2003 JTR(SC) 609
2003 8 AIC 15 ; 2003 AIR(SC) 2661 ; 2003 AIR(SCW) 3387 ; 2003 AllLJ 1874 ; 2003 4 AWC 2871 ; 2004 1 CalLJ(SC) 151 ; 2003 98 FLR 602 ; 2003 3 JCR(SC) 183 ; 2003 6 JT 184 ; 2003 3 KLT(SN) 61 ; 2003 4 LLN 18 ; 2003 4 RSJ 208 ; 2003 5 Scale 255 ; 2003 11 SCC 584 ; 2004 SCC(L&S) 95 ; 2003 Supp1 SCR 528 ; 2003 3 SCT 619 ; 2003 5 SLR 82 ; 2003 3 UPLBEC 2240 ; 2003 KHC 1334 ; 2003 4 Supreme 573
2003(4) Supreme 573
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju & Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
Ashwani Kumar Singh -Appellant
versus
U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4571 of 2003
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11503 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal No. 4572 of 2003
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19813 of 1998)
Decided on 14-7-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : A. Sharan, Sr. Advocate and Irshad Ahmad, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Shail Kumar Dwivedi, R.C. Verma, Mukesh Verma and Manish Shanker, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
If employer fixes a cut off position for selection of candidates for the posts, same is not to be lightly tinkered with unless it is totally irrational or tainted with mala fides.
Act Referred :SERVICE LAW : .
(A) The relevant statutory framework governing service appointments and recruitment procedures under the Service Law, read with the principles laid down in precedential jurisprudence, applies to this case where the validity of selections made through a competitive state examination is challenged. The provisions contemplate that appointments from a merit list must be made in accordance with prescribed categories and vacancies, and deviations require a clear legal basis and must not be arbitrary, especially when the appointment process involves carrying forward unfilled posts to subsequent years and making fresh selections. The statutory scheme mandates that decisions on appointments and non-appointments from a merit list are subject to judicial review for rationality, absence of mala fide, and adherence to the governing rules, while also respecting the finality of appointments once made under a subsequent valid exercise of authority.
(B) Key legal principles include that courts must not mechanically follow prior judicial observations without analyzing their factual applicability; precedent must be followed only to the extent it serves justice and aligns with the facts; and appointments from a merit list are governed by statutory provisions and rules of rationality and mala fides. The court emphasized that circumstantial variations can materially affect outcomes, and dismissals of petitions challenging appointment orders are proper where the selection process is bona fide, rational, and not tainted by arbitrariness.
Facts of the case:
The appellants appeared for the Combined State Services Examination of 1987, indicating preferences for Treasury Officer/Accounts Officer and Assistant Accounts Officer. The examination was conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission on requisition from the State of Uttar Pradesh for 40 vacancies across specified categories. Results were declared in 1989, with the appellants placed at different positions on the merit list. In 1990, one appellant made a representation citing unfilled vacancies and sought appointment from the waiting list, having already been appointed in another category, while the other appellant remained unappointed due to a lower rank. Writ petitions filed in 1992 before the Allahabad High Court challenged the non-appointment of the appellants, contending that vacancies should have been filled from the waiting list. The High Court rejected the petitions accepting the respondents submission that there was no continuing waiting list and that vacancies were filled through subsequent examinations, with non-appearance of impleaded parties not strengthening the appellants case.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the earlier decision in Jai Narain Ram v. State of U.P. did not lay down a universal rule requiring appointment from a waiting list merely because vacancies exist, given its distinct factual background relating to reserved categories. It observed that judicial observations are not to be treated as statutory provisions and must be read in context, emphasizing circumstantial flexibility and the dangers of mechanically applying prior decisions. The court held that the fixation of a cutoff position by the employer was not irrational or mala fide, especially where the unfilled posts were carried forward and subsequently filled through a valid selection process. It concluded that it would not be fair to disturb the settled position, particularly when later-appointed individuals had proceeded in the service, and that the appellants claims lacked merit.
Issues:
Whether a representation based on unfilled vacancies and a waiting list is maintainable when the vacancies have been filled through a subsequent valid examination; whether the principles laid down in Jai Narain Rams case apply to the present facts; whether the non-appointment of appellants from a merit list, years after the examination, can be rectified by judicial order; and whether the fixation of cutoff positions and the finality of appointments are immune from interference in the absence of mala fides or irrationality.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core judicial reasoning is that appointments from a merit list must be evaluated under the statutory scheme and principles of rationality and mala fides, and courts must carefully analyze whether prior precedential observations are factually in point. Mechanical reliance on earlier decisions without contextual analysis is inappropriate, and an employers reasonable exercise of discretion in fixing cutoffs and carrying forward vacancies is entitled to deference where the process is bona fide and the order has achieved finality through subsequent valid appointments.
