1998 JTR(SC) 959
1999 AIR(SC) 1486 ; 1998 AIR(SCW) 4061 ; 1998 5 ALT(SC) 30 ; 1999 2 CurLJ 224 ; 1998 6 JT 396 ; 1999 1 MLJ 18 ; 1998 4 RCR(Civ) 415 ; 1998 2 RCR(Rent) 483 ; 1998 5 Scale 274 ; 1998 7 SCC 386 ; 1998 Supp1 SCR 535 ; 1998 2 UJ 802 ; 1998 KHC 1195 ; 1998 2 KLT(Online) 1282 ; 1998 7 Supreme 340
1998(7) Supreme 340
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
Dr. A.S. Anand, V.N. Khare & D.P. Wadha, JJ.
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. -Appellants
versus
K. Santhakumaran & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 4996-4999 of 1994
Decided on 9-9-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : S. Sivasubramaniam, Sr. Advocate and V. Balachandran, Advocate.
For the Respondents : V.R. Reddy, Sr. Advocate, T. Raja, Jayaprakash Narain and Sunil Murarka, Advocates.
Important Point
Once an order is subjected to SLP before the Supreme Court after the dismissal of the SLP the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to review the self same order which was the subject matter of challenge in SLP.
Act Referred :CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : O.47 R.1
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1, governs the procedural framework for eviction and review petitions in rent disputes, particularly addressing the jurisdiction of appellate and revisional authorities. The present case involves an eviction petition where the Rent Controller ordered eviction on grounds of wilful default in rent and bona fide requirement, but the appellate authority set aside the order due to a bonafide title dispute requiring civil court adjudication. Subsequent orders by the High Court were challenged through Special Leave Petitions dismissed by the Supreme Court, after which the respondents filed review petitions, which the impugned order allowed. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1, contemplate limited and structured review mechanisms to prevent abuse of judicial process and maintain judicial discipline. The High Courts exercise of review jurisdiction after dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions, coupled with a significant delay in filing the review petition, falls outside the permissible scope of revisional authority and undermines the hierarchy of judicial orders.
(B) Key legal principles include the doctrine of judicial discipline, the bar on re-litigation after a final order by a higher court, the limited scope of review petitions, and the prohibition of vexatious litigation. The case underscores that appellate bodies lack jurisdiction to review matters already conclusively decided or dismissed by superior courts, and that delay in filing review petitions must be strictly scrutinized.
Facts of the case:
The Rent Controller ordered eviction of appellants for wilful rent default and bona fide need. On appeal, a bonafide title dispute led the appellate authority to set aside the eviction order. The High Court rejected respondents revision petitions confirming the appellate authoritys order. After dismissal of Special Leave Petitions in the Supreme Court, respondents filed review petitions in the High Court, which were entertained despite a 221-day delay, leading to an impugned order setting aside the earlier order and directing eviction.
Findings of Court:
The High Court improperly exercised review jurisdiction over an order already dismissed by the Supreme Court, violating judicial discipline. The review petition was filed after the final disposal of the matter, and the condonation of delay was unwarranted. The respondents abused the process of court through vexatious litigation.
Issues:
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review an order already dismissed by the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petitions, and whether the review petition was maintainable after the finality of the earlier order.
Ratio Decidendi:
Once a higher court dismisses a Special Leave Petition, the matter is concluded, and the revisional or review court cannot re-examine the same order, as it would subvert judicial hierarchy and encourage vexatious litigation. The delay in filing the review petition and the lack of sufficient cause justify non-maintainability.
Result:
The impugned order dated 7.4.1994 is set aside, the appeals are allowed, and the respondents are ordered to pay costs.
(A) The Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1, governs the procedural framework for eviction and review petitions in rent disputes, particularly addressing the jurisdiction of appellate and revisional authorities. The present case involves an eviction petition where the Rent Controller ordered eviction on grounds of wilful default in rent and bona fide requirement, but the appellate authority set aside the order due to a bonafide title dispute requiring civil court adjudication. Subsequent orders by the High Court were challenged through Special Leave Petitions dismissed by the Supreme Court, after which the respondents filed review petitions, which the impugned order allowed. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1, contemplate limited and structured review mechanisms to prevent abuse of judicial process and maintain judicial discipline. The High Courts exercise of review jurisdiction after dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions, coupled with a significant delay in filing the review petition, falls outside the permissible scope of revisional authority and undermines the hierarchy of judicial orders.
