1999 JTR(SC) 989
1999 AIR(SC) 3284 ; 1999 AIR(SCW) 3269 ; 1999 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 506 ; 2000 1 AllCJ 364 ; 2000 41 AllLR 215 ; 1999 4 AWC 3383 ; 1999 CriLR 605 ; 1999 CrLJ 4292 ; 1999 81 DLT 510 ; 1999 3 EastCrC(SC) 333 ; 2000 1 HinduLR 67 ; 2000 1 ICC 188 ; 1999 2 JCC 449 ; 1999 6 JT 523 ; 1999 4 RCR(Civ) 149 ; 1999 5 Scale 414 ; 1999 8 SCC 525 ; 1999 SCR 280 ; 1999 KHC 1450 ; 1999 3 KLT(Online) 1107 ; 1999 7 Supreme 561
1999(7) Supreme 561
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
G.B. Pattanaik & U.C. Banerjee, JJ.
Rajiv Bhatia etc. -Appellants
versus
Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 922 of 1999
(@ SLP (Crl.) No. 1670 of 1999)
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 923 & 924 of 1999
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1807/99 & SLP (Crl.) No. 2973/1999 (Crl. M.P. No. 4554/1999) ]
Decided on 9-9-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : D.N. Goburdhan, Ms. Pinky Anand, Ms. Geeta Luthra, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate.
For the Govt. of Delhi : Ms. Binu Tamta, Advocate for Ms. Sushma Suri, Advocate.
Important Point
Where natural mother filed habeas corpus petition alleging illegal detention of her child and defence put up was that child was given in adoption under a deed of adoption, High Court could not examine legality of adoption deed to decide question of custody of child.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226
HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT : S.16
(A) The interplay between the inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and the statutory framework governing adoptive custody under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act is central to this appeal. The High Court, while entertaining a writ petition for habeas corpus, examined the validity of a registered adoption deed and the custodial arrangements, effectively adjudicating on the merits of adoption legality rather than solely on the liberty of the respondent. This approach is inconsistent with the limited, extraordinary jurisdiction of habeas corpus, which is designed to inquire into unlawful restraint, not to conduct a full trial on the validity of an adoption that is subject to a separate, ongoing civil proceeding. The statutory presumption in favour of the validity of a registered adoption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act further underscores that such merits-based challenges are reserved for civil courts.
(B) The primary legal principle is that a petition for habeas corpus is a procedural remedy aimed at securing the release of a person from unlawful detention and is not a substitute for civil proceedings to determine rights of custody or the validity of legal instruments like adoption deeds. Courts exercising powers under Article 226 must respect the jurisdictional boundaries between habeas corpus and civil litigation, particularly where a separate, competent forum is already addressing the substantive issues of adoption and custody. The presumption of validity attaching to a registered adoption deed is a significant factor that cannot be disregarded through conjectural examination in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Facts of the case:
A natural mother filed a writ petition for habeas corpus in the Delhi High Court seeking the production of her young daughter from the custody of her husbands brother, alleging illegal custody. Prior to this, a petition for habeas corpus had been filed in the Rajasthan High Court, which had noted that the children had been given in adoption, a registered deed of adoption had been executed, and the State had no jurisdiction to interfere. The Delhi High Court, however, examined the validity of the adoption deed, found it suffered from legal infirmities, presumed ceremonial gifts had not been performed, and directed that the child remain in the custody of the natural mother. Subsequently, the child was produced before the court, who observed a natural inclination to stay with the biological mother. The core dispute revolves around the correctness of the Delhi High Courts intervention into the legality of the adoption and its direction regarding custody.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found that the Delhi High Court was not entitled to examine the legality of the adoption deed or determine custody in a habeas corpus petition. The court held that the petition was maintainable only in the Rajasthan High Court, and the Delhi High Courts examination of the adoptions validity and its directions were beyond the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction. While the court acknowledged the childs apparent preference to stay with the natural mother, it did not interfere with the Delhi High Courts ultimate direction, prioritizing the avoidance of custodial turmoil for the young child pending the resolution of the adoption validity in the appropriate civil forum.
Issues:
Whether a High Court is entitled to examine the validity of an adoption deed and adjudicate on custody in a petition for habeas corpus filed in a different state when a separate civil proceeding is pending? Whether the inherent powers under Article 226 permit a court to decide substantive custodial rights outside the territorial and procedural jurisdiction of the competent court? Whether the natural mother, having executed an adoption deed, can challenge its validity through a habeas corpus petition in another high court?
Ratio Decidendi:
The courts ratio hinges on the jurisdictional limitation of habeas corpus proceedings. The remedy is strictly for challenging unlawful detention and does not extend to determining the merits of adoption or custody, which are squarely within the domain of civil courts. Therefore, a high court cannot transform a habeas corpus petition into a full-blown custody and adoption trial, especially when the petitioner has access to an alternative, competent forum. The childs welfare and stated preference were considered but did not override the jurisdictional error, leading to the dismissal of the appeals with a clear directive not to prejudice the ongoing civil proceedings.
