2000 JTR(SC) 2006
2000 AIR(SCW) 4556 ; 2001 1 CLR 788 ; 2001 98 FJR 85 ; 2001 88 FLR 351 ; 2000 Supp3 JT 602 ; 2001 1 LLJ 476 ; 2001 2 LLN 118 ; 2001 2 MLJ 21 ; 2001 2 RSJ 5 ; 2000 8 Scale 180 ; 2001 1 SCC 133 ; 2001 SCC(L&S) 165 ; 2001 1 SCT 370 ; 2000 6 SLR 469 ; 2001 1 SLT 28 ; 2001 1 UJ 230 ; 2001 1 UPLBEC 331 ; 2001 KHC 1324 ; 2000 8 Supreme 236
2000(8) Supreme 236
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
D.P. Mohapatra & Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.
Balbir Singh -Petitioner
versus
Punjab Roadways & Anr. -Respondents
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14225 of 1999
Decided on 8-12-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Petitioner : Manoj Swarup, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mahabir Singh, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Act Referred :INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT : S.11(a)
(A) The Industrial Disputes Act, specifically Section 11(a), governs the adjudication of industrial disputes where a workman challenges adverse orders such as stoppage of increment. In this case, the Act provided the statutory framework for referring the dispute arising from multiple punitive orders passed between 1978 and 1991 to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal operated within this statutory mandate to assess the legality of the orders and the implications of procedural delay.
(B) Key legal principles include that delay in raising a plea can be a valid ground for denying relief, and the discretion of the Tribunal in this regard is judicial and fact-specific. The relief granted or denied must be proportionate to the merits of the case and the procedural defaults. (
Facts of the case:
The petitioner, a conductor, faced several orders of stoppage of increment passed between June 1978 and May 1991. An industrial dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal in 1995, which in its 1998 award held the orders vitiated due to improper inquiry but denied relief except for the last order due to delay. The High Court confirmed the award, and the appeal challenged this denial of relief on grounds of delay and merit.) (
Findings of Court:
The High Court found no good ground to interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal's discretion is to be exercised judicially and noted that the High Court's satisfaction on the matter left no serious illegality warranting interference. (
Issues:
Whether delay alone can justify denial of relief when the impugned orders are found unsustainable in law, and whether the Tribunal abused its discretion in weighing delay against merit. (
Ratio Decidendi:
The Tribunal's discretion to deny relief on the ground of delay is broad and judicial; where the plea of delay is raised and accepted by the Tribunal, the High Court's finding on such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it suffers from serious illegality. (
Result:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.)
(A) The Industrial Disputes Act, specifically Section 11(a), governs the adjudication of industrial disputes where a workman challenges adverse orders such as stoppage of increment. In this case, the Act provided the statutory framework for referring the dispute arising from multiple punitive orders passed between 1978 and 1991 to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal operated within this statutory mandate to assess the legality of the orders and the implications of procedural delay.
(B) Key legal principles include that delay in raising a plea can be a valid ground for denying relief, and the discretion of the Tribunal in this regard is judicial and fact-specific. The relief granted or denied must be proportionate to the merits of the case and the procedural defaults. (
Facts of the case:
The petitioner, a conductor, faced several orders of stoppage of increment passed between June 1978 and May 1991. An industrial dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal in 1995, which in its 1998 award held the orders vitiated due to improper inquiry but denied relief except for the last order due to delay. The High Court confirmed the award, and the appeal challenged this denial of relief on grounds of delay and merit.) (
Findings of Court:
The High Court found no good ground to interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal's discretion is to be exercised judicially and noted that the High Court's satisfaction on the matter left no serious illegality warranting interference. (
Issues:
Whether delay alone can justify denial of relief when the impugned orders are found unsustainable in law, and whether the Tribunal abused its discretion in weighing delay against merit. (
Ratio Decidendi:
The Tribunal's discretion to deny relief on the ground of delay is broad and judicial; where the plea of delay is raised and accepted by the Tribunal, the High Court's finding on such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it suffers from serious illegality. (
Result:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.)
ORDER
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner was a conductor in the Punjab Roadways at the relevant point of time. Several orders of punishment of stoppage of increment, with or without cumulative effect were passed against him in June 1978, October 1983, April 1987, November 1990 and May 1991. The industrial dispute raised on behalf of the petitioner by the workmens union was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal in 1995. The Tribunal by the award dated 22nd July, 1998 held that the punishment orders were vitiated having been passed without holding proper inquiry but declined to grant relief in respect of the orders excepting the last order dated 10th May, 1991, on the ground of delay.
3. The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana seeking quashing of the award of the Tribunal declining to grant any relief in his favour despite the favourable finding in merits. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition and confirmed the award passed by the Tribunal holding that there was no good ground to interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by the Tribunal. The High Court observed:
"The dispute was indeed belated and the order withholding the increments of the petitioner passed in 1978 could not be set at naught in the year 1994 and thereafter."
The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the Tribunal committed error in denying relief to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The learned counsel submitted that in industrial dispute delay should not be taken as a ground for denying relief to the workman if the order/orders under challenge are found to be unsustainable in law. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and another1.
5. We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also perused the aforementioned decision. We do not find that any gen eral principle as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid down in that decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the management in the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case on hand the plea of delay was raised and was accepted by the Tribunal. Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the present case. Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of delay or it should be appropriately moulded is at the discretion of the Tribunal depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt the discretion is to be exercised judicially. The High Court on consideration of the matter held that there was no ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal. We are not satisfied that the award of the Tribunal declining relief to the petitioner, which was confirmed by the High Court suffered from any serious illegality which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly the special leave petition is dismissed.
(C.R.) SLP dismissed.
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