2001 JTR(SC) 1592
2002 AIR(SC) 224 ; 2001 AIR(SCW) 4885 ; 2002 1 CLR 339 ; 2002 93 FLR 310 ; 2002 1 JCR(SC) 301 ; 2001 10 JT 191 ; 2002 LIC 128 ; 2002 1 LLJ 819 ; 2002 2 LLN 33 ; 2002 1 RSJ 208 ; 2001 8 Scale 212 ; 2001 10 SCC 51 ; 2002 SCC(L&S) 720 ; 2002 1 SLR 355 ; 2002 2 UPLBEC 1121 ; 2001 KHC 1206 ; 2001 3 KLT(Online) 1014 ; 2001 8 Supreme 271
2001(8) Supreme 271
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
S. Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju, JJ.
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. -Appellant
versus
Rajendra Bhimrao Mandue & Ors. -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. of 2000
Decided on 20-11-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Atlaf Ahmed, additional Solicitor General, R.S.Hegde, Somiran Sharma, Prashant Jain, Advocoates for K.R.Nagaraja, Advocate (NP).
For the Respondents : Shrish Kumar Mishra, Advocate.
Act Referred :SERVICE JURISPRUDENCE : .
(A) The relevant statutory framework is derived from the Service Jurisprudence, which provides the interpretive context for the case. The appeal challenges the setting aside of a selection list for the post of Drivers, where the impugned circular introduced new criteriaspecifically, the weightage of 25% marks for the allotment by the Selection Committeeafter the selection process had commenced. The validity of this circular was contested on grounds that it was arbitrary, illegal, and not retrospective, and that earlier circulars, namely Circular No. 52 of 1980 and Circular No. 23.1.95, should have governed the process. The High Court held that the later circular could not be applied to ongoing selections, as altering criteria mid-process would undermine the integrity of the procedure already initiated. The Supreme Court, in turn, examined the interplay between statutory rules and departmental circulars where no specific statutory provisions existed, emphasizing that such circulars must maintain consistency with established procedures and not disrupt an ongoing selection exercise.
(B) Key legal principles include: departmental circulars must not arbitrarily alter selection criteria once a selection process has commenced; the weightage assigned to different components of selection (e.g., written test, interview, driving test) must be predetermined and adhered to; and the doctrine of equity may apply to avoid hardship where the conduct of the process has been irregular. The court also underscored that mala fide or bias must be specifically alleged and substantiated to warrant setting aside selections.
Facts of the case:
The appellants, a state transport corporation, issued an advertisement for recruitment of Drivers and Conductors. Ten petitioners, who met the eligibility criteria, applied and were shortlisted for a Driving Test and subsequent personal interview. A selection list was prepared and displayed, allegedly giving 25% marks for the Selection Committees assessment, which the petitioners challenged as arbitrary. They contended that earlier circulars prescribing a 60-40 weightage between written test and interview, and excluding a driving test, should have governed the process. The High Court set aside the selection list, directing that the petitioners claims be reconsidered.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found that Circular No. 17 of 1996 was neither arbitrary nor illegal and was a valid clarification of earlier circulars. It held that the High Court was not justified in striking it down, as the circular did not violate any statutory or higher-order policy. However, the court acknowledged that introducing new criteria mid-process was inappropriate and could not be applied retrospectively to the pending selections.
Issues:
Whether Circular No. 17/1996 was legally valid and applicable to the selection in question; whether the High Court erred in setting aside the selection list; and whether the writ petitioners claims should be reconsidered under the earlier criteria or adjusted on grounds of equity.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that while the later circular was not per se invalid, it could not be applied to an ongoing selection process as it would amount to changing the rules mid-game. The appropriate remedy was to adjust equities by considering the petitioners claims alongside those of selected candidates, rather than setting aside the entire selection.
Result:
The appeal was allowed to the extent of setting aside the High Courts order that had invalidated the selection list. The selection list for the drivers was restored, and the petitioners claims were to be considered for appointment based on their performance, provided they were medically fit.
(A) The relevant statutory framework is derived from the Service Jurisprudence, which provides the interpretive context for the case. The appeal challenges the setting aside of a selection list for the post of Drivers, where the impugned circular introduced new criteriaspecifically, the weightage of 25% marks for the allotment by the Selection Committeeafter the selection process had commenced. The validity of this circular was contested on grounds that it was arbitrary, illegal, and not retrospective, and that earlier circulars, namely Circular No. 52 of 1980 and Circular No. 23.1.95, should have governed the process. The High Court held that the later circular could not be applied to ongoing selections, as altering criteria mid-process would undermine the integrity of the procedure already initiated. The Supreme Court, in turn, examined the interplay between statutory rules and departmental circulars where no specific statutory provisions existed, emphasizing that such circulars must maintain consistency with established procedures and not disrupt an ongoing selection exercise.