Result:
The appeals filed by the adoptive father and the natural father against the Delhi High Courts impugned judgment are dismissed. The Delhi High Courts direction regarding the childs custody is allowed to stand, but with the critical caveat that any observations on the validity of the adoption deed or the suitability of custody are non-binding and reserved for determination by the competent civil court.
(A) The interplay between the inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and the statutory framework governing adoptive custody under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act is central to this appeal. The High Court, while entertaining a writ petition for habeas corpus, examined the validity of a registered adoption deed and the custodial arrangements, effectively adjudicating on the merits of adoption legality rather than solely on the liberty of the respondent. This approach is inconsistent with the limited, extraordinary jurisdiction of habeas corpus, which is designed to inquire into unlawful restraint, not to conduct a full trial on the validity of an adoption that is subject to a separate, ongoing civil proceeding. The statutory presumption in favour of the validity of a registered adoption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act further underscores that such merits-based challenges are reserved for civil courts.
(B) The primary legal principle is that a petition for habeas corpus is a procedural remedy aimed at securing the release of a person from unlawful detention and is not a substitute for civil proceedings to determine rights of custody or the validity of legal instruments like adoption deeds. Courts exercising powers under Article 226 must respect the jurisdictional boundaries between habeas corpus and civil litigation, particularly where a separate, competent forum is already addressing the substantive issues of adoption and custody. The presumption of validity attaching to a registered adoption deed is a significant factor that cannot be disregarded through conjectural examination in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Facts of the case:
A natural mother filed a writ petition for habeas corpus in the Delhi High Court seeking the production of her young daughter from the custody of her husbands brother, alleging illegal custody. Prior to this, a petition for habeas corpus had been filed in the Rajasthan High Court, which had noted that the children had been given in adoption, a registered deed of adoption had been executed, and the State had no jurisdiction to interfere. The Delhi High Court, however, examined the validity of the adoption deed, found it suffered from legal infirmities, presumed ceremonial gifts had not been performed, and directed that the child remain in the custody of the natural mother. Subsequently, the child was produced before the court, who observed a natural inclination to stay with the biological mother. The core dispute revolves around the correctness of the Delhi High Courts intervention into the legality of the adoption and its direction regarding custody.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found that the Delhi High Court was not entitled to examine the legality of the adoption deed or determine custody in a habeas corpus petition. The court held that the petition was maintainable only in the Rajasthan High Court, and the Delhi High Courts examination of the adoptions validity and its directions were beyond the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction. While the court acknowledged the childs apparent preference to stay with the natural mother, it did not interfere with the Delhi High Courts ultimate direction, prioritizing the avoidance of custodial turmoil for the young child pending the resolution of the adoption validity in the appropriate civil forum.
Issues:
Whether a High Court is entitled to examine the validity of an adoption deed and adjudicate on custody in a petition for habeas corpus filed in a different state when a separate civil proceeding is pending? Whether the inherent powers under Article 226 permit a court to decide substantive custodial rights outside the territorial and procedural jurisdiction of the competent court? Whether the natural mother, having executed an adoption deed, can challenge its validity through a habeas corpus petition in another high court?
Ratio Decidendi:
The courts ratio hinges on the jurisdictional limitation of habeas corpus proceedings. The remedy is strictly for challenging unlawful detention and does not extend to determining the merits of adoption or custody, which are squarely within the domain of civil courts. Therefore, a high court cannot transform a habeas corpus petition into a full-blown custody and adoption trial, especially when the petitioner has access to an alternative, competent forum. The childs welfare and stated preference were considered but did not override the jurisdictional error, leading to the dismissal of the appeals with a clear directive not to prejudice the ongoing civil proceedings.
Result:
The appeals filed by the adoptive father and the natural father against the Delhi High Courts impugned judgment are dismissed. The Delhi High Courts direction regarding the childs custody is allowed to stand, but with the critical caveat that any observations on the validity of the adoption deed or the suitability of custody are non-binding and reserved for determination by the competent civil court.
