2001 JTR(SC) 531
2001 AIR(SC) 1668 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 1403 ; 2002 AIR(SCW) 4346 ; 2001 3 BomCR(SC) 54 ; 2001 4 BomLR 871 ; 2001 4 JT 152 ; 2001 2 Scale 523 ; 2002 4 Scale 132 ; 2001 4 SCC 455 ; 2001 2 UJ 858 ; 2001 KHC 1808 ; 2001 2 Supreme 457
2001(2) Supreme 457
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
B.N. Kirpal, S.S. Mohammed Quadri, M.B. Shah, Mrs. Ruma Pal and K.G. Balakrishnan, JJ.
Property Owners’ Association & Ors. etc. etc. —Petitioners
versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. —Respondents
SLP (C) No. 5302 of 1992
With
SLP (C) Nos. 5777, 5204, 8797, 7950 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 934 of 1992 and 16 of 1996, SLP (C) Nos. 6744 of 1993, 2303 and 13467 of 1995, 4367 and 6191-6192 of 1992, W.P. (C) Nos. 342 of 1999, 469 and 672 of 2000, 660 of 1998, I.A. Nos., 2-3 in C.A. Nos. 2797-2798 of 1992 and SLP (C) No. 4129 of 1992
Decided on 21-3-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Harish N. Salve, Solicitor General, F.S. Nariman, G.L. Sanghi, T.R. Andhyarujina, Ranjit Kumar, Ashok H. Desai, Bhimrao N. Naik, Rajiv Dutta, Anil B. Divan, Sr. Advocates, Mulraj Shah, P.H. Parekh, S.K. Sethna, E.R. Kumar, Subhash Sharma, Sameer, Devarajan, Ms. Dhun Chhapgar, Rohit Mammen Alex, Ms. Ruchi Khurana, U.A. Rana, Ms. Shalini Mittal, Arvind Kumar, Anil Kumar Sinha, P. Narasimhan, T.C. Tolat, S.R. Setia, Vijay K. Jain, P.N. Gupta, Alok Mahajan, O.P. Poplai, Ms. J.S. Wad, Preetesh Kapoor, Ms. Aparajita Singh, Siddharth Goswami, Siddharth Chaudhary, S.V. Deshpande, Milind Sathe, Pallav Sisodia, Sanjay Hegde, Harsh Desai, Anand S. Bhatt, Ameet B. Naik Ashish A. Ahuja, M.N. Shroff, Vipin Sanghi, Pramod B. Agarwala, Ms. Praveena Gautam, Mahesh Agrawala, E.C. Agrawala, G.B. Sathe, K.V. Sreekumar, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, Sushil Kumar Jain, Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli, Ms. Maulina Swarup, T.V. Ratnam, C. Mukund, Gaurav K. Singh, A.S. Bhasme, Manoj Kumar Mishra, Keerit Shah, Rishi Agrawal, Vivek Yadav, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Sushil Karanjakar, A. Venkateshwar Rao, Vishwajit Singh, P.N. Gupta, Harish Ganatra, Ms. Minaz Merchant, Kapil Sharma, R. Nedumaran, S.M. Jadhav, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Prasant Kumar, Anip Sachthey, Prashant Chaudhary, M.C. Dhingra, Praveen Swarup, S.K. Verma, Ms. Bela Maheshwari, Ms. Geetanjali Mohan, Shrish Kumar Misra, Uday Umesh Lalit, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Views expressed on interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution in Sanjeev Coke’s case, (1983) 1 SCR 1000 requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of not less than seven Judges.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.39(b), Art.31(c), Art.14
MAHARASHTRA HOUSING AND AREA DEVELOPMENT ACT : S.1(a)
(A) The impugned ChapterVIIIA was inserted into the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 in 1986, prescribing acquisition of properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent. Section1A was concurrently inserted, containing a declaration that the Act implements the States policy under Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In light of Article 31C, the State argued that challenges on grounds of inconsistency with Article 14 or Article 19 were barred, and that the doctrine of revival did not apply to constitutional amendments after partial invalidation of the Forty-second Amendment. This case questions the endurance of Article 31C and the scope of Article 39(b) read with Article 31C in the postKeshavananda Bharati environment.
(B) The core legal principles involve the interplay between Article 39(b), Article 31C, and Article 14, focusing on whether socioeconomic legislation aimed at securing distributive justice can be insulated from constitutional scrutiny. The case also touches upon interpretative methodology, the doctrine of revival after constitutional amendment invalidation, and the requirement for a larger Bench to clarify the correct interpretation of Article 39(b).
Facts of the case:
The challenge was directed at the constitutional validity of ChapterVIIIA of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, as amended in 1986, which provided for acquisition of properties at hundred times the monthly rent and declared that the Act gave effect to the policy enshrined in Clause (b) of Article 39. The contention was that Article 31C no longer survived due to subsequent events postKeshavananda Bharati and that the doctrine of revival did not apply to constitutional amendments.
Findings of Court:
The Bench noted the States reliance on Article 31C and the argument barring challenges on Article 14 and Article 19. It reviewed earlier interpretations of Article 39(b) in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, and observed the need for reconsideration by a larger Bench. The matter was subsequently referred to a Bench of not less than seven judges.
Issues:
1. Whether Article 31C survives the subsequent constitutional developments postKeshavananda Bharati.
2. Whether the doctrine of revival applies to constitutional amendments after a portion of the Forty-second Amendment was invalidated.
