2001 JTR(SC) 904
2002 ACJ 210 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 2112 ; 2001 2 JLJR(SC) 206 ; 2001 Supp1 JT 351 ; 2001 3 PLJR(SC) 167 ; 2001 2 RLW(Raj) 268 ; 2001 4 Scale 162 ; 2001 6 SCC 158 ; 2001 3 SCR 759 ; 2001 2 LRI 1251 ; 2002 2 TAC 144 ; 2001 AIRSCW 2112 ; 2001 KHC 1579 ; 2001 4 Supreme 302
2001(4) Supreme 302
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Patna High Court)
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & Y.K. Sabharwal, JJ.
Chandra Kanta Sinha -Appellant
versus
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3880 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16879/98)
Decided on 12-5-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : S.B. Sanyal, Sr. Advocate, Ranjan Mukherjee, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ms. K. Sharda Devi, Vishnu Mehra and B.K. Satija, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
LPA, under Clause 10 of Letters Patent of Patna, against Misc. Appeal decided by a Single Judge against motor accident claim to trial Court is maintainable.
Act Referred :MOTOR VEHICLES ACT : S.140
(A) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 140, governs claim cases arising from accidents involving motor vehicles, providing the statutory basis for the compensation claim instituted by the victims parents following a fatal accident. The appeal invokes the provisions of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, particularly Clause 10, read in conjunction with Article 225 of the Constitution, which confer appellate jurisdiction of the High Court over judgments of its single Judges. This Clause outlines the classes of judgments that are appealable and crucially excludes decrees or orders made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in a first appeal or those made in revisional jurisdiction. The provisions of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which bar appeals from certain second appeals, are also material in determining maintainability. These statutory and subordinate provisions collectively frame the scope of permissible appeals from single-judge orders to the Division Bench.
(B) The key legal principles elucidated include the classification of judgments under the Letters Patent into appealable and non-appealable categories, the exclusion of second appeals from Letters Patent protection, the interplay between statutory appeals and Letters Patent appeals, and the threshold requirement of a fit case declaration for an appeal to lie. The judgment emphasizes that an appeal under Clause 10 is maintainable only when the impugned judgment is not barred by specific provisions such as Section 100A CrPC and does not fall within the excluded categories of appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
Facts of the case:
A truck owner was involved in an accident on February 1, 1996, causing the death of Pradeep Kumar. The victims parents filed a claim case under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. An interim compensation order of Rs. 50,000 was passed by the trial judge, which the insurance company challenged. A single judge of the Patna High Court allowed the challenge via an appeal filed under the Letters Patent. The Division Bench later held the appeal non-maintainable, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court determined that the impugned order was passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction as a second appeal. It clarified that Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent does not prohibit such an appeal if it satisfies the fit case criterion, and that Section 100A of the CrPC does not bar the present appeal because the impugned order was passed by a single judge in a second appeal on a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, the Division Benchs order was set aside, and the Letters Patent Appeal was deemed maintainable.
Issues:
The primary issue was whether a Letters Patent Appeal filed against a single-judge order passed in a second appeal on a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable under Clause 10 of the Patna High Court Letters Patent.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court held that Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent permits an appeal to the Division Bench from a single-judge judgment in a second appeal, provided the judgment is not barred by Section 100A CrPC and falls outside the excluded categories of appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The court ruled that the appeal was maintainable as it did not fall within the ambit of the exclusions, thereby restoring the appeal to the High Court for merits.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, the Letters Patent Appeal is restored to the file of the High Court, and the High Court is directed to decide the appeal on its merits.
(A) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 140, governs claim cases arising from accidents involving motor vehicles, providing the statutory basis for the compensation claim instituted by the victims parents following a fatal accident. The appeal invokes the provisions of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, particularly Clause 10, read in conjunction with Article 225 of the Constitution, which confer appellate jurisdiction of the High Court over judgments of its single Judges. This Clause outlines the classes of judgments that are appealable and crucially excludes decrees or orders made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in a first appeal or those made in revisional jurisdiction. The provisions of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which bar appeals from certain second appeals, are also material in determining maintainability. These statutory and subordinate provisions collectively frame the scope of permissible appeals from single-judge orders to the Division Bench.