Judgment
Pattanaik, J.-Delay condoned in filing the special leave petition.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals by grant of special leave are directed against the judgment dated 11.3.99 by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in a writ of habeas corpus filed by the natural mother of a young girl, named Akansha. The undisputed facts are that Priyanka had married Amit in April, 1993. Out of their wedlock, two girl children-Akansha and Jayanti-were born. The husband of Priyanka was a Preventive Officer in the Customs Department of the Government of India. The said Priyanka filed the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus alleging therein that her daughter, Akansha is in illegal custody of Rajiv, the elder brother of her husband and the said Akansha should be produced in Court and she should be given the custody of the child. Earlier to the filing of the aforesaid petition in Delhi High Court, the said Priyanka had filed an application in a writ of habeas corpus in Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur in which notice had been duly issued and the State of Rajasthan had filed an affidavit stating therein that Akansha and her younger sister, Jayanti had been given in adoption by the natural parents to Rajiv and his wife and a registered deed of adoption has been executed and the children are staying in Bombay with her adoptive parents and as such the High Court of Rajasthan has no jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus petition and to issue directions therein. In Delhi High Court, Priyanka had challenged the validity of the deed of adoption said to have been executed by her and her husband, inter-alia on the ground that the said documents were fraudulently got executed and on the statement of her husband, she has signed those papers thinking them to be in relation to some property. Pursuant to the notice issued by the Delhi High Court, the adoptive father appeared and contested the proceedings, inter-alia on the ground that Akansha has been given in adoption by the natural parents by executing a registered adoption deed and from the date of said deed, Akansha is staying with the adoptive parents and the adoptive parents are in lawful custody of the child and consequently the question of issuing a writ of habeas corpus does not arise. By the impugned judgment, the High Court examined the legality of the adoption deed to find out whether the custody of Akansha should be with the natural mother or with the adoptive parents. The High Court came to the conclusion that the deed of adoption does not suffer from any illegality but the said alleged adoption does not inspire confidence. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the possibility of signatures of the natural mother on the adoption deed of Akansha were taken by practicing fraud and misrepresentation, as alleged cannot be ruled out. According to the High Court, prima facie it is not acceptable that the young mother would give in adoption her daughter, aged three years. The High Court also considered the question of performance of ceremonial gift and came to hold that it can be presumed that the ceremonial gift has not been performed. Ultimately, the High Court directed that the custody of the daughter, Akansha shall remain with the natural mother till appropriate Civil Courts in appropriate civil proceedings decide otherwise. It is this direction of the Delhi High Court in a habeas corpus petition which is assailed in these appeals, one filed by the adoptive father, the other filed by Akansha through the adoptive father and the third filed by the natural father.
4. Ms Pinky Anand as well as Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, learned counsel assailing the impugned order of the High Court contends that in a petition for habeas corpus, the High Court was not entitled to examine the legality of the adoption deed and come to his own conclusion on mere surmises and conjectures even ignoring the statutory presumption of a registered adoption deed available under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. According to them, the natural mother having filed a petition for habeas corpus in Rajasthan High Court was not entitled to file a separate application in Delhi High Court which tantamounts to forum haunting and the High Court of Delhi committed gross error in entertaining the said application and passing the impugned direction. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, the natural mother is not an illiterate lady and having signed the deed of adoption knowing contents thereof was not entitled to wriggle out from the same by making frivolous allegations.
5. Ms Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the natural mother on the other hand contends that the circumstances under which the mother was deprived of the responsibility and duties of taking care of her own children shocks the normal conscience and under the circumstances the High Court was justified in issuing the impugned direction.
6. Before examining the correctness of the rival submissions, we would like to state one fact that in view of the allegations and counter allegations made, we had called upon the natural mother to produce the child in our Chambers to ascertain the views of the child and pursuant to the said direction, the child was produced in our Chambers. Though the child is quite young and is, therefore, not in a position to express any positive view, on questioning her we have got the impression that the child would like to stay with her natural mother and does not want to be with the alleged adoptive parents. This is borne out from the fact that even in our Chambers when the adoptive parents wanted to talk, the child started crying and did not want to talk to them even. Though Mr. D.N. Goburdhan vehemently submitted that this is the result of tutoring but we are not persuaded to accept the said submission. We could gather, by putting questions to the child, in the absence of the natural mother, adoptive parents and the lawyers that Akansha’s natural instinct is to continue with the natural mother.
7. We have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Delhi in a petition for habeas corpus was not entitled to examine the legality of the deed of adoption and then came to the conclusion one way or the other with regard to the custody of the child. The High Court has lost sight of the fact that the petition was one for issuance of writ of habeas corpus and not for custody of the child. Then again, Mr. D.N. Goburdhan and Ms. Pinky Anand were justified in their submissions that the mother having filed the petition for habeas corpus in Rajasthan High Court, was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. That apart in the manner in which the High Court of Delhi appears to have issued direction to the SHO of Lajpat Nagar Police Station to produce the child indicates that the entire episode is by way of stage maneuvering. We, therefore, find sufficient force in the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants. But having had the opportunity of ascertaining the views of young Akansha, as already stated, and in view of our conclusion that the child does not want even to talk to adoptive parents, we are not inclined to interfere with the direction of the Delhi High Court allowing the custody of Akansha to the natural mother until appropriation decision of competent forum is obtained with regard to the validity of the adoption deed as well as the custody of the child in question. We accordingly dismiss these appeals. We, however, make it clear that any observation made by Delhi High Court in the impugned judgment with regard to the validity of the registered deed of adoption or with regard to the suitability of the custody of Akansha will not be binding in the pending proceedings.
(C.R.) Appeals dismissed.
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