2000 JTR(SC) 255
2000 AIR(SC) 860 ; 2000 AIR(SCW) 442 ; 2000 2 AllCJ 987 ; 2000 AllLJ 503 ; 2000 38 AllLR 651 ; 2000 39 AllLR 365 ; 2000 2 AllMR(SC) 565 ; 2000 2 AWC 929 ; 2000 3 CalLT(SC) 63 ; 2000 1 CHN(SC) 109 ; 2000 1 CivCC 702 ; 2000 1 CLT(SC) 335 ; 2000 2 GLH 600 ; 2000 3 ICC 349 ; 2000 1 JT 535 ; 2000 1 KLJ(NOC) 39 ; 2000 2 MLJ 42 ; 2000 2 OLR 104 ; 2000 2 RCR(Civ) 2 ; 2000 91 RD 241 ; 2000 1 Scale 415 ; 2000 2 SCC 428 ; 2000 2 SCJ 342 ; 2000 1 SCR 566 ; 2000 WBLR 165 ; 2000 WLC 181 ; 2000 KHC 1695 ; 2000 1 Supreme 319
2000(1) Supreme 319
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
S.P. Bharucha, N. Santosh Hegde and Ruma Pal, JJ.
Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs. & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Achhaibar Dubey & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 1999
Decided on 1-2-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Sudhir Chandra, Sr. Advocate and Parmanand Gaur and Ms. Priya Rao, Achintya Dvivedi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : B.D. Agarwala, Sr. Advocate, Anish Dayal, Ms. Manjula Gupta, Advocates.
VERY IMPORTANT POINT
In a suit for specific performance, subsequent purchaser can plead and defend that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of agreement at all material time.
(A) Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act outlines personal bars to relief, stipulating that specific performance cannot be enforced against a party who fails to prove readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations. This provision directly governs the present appeal concerning a subsequent purchaser challenging a decree for specific performance. The applicability of Section 16(c) is central, as the earlier Bench of two Judges in Jugraj Singh & Anr. v. Labh Singh & Ors. emphasized that readiness and willingness must be continuously established by the plaintiff up to the decree date. This Courts prior observation in Jugraj Singh created interpretative division regarding whether the burden of proving readiness and willingness is personal to the vendor or also available to subsequent purchasers. The High Courts reliance on this earlier decision was reviewed by a larger Bench due to conflicting judicial reasoning, necessitating clarification of the scope of Section 16(c) in transactions involving subsequent purchasers.
(B) The core legal principles include that Section 16(c) imposes a mandatory obligation on the Court to deny specific performance if the plaintiff fails to prove continuous readiness and willingness. The plea is not personal to the vendor alone but is open to any defendant to establish non-compliance. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and the Court must independently determine compliance. A decree cannot be granted if the mandatory statutory condition is unmet, irrespective of party status.
Facts of the case:
The appellants, as legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser, were defendants in a suit by the original plaintiff Bachna seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell property. Bachna had not initially pleaded readiness and willingness to perform, though she later amended her plaint to include this plea. The first appellate court and the High Court declined to allow the appellants to argue that Bachna and her legal representatives were never prepared to perform, instead relying on Jugraj Singhs precedent. The central issue was whether Bachna and her legal representatives were, at all material times, ready and willing to perform the agreement.
Findings of Court:
This Court held that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires the plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract. The earlier decision in Jugraj Singh, which suggested that the plea is personal to the vendor and not available to subsequent purchasers, was found erroneous. The mandatory nature of Section 16(c) applies to any defendant, and it is the Courts duty to determine compliance. The appeal was allowed, and the suit was remanded to the trial Court to assess whether the original plaintiff had discharged this burden.
Issues:
Whether the plea of readiness and willingness to perform under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is personal to the vendor or can also be raised by subsequent purchasers, and whether the High Court correctly declined to permit the appellants to challenge Bachnas readiness and willingness.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates that the plaintiff must continuously prove readiness and willingness to perform, and this statutory bar applies to all parties. The burden is not personal to the vendor, and it is the Courts obligation to determine compliance before granting specific performance.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The judgments and orders under appeal and the orders of the courts below are set aside. The suit is remanded to the trial Court for a determination of whether the original plaintiff proved readiness and willingness to perform, to be decided expeditiously within six months.
(A) Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act outlines personal bars to relief, stipulating that specific performance cannot be enforced against a party who fails to prove readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations. This provision directly governs the present appeal concerning a subsequent purchaser challenging a decree for specific performance. The applicability of Section 16(c) is central, as the earlier Bench of two Judges in Jugraj Singh & Anr. v. Labh Singh & Ors. emphasized that readiness and willingness must be continuously established by the plaintiff up to the decree date. This Courts prior observation in Jugraj Singh created interpretative division regarding whether the burden of proving readiness and willingness is personal to the vendor or also available to subsequent purchasers. The High Courts reliance on this earlier decision was reviewed by a larger Bench due to conflicting judicial reasoning, necessitating clarification of the scope of Section 16(c) in transactions involving subsequent purchasers.