(B) The key legal principles elucidated include the classification of judgments under the Letters Patent into appealable and non-appealable categories, the exclusion of second appeals from Letters Patent protection, the interplay between statutory appeals and Letters Patent appeals, and the threshold requirement of a fit case declaration for an appeal to lie. The judgment emphasizes that an appeal under Clause 10 is maintainable only when the impugned judgment is not barred by specific provisions such as Section 100A CrPC and does not fall within the excluded categories of appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
Facts of the case:
A truck owner was involved in an accident on February 1, 1996, causing the death of Pradeep Kumar. The victims parents filed a claim case under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. An interim compensation order of Rs. 50,000 was passed by the trial judge, which the insurance company challenged. A single judge of the Patna High Court allowed the challenge via an appeal filed under the Letters Patent. The Division Bench later held the appeal non-maintainable, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court determined that the impugned order was passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction as a second appeal. It clarified that Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent does not prohibit such an appeal if it satisfies the fit case criterion, and that Section 100A of the CrPC does not bar the present appeal because the impugned order was passed by a single judge in a second appeal on a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, the Division Benchs order was set aside, and the Letters Patent Appeal was deemed maintainable.
Issues:
The primary issue was whether a Letters Patent Appeal filed against a single-judge order passed in a second appeal on a claim case under the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable under Clause 10 of the Patna High Court Letters Patent.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court held that Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent permits an appeal to the Division Bench from a single-judge judgment in a second appeal, provided the judgment is not barred by Section 100A CrPC and falls outside the excluded categories of appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The court ruled that the appeal was maintainable as it did not fall within the ambit of the exclusions, thereby restoring the appeal to the High Court for merits.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, the Letters Patent Appeal is restored to the file of the High Court, and the High Court is directed to decide the appeal on its merits.
JUDGMENT
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.-Leave is granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in L.P.A. No. 599 of 1998 dated July 2, 1998 holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable.
3. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is : whether the Letters Patent Appeal No. 599 of 1998 filed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court passed in M.A.No. 494 of 1996 dated April 13, 1998, is maintainable.
4. The following resume of the facts will be helpful in appreciating the question.
5. The appellant is the owner of a truck which met with an accident, on February 1, 1996, resulting in the death of one Pradeep Kumar. The parents of the victim filed a Claim Case No. 31 of 1996 under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. On October 15, 1996, the learned Trial Judge, Madhubani, Bihar ordered that interim compensation of Rs. 50,000/- be paid to the claimants by the Insurance Company within one month. Against that order, M.A.No. 494 of 1996 was filed by the Insurance Company, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on April 13, 1998. It was from that order that the Letters Patent Appeal arose, which was held to be not maintainable by the Division Bench of the High Court.
6. Mr. S.B. Sanyal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna an appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge would lie to the High Court which was erroneously dismissed as not maintainable. He relied on a decision of this Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd.1.
7. Mr. Vishnu Mehra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, relying on the judgment of this Court in New Kcnilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Orissa State Finance Corporation & Ors.2 argued that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and the High Court had rightly rejected the same.
8. It will be useful to refer to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, Patna, which, after omitting the words not necessary for the present discussion, would read thus :
"That an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction.........) of one Judge of the said High Court......... that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act (Article 225 of the Constitution of India) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declared that the case is a fit one for appeal......"
9. It can thus be seen that for purposes of appeal, under this clause, judgments of one Judge of the High Court of Patna are classified in two groups. In the first group fall judgments from which appeal will lie to the said High Court. From this group two categories of judgments of one Judge of the High Court are excluded (i) a judgment passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, that is, where a judgment is passed by a Judge of the High Court in second appeal, no Letters Patent Appeal lies in the said High Court; and (ii) from an order or judgment made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The second group takes in judgments of one Judge passed in second appeal where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. But now Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars an appeal under the Letters Patent from the judgment of one Judge of a High Court passed in second appeal even with the leave of the Judge who passed the judgment.
