2003 JTR(SC) 1317
2004 1 AICLR 870 ; 2003 AIR(SC) 1188 ; 2004 1 ALD(Cri)(SC) 464 ; 2005 Supp AllCriC 166 ; 2004 2 BomLR 357 ; 2004 1 CCR(SC) 6 ; 2004 2 CriCC 414 ; 2004 CriLR 242 ; 2003 1 Crimes(SC) 164 ; 2004 1 Crimes(SC) 164 ; 2004 CrLJ 919 ; 2004 3 JCR(SC) 227 ; 2004 1 JLJR(SC) 303 ; 2003 10 JT 164 ; 2003 10 Scale 1009 ; 2003 12 SCC 432 ; 2004 Supp SCC(Cri) 459 ; 2004 1 UD 357 ; 2004 1 WLC 411 ; 2003 8 Supreme 816
2003(8) Supreme 816
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court at