1996 JTR(SC) 1346
1997 AIR(SC) 503 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 3894 ; 1996 4 CLT(SC) 213 ; 1996 4 ICC 149 ; 1996 10 JT 262 ; 1997 1 RCR(Civ) 568 ; 1996 6 Scale 681 ; 1997 9 SCC 128 ; 1996 Supp5 SCR 330 ; 1997 KHC 1137 ; 1996 7 Supreme 584
1996(7) Supreme 584
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy & K. Venkataswami, JJ.
Venkataswamappa -Appellant
versus
The Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 1006-25 of 1990
Decided on 28-8-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : M.N. Shroff, Advocate.
For the Respondent : M. Veerappa, Advocate.
For the Respondent No. 2 : R.S. Hegde, Advocate for K.R. Nagaraja, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Publication of notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in the newspaper before it was published in the Gazette is only an irregularity which did not vitiate the validity of notification.
2. If notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is challenged then entire time taken from the date of filing of writ petition till its final decision has to be excluded and limitation of one year would start thereafter only for making of declaration u/s 6 of the Act.
Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.4, S.6(1), S.32(c)(vi), S.4(1)
(A) The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894, read with its Section 4(1), governs the publication and procedure for land acquisition notifications, while Section 6(1) and its Explanation 1 to the proviso regulate the limitation period for challenges and the consequences of procedural irregularities. Section 32(c)(vi), as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984, defines the public purpose to include providing house sites for cooperative societies, and Section 5-A prescribes the enquiry process. In this case, the notification issued under Section 4(1) acquiring 80 acres for the N.T.I. House Building Cooperative Society was challenged on grounds of mala fide acquisition, procedural irregularity in newspaper publication, and lapsed validity, with the Acts provisions on public purpose, procedural compliance, and limitation directly shaping the courts analysis.
(B) Key legal principles include that acquisition for housing cooperative purposes is a public purpose; procedural irregularities in newspaper publication do not invalidate a notification if the substance is properly communicated; limitation periods do not apply until the aggrieved party has been finally dispossessed; and objections and Section 5-A enquiries can toll the limitation period.
Facts of the case:
The second respondent, a Cooperative Society registered under the State Cooperative Societies Act, issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act acquiring 80 acres of land for house sites. The appellants challenged the notifications validity on multiple grounds, including prior acquisitions for defence and for the society, alleged mala fide intent, availability of alternative lands, and procedural defects because the newspaper publication preceded the Gazette publication. The enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted, and the appellants participated. The single Judge dismissed the objections, and the Division Bench dismissed the appeals.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the public purpose of providing house sites for the Cooperative Society was valid under Section 32(c)(vi) as amended. It found that prior acquisitions did not make the notification mala fide. It determined that the procedural irregularity in newspaper publication did not vitiate the notification because the substance was published in the locality and the intention to acquire was communicated. The court also held that the limitation period of one year had not elapsed because the period from filing of the writ petitions until the receipt of the order was excluded under the Acts provisions.
Issues:
Whether the notification was valid despite prior acquisitions for defence and for the Cooperative Society.
Whether the land was necessary and fit for construction or alternative land was available.
Whether the procedural irregularity in the timing of newspaper publication invalidated the notification.
Whether the limitation period had lapsed under Explanation 1 to proviso to Section 6(1).
Ratio Decidendi:
The court applied the enlarged definition of public purpose under Section 32(c)(vi), upheld the validity of the notification despite procedural irregularities that did not affect its operative effect, and held that the limitation period was tolled until final disposal of the writ petitions, thereby preventing the notification from lapsing.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed with directions to the State Government to publish the declaration within four months if objections are overruled, and no costs are awarded.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894, read with its Section 4(1), governs the publication and procedure for land acquisition notifications, while Section 6(1) and its Explanation 1 to the proviso regulate the limitation period for challenges and the consequences of procedural irregularities. Section 32(c)(vi), as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984, defines the public purpose to include providing house sites for cooperative societies, and Section 5-A prescribes the enquiry process. In this case, the notification issued under Section 4(1) acquiring 80 acres for the N.T.I. House Building Cooperative Society was challenged on grounds of mala fide acquisition, procedural irregularity in newspaper publication, and lapsed validity, with the Acts provisions on public purpose, procedural compliance, and limitation directly shaping the courts analysis.