(B) Key legal principles include the doctrine of judicial discipline, the bar on re-litigation after a final order by a higher court, the limited scope of review petitions, and the prohibition of vexatious litigation. The case underscores that appellate bodies lack jurisdiction to review matters already conclusively decided or dismissed by superior courts, and that delay in filing review petitions must be strictly scrutinized.
Facts of the case:
The Rent Controller ordered eviction of appellants for wilful rent default and bona fide need. On appeal, a bonafide title dispute led the appellate authority to set aside the eviction order. The High Court rejected respondents revision petitions confirming the appellate authoritys order. After dismissal of Special Leave Petitions in the Supreme Court, respondents filed review petitions in the High Court, which were entertained despite a 221-day delay, leading to an impugned order setting aside the earlier order and directing eviction.
Findings of Court:
The High Court improperly exercised review jurisdiction over an order already dismissed by the Supreme Court, violating judicial discipline. The review petition was filed after the final disposal of the matter, and the condonation of delay was unwarranted. The respondents abused the process of court through vexatious litigation.
Issues:
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review an order already dismissed by the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petitions, and whether the review petition was maintainable after the finality of the earlier order.
Ratio Decidendi:
Once a higher court dismisses a Special Leave Petition, the matter is concluded, and the revisional or review court cannot re-examine the same order, as it would subvert judicial hierarchy and encourage vexatious litigation. The delay in filing the review petition and the lack of sufficient cause justify non-maintainability.
Result:
The impugned order dated 7.4.1994 is set aside, the appeals are allowed, and the respondents are ordered to pay costs.
Order
These appeals are directed against the order made by the High Court of Madras dated 7.4.1994 in Review C.M.P. Nos. 44 and 45 of 1994 in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 4974 and 4975 of 1983.
2. The Rent Controller ordered eviction of the appellants in an eviction petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the premises by respondents 1 and 2 for their own business. On appeal filed by the appellant-tenants, it was found that there was a bonafide dispute with regard to the title of the property which could be decided by the Civil Court. The appellate authority set aside the order of the Rent Controller on 27.8.1983. Respondents 1 and 2 thereupon preferred revision petitions in the High Court and by its order dated 7.1.1987, the High Court rejected both the revision petitions, confirming the view of the appellate authority. Aggrieved by the orders of the High Court dated 7.1.1987, respondents 1 and 2 filed S.L.P. (C) Nos. 4039-4040 of 1987. The appellants appeared on caveat in the Supreme Court. Both sides were represented by senior Advocates of this court. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the special leave petitions were dismissed on 16.9.1987. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this court, the respondents filed review petitions No. CMP 44 and 45 of 1994 in the High Court seeking review of the order, dismissing civil revision petitions No. 4974 and 4975 of 1983 on 7.1.1987. It was the order dated 7.1.1987 (supra) which was the subject matter of challenge in SLP (C) Nos. 4039-4040/87. There was also a delay of 221 days in filing the review petitions in the High Court after the dismissal of the special leave petitions. The learned Single Judge, by the order impugned before us, not only condoned the delay of 221 days but also reviewed the earlier orders made on 7.1.1987, reversed the orders made in civil revision petitions and allowed civil revision petitions and ordered eviction of the tenant-appellants. Aggrieved, the appellants are before us against the order dated 7.4.1994 made in the review petitions.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the self-same order had been dismissed by this court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper. Interference by the learned single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court was aware that SLPs. against the orders dated 7.1.87 had already been dismissed by this court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the self same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the SLPs. in this court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 7.4.1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case was an affront of the order of this court. We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs. by this court, abused the process of the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly deprecate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs. by this court. The appeals deserve to succeed on that short ground. The appeals are, consequently, allowed and the impugned order dated 7.4.1994 passed in the review petitions is hereby set aside. The respondents shall pay Rs. 10,000/- as costs.
(C.R.) Appeals allowed.
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