2001 JTR(SC) 955
2001 AIR(SC) 2582 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 2809 ; 2001 44 AllLR 577 ; 2001 4 AllMR(SC) 254 ; 2001 3 AWC 2353 ; 2001 3 BBCJ(SC) 16 ; 2001 4 BomLR 296 ; 2001 4 CivLJ 107 ; 2001 3 CTC 763 ; 2002 173 CTR 300 ; 2001 132 ELT 15 ; 2001 4 ICC 121 ; 2002 253 ITR 798 ; 2001 3 JCR(SC) 82 ; 2001 2 JLJR(SC) 535 ; 2001 5 JT 608 ; 2002 1 KLT(SN) 76 ; 2002 25 MTJ 646 ; 2001 2 PLJ 373 ; 2001 3 PLR(SC) 25 ; 2001 3 RCR(Civ) 831 ; 2001 4 Scale 506 ; 2001 9 SCC 106 ; 2001 3 SCR 1053 ; 2001 5 SLT 366 ; 2002 125 STC 375 ; 2002 122 Taxman 114 ; 2001 2 UJ 1481 ; 2001 WLC 608 ; 2002 KHC 292 ; 2001 5 Supreme 266
2001(5) Supreme 266
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & S.N. Phukan, JJ.
Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil -Appellant
versus
Shantaram Baburao Patil & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4494 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19434 of 2000)
Decided on 20-7-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A.P. Mayee, Ms. Rucha Mayee, Advocate for S.V. Tambwekar, Advocate/Advocates.
For the Respondents : S.U.K. Sagar, Sanjay V. Kharde and Naresh Kumar, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
In exercising discretion under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Depending upon facts in the later case the Court should follow a liberal approach to condone delay.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE : S.115
LIMITATION ACT : S.5
(A) The appeal pertains to condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the interplay of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically Section 115, and the Limitation Act, Section 5. The appellate court examined whether the delay was justified and whether the principles of substantial justice required liberal exercise of discretion, emphasizing that the expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed progressively to advance justice.
(B) Key legal principles include that discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised pragmatically, distinguishing between inordinate and short delays, and that a delay of a few days may be condoned liberally without strict adherence to prejudice considerations. The court must advance substantial justice while construing 'sufficient cause' broadly, as reiterated in prior precedents.
Facts of the case:
The appellant moved for condonation of a seven-day delay in filing an appeal against an order of the trial court. The motion was dismissed by the Additional District Judge relying on the delay and the appellant's illness as reasons, while noting that the court vacation period was overlooked.
Findings of Court:
The learned Civil Judge erred by not appreciating that the court was in vacation during the relevant period and by not adopting a liberal approach to such a short delay. The application for condonation was wrongly dismissed in view of the principles of substantial justice and the need to minimize delay.
Issues:
Whether the delay of seven days was sufficient to attract denial of condonation and whether the appellate court correctly applied the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi:
A short delay in filing an appeal, especially when motivated by a desire to minimize delay and where no prejudice is caused, warrants liberal exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, read with Section 115 of the CPC, and the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a broad, progressive interpretation.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is restored to the file of the Civil Judge, and the matter is directed to be decided on merits without costs.
(A) The appeal pertains to condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the interplay of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically Section 115, and the Limitation Act, Section 5. The appellate court examined whether the delay was justified and whether the principles of substantial justice required liberal exercise of discretion, emphasizing that the expression 'sufficient cause' must be construed progressively to advance justice.
(B) Key legal principles include that discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised pragmatically, distinguishing between inordinate and short delays, and that a delay of a few days may be condoned liberally without strict adherence to prejudice considerations. The court must advance substantial justice while construing 'sufficient cause' broadly, as reiterated in prior precedents.
Facts of the case:
The appellant moved for condonation of a seven-day delay in filing an appeal against an order of the trial court. The motion was dismissed by the Additional District Judge relying on the delay and the appellant's illness as reasons, while noting that the court vacation period was overlooked.
Findings of Court:
The learned Civil Judge erred by not appreciating that the court was in vacation during the relevant period and by not adopting a liberal approach to such a short delay. The application for condonation was wrongly dismissed in view of the principles of substantial justice and the need to minimize delay.
Issues:
Whether the delay of seven days was sufficient to attract denial of condonation and whether the appellate court correctly applied the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi:
A short delay in filing an appeal, especially when motivated by a desire to minimize delay and where no prejudice is caused, warrants liberal exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, read with Section 115 of the CPC, and the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a broad, progressive interpretation.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is restored to the file of the Civil Judge, and the matter is directed to be decided on merits without costs.
ORDER
Leave is granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench in Civil Revision Application No. 884 of 1999 dated August 7, 2000, declining to interfere with the order of the Additional District Judge, Amalner, dated March 16, 1998 dismissing Misc. Civil Application No. 21 of 1997. The appellant made that application for condonation of delay of 7 days in filing the appeal against the order of the trial Court in Special C.S.No. 5/95 on the file of the Civil Judge, S.D. Amalner.
4. A perusal of the order of the learned Civil Judge shows that he found fault with the appellant on two grounds : (i) the judgment under appeal was delivered on April 30, 1997 but the application for certified copy was made on June 5, 1997 and (ii) in regard to the averment in the affidavit, filed in support of the application, her illness was given as a reason for the delay; it was pointed out that while she was still ill she filed the appeal. For those two reasons the application to condone the delay of seven days in filing the appeal was dismissed. It appears that the fact that during the period from May 1, 1997 to June 1, 1997 the Court was in vacation, has escaped the attention of the learned Appellate Judge. To avert further delay in filing the appeal as soon as she felt a little better she filed the appeal. This depicts her anxiety to minimise the delay rather than falsity of her case or mala fides.
5. In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression sufficient cause , the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. In our view in this case, the approach of the learned Civil Judge is wholly erroneous and his order is unsustainable. It is evident that the discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is exercised by the Civil Judge in contravention of the law laid down by this Court, that the expression sufficient cause should receive liberal construction, in catena of decisions (see State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors.1 and Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi & Ors.2. The High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC failed to correct the jurisdictional error of the Appellate Court.
6. For the aforementioned reasons, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court as well as that of the Civil Judge, Amalner (the appellate Court), condone the delay of seven days in filing the appeal, restore the appeal to the file of the Civil Judge and direct the learned Civil Judge, Amalner to decide the appeal on merits.
7. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.
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