(B) Key legal principles include: departmental circulars must not arbitrarily alter selection criteria once a selection process has commenced; the weightage assigned to different components of selection (e.g., written test, interview, driving test) must be predetermined and adhered to; and the doctrine of equity may apply to avoid hardship where the conduct of the process has been irregular. The court also underscored that mala fide or bias must be specifically alleged and substantiated to warrant setting aside selections.
Facts of the case:
The appellants, a state transport corporation, issued an advertisement for recruitment of Drivers and Conductors. Ten petitioners, who met the eligibility criteria, applied and were shortlisted for a Driving Test and subsequent personal interview. A selection list was prepared and displayed, allegedly giving 25% marks for the Selection Committees assessment, which the petitioners challenged as arbitrary. They contended that earlier circulars prescribing a 60-40 weightage between written test and interview, and excluding a driving test, should have governed the process. The High Court set aside the selection list, directing that the petitioners claims be reconsidered.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court found that Circular No. 17 of 1996 was neither arbitrary nor illegal and was a valid clarification of earlier circulars. It held that the High Court was not justified in striking it down, as the circular did not violate any statutory or higher-order policy. However, the court acknowledged that introducing new criteria mid-process was inappropriate and could not be applied retrospectively to the pending selections.
Issues:
Whether Circular No. 17/1996 was legally valid and applicable to the selection in question; whether the High Court erred in setting aside the selection list; and whether the writ petitioners claims should be reconsidered under the earlier criteria or adjusted on grounds of equity.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that while the later circular was not per se invalid, it could not be applied to an ongoing selection process as it would amount to changing the rules mid-game. The appropriate remedy was to adjust equities by considering the petitioners claims alongside those of selected candidates, rather than setting aside the entire selection.
Result:
The appeal was allowed to the extent of setting aside the High Courts order that had invalidated the selection list. The selection list for the drivers was restored, and the petitioners claims were to be considered for appointment based on their performance, provided they were medically fit.
JUDGMENT
Raju, J.-The appellants, the Maharashtra State road Transport Corporation and authorities of the said Corporation, challenge the judgment dated 7.5.1997 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, in W.P. No 2053 of 1996, sustaining a challenge made to the selection list for appointment of Drivers - displayed on 26.7.1996 and as a consequence thereof, set aside the said selection list while declaring that the claims of the ten petitioners are also to be considered for selection to the post of Drivers. In coming to the said conclusion, the Division Bench of the High Court held that the claims have to be considered in terms of Circular No.15/95 dated 4.4.1995 which was said to be in force when the applications were called for and that Circular No.17/96 dated 24.6.1996 has got to be ignored as being arbitrary, illegal and, at any rate, not retrospective in effect.
2. The third appellant issued an advertisement, inviting applications for the posts of Drivers and Conductors in the Newspapers on 20.9.1995, and the ten persons, who were petitioners before the High Court, applied for the post of Drivers along with several others. Since the Writ Petitioners were found to satisfy the requisite qualifications and experience, they were called for Driving Test, were again called for personal interview by a letter dated 3.7.1996, which was held on 26.7.1996. Thereafter, the selection list was also said to have been displayed by the third respondent on 26.7.1996. The grievance of the Writ Petitioners before the High Court was that the Selection Committee, which conducted the personal interview, exercised the power of allotment of 25% marks, arbitrarily and in such a manner that the marks obtained in the Driving Test lost significance. It was also the grievance of the Writ Petitioners that the Circulars, which really should govern the selection, are those dated 23.1.1995 and 4.4.1995 and not the one dated 24.6.1996. As noticed earlier, the grievance espoused found favour of acceptance with the High Court, resulting in this appeal.
3. Shri Atalf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General, for the appellants and Shri shrish Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the private party respondents, were heard. We have been taken through the different Circular Orders on which either party staked their respective claims and contentions. Certain case law was also brought to our notice. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel on either side.
4. During the relevant point of time and in respect of the selections in question, there are no statutory Rules or Regulations to govern the selections and it is the common stand that only Circular Orders issued by the Corporation governed the same. Circular No. 52 of 1980 dated 21.8.1980 contained instructions relating to the constitution of Screening Committees for selection of Drivers with effect from 1.11.1980, at the Regional Level and the procedure to be adopted therefor. The same was provided for initial screening of candidates with reference to the applications submitted by verification of the credentials on the basis of qualifications and past experience. Thereupon, the candidates have to undergo physical examination in respect of height, weight, measurements, etc. Thereafter, one has to undergo Driving test and finally Personal Interview. The next Circular relevant and brought to our no tice is dated 23.1.1995 and in this Circular, after adverting to the Resolution of the Board of the Corporation dated 26.8.1992 in para 4, it was stated as follows:-
"Taking into consideration the above facts, it is informed by this circular again that the procedure laid down by the Corporation in the matter of taking into consideration 60% marks obtained in the written test/trade test and 40% marks obtained in their personal interview, both should be taken into consideration while preparing the final selection list, and this procedure should be followed strictly. The same procedure should be followed while preparing the final selection list for the post of Driver. The final list of the marks obtained during the test taken by the second Scrutiny Committee will be required for preparing the final selection list. Thereforem the said list of the marks obtained should be treated as confidential and should be in the custody of the Divisional Controller. After the meeting of the sub-selection committee is over, the final selection list should be prepared after giving weightage of 60% as instructed earlier.
