2000 JTR(SC) 500
2000 AIR(SC) 1080 ; 2000 AIR(SCW) 792 ; 2000 2 AWC 1354 ; 2000 1 CLR 929 ; 2000 96 FJR 626 ; 2000 85 FLR 197 ; 2000 3 JT 1 ; 2000 18 LCD 876 ; 2000 LIC 1022 ; 2000 1 LLJ 1099 ; 2000 2 LLN 47 ; 2000 2 Scale 233 ; 2000 3 SCC 239 ; 2000 SCC(Cri) 606 ; 2000 3 SCJ 46 ; 2000 2 SCR 130 ; 2000 2 SCT 327 ; 2000 2 SLR 1 ; 2000 2 SLT 572 ; 2000 1 UJ 630 ; 2000 2 UPLBEC 960 ; 2000 WBLR 261 ; 2000 KHC 1044 ; 2000 1 KLT(Online) 1030 ; 2000 2 Supreme 259
2000(2) Supreme 259
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & R.P. Sethi, JJ.
V.P. Ahuja -Appellant
versus
State of Punjab & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1965 of 2000
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11701 of 1989)
Decided on 6-3-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : M. Qamaruddin, Ambar Qamaruddin, Ajay Talesara, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin Advocates.
For the Respondents : Mrs. Jayshree Anand, (Additional Advocate General, Punjab), G. Sivabalamurugan, Rajiv Dutta, Ashok K. Mahajan Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice.
Act Referred :SERVICE LAW : .
(A) The service law framework governing probationary appointments in statutory corporations mandates that termination during probation must adhere to principles of natural justice and cannot be arbitrary or punitive, as referenced in the provisions implicitly applied to the impugned order. The case invokes the requirement of a fair inquiry and opportunity of hearing before passing an order that is stigmatic in nature, consistent with the principles enshrined in the relevant service statutes read with the doctrine of natural justice.
(B) Key legal principles include that a probationer is entitled to protection against arbitrary termination, service termination during probation must not be punitive, and an order terminating services that is stigmatic on its face must be preceded by a regular enquiry and hearing. The court emphasized that mere probation does not absolve the terminating authority from procedural fairness.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was appointed as Chief Executive on probation for two years with a clause allowing termination during probation without notice. The appellants services were terminated during the probation period on grounds of unsatisfactory administrative and technical performance, and the impugned order was held to be stigmatic. The High Court dismissed the appeal, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found the impugned order to be stigmatic and punitive, and noted that it could not have been passed without a regular enquiry and hearing. The court relied on its earlier decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, to conclude that probationers are entitled to procedural safeguards.
Issues:
Whether an order terminating services of a probationer during the probation period, which is stigmatic on its face, can be passed without a hearing and without complying with principles of natural justice.
Ratio Decidendi:
An order terminating the services of a probationer that is stigmatic must be preceded by a fair enquiry and an opportunity of hearing; mere probation does not justify arbitrary or punitive termination, and such an order is invalid if passed without these procedural safeguards.
Result:
The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, the termination order was quashed, and the appellant was directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits.
(A) The service law framework governing probationary appointments in statutory corporations mandates that termination during probation must adhere to principles of natural justice and cannot be arbitrary or punitive, as referenced in the provisions implicitly applied to the impugned order. The case invokes the requirement of a fair inquiry and opportunity of hearing before passing an order that is stigmatic in nature, consistent with the principles enshrined in the relevant service statutes read with the doctrine of natural justice.
(B) Key legal principles include that a probationer is entitled to protection against arbitrary termination, service termination during probation must not be punitive, and an order terminating services that is stigmatic on its face must be preceded by a regular enquiry and hearing. The court emphasized that mere probation does not absolve the terminating authority from procedural fairness.
Facts of the case:
The appellant was appointed as Chief Executive on probation for two years with a clause allowing termination during probation without notice. The appellants services were terminated during the probation period on grounds of unsatisfactory administrative and technical performance, and the impugned order was held to be stigmatic. The High Court dismissed the appeal, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found the impugned order to be stigmatic and punitive, and noted that it could not have been passed without a regular enquiry and hearing. The court relied on its earlier decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, to conclude that probationers are entitled to procedural safeguards.
Issues:
Whether an order terminating services of a probationer during the probation period, which is stigmatic on its face, can be passed without a hearing and without complying with principles of natural justice.
Ratio Decidendi:
An order terminating the services of a probationer that is stigmatic must be preceded by a fair enquiry and an opportunity of hearing; mere probation does not justify arbitrary or punitive termination, and such an order is invalid if passed without these procedural safeguards.
Result:
The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, the termination order was quashed, and the appellant was directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits.
JUDGMENT
S. Saghir Ahmad, J.-Leave granted.
2. The appellant was appointed as Chief Executive in the Establishment of Punjab Co-operative Cotton Marketing & Spinning Mills Federation Limited by order dated 29th of September, 1998. One of the terms of his appointment was that he would be on probation for a period of two years which could be extended further at the discretion of the Management. It further provided that during the probation period, the Management shall have the right to terminate his services without notice. His services were terminated by order dated 2.12.1998 reading as under:-
"ORDER
Sh. V.P. Ahuja, S/o Late Sh. H.N. Ahuja was appointed on probation for 2 years as Chief Executive of the Coop. Spg. Mills Ltd., vide orders Endst. No. Spinfed/CCA/7844-45 dated 29.9.98 and posted at Bacospin. However, he failed in the performance of his duties administratively & technically. Therefore, as per Clause-I of the said appointment order, the services of Sh. V.P. Ahuja are hereby terminated with immediate effect.
Sd/-
(Managing Director)
Spinfed"
3. This order was challenged by the appellant in the Punjab and Haryana High Court through a Writ Petition which was dismissed by order dated 26th of March, 1999 reading as under :-
"Vide order dated 2.12.1998, Annexure-P-17 petitioner has been asked to quit, concededly during the period of probation. The impugned order is not stigmatic and nothing at all has been urged that may detract from such an order being passed during the currency of probation. Insofar as, thus, order, Annexure-P-17 is concerned, we find no infirmity therein."
4. It is this order which is challenged in this appeal.
5. The observation of the High Court that :-
"The impugned order is not stigmatic and nothing at all has been urged that may detract from such an order being passed during the currency of probation."
is surprising, to say the least. The order by which the services of the appellant were terminated has already been quoted by us above. The order, ex facie, is stigmatic as also punitive. The order is founded on the ground that the appellant had failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. It is for this reason that the services of the appellant were terminated. As pointed out above, the order, ex facie, is stigmatic.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the appellant, after appointment, was placed on probation and though the period of probation was two years, his services could be terminated at any time during the period of probation without any notice, as set out in the appointment letter. It is contended that the appellant cannot claim any right on the post on which he was appointed and being on probation, his work and conduct was all along under scrutiny and since his work was not satisfactory, his services were terminated in terms of the conditions set out in the Appointment order. This plea cannot be accepted.
7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice.
8. The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which the order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.
9. The entire case law with respect to a "probationer" was reviewed by this Court in a recent decision in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Others1. This decision fully covers the instant case as well, particularly as in this case, the order impugned is stigmatic on the face of it.
10. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 26.3.1999, passed by the High Court is set aside and the Writ Petition of the appellant is allowed. The order dated 2.12.1998, by which the services of the appellant were terminated, is quashed with the direction that he shall be put back on duty with all consequential benefits. No costs.
(C.R.) Appeal allowed.
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