Result:
Both appeals are dismissed with costs to be borne by the respective parties.
(A) The relevant statutory framework governing service appointments and recruitment procedures under the Service Law, read with the principles laid down in precedential jurisprudence, applies to this case where the validity of selections made through a competitive state examination is challenged. The provisions contemplate that appointments from a merit list must be made in accordance with prescribed categories and vacancies, and deviations require a clear legal basis and must not be arbitrary, especially when the appointment process involves carrying forward unfilled posts to subsequent years and making fresh selections. The statutory scheme mandates that decisions on appointments and non-appointments from a merit list are subject to judicial review for rationality, absence of mala fide, and adherence to the governing rules, while also respecting the finality of appointments once made under a subsequent valid exercise of authority.
(B) Key legal principles include that courts must not mechanically follow prior judicial observations without analyzing their factual applicability; precedent must be followed only to the extent it serves justice and aligns with the facts; and appointments from a merit list are governed by statutory provisions and rules of rationality and mala fides. The court emphasized that circumstantial variations can materially affect outcomes, and dismissals of petitions challenging appointment orders are proper where the selection process is bona fide, rational, and not tainted by arbitrariness.
Facts of the case:
The appellants appeared for the Combined State Services Examination of 1987, indicating preferences for Treasury Officer/Accounts Officer and Assistant Accounts Officer. The examination was conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission on requisition from the State of Uttar Pradesh for 40 vacancies across specified categories. Results were declared in 1989, with the appellants placed at different positions on the merit list. In 1990, one appellant made a representation citing unfilled vacancies and sought appointment from the waiting list, having already been appointed in another category, while the other appellant remained unappointed due to a lower rank. Writ petitions filed in 1992 before the Allahabad High Court challenged the non-appointment of the appellants, contending that vacancies should have been filled from the waiting list. The High Court rejected the petitions accepting the respondents submission that there was no continuing waiting list and that vacancies were filled through subsequent examinations, with non-appearance of impleaded parties not strengthening the appellants case.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the earlier decision in Jai Narain Ram v. State of U.P. did not lay down a universal rule requiring appointment from a waiting list merely because vacancies exist, given its distinct factual background relating to reserved categories. It observed that judicial observations are not to be treated as statutory provisions and must be read in context, emphasizing circumstantial flexibility and the dangers of mechanically applying prior decisions. The court held that the fixation of a cutoff position by the employer was not irrational or mala fide, especially where the unfilled posts were carried forward and subsequently filled through a valid selection process. It concluded that it would not be fair to disturb the settled position, particularly when later-appointed individuals had proceeded in the service, and that the appellants claims lacked merit.
Issues:
Whether a representation based on unfilled vacancies and a waiting list is maintainable when the vacancies have been filled through a subsequent valid examination; whether the principles laid down in Jai Narain Rams case apply to the present facts; whether the non-appointment of appellants from a merit list, years after the examination, can be rectified by judicial order; and whether the fixation of cutoff positions and the finality of appointments are immune from interference in the absence of mala fides or irrationality.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core judicial reasoning is that appointments from a merit list must be evaluated under the statutory scheme and principles of rationality and mala fides, and courts must carefully analyze whether prior precedential observations are factually in point. Mechanical reliance on earlier decisions without contextual analysis is inappropriate, and an employers reasonable exercise of discretion in fixing cutoffs and carrying forward vacancies is entitled to deference where the process is bona fide and the order has achieved finality through subsequent valid appointments.
Result:
Both appeals are dismissed with costs to be borne by the respective parties.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.
These two appeals involve identical issues and, therefore, are taken up together.
2. Factual position which is necessary to be noted for disposal of the appeals in a nutshell is as follows :
3. The appellants appeared at the Combined State Services Examination of 1987. They indicated the preference for appointment as Treasury Officer/Accounts Officer and also for Assistant Accounts Officer as required to be indicated in the application form. The examination was conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission ) on the basis of requisition made by the State of U.P. Requisition for 40 vacancies was sent by the State to the Commission in July 1987. Out of said 40 vacancies, 21 were meant for General category, while 7, 1, 2, 6, 2 and 1 vacancies were meant for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Dependents of Freedom Fighters, Backward Classes, Retrenched Emergency/Short Service Commission Military Officers, and Handicapped persons respectively. The Accounts service has two designated posts i.e. Accounts Officer/Treasury Officer and Assistant Accounts Officer. Results were declared on 29.12.1989. In the merit list, appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh was placed at Sl.No. 52 while appellant-Brij Nath Srivastava was placed much below.
