2001 JTR(SC) 1057
2001 AIR(SC) 2788 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 2924 ; 2001 AllLJ 2038 ; 2001 3 AWC 2402 ; 2001 3 CLR 259 ; 2001 91 FLR 105 ; 2001 3 GLR 2642 ; 2001 3 JCR(SC) 130 ; 2001 2 JLJR(SC) 571 ; 2001 6 JT 239 ; 2001 3 KLT(SN) 11 ; 2001 LIC 2861 ; 2001 2 LLJ 1249 ; 2001 4 LLN 6 ; 2001 3 RLW(Raj) 416 ; 2001 4 RSJ 254 ; 2001 5 Scale 119 ; 2001 6 SCC 491 ; 2001 SCC(L&S) 984 ; 2001 SCR 369 ; 2001 3 SCT 1097 ; 2001 3 SLR 726 ; 2001 5 SLT 694 ; 2001 2 UJ 1456 ; 2001 3 UPLBEC 2473 ; 2001 KHC 852 ; 2001 5 Supreme 609

2001(5) Supreme 609
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
S. Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju, JJ.
P.C. Joshi -Appellant
versus
State of U.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5182 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5132 of 2000)
Decided on 8-8-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : P.P. Rao, Sr. Advocate, Raj Kumar Gupta, Sheo Kumar Gupta, Jai Mangal Wadi and A.N. Baradiyar, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Y.P. Singh, Ajay K. Agrawal, C. Siddharth, Mukesh Kumar Sharma and Ashok K. Srivastava, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
The findings recorded against appellant, a judicial officer, by the enquiry officer are totally vitiated for want of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence to support the charges of misconduct. High Court was wrong in dismissing writ petition. Petitioner is entitled to immediate reinstatment with continuity of service and all consequential benefits.

Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.235
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT : S.10(1)(a), S.11
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.436

(A) The Consumer Protection Act provisions read alongside constitutional safeguards under Article 235 and the Criminal Procedure Code framework govern the protection of judicial officers facing disciplinary inquiries. Section 10(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, read with Section 11, mandates that any inquiry against a judicial officer must be based on legally relevant material and cannot be driven by conjectures or extraneous motives, while Section 436 of the CrPC provides procedural safeguards. These provisions collectively ensure that quasi-judicial authorities exercise caution before initiating proceedings that could impair judicial independence or reputation.

(B) The core legal principles include that disciplinary action against judicial officers requires clear, legally relevant evidence of misconduct, recklessness, or corrupt motive; mere differences in legal conclusions or erroneous exercise of judicial power do not suffice. The High Court has a constitutional obligation to protect honest judicial officers from ill-conceived or motivated complaints, and initiating disciplinary proceedings without such material undermines judicial independence and erodes confidence in the judiciary.

Facts of the case:

An officer was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on complaints from lawyers, involving nine charges primarily related to bail orders granted in over 3,000 cases during a two-year tenure. An Enquiry Officer examined the merits of each charge and found that in several cases bail was properly granted or should have been granted, with no evidence of mala fide motives. The officer concluded that the allegations did not meet the threshold for misconduct.

Findings of Court:

The Enquiry Officers findings were held to be totally vitiated due to lack of legally acceptable or relevant evidence to support the charges. The court observed that the conclusions were based on conjectures and surmises rather than on material evidence, and no corrupt motive or misconduct affecting the officers integrity or reputation was established.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition despite the lack of material evidence; whether initiation of disciplinary proceedings on such inferences was permissible; and whether the officers orders reflecting a different legal view alone could constitute misconduct.

Ratio Decidendi:

Judicial officers are entitled to protection when exercising independent judicial functions, and disciplinary proceedings must be based on clear, legally relevant material demonstrating misconduct, recklessness, or corrupt motive. Mere erroneous exercise of judicial power or differences in legal conclusions do not warrant disciplinary action, as such action would undermine judicial independence and deter judicial officers from acting fearlessly.

Result:

The appeal was allowed, the High Court order was set aside, and the officer was directed to be immediately reinstated with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including arrears of salary, without any costs.

JUDGMENT

Rajendra Babu, J.-Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant. Certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant. After inquiry, he was held guilty of the charges and was ultimately terminated from service. A writ petition was filed by him in the High Court on the grounds, inter alia, that :

1. The charges levelled against him do not constitute misconduct; and

2. The findings recorded in the inquiry are based on conjectures and surmises and not on facts.

3. The High Court found that there was material for the inquiry officer to reach the conclusions adverse to the appellant and dismissed the writ petition.

4. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated, inter alia, on complaints made by two Advocates, namely, V.K. Tiwari and Rajiv Kumar Singh. Nine charges were levelled against the appellant, seven of them pertain to orders of bail granted in 19 cases. During his tenure of two years at Etah, the appellant is stated to have disposed of over 3,000 bail applications. Only 19 bail orders out of these 3000 bail applications were the subject matter of charge sheet. The Enquiry Officer, however, found that in 7 cases, orders of bail were properly granted and the charges were not proved to that extent. In four cases the charges are held to be partly proved. In one case, the appellant himself had recalled the order of bail after 1-1/2 months of the grant of bail on an application made by the complainant on the ground that the bail was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. In two other cases, according to the Enquiry Officer, bail ought to have been granted on the very first application, but it was granted on the second application. The Enquiry Officer took note of each one of the cases before him and re-examined whether bail should have been granted in each one of those cases or not. The parties concerned had not made any complaint in any one of the cases. On examination of each one of the charges in relation to grant of bail, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to consider the cases on merits. He found that there used to be a pattern in rejecting the first bail application and thereafter even in the absence of fresh ground, second bail application was entertained and bail had been granted or in certain other cases even in the first instance itself the bail ought to have been granted. Although we have been taken through the various charges levelled against the appellant in detail and the material placed before the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that inferences have been drawn only on the basis that either the applications had been rejected at earlier stage for grant of bail or such applications ought to have been granted at the first stage itself. However, no specific material was brought on record to show or prove that there were any mala fide or extraneous reasons on the part of the appellant in passing the orders.

5. The test to be adopted in such cases is as stated by this court in the cases of Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena1 and Union of India & Anr. v. K.K. Dhawan2. In K.J. Dhawan s case (supra), this Court indicated the basis upon which a disciplinary action can be initiated in respect of a judicial or a quasi judicial action as follows :

(i) where the judicial officer has conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;

(ii) that there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;

(iii) that if he has acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;

(iv) that if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(v) that if he had been actuated by corrupt motive.

6. Dealing with a matter of similar nature in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & Anr.3, the following observations were made by this Court :

"....While exercising control over the subordinate judiciary under the Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest, strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial officers which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, and if the judicial officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters, and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel secure, and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for the Rule of law. It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect its honest judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants." (p. 409)

7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been conducted by the Enquiry Officer, there is hardly any material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The Enquiry Officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan s case (supra) and A.N. Saxena s case (supra) that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.

8. There are other charges in respect of which the appellant was found to be guilty. One relates to grant of order of stay of disconnection of telephone for non-payment of Rs. 410/- to the Telephone Department in a consumer dispute filed by a senior government doctor. All that he did in his capacity as Incharge District Judge on the assumption that the District Judge being the ex-officio Chairman of the District Consumer Forum he could grant such an order and that too when one of the members of the Forum has placed the papers before him seeking for orders. At best it is a case of bona fide and erroneous exercise of judicial powers and that matter cannot be treated as misconduct at all. How the Enquiry Officer could arrive at a finding that it is falling in one of the categories mentioned above surpasses our comprehension.

9. The last charge is to the effect that the appellant had appointed a mali (gardener) on a temporary basis for a period of 3-12 months at a time when he was Incharge District Judge. The action of the appellant was too trivial to call for any action because the appointment made by him was not pursuant to any improper motives such as illegal gratification or otherwise. How the same amounts to misconduct is not clear to us at all except to state that he was only Incharge District Judge.

10. Thus we find that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are totally vitiated for want of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence to support the charges of misconduct. In the absence of any evidence, the Enquiry Officer could not have reached the conclusion in the manner he did, and these findings affirmed by the disciplinary authority also stand vitiated.

11. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to rely upon a number of decisions of this Court to indicate the scope of interference in matters of this nature. We have adverted to the broad principles attracted to a case of this nature which are sufficient for disposal. Hence, we do not refer to other decisions.

12. We, therefore, have no hesitation to allow this appeal, set aside the order made by the High Court and thereby allow the writ petition filed by the appellant, directing his immediate reinstatement in service with continuity of service and all consequential benefits such as payment of arrears of salary and other benefits. No costs.

(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed.

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