(B) Key legal principles include that acquisition for housing cooperative purposes is a public purpose; procedural irregularities in newspaper publication do not invalidate a notification if the substance is properly communicated; limitation periods do not apply until the aggrieved party has been finally dispossessed; and objections and Section 5-A enquiries can toll the limitation period.
Facts of the case:
The second respondent, a Cooperative Society registered under the State Cooperative Societies Act, issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act acquiring 80 acres of land for house sites. The appellants challenged the notifications validity on multiple grounds, including prior acquisitions for defence and for the society, alleged mala fide intent, availability of alternative lands, and procedural defects because the newspaper publication preceded the Gazette publication. The enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted, and the appellants participated. The single Judge dismissed the objections, and the Division Bench dismissed the appeals.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the public purpose of providing house sites for the Cooperative Society was valid under Section 32(c)(vi) as amended. It found that prior acquisitions did not make the notification mala fide. It determined that the procedural irregularity in newspaper publication did not vitiate the notification because the substance was published in the locality and the intention to acquire was communicated. The court also held that the limitation period of one year had not elapsed because the period from filing of the writ petitions until the receipt of the order was excluded under the Acts provisions.
Issues:
Whether the notification was valid despite prior acquisitions for defence and for the Cooperative Society.
Whether the land was necessary and fit for construction or alternative land was available.
Whether the procedural irregularity in the timing of newspaper publication invalidated the notification.
Whether the limitation period had lapsed under Explanation 1 to proviso to Section 6(1).
Ratio Decidendi:
The court applied the enlarged definition of public purpose under Section 32(c)(vi), upheld the validity of the notification despite procedural irregularities that did not affect its operative effect, and held that the limitation period was tolled until final disposal of the writ petitions, thereby preventing the notification from lapsing.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed with directions to the State Government to publish the declaration within four months if objections are overruled, and no costs are awarded.
ORDER
These appeals by special leave arise from the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court made on July 17, 1989 in Writ Appeals Nos. 897-896/89 dismissing the appeals in limine and confirming the judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated March 30, 1989 made in Writ Petition Nos. 5316-35/89.
2. The appellants have challenged the validity of the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894, (for short, the "Act") acquiring 80 acres of land in favour of the second respondent - N.T.I. House Building Cooperative Society. Notification under Section 4(1) was published on February 23, 1989. Enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted. The appellant participated in the enquiry. Before the declaration could be taken up, the appellants filed the writ petition in March 1989 challenging the validity of the notification. Before the learned single Judge, the appellants had taken five grounds of objections as enumerated in para 2 of the judgment of the learned single Judge. He dealt with each of the points separately and negatived the same. The Division Bench summarily dismissed the appeal. Thus, these appeals by special leave.
3. It is strenuously contended for the appellants that since some of the lands of the appellants were acquired, one on March 2, 1973 for defence purposes and second on July 28, 1988 for the HMI House Building Cooperative Society, the acquisition of the lands under this notification is mala fide and, therefore, is not valid in law. We find no force in the contention. Providing house sites for construction of houses for the members of the second respondent, Cooperative Society registered under State Cooperative Societies Act, is a public purpose is not in question and cannot be questioned in view of the enlarged definition of public purpose under Section 32(c)(vi) of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. Therefore, so long as providing house sites to the members of the Cooperative Society is a public purpose , the contention that on earlier occasion also some of the lands belonging to the appellants were acquired for such or some other public purpose, cannot be held to be mala fide.
