2000 JTR(SC) 313
2000 3 AICLR 426 ; 2000 AIR(SC) 3559 ; 2000 AIR(SCW) 3481 ; 2003 Supp AllCriC 651 ; 2000 AllMR(Cri)(SC) 1717 ; 2000 4 Crimes(SC) 104 ; 2000 CrLJ 4672 ; 2000 3 EastCrC(SC) 859 ; 2000 7 JT 458 ; 2000 10 SCC 662 ; 2001 SCC(Cri) 1518 ; 2000 KHC 1684 ; 2000 1 KLT(Online) 905 ; 2000 6 Supreme 570
2000(6) Supreme 570
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.T. Thomas & D.P. Mohapatra, JJ.
Smt. Raj Rani -Appellant
versus
State (Delhi Administration) -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 776 of 1995
Decided on 8-2-2000
Act Referred :INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.34, S.306, S.498(a)
(A) The accused was charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide, and alternatively under Section 498A. The suicide note left by the deceased was the primary evidence. The High Court held that while the note cast aspersions, it did not legally satisfy the heightened threshold of cruelty under Section 498A, nor did it establish the requisite criminal intent under Section 306 read with Section 34. The accused was thus entitled to acquittal.
(B) Section 306 requires proof of intention to cause death; Section 34 applies common intention; Section 498A requires proof of cruelty, which must be judged objectively and subjected to judicial scrutiny, not merely based on the subjective hurt felt by the deceased.
Facts of the case:
The deceased, married to the appellant's brother, committed suicide and left a lengthy suicide note alleging drug addiction and general cruelty but failing to specify any concrete act of cruelty by the appellant. The note contained hurtful remarks but no evidence of actionable cruelty as defined.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the suicide note did not contain any specific deed amounting to cruelty within Section 498A and lacked evidence of the requisite criminal intention for abetment under Section 306. The accused was acquitted of all charges.
Issues:
Whether general allegations of hurtful words without specific acts can constitute cruelty under Section 498A, and whether a suicide note alone can establish the intent required for Section 306 read with Section 34.
Ratio Decidendi:
A suicide note expressing subjective hurt is insufficient to prove the statutory definition of cruelty under Section 498A or to establish the specific intent required under Section 306 read with Section 34; without concrete evidence of cruelty or malicious intent, the accused must be acquitted.
Result:
Appeal allowed; conviction set aside; accused acquitted; fine refunded.
(A) The accused was charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for abetment of suicide, and alternatively under Section 498A. The suicide note left by the deceased was the primary evidence. The High Court held that while the note cast aspersions, it did not legally satisfy the heightened threshold of cruelty under Section 498A, nor did it establish the requisite criminal intent under Section 306 read with Section 34. The accused was thus entitled to acquittal.
(B) Section 306 requires proof of intention to cause death; Section 34 applies common intention; Section 498A requires proof of cruelty, which must be judged objectively and subjected to judicial scrutiny, not merely based on the subjective hurt felt by the deceased.
Facts of the case:
The deceased, married to the appellant's brother, committed suicide and left a lengthy suicide note alleging drug addiction and general cruelty but failing to specify any concrete act of cruelty by the appellant. The note contained hurtful remarks but no evidence of actionable cruelty as defined.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the suicide note did not contain any specific deed amounting to cruelty within Section 498A and lacked evidence of the requisite criminal intention for abetment under Section 306. The accused was acquitted of all charges.
Issues:
Whether general allegations of hurtful words without specific acts can constitute cruelty under Section 498A, and whether a suicide note alone can establish the intent required for Section 306 read with Section 34.
Ratio Decidendi:
A suicide note expressing subjective hurt is insufficient to prove the statutory definition of cruelty under Section 498A or to establish the specific intent required under Section 306 read with Section 34; without concrete evidence of cruelty or malicious intent, the accused must be acquitted.
Result:
Appeal allowed; conviction set aside; accused acquitted; fine refunded.
ORDER
Appellant is Smt. Raj Rani whose brother Shashi Pal Malhotra had married one Veena in the year 1978. The said Veena committed suicide on 17.4.1984 after leaving a suicide note. The case was charge-sheeted against the Appellant, her brother and her mother for the offence under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellant to undergo imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000 (it is not necessary to mention the sentences imposed on the other accused as they are not before us). When an appeal was filed by this Appellant along with other 2 accused the High Court of Delhi found that there is no acceptable evidence to prove the offence under Section 306 and hence acquitted them. However, learned Single Judge of the High Court felt that on the evidence an offence under Section 498A stood proved and accordingly all the accused were convicted under the altered Sections and each of them was sentenced to undergo the period of imprisonment which they have already undergone.
2. The reason why the Appellant has now challenged the said conviction and sentence has been stated by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. She is a Government servant being a teacher attached to a Government school. Hence, the conviction will have devastating consequences on her career besides the stigma attached to her even otherwise. We, therefore, chose to hear the appeal on merits.
3. Both sides submitted that the only reliable evidence which can be looked into is the suicide note left behind by Veena which should have been scribed by her on 17.4.1984, the date of the commission of suicide.
4. We have gone through the entire writings contained in the suicide note. It makes a serious castigation against her husband for being an addict to narcotic drugs. Then she made a general allegation against her mother-in-law and in a lesser degree towards the Appellant. But unfortunately she did not advert to any concrete instance which can be termed as cruelty as defined in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The utterances said to have been made by the Appellant towards the deceased were to her chagrin and she had taken them very seriously in the suicide note. She described such utterances as not worthy of reproduction.
5. It is not enough that the deceased felt those words hurting, it must be subjected to judicial scrutiny and the court must be in a position to hold that those words were sufficiently hurting enough as to amount to "cruelty" falling within the parameters fixed in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The area remains grey and vague. Not a single word said to have been spoken to by the Appellant as against the deceased had been put on record by the deceased in the suicide note in spite of the fact that the said note is a very lengthy letter running into several paragraphs. The tenor and language of the suicide note would reflect that she was not an illiterate lady. As the court is rendered helpless to judge whether the words which deceased heard from the Appellant would amount to cruelty, it is far from possibility for the criminal court to hold that she is guilty of the offence of cruelty as envisaged in the Section. It is also to be pointed out that the deceased did not mention a single deed which the Appellant would have done against her. All that is said against the Appellant were that she spoke some thing which she took objectionable.
6. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to hold her guilty of the offence of which she was found guilty by the High Court. No offence at all has been proved against her. She is entitled to be acquitted of the charge as well as the offence now found against her by the learned Single Judge.
7. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction passed on her and acquit her. The fine, if any, paid by her shall be refunded to her.
(C.R.) Appeal allowed.
***************