2003 JTR(SC) 833
2003 10 AIC 73 ; 2003 AIR(SC) 3720 ; 2003 AIR(SCW) 4233 ; 2003 5 AWC 4286 ; 2003 7 JT 502 ; 2003 4 RSJ 566 ; 2003 7 Scale 129 ; 2003 7 SCC 719 ; 2003 Supp3 SCR 275 ; 2004 1 SCT 117 ; 2003 UD 363 ; 2003 3 UPLBEC 2606 ; 2003 KHC 1571 ; 2003 6 Supreme 491
2003(6) Supreme 491
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
Brijesh Kumar and Arun Kumar, JJ.
Regional Officer, C.B.S.E. -Appellant
versus
Ku. Sheena Peethambaran and Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3068 of 1997
Decided on 1-9-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Tara Chand Sharma and Ms. Neelam Sharma, Advocates.
IMPORTNAT POINT
The Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of permitting the students to pursue their studies and to appear in the examination under the interim orders passed by the Courts.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226
(A) The constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was invoked to challenge an administrative decision of the Central Board of Secondary Education concerning the eligibility and examination participation of a student. The High Court intervened on grounds of sympathy and interim relief in a matter governed by statutory bye-laws and academic regulations, raising questions under principles of judicial review and administrative law. The case touches upon the limits of judicial discretion in academic matters and the necessity to adhere to procedural fairness and substantive eligibility norms as required by the Boards regulations and constitutional safeguards.
(B) Key legal principles include that courts must not substitute their discretion for that of academic or administrative authorities, interim relief cannot override clear eligibility requirements, and decisions must be based on objective criteria rather than sympathy. The court emphasized that condoning lapses undermines institutional discipline and academic standards, and that statutory compliance cannot be overridden by ad hoc benevolent orders.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was a student affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education who failed to clear class IX but was permitted by the school to appear for the class X examination. The Board withheld her admission on this ground, prompting a writ petition. The High Court passed several interim orders allowing her to take the exam and directing the Board to declare results and issue a fresh marks sheet, which the Board challenged.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was found to have acted without proper regard for the eligibility requirements and statutory bye-laws, and its orders were driven more by sympathy than by a principled assessment of the legal position. The Supreme Court held that such orders disturb academic discipline and adversely affect the integrity of the system.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in directing the Board to declare results and issue a fresh marks sheet despite the respondents ineligibility to appear for the examination, and whether judicial sympathy can override clear statutory and regulatory conditions.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court cannot override clear eligibility conditions and statutory requirements in academic matters, especially where the student does not meet the prerequisite qualifications. Sympathetic interim orders that ignore legal compliance undermine institutional discipline and are not sustainable; the correctness of the administrative decision must be upheld in the absence of jurisdictional or mala fide considerations.
Result:
The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and no order as to costs was made.
(A) The constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was invoked to challenge an administrative decision of the Central Board of Secondary Education concerning the eligibility and examination participation of a student. The High Court intervened on grounds of sympathy and interim relief in a matter governed by statutory bye-laws and academic regulations, raising questions under principles of judicial review and administrative law. The case touches upon the limits of judicial discretion in academic matters and the necessity to adhere to procedural fairness and substantive eligibility norms as required by the Boards regulations and constitutional safeguards.
(B) Key legal principles include that courts must not substitute their discretion for that of academic or administrative authorities, interim relief cannot override clear eligibility requirements, and decisions must be based on objective criteria rather than sympathy. The court emphasized that condoning lapses undermines institutional discipline and academic standards, and that statutory compliance cannot be overridden by ad hoc benevolent orders.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was a student affiliated with the Central Board of Secondary Education who failed to clear class IX but was permitted by the school to appear for the class X examination. The Board withheld her admission on this ground, prompting a writ petition. The High Court passed several interim orders allowing her to take the exam and directing the Board to declare results and issue a fresh marks sheet, which the Board challenged.
