1997 JTR(SC) 1252
1998 AIR(SC) 2276 ; 1998 AIR(SCW) 2177 ; 1998 1 AllCJ 119 ; 1997 31 AllLR 412 ; 1998 32 AllLR 284 ; 1997 4 CLT(SC) 95 ; 1997 2 CTC 663 ; 1997 DNJ 401 ; 1998 4 ICC 445 ; 1997 8 JT 189 ; 1998 7 JT 21 ; 1997 2 KLT 647 ; 1998 16 LCD 610 ; 1998 3 PLR(SC) 605 ; 1997 4 RCR(Civ) 242 ; 1998 89 RD 18 ; 1997 6 Scale 209 ; 1997 7 SCC 556 ; 1997 KHC 431 ; 1997 8 Supreme 332
1997(8) Supreme 332
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dr. A.S. Anand & K. Venkataswami, JJ.
P.K. Ramachandran -Appellant
versus
State of Kerala & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6514 of 1997
(@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2380/97)
Decided on 19-9-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, Sr. Advocate, Mrs. Prasantha Prasad, N. Sudhakaran, Advocates.
For the Respondents : P.S. Poti, Sr. Advocate, Mrs. Beena Prakash and G. Prakash, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Recording satisfaction that explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory is a essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay.
2. Law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable grounds.
Act
Referred
:ARBITRATION ACT : S.39
LIMITATION ACT : S.5
(A) The Arbitration Act (Section 39) and the Limitation Act (Section 5) govern the present appeal concerning the condonation of delay in filing a statutory appeal from an arbitral award. Under the Limitation Act, the appellate filing was barred by 565 days, and the central legal question revolves around whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion under Section 5 to condone this inordinate delay. The Arbitration Act provides the procedural framework for challenging awards, while the Limitation Act imposes strict time limits, with courts holding the discretion to excuse delays only where sufficient cause is demonstrated.
(B) Key legal principles include that delay in filing an appeal is fatal unless condoned, and condonation requires a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay. Courts must apply the limitation period with rigor and cannot extend it on equitable grounds without a proper showing. The burden lies on the appellant to justify the delay, and the court must examine whether the explanation is genuine, reasonable, and sufficient.
Facts of the case:
The respondent State of Kerala filed a Miscellaneous First Appeal against an arbitration award after the limitation period had expired. The appeal was filed 565 days after the decree, and the respondent sought condonation of delay, which was granted by the learned Sub Court at Kollam. The appellant challenged this order, arguing the explanation provided was neither reasonable nor satisfactory.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the impugned order did not record satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was reasonable or satisfactory. The explanation offeredthat the Advocate General's office was overburdenedwas deemed insufficient. The court also noted that the appellant's reply disputing the lack of a reasonable explanation was not considered by the High Court, and no valid reason was disclosed for the inordinate delay.
Issues:
Whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to condone delay of 565 days; whether the appellant provided a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay; and whether the appeal should be allowed despite being time-barred.
Ratio Decidendi:
The limitation period under the Limitation Act must be strictly applied, and condonation of delay is only permissible where a reasonable and satisfactory explanation is provided. The High Court failed to assess the adequacy of the explanation and erred in excusing the delay, rendering its order unjustified.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned order setting aside the limitation bar is set aside, the application for condonation of delay is rejected, and the Miscellaneous First Appeal is dismissed as time-barred with no costs.
(A) The Arbitration Act (Section 39) and the Limitation Act (Section 5) govern the present appeal concerning the condonation of delay in filing a statutory appeal from an arbitral award. Under the Limitation Act, the appellate filing was barred by 565 days, and the central legal question revolves around whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion under Section 5 to condone this inordinate delay. The Arbitration Act provides the procedural framework for challenging awards, while the Limitation Act imposes strict time limits, with courts holding the discretion to excuse delays only where sufficient cause is demonstrated.
(B) Key legal principles include that delay in filing an appeal is fatal unless condoned, and condonation requires a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay. Courts must apply the limitation period with rigor and cannot extend it on equitable grounds without a proper showing. The burden lies on the appellant to justify the delay, and the court must examine whether the explanation is genuine, reasonable, and sufficient.
Facts of the case:
The respondent State of Kerala filed a Miscellaneous First Appeal against an arbitration award after the limitation period had expired. The appeal was filed 565 days after the decree, and the respondent sought condonation of delay, which was granted by the learned Sub Court at Kollam. The appellant challenged this order, arguing the explanation provided was neither reasonable nor satisfactory.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the impugned order did not record satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was reasonable or satisfactory. The explanation offeredthat the Advocate General's office was overburdenedwas deemed insufficient. The court also noted that the appellant's reply disputing the lack of a reasonable explanation was not considered by the High Court, and no valid reason was disclosed for the inordinate delay.
Issues:
Whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to condone delay of 565 days; whether the appellant provided a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay; and whether the appeal should be allowed despite being time-barred.
Ratio Decidendi:
The limitation period under the Limitation Act must be strictly applied, and condonation of delay is only permissible where a reasonable and satisfactory explanation is provided. The High Court failed to assess the adequacy of the explanation and erred in excusing the delay, rendering its order unjustified.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned order setting aside the limitation bar is set aside, the application for condonation of delay is rejected, and the Miscellaneous First Appeal is dismissed as time-barred with no costs.
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. The respondent - State of Kerala and Anr. filed Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 316/96 against the judgment and decree of the learned Sub Court at Kollam in Arbitration Application No. 108/92. The appeal was barred by 565 days. The respondents filed an application seeking condonation of delay and by the order impugned herein, that delay was condoned. The impugned order reads thus :
"This is an application to condone the delay of 565 days in filing an appeal. The petition is seriously opposed by the respondent. But taking into consideration the averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition. The petition stands allowed."
3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order (supra) that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay.
4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.5.1995, is :
"at that time the Advocate General s office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 2.9.1995."
This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub Judge, Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but lateron, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicious by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.
6. Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have not power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.
Appeal allowed.
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