1997 JTR(SC) 637
1997 AIR(SC) 2630 ; 1997 AIR(SCW) 2591 ; 1997 30 AllLR 314 ; 1997 2 CLT(SC) 327 ; 1997 2 CurCC(SC) 193 ; 1997 2 ICC 620 ; 1997 4 JT 659 ; 1998 89 RD 159 ; 1997 3 Scale 601 ; 1997 10 SCC 66 ; 1997 3 SCR 579 ; 1997 1 UJ 775 ; 1997 WBLR 435 ; 1997 4 Supreme 217
1997(4) Supreme 217
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.
Venkappa Gurappa Hosur -Appellant
versus
Kasawwa -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 2837 of 1986
Decided on 3-4-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Manoj Kumar Mishra Advocate for A.S. Bhasme, Advocate.
For the Respondent : P.R. Ramasesh, Advocate.
Act Referred :LIMITATION ACT : Art.54
(A) The applicability of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is the critical statutory consideration in this case, where the limitation period for filing a suit regarding a denial of right or title is three years. The provision operates to bar a suit that is filed after the expiry of the said period from the date of the plaintiffs knowledge of the denial, and this period runs continuously from the date of the denial itself, irrespective of any subsequent notice. The analysis requires determining the precise date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the denial of his claim, which in this case is traced to the early stages of the defendants suit in 1960, leading to the conclusion that the subsequent suit was time-barred.
(B) The key legal principle is that a suit based on a denied agreement or transaction is subject to the three-year limitation period under Article 54, commencing from the date of knowledge of the denial. A mere notice of intent to sue does not stop the running of time if the denial has already occurred, and the doctrine of continuous running of limitation bars relief if the suit is instituted after the period has expired.
Facts of the case:
The appellant entered into a sale agreement for land in 1959 and made partial payments. The defendant subsequently filed a suit for possession in 1960, asserting ownership and denying the appellant's title. The appellant filed his suit for specific performance in 1972, after the three-year limitation period calculated from his knowledge of the defendant's denial in 1960.
Findings of Court:
The courts below determined that the suit document in the defendant's possession denied the agreement of sale as early as 1960, converting the dispute into a matter of a denied right or title. Consequently, the limitation period commenced in 1960, and the suit filed in 1972 was found to be hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 54.
Issues:
Whether the suit for specific performance was filed within the prescribed limitation period of three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, given that the denial of the agreement was asserted in an earlier suit in 1960.
Ratio Decidendi:
Once the denial of the right or title is established through a separate suit, the three-year limitation period under Article 54 begins to run from the date of that denial, and a subsequent suit filed after this period is barred, irrespective of any later notice claiming to stop the limitation clock.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs, as the suit is found to be time-barred.
(A) The applicability of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is the critical statutory consideration in this case, where the limitation period for filing a suit regarding a denial of right or title is three years. The provision operates to bar a suit that is filed after the expiry of the said period from the date of the plaintiffs knowledge of the denial, and this period runs continuously from the date of the denial itself, irrespective of any subsequent notice. The analysis requires determining the precise date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the denial of his claim, which in this case is traced to the early stages of the defendants suit in 1960, leading to the conclusion that the subsequent suit was time-barred.
(B) The key legal principle is that a suit based on a denied agreement or transaction is subject to the three-year limitation period under Article 54, commencing from the date of knowledge of the denial. A mere notice of intent to sue does not stop the running of time if the denial has already occurred, and the doctrine of continuous running of limitation bars relief if the suit is instituted after the period has expired.
Facts of the case:
The appellant entered into a sale agreement for land in 1959 and made partial payments. The defendant subsequently filed a suit for possession in 1960, asserting ownership and denying the appellant's title. The appellant filed his suit for specific performance in 1972, after the three-year limitation period calculated from his knowledge of the defendant's denial in 1960.
Findings of Court:
The courts below determined that the suit document in the defendant's possession denied the agreement of sale as early as 1960, converting the dispute into a matter of a denied right or title. Consequently, the limitation period commenced in 1960, and the suit filed in 1972 was found to be hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 54.
Issues:
Whether the suit for specific performance was filed within the prescribed limitation period of three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, given that the denial of the agreement was asserted in an earlier suit in 1960.
Ratio Decidendi:
Once the denial of the right or title is established through a separate suit, the three-year limitation period under Article 54 begins to run from the date of that denial, and a subsequent suit filed after this period is barred, irrespective of any later notice claiming to stop the limitation clock.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed with no costs, as the suit is found to be time-barred.
ORDER
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, made on July 30, 1984 in Second Appeal No. 646 of 1976.
2. The appellant had filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement date August 9, 1959 in respect of the land in Village Linganur for a consideration of Rs. 10,200/-. It is the case of the appellant that he paid as part consideration a sum of Rs. 501/- on the said date and a further sum of Rs. 700/- on March 4, 1960. In the meanwhile, the defendant filed suit No. 9/60 for possession of the said properties. The suit was decided in his favour on November 9, 1971. The appellant, therefore, issued notice for the first time on August 22, 1972. Thereon, the respondent denied execution of agreement. Then the appellant filed the suit on November 5, 1972. Thus, according to the plaintiff the suit was filed within limitation. The respondent has denied the execution of the agreement of sale, but the courts below have found that it is one of money transaction. It is, therefore, clear from Suit No. 9/60 itself that he had asserted to be the owner of the property and the property is unencumbered property. Therefore, no one has a right to interfere with his possession. Thus, it could be seen that the suit document itself was denied as early as in 1960. As a consequence, mere issuance of notice dated August 22, 1972 does not stop the running of limitation period. Once the same has began to run, it runs its full course. Therefore, the suit having been filed after the expiry of 3 years from the date of the knowledge of denial, by operation of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The High Court, therefore, is right in dismissing the suit in the second appeal.
3. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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