Findings of Court:
The High Court was found to have acted without proper regard for the eligibility requirements and statutory bye-laws, and its orders were driven more by sympathy than by a principled assessment of the legal position. The Supreme Court held that such orders disturb academic discipline and adversely affect the integrity of the system.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in directing the Board to declare results and issue a fresh marks sheet despite the respondents ineligibility to appear for the examination, and whether judicial sympathy can override clear statutory and regulatory conditions.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court cannot override clear eligibility conditions and statutory requirements in academic matters, especially where the student does not meet the prerequisite qualifications. Sympathetic interim orders that ignore legal compliance undermine institutional discipline and are not sustainable; the correctness of the administrative decision must be upheld in the absence of jurisdictional or mala fide considerations.
Result:
The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and no order as to costs was made.
JUDGMENT
Brijesh Kumar, J.- The Central Board of Secondary Education (for short the Board ), felt aggrieved by the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered on 2-7-1996 in writ petition No. 426 of 1996, filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, whereby directing the Board to declare the result of the examination undertaken by the respondent No. 1 for class X in the year 1996, hence the present appeal. In the impugned judgment it was also directed that a fresh marks-sheet be also issued to her, since the result had been declared earlier only provisionally. The grievance of the Board that the respondent No. 1 was not eligible to appear in the high school examination, was not accepted.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1 was a student of St. Paul s School, Morar, Gwalior, affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi. She filled up form for high school examination but the same was withheld by the school authorities on the ground that she had not cleared her class IX examination. It gave rise to filing of a writ petition No. 484/95 by respondents Nos. 1 and 2, the candidate and her father. On 4-4-95 an interim order was passed by the High Court to the following effect:-
"4.4.95
ORDER
(1) Notice of admission was given to the respondents.
(2) There is a report that respondents have refused the notice.
(3) Let a fresh notice be sent by way of registered post also and service be effected by affixation. The Notices be issued for 18th April, 1995.
(4) In para 11 of the Petition, it has been stated that the Petitioner was initially "promoted" but later on she was declared to have "failed". In this view of the matter, a direction is given to the respondents to permit the petitioner No. 2 to join Class X. This would be subject to the decision of this petition.
C.C. Today. Sd/-
T.S. Doabia
Judge"
Later yet another interim order was granted on 19-9-1995 in Writ Petition No. 484 of 1995 to the following effect:-
"19.9.1995
ORDER
Petitioner No. 2 be permitted to take part in the examination
To come up on the date already fixed.
Sd/- T.S. Doabia
Judge"
The Writ Petition No. 484/95 was thereafter disposed of by order dated 5-12-95, which reads as under:-
The order of the High Court was set aside. Another decision reported in 1993 (4) SCC 401, Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal, a three judge bench decision, was relied upon in the case of Sunil Kumar (supra). A passage from the above noted decision was also quoted therein which reads as follows:
"We are afraid that this kind of administration of interlocutory remedies, more guided by sympathy quite often wholly misplaced, does no service to anyone. From the series of orders that keep coming before us in academic matters, we find that loose, ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing judicial discretion to the criticism of degenerating into private benevolence. This is subversive of academic discipline, or whatever is left of it, leading to serious impasse in academic life. Admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. Decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensure from the interim order itself. In the present case, the High Court was apparently moved by sympathy for the candidates than by an accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. Such orders cannot be allowed to stand. The courts should not embarrass academic authorities by themselves taking over their functions.
Yet another decision referred to is reported in (1986) 2 SCC 667, A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. etc. etc., again a three judge bench decision. It was observed in this case:
"...We cannot by our fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws."
The above referred matter relates to the admission and examination of M.B.B.S. courses.
7. In the background of the law as laid down by this Court, we find that in the case in hand the fact situation was even worse as compared to the decision cited above. The student, namely, respondent No. 1 had failed to clear her class IX examination which was a necessary requirement as provided under the bye-laws of the Board so as to be entitled to appear in the class X examination conducted by the Board. Despite notice, no one has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents No. 1 and 2 to indicate any fact or circumstance so as to take any different view. Condoning the lapses or overlooking the legal requirements in consideration of mere sympathy factor does not solve the problem rather breeds more violations in the hope of being condoned. It disturbs the discipline of the system and ultimately adversely affects the academic standards.
8. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 2.7.1996 passed by the High Court in writ petition No. 426 of 1996. There would, however, be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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