3. The correct interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution, particularly its relationship with Article 31C and the scope of judicial review.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that the interpretation of Article 39(b) as elucidated in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company required reconsideration due to its significance and the questions raised. This necessitated a larger Bench to correctly interpret Article 39(b) and determine the scope and survival of Article 31C vis--vis Article 14 and Article 19.
Result:
The reference to a larger Bench of not less than seven judges was ordered for hearing and deciding these constitutional and interpretative matters.
(A) The impugned ChapterVIIIA was inserted into the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 in 1986, prescribing acquisition of properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent. Section1A was concurrently inserted, containing a declaration that the Act implements the States policy under Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In light of Article 31C, the State argued that challenges on grounds of inconsistency with Article 14 or Article 19 were barred, and that the doctrine of revival did not apply to constitutional amendments after partial invalidation of the Forty-second Amendment. This case questions the endurance of Article 31C and the scope of Article 39(b) read with Article 31C in the postKeshavananda Bharati environment.
(B) The core legal principles involve the interplay between Article 39(b), Article 31C, and Article 14, focusing on whether socioeconomic legislation aimed at securing distributive justice can be insulated from constitutional scrutiny. The case also touches upon interpretative methodology, the doctrine of revival after constitutional amendment invalidation, and the requirement for a larger Bench to clarify the correct interpretation of Article 39(b).
Facts of the case:
The challenge was directed at the constitutional validity of ChapterVIIIA of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, as amended in 1986, which provided for acquisition of properties at hundred times the monthly rent and declared that the Act gave effect to the policy enshrined in Clause (b) of Article 39. The contention was that Article 31C no longer survived due to subsequent events postKeshavananda Bharati and that the doctrine of revival did not apply to constitutional amendments.
Findings of Court:
The Bench noted the States reliance on Article 31C and the argument barring challenges on Article 14 and Article 19. It reviewed earlier interpretations of Article 39(b) in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, and observed the need for reconsideration by a larger Bench. The matter was subsequently referred to a Bench of not less than seven judges.
Issues:
1. Whether Article 31C survives the subsequent constitutional developments postKeshavananda Bharati.
2. Whether the doctrine of revival applies to constitutional amendments after a portion of the Forty-second Amendment was invalidated.
3. The correct interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution, particularly its relationship with Article 31C and the scope of judicial review.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court held that the interpretation of Article 39(b) as elucidated in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company required reconsideration due to its significance and the questions raised. This necessitated a larger Bench to correctly interpret Article 39(b) and determine the scope and survival of Article 31C vis--vis Article 14 and Article 19.
Result:
The reference to a larger Bench of not less than seven judges was ordered for hearing and deciding these constitutional and interpretative matters.
ORDER
In these cases the main challenge is to the constitutional validity of Chapter—VIIIA which was inserted in 1986 in the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 which, inter alia, provided for the acquisition of certain properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent for the premises. By the said amendment, Section-1A was also inserted in that Act and it contains a declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In view of Article 31C of the Constitution, the contention of the State was that the validity of any part of the statute on the ground that it violated Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution, was not permissible.
2. The case was heard by a Bench of Three Judges. At that time on behalf of the appellants a contention was sought to be raised, inter alia, to the effect that Article 31C did not survive because of the events subsequent to the decision in Keshavananda Bharati’s case1. It was also submitted before that Bench that the doctrine of revival, as it applied to ordinary statutes, did not apply to the Constitutional Amendment and when a part of the Forty-second Amendment, which amended Article 31C, had been held to be invalid it did not result in the automatic revival of the unamended Article 31C.
3. In view of the aforesaid contention which was raised, by Order dated 1st May, 1956 reported in 1996(4) SCC 492, the matter was referred to “a larger Bench of not less than five Judges for hearing and deciding these matters”.
4. We heard the counsel at length on various issues which arise in these cases. One of the points which arises for consideration relates to the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. In State of Karnataka and Anr. Etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and Anr. Etc.3 validity of Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was challenged and the question which arose was whether the State Government could acquire and then transfer counter-signed portions of Inter State permits to Road Transport Corporation. Two judgments were delivered in that case. Krishna Iyer, J. for himself and two other learned Judges, while concurring with the decision of Untwalia, J. (with whom three other Judges agreed), interpreted Article 39(b) of the Constitution and then came to the conclusion that the Act had direct nexus with Article 39(b) and by virtue of Article 31C its validity could not be challenged on the ground of its being violative of Article 14 or 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Untwalia, J. in his judgment observed that “we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion with reference of Article 31C read with clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. Our learned brother, Krishna Iyer, J. has prepared a separate judgment specially dealing with this point. We must not be understood to agree with all that he has said in his judgment in this regard”.
5. The need to interpret Article 39(b) again arose in the case of Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Anr.4. While upholding the validity of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the two other connected enactments the Constitution Bench adopted the interpretation of Article 39(b) as enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case (supra). This interpretation has also been following by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan and Ors.5.
6. The interpretation put on Article 39(b) by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy’s case (supra) was not specifically assented to in the majority decision but in Sanjeev Coke’s case (supra) it is the observations in the judgment of Kishna Iyer, J. which have been followed.
7. Having heard the counsel at length, we are of the opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke’s case require reconsideration. Keeping in view the importance of the point in issue, namely, the interpretation of Article 39(b) it will be appropriate if these cases are heard by a larger Bench of not less than Seven Judges.
8. The papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.
(N.K.R.) Order for reference to larger Bench of 7 Judges.
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