4. It is next contended that alternative lands are available and the lands in question are not fit for construction. That question was gone into by the learned single Judge and was negatived. It is a question of fact in each case. The serious contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that while the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on February 23, 1989 the newspaper publication thereof had come to be made prior thereto, i.e., on February 1, 1989 and, therefore, the mandatory requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 4 has not been complied with. It is further contended that the substance of the notification was not published in the locality. These two contentions were not raised before the learned single Judge; even otherwise, we find that there is no force in these contentions. It is stated in the counter affidavit and also in the record of the Section 5-A enquiry produced by the appellant which would clearly indicate that after the notification was published, it was published in one of the newspapers on February 1, 1989 and substance thereof was published in the locality on March 20, 1989. The second publication in the newspaper could not be made for the reason that it was already published prior to the publication of the notification in the Gazette. The question is : whether the procedure adopted in publishing the notification in the local newspaper before it was actually published in the Gazette is in violation of the requirement under Section 4(1)?
5. It is true that normally publication in the newspapers would be preceded by a publication in the Gazette notification. It would appear that in this case while sending the notification, which was approved by the Government for publication in the Gazette, simultaneously direction was issued to have it published in the Gazette. Therefore, it would appear that before publication in the Gazette was made, it was published in one of the newspapers. This is only an irregularity in the procedural steps required to be taken under the Act. It does not vitiate the validity of the notification published in the Gazette on January.
6. In support of the contention that it is mandatory that the procedure prescribed under Section 4(1) should be strictly complied with, the learned counsel has placed strong reliance on the ratio of this Court in The Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad & Anr. v. Raja Ram Jaiswal etc. There is no dispute on the proposition that publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette is a mandatory requirement. In fact, in that case, that was not done. The contention raised in Jaiswal s case (supra) was that it is only an intention and not mandatory. This Court has rightly rejected that contention. As noted earlier, since the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) was made on February 23, 1989, the intention of the Government to acquire the land for public purpose had been set in motion and it was directed to take the procedural steps in that behalf as mandated under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. What transpires, therefore, is that of the notification was made in one of the newspapers publication earlier to the actual publication in the Gazette. As stated earlier, it was only an irregularity in the procedural steps to be taken under the Act. It is to be seen that the object of the publication of Section 4(1) is to put a notice to the owners that the land is proposed to be acquired for a public purpose and that they are prevented to deal with the lands in any manner detrimental to the public purpose. Obviously, therefore, the publication in the newspaper would put the owners on notice of the proposed acquisition even prior to the actual publication. Admittedly, in one of the newspapers notification was published after the publication in the Gazette, namely, February 1, 1989. The substance was also published, as indicated in the proceedings of the Land Acquisition Officer conducted under Section 5-A, on March 20, 1989, the last of the dates was taken for the purpose of notification under Section 4(1). In that view we hold that there was no infraction of the compliance of the requirement under Section 4(1) of the Act.
7. It is then contended that since the limitation period of one year from the date of the publication under Section 4(1) had elapsed and the step granted by the High Court or this Court was only of dispossession of the appellants from the lands, the notification under Section 4(1) now stands lapsed by Explanation 1 to proviso to Section 6(1). We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the writ petitions came to be filed in March 1989 in the same month in which the substance of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) was made and the proceedings were pending before the learned single Judge, the Division Bench and in this Court. Under these circumstances, the entire time taken from the date of the filing of the writ petitions till the date of the receipt of the order of this Court stands excluded and the limitation of one year would start thereafter only. Accordingly, we hold that the notification under Section 4(1) has not been lapsed. It is now on record that the appellants have already filed their objections; enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted and report obviously must have been furnished to the Government for taking further steps in the matter. It would, therefore, be necessary for the Government to consider the objections and have the declaration under Section 6 published, if the Government is of the opinion that the public purpose still subsists.
8. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with the above observations. The State Government is directed to publish the declaration, if the objections are overruled, within four months from the date of the receipt of this order. No costs.
Appeals dismissed.
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