4. On the basis of recommendations received from the Commission a list of 37 candidates was made available initially. Three other candidates were included on the basis of the order passed by the Allahabad High Court. All the three candidates relate to the Retrenched Military Officers category. As three selected candidates, one each from the general category, dependent of freedom fighters and scheduled tribe had already been appointed on the basis of examination held in 1986; names of three more candidates were included in the respective categories.
5. In 1990, appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh made a representation stating that on account of some selected candidates not joining, vacancies exist and since the merit list was effective for one year, persons in the waiting list should be appointed. Appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh in view of his placement in the select list had already been appointed as Assistant Accounts Officer. However, appellant-Brij Nath Srivastava was not appointed as his position was far below in the select list.
6. Writ petitions were filed in 1992 by the appellants before the Allahabad High Court. The writ petitions were filed on the foundation that the vacancies which arose on account of selected candidates not joining, should have been filled up and that having not been done, the appointments made subsequently were illegal. The claims were resisted by the State Government and the Commission. They took the stand that there was no waiting list as such and the vacancies were carried forward to the subsequent period as required in law and persons had already been appointed on the basis of subsequent examination. A belated attempt by the appellants to get appointment is not countenanced in law. The High Court accepted the plea of the respondents and rejected the writ petitions.
7. Mr. A. Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the course adopted by the State Government and the Commission is clearly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Jai Narain Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1996(1) SCC 332). It was also submitted that in several unreported judgments of the High Court, directions were given to fill up the posts on the basis of the waiting list and the stand taken by the State Government and the Commission is contrary to the factual position and in contravention of the High Court s view.
8. In response, learned counsel for the Commission and the State Government submitted that Jai Narain s case (supra) has no application to the facts of the case since there was no vacancy and the posts which fell vacant on account of selected candidates not joining have subsequently been filled up. Initially, those persons were not impleaded as parties. Subsequently, in view of the observations made by this Court on 11.12.2001 they were directed to be impleaded as parties. Their non appearance does not strengthen the appellants case.
9. It shall be necessary to first consider whether Jai Narain s case (supra) has application to the facts of the case. A bare reading of the judgment shows that it was rendered in a different factual and legal background, and related to non-appointment of persons belonging to reserved category. This is evident from even a cursory reading of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment. It has not laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever vacancy exists persons who are in the merit list perforce have to be appointed. Much would depend upon the statutory provisions governing the field. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the direction given in Jai Narain s case (supra) was not strictly on that basis. The plea has no substance as reading of the judgment goes to show otherwise.
10. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions, but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graying Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge."
11. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin s speech .... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062] observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. and if it were an Act of Parliament." In Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972(2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said :
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
12. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
13. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus :
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the board resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
xxx xxx xxx xxx
"Precedent would be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."
14. It is on record that a policy decision was taken to appoint candidates who had opted for Treasury Officer/Accounts Officer if their names were (included in the first 40 of the merit list. Admittedly, appellant-Ashwani Kumar was not so included and the position is worse in the case of other appellant-Brij Nath Srivastava. It is submitted that there is no logic for such fixation. Here again the plea is without substance. If the employer fixes a cut off position, same is not to be lightly tinkered with unless it is totally irrational or tainted with mala fides. Employer in its wisdom may consider a particular range of selection to be appropriate. It has not been shown as to how the fixation is irrational, much less mala fide. Additionally, it is noticed that the unfilled posts were carried forward to the next year and have been filled up on the basis of selection made by the Commission. Accepting the prayer of the appellants would mean that the position which has assumed a sort of finality for more than a decade would be unsettled. Persons who have been appointed on the basis of the subsequent examination has to give way to appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh. Though they had been impleaded but did not appear, it does not mean that something which is not permissible in law has to be done. It would not be fair to disturb the prevailing position. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh that he has already been promoted as Accounts Officer, and the only question left is of his seniority over those who were subsequently appointed. This plea is without any substance. Since he has been promoted later on, in the absence of any statutory prescription, person who has been appointed to the higher post earlier would be logically senior to him. The High Court was, therefore, justified in rejecting the writ petition filed by the appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh. So far as the other appellant-Brij Nath Srivastava is concerned, his claim is based on almost identical premises as that of Ashwani Kumar Singh. His name was far below in the select list. Therefore, he does not have a better case than that of appellant-Ashwani Kumar Singh whose stand has been negatived. Though he claims to be a candidate belonging to the background class, the posts have been filled up and his name finds place much below the zone of selected candidates. Both the appeals deserve dismissal, which we direct. However, parties shall bear their respective costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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