10. In Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai & Anr. v. State Bank of India3 , the question before a three-Judge Bench of this Court was whether the Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment and order of Single Judge of the Bombay High Court passed in an appeal under Section 218-D of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, was maintainable. It was held that the appeal under Section 218-D of the said Act was a second appeal against the appellate order made by the Additional Chief Judge, Small Causes Court. In view of Section 100A CPC, Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge passed in the second appeal was not maintainable.
11. In National Sewing Thread (supra), the case arose from the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The first appeal against the order of the Registrar was filed under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 before the High Court which was decided by a learned Single Judge. No procedure was prescribed as to the hearing of the appeal under that Act. The question that arose for consideration was : whether the judgment of the learned Single Judge was appealable to the Division Bench under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, Bombay. It was held that the High Court had to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under Section 76 of the said Act in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction was exercised by a Single Judge, his judgment was appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
12. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court has been the subject-matter of consideration of a two-Judge Bench of this Court (of which I was a member) in a recent case - Employer in Relation to Management of Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.4. After noticing that clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras is in iisdem terminis clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Allahabad, Patna, Punjab & Haryana and Madhya Pradesh; the Court laid down as follows :
"The above analysis of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will equally apply to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna. It follows that an appeal shall lie to a larger Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The following categories of judgment are excluded from the appealable judgments under the first limb of clause 10 of the Letters Patent:
(i) a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to Superintendence of the said High Court; in other words, no letters patent appeal lies to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court passed in second appeal;
(ii) an order made by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction; and
(iii) a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of power under the provisions of Section 107 of Government of India Act, 1915 (now Article 227 of the Constitution of India) or in exercise of criminal jurisdiction."
13. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, argued that clause 10 provides that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court only from "a judgment passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction not being a judgment passed in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction" and as the judgment of the learned Single Judge was passed in the appellate jurisdiction, a Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. In our view, the contention of the learned counsel is based on a mis-reading of clause 10. He has overlooked the vital words, namely, in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court" in the first limb of clause 10. If those words are also read along with the words relied upon by the learned counsel, it becomes clear that the appellate jurisdiction mentioned therein refers to a second appeal under Section 100 CPC (or under any provision of an special Act) which is in respect of decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in the first appeal, filed under Section 96 CPC, (or under any provision of an special Act) by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. In other words, from a judgment passed by one judge in second appeal, under Section 100 CPC or any other provision of an special Act no Letters Patent Appeal will lie to the High Court provided the second appeal was against a decree or order of a District Judge or a subordinate judge or any other judge subject to the superintendence of the High Court passed in a first appeal under Section 96 CPC or any other provision of an special Act.
14. In New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. case (supra), aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court passed under Order 39, Rules (1) and (2), an appeal under Section 104(1) CPC read with Order 43, Rule 1(r) was filed before the High Court which was disposed of by one Judge of the High Court. From the order/judgment of one Judge, a letters patent appeal (second appeal) was filed before the Division Bench under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Orissa High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. Having regard to the provision of Section 104(2), the appeal before the Division Bench was barred. On appeal to this Court it was held :
"As held earlier, the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the statute having expressly prohibited the filing of second appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 104, the right of appeal provided under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would not be available".
Therefore, reliance on the judgment of this Court in New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. case (supra) will be of no avail to the respondents.
15. From the above discussion, it follows that the appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge in M.A.No. 494 of 1996 dated April 13, 1998 would lie before the Division Bench under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Letters Patent Appeal No. 599 of 1998 is, therefore, maintainable. The order of the High Court under challenge is set aside. The Letters Patent Appeal is restored to the file of the High Court. The High Court will now decide the said letters patent appeal on merits in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed accordingly.
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