There can be no controversy or dispute over those Circular Orders.
5. The serious dispute and controversy raised relates to the claim of the Corporation that the circular No.17 of 1996 dated 24.6.1996, only came to be issued by way of clarification and it was not only necessary to be issued but also governed the selection of Drivers in question. The writ Petitioners, who were unsuccessful, asserted that it is the Circular dated 4.4.1995 which should govern the selection and consequently the selections ought to have been made by assinging 87½ % marks for Written/Trade Test and 12½ % for the oral test (personal Interview) and results declared, accordingly. On going through the above Circular Orders, we find that the procedure for recruitment of Drivers is separate from recruitment for other categories where Written Test/Trade Test has been specifically laid down and that it is only where the Written Test and Interview are stipulated, the percentage of weightage for written test/Interview has been resolved by the Board, under the directions of the State government, to be fixed at 87.5% and 12.5% respectively. The directions of the State Government in their Letter dated 2.1.1995 only fixes the weightage to be given between marks obtained in Written Test and those in Interview and no reference is found therein of any trade Test or Driving Test. The resolution of the Board dated 21.3.1995 also seems to be on the same lines and is with reference to marks obtained in Wrtten Test and Interview respectively and not otherwise. Apparently, in view of the above and in the absence of reference to Driving Test or other Trade Test too, that the Corporation claims to have issued the Circular Order No.17/1996 dated 24.6.1996, on the basis of the earlier circulars Nos.52/80 for pass in Driving test to be presented to the S.T.Committee and 25/90 dated 2.7.1990 pertaining to award of marks in the interview, by fixing the average of the marks awarded by the S.T.Sub-Committee to be the final and deciding factor in the matter of selection of a candidate. Therefore, the High Court cannot be said to be correct in holding that the Circular Order dated 24.6.1996 is illegal or arbitrary or against the orders of the State Government or the Resolution of the Board of the Transport corporation. Instead, it would have been well open to the High Court to have declared that the criteria sought to be fixed by the Circular dated 24.6.1996 as the sole determinative of the merit or grade of a acandidate for selection long after the last date fixed for receipt of application and in the middle of the course of selection process (since in this case the Driving Test was stated to have been conducted on 27.11.1995) cannot be applied to the selections under consideration and challenged before the High Court. It has been repeatedly held by this court that the games of the rules meaing thereby, that the criteria for selection cannot be altered by the authorities concerned in the middle or after the process of selection has commened. Therefore, the decision of the High Court, to the extent it pronounced upon the invalidity of the circular orders dated 24.6.1996, does not merit acceptance in our hand and the same are set aside.
6. We have held that the circular orders dated 24.6.1996 will have no relevance or application to the selections in question, undertaken pursuant to the advertisement issued on 20.9.1995. it has also been noticed by us that the circular order dated 4.4.1995, on the face of it, will apply only in cases where the selection has to be finalized on the basis of any Written Examination and Itnerview. There being no written Examination for selection of Drivers for appointment, the selection process has to be on the basis of only circular orders dated 21.8.1980 and 23.1.1995. These aspects were left to lie in a nebulous state, leaving much for assumptions on either side to be possible. This should have been averted by the Corporation, by proper and appropriate action at the crucial and relevant point of time before setting the selection process in motion. It is High time that the Board takes up this for consideration resolve it by an appropriate decision. For such lapses, neither the candidates, who got selected and appointed, nor the writ petitioners, who lost in the selection, could be entirely blamed. The writ petitioners also have no chosen either to allege or substantiate any malafides orbias against any member of the Selection Committee, except making a grievance that within the course of the time available on a single day about 322 applicants could not have properly subjected to interview for assessment ofmerits or assignment of marks for selection. The learned counsel for the appellants would seek to place reliance upon the decisions of this court reported in Sardara Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [(1991) 4 SCC 555] and Madan Lal & Ors. vs. State of J & K & Ors. [(1995) 3 SCC 486] to contend that such contentions are not sufficient to warrant interference with the selections made.
7. On an overall consideration of all the above noticed factors, we are of the view that this is a case most suitable for adjustment of equities, taking into account the fate of the Drivers, who already got appointed and serving all along though subject to the result of this appeal. The writ petitioners are only ten in number and their claims may be considered for appointment favourably keeping into account their performance in driving Test and the marks obtained by them in the said test and Personal Interview and accommodate them unless they are medically found unfit to the posts. This would help to give a quietus to the controversies with reference to the selection on hand and avoid reopening the selection process to be undertaken afresh, dislocating the persons, who have been serving for quite some substantial period.
8. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the decision of the High Court, insofar as it set aside selections published on 26.7.1996, is set aside. No costs.
(N.K.R.) Appeal allowed accordingly.
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