Nasik complaint at the cognizance stage.
Result:
The appeal is allowed in part. The complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Pune under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC is quashed. The complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Nasik is not quashed at this stage.
(A) The appeal is governed by provisions under the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908, read in relation to the Constitution of India. Section 295-A of the IPC penalizes acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by words, signs, or representations, while Section 500 defines and punishes defamation. Section 499 of the IPC clarifies that defamation involves imputations that harm, or are likely to harm, the reputation of a person or class, and includes explanations that cover imputations against companies or associations. Sections 190(1)(a) and 200 of the Cr.P.C. outline the procedure by which a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, requiring that the complaint contain all necessary facts constituting the alleged offence. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and Article 136 and 226 of the Constitution of India provide the High Courts and Supreme Courts respective powers to grant leave to appeal and to quash complaints. Section 204 Cr.P.C. and Section 196 Cr.P.C. relate to examination of witnesses and formal complaint procedures. The instant case examines whether a complaint discloses an offence under Section 295-A or defamation under Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and whether a Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance and issuing process.
(B) Key legal principles include that a complaint must contain all facts constituting the alleged offence for a Magistrate to take cognizance; Section 295-A requires proof of deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings; defamation under Section 500 requires an imputation that harms the reputation of a person or class; and a Court must read the complaint as a whole to determine if a prima facie offence is made out before issuing process. The High Courts discretion to quash a complaint at the cognizance stage is limited to cases where no offence is apparent.
Facts of the case:
A complaint was filed by a social activist of the Marwari Community against an appellant and a magazine editor/publisher alleging that during an interview published in a film magazine, the appellant made statements outraging the religious feelings of the Marwari community and defamed them as a class. The complaint sought action under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The respondents were served and appeared once but did not appear later, leading to the appointment of an amicus curiae. The High Court quashed the complaint under Section 295-A but allowed the complaint under Section 500 to proceed, prompting this special leave appeal.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the complaint did not contain the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 295-A. It further held that the complaint did not contain any allegations amounting to defamation as defined under Section 499 read with Section 500, because it did not allege imputations that lowered the moral or intellectual character or credit of the Marwari community, or caused it to be believed that the community was in a loathsome state. Consequently, the process issued under Section 200 Cr.P.C. was not justified. However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 500, and quashed the complaint filed at Pune, while declining to quash the complaint filed at Nasik on the ground that it was not the province of the Court at that stage to assess the evidence or the meaning of the allegations, as the prima facie completion of the offence was a matter for the Magistrate to determine at trial.
Issues:
1. Whether the complaint disclosed an offence under Section 295-A of the IPC.
2. Whether the complaint disclosed an offence of defamation under Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
3. Whether the Magistrate was justified in issuing process against the appellant on the complaint as filed.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that the complaint must contain all the necessary facts constituting the alleged offence for a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 200 Cr.P.C. The complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 295-A, as it did not specify the essential ingredients of that offence. Similarly, the complaint did not allege facts amounting to defamation under Section 499 read with Section 500, because it did not allege imputations that harmed the reputation of the Marwari community in the required manner. Therefore, the Magistrate was not justified in issuing process, and the complaint was quashed. The Court distinguished between the two complaints, allowing quashing of the Pune complaint but declining to interfere with the Nasik complaint at the cognizance stage.
Result:
The appeal is allowed in part. The complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Pune under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with Section 34 of the IPC is quashed. The complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Nasik is not quashed at this stage.
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. Though the respondents were duly served and on an occasion appeared in person, subsequently they did not appear. Resultantly, we requested Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, Advocate of the Bar to assist the Court as amicus curiae. We place on record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by him.
3. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay made on January 21, 1991 in Crl. Writ Petition No. 1545 of 1990. The facts relevant for the purpose of this case and we proceed on the basis thereof are that allegations were made in the complaint filed by the respondents in the Courts of Magistrate at Pune and Nasik; we deal with those allegations as they constitute offence for which the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, could take cognizance. In paragraph 2 it is narrated that the complainant-respondent was a social activist belonging to the Marwari Community, and that the respondent-second accused respectively is the editor and publisher of Stardust, Film Magazine. An interview she had with the appellant in June 1989, came to be published at page 82 of that magazine. During the course of the interview, the appellant was alleged to have made statements outraging the religious feeling of the Marwari community and also defamed the members of Marwari community as a class. In the complaint filed at Pune, what he has stated is as under :
"The Complainant submits that in June 89 the Accused No. 1 has with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of Marwari Community made the said statement. By the statement of the Accused No. 1, the structure of National Integrity is being paralysed. The feelings of Marwari Community also being hurt by the Statement made by the Accused No. 1. The Statement of Accused No. 1 goes to show that Marwari Community is not a Class belonging to India and they have not faith and love towards India, their mother land. It is implied from the said statement that Marwaris are traitors and enemies of India. So also accused No.2 has also printed and published the said statement in Star Dust Magazine of 1989 with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of Marwari Community."
4. The rest of the paragraphs are only the consequential narration of the allegations in paragraph 3. According to the respondents, these allegations constitute offence punishable under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC, for short). The Magistrate had taken cognizance and issued notice to the appellant for appearance. When it was challenged in the writ petition, the learned single Judge of the High Court had held that on a reading of the complaint as a whole, no offence under Section 295A could be made out; however, the allegations constitute prima facie offence triable by the Magistrate under Section 500, IPC. Thus, these appeals by special leave.
5. Section 295A of the IPC envisages the essential ingredients of the punishment and provides that whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. The quoted para does not contain essential facts constituting the offence.
6. Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (Cr.P.C., for short) in Chapter XV provides as under :
"A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate provided that when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses."
7. The High Court may take cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) upon receiving a complaint containing facts which constitute such offence. It is a matter of discretion. Criminal proceedings are initiated by a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Taking cognizance of the offence would include the intention of the Magistrate of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purpose.
8. It would thus be seen that when a private complaint is made to the Magistrate, before the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence on the complaint so as to take the other steps, the complaint shall contain all the necessary facts constituting the offence for which the complaint was laid, so that the Magistrate can proceed further in taking further steps after cognizance of the offence is taken by issuing the process etc. It is seen from reading of para 3 of the complaint, which is the foundation to taking cognizance of the offence, that the complainant-respondent has concentrated mainly on the offence punishable under Section 295A of IPC; the High Court had quashed the said complaint and no appeal has been filed in this Court.
9. The next question is: whether the learned Judge was right in holding that the complaint discloses offence punishable under Section 500, IPC? Section 499 defines defamation thus :
"Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any persons intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person".
Explanation 2 to the said section envisages that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.
10. Explanation a provides that no imputation is said to harm a person s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.
11. A reading of the complaint does not contain any of the allegations constituting the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500, IPC. The contents of the magazine are alleged to be defamatory against the Marwari community, lowering them in the estimate of the public or their reputation is lowered in the society. But we do not find any allegation made in the complaint. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Court No. 4 at Pune does not contain any of the allegations so as to constitute the offence of defamation defined in Section 499 and punishable under Section 500. Consequently, the Magistrate was not justified in issuing the process against the appellant. The complaint is accordingly quashed.
12. As regards the allegations made against the appellant in the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Nasik, on a reading of the complaint we do not think that we will be justified at this stage to quash that complaint. It is not the province of this Court to appreciate at this stage the evidence or scope of and meaning of the statement. Certain allegations came to be made but whether these allegations do constitute defamation of the Marwari community as a business class and whether the appellant had intention to cite as an instance of general feeling among the community and whether the context in which the said statement came to be made, as is sought to be argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, are all matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate at a later stage. At this stage, we cannot embark upon weighing the evidence and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or not the allegations made in the complaint constitute an offence punishable under Section 500. It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations might come within the definition of defamation under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500, IPC.
The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.
Appeal allowed in part.
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