(B) The core legal principles include that Section 16(c) imposes a mandatory obligation on the Court to deny specific performance if the plaintiff fails to prove continuous readiness and willingness. The plea is not personal to the vendor alone but is open to any defendant to establish non-compliance. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and the Court must independently determine compliance. A decree cannot be granted if the mandatory statutory condition is unmet, irrespective of party status.
Facts of the case:
The appellants, as legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser, were defendants in a suit by the original plaintiff Bachna seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell property. Bachna had not initially pleaded readiness and willingness to perform, though she later amended her plaint to include this plea. The first appellate court and the High Court declined to allow the appellants to argue that Bachna and her legal representatives were never prepared to perform, instead relying on Jugraj Singhs precedent. The central issue was whether Bachna and her legal representatives were, at all material times, ready and willing to perform the agreement.
Findings of Court:
This Court held that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires the plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract. The earlier decision in Jugraj Singh, which suggested that the plea is personal to the vendor and not available to subsequent purchasers, was found erroneous. The mandatory nature of Section 16(c) applies to any defendant, and it is the Courts duty to determine compliance. The appeal was allowed, and the suit was remanded to the trial Court to assess whether the original plaintiff had discharged this burden.
Issues:
Whether the plea of readiness and willingness to perform under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is personal to the vendor or can also be raised by subsequent purchasers, and whether the High Court correctly declined to permit the appellants to challenge Bachnas readiness and willingness.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates that the plaintiff must continuously prove readiness and willingness to perform, and this statutory bar applies to all parties. The burden is not personal to the vendor, and it is the Courts obligation to determine compliance before granting specific performance.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. The judgments and orders under appeal and the orders of the courts below are set aside. The suit is remanded to the trial Court for a determination of whether the original plaintiff proved readiness and willingness to perform, to be decided expeditiously within six months.
JUDGMENT
Bharucha, J.-This appeal stands referred to a Bench of three Judges because the two learned Judges who heard it earlier found difficulty in following the judgment of a Bench of two learned Judges in Jugraj Singh & Anr. v. Labh Singh & Ors.1.
2. It is not necessary to go into any great detail insofar as the facts are concerned. The appellants before us are the legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser of certain property. They were defendants to a suit by one Bachna for specific performance of an earlier agreement to sell that property to her. She had not pleaded in her plaint that she was ready willing to perform her part of the agreement, but that plea was later introduced by way of an amendment. The question now is in regard to whether she or her legal representatives were, in fact, at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of that agreement. The first appellate Court declined to permit the present appellants to plead and contend that Bachna and her legal representatives were never prepared to perform their part of the agreement and, for this purpose, it relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Jugraj Singh. The High Court, in second appeal, affirmed that view.
3. In Jugraj Singh s case, upon substantially similar facts, this Court noted Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and the dictum of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sasson2 that in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on the plaintiff s part, upto the date of the decree, was necessary. It also noted that this Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar3 had held that it was for the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance "to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail." Jugraj Singh s case, however, held:
"That plea is specifically available to the vendor/defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent purchasers have got only the right to defend their purchase on the premise that they have no prior knowledge of the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. They are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Though they are necessary parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent purchasers, the plea that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract must be available only to the vendor or his legal representatives, but not to the subsequent purchasers."
4. The decision in Jugraj Singh s case was noted by a Bench of two learned Judges in Lakhi Ram v. Trikha Ram4 and doubted, but the appeal there was decided on another point.
Section 16 of the Specific Performance Act reads:
"16. Personal bars to relief.-Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
(a) x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant."
5. The obligation imposed by Section 16 is upon the Court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff who has not met the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. A Court may not, therefore, grant to a plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement the specific performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no question of the plea being available to one defendant and not another. It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) has not been complied with and it is for the court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and, depending upon its conclusion, decree or decline to decree the suit. We are of the view that the decision in Jugraj Singh s case is erroneous.
6. In the circumstances, it becomes necessary to remand the suit to the trial Court, namely, the Court of the Munsif, Gyanpur, Varanasi, to consider whether or not it has been established that the original plaintiff Bachna and her legal representatives had proved that they had performed or were always ready and willing to perform the terms of the agreement for sale in Bachna s favour.
7. The appeal is allowed. The judgments and order under appeal and the orders and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court for decision of the question stated above. The suit shall be decided as expeditiously as possible, and within a period of six months from today.
8. No order as to costs.
(C.R.) Appeal allowed.
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