1996 JTR(SC) 1329
1996 4 CCC(SC) 172 ; 1996 4 CLT(SC) 123 ; 1996 4 CurCC(SC) 172 ; 1996 4 ICC 561 ; 1996 Supp JT 471 ; 1996 7 Scale 117 ; 1996 10 SCC 619 ; 1996 Supp5 SCR 222 ; 1996 2 KLT(Online) 1157 ; 1996 8 Supreme 189
1996(8) Supreme 189
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
State of Karnataka & Ors. -Appellants
versus
D.C. Nanjudaiah & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 11874-75 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12278-79 of 1991)
Decided on 26-8-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : M. Veerappa, Advocate.
Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.4, S.6(1), S.6
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4(1) authorised the publication of a notification on August 26, 1982, initiating the acquisition process, while Section 5-A mandated a compulsory enquiry whose report was pending. Section 6 required a declaration to be published within three years of the Section 4(1) notification, a deadline that was met by the declaration dated June 24, 1985. However, the validity of the Section 6 declaration was challenged on the ground that the enquiry under Section 5-A was not properly conducted, invoking the proviso which tolls the three-year period during pendency of writ petitions. The High Court quashed both the notification and the declaration, a ruling reviewed on appeal.
(B) The core legal principles are that the three-year window for publishing the declaration under Section 6 runs from the date of the Section 4(1) notification unless extended by the proviso during pendancy of petitions, and that a defective Section 5-A enquiry does not automatically nullify the notification but requires a fresh enquiry.
Facts of the case:
Notification under Section 4(1) was published on August 26, 1982; enquiry under Section 5-A was found improper; declaration under Section 6 was published on June 24, 1985; two writ petitions were filed on December 10, 1985 challenging both the notification and the declaration; the High Court quashed both the notification and the declaration.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly observed that the declaration was within three years but faulted the Section 5-A enquiry, quashing the notification and declaration; this Court finds that only the enquiry was at fault and the notification should stand if a fresh enquiry is conducted.
Issues:
Whether the three-year period for declaration under Section 6 was validly computed, whether a defective Section 5-A enquiry mandates quashing of the notification, and what remedy follows for the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi:
Since the declaration under Section 6 was published within the three-year period, the notification cannot be quashed solely on that ground; however, the irregularity in the Section 5-A enquiry requires it to be quashed to enable a fresh enquiry, with the three-year period restarting from the receipt of this order.
Result:
The appeals are allowed, the declaration is quashed, and the appellant is directed to conduct a fresh enquiry within four months and publish the declaration within one month.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4(1) authorised the publication of a notification on August 26, 1982, initiating the acquisition process, while Section 5-A mandated a compulsory enquiry whose report was pending. Section 6 required a declaration to be published within three years of the Section 4(1) notification, a deadline that was met by the declaration dated June 24, 1985. However, the validity of the Section 6 declaration was challenged on the ground that the enquiry under Section 5-A was not properly conducted, invoking the proviso which tolls the three-year period during pendency of writ petitions. The High Court quashed both the notification and the declaration, a ruling reviewed on appeal.
(B) The core legal principles are that the three-year window for publishing the declaration under Section 6 runs from the date of the Section 4(1) notification unless extended by the proviso during pendancy of petitions, and that a defective Section 5-A enquiry does not automatically nullify the notification but requires a fresh enquiry.
Facts of the case:
Notification under Section 4(1) was published on August 26, 1982; enquiry under Section 5-A was found improper; declaration under Section 6 was published on June 24, 1985; two writ petitions were filed on December 10, 1985 challenging both the notification and the declaration; the High Court quashed both the notification and the declaration.
Findings of Court:
The High Court correctly observed that the declaration was within three years but faulted the Section 5-A enquiry, quashing the notification and declaration; this Court finds that only the enquiry was at fault and the notification should stand if a fresh enquiry is conducted.
Issues:
Whether the three-year period for declaration under Section 6 was validly computed, whether a defective Section 5-A enquiry mandates quashing of the notification, and what remedy follows for the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi:
Since the declaration under Section 6 was published within the three-year period, the notification cannot be quashed solely on that ground; however, the irregularity in the Section 5-A enquiry requires it to be quashed to enable a fresh enquiry, with the three-year period restarting from the receipt of this order.
Result:
The appeals are allowed, the declaration is quashed, and the appellant is directed to conduct a fresh enquiry within four months and publish the declaration within one month.
ORDER
Though the respondents have been served, no one is appearing either in person or through counsel.
Leave granted.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.
The controversy raised in this case is covered by the judgment of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka1. The admitted facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on August 26, 1982 and enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted thereafter. But before the receipt of the report from the Land Acquisition Officer, the declaration under Section 6 was published on June 24, 1985 within three years. Two writ petitions were filed on December 10, 1985 challenging the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6. The High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 by the impugned judgment dated February 26, 1991 made in Writ Petition Nos.19348 of 1985. Thus, these appeals by special leave.
3. It is seen that the declaration under Section 6 was published within three years from the date of the notification under Section 4(1) as upheld by the High Court. But the High Court noted that the enquiry under Section 5-A was not properly conducted. The declaration under Section 6 dated June 24, 1985 quashed since the notification under Section 4(1) was dated August 26, 1982 and the declaration could not be published within three years even after excluding the period of pendency of the writ petitions under proviso to Section 6 of the Act. Thus, the notification under Section 4(1) was quashed. We find no justification for the view taken by the High Court. It is seen that declaration under Section 6 was published, as held by the High Court, within three years, but the conduct of the enquiry under Section 5-A was found fault with and it requires to be quashed. If it is quashed, necessarily an enquiry under Section 5-A has to be conducted. The limitation, therefore, of conducting the enquiry and publication of the declaration within three years would start running from the date of the receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made. This view was laid by this Court in Narasimiah s case (supra). For the same ratio, the appeals are to be allowed and the declaration has to be quashed. Accordingly, the declaration is quashed. The appellant is permitted to conduct an enquiry within a period of four months from the date of the receipt of this order and have the declaration published within one month thereafter.
4. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs.
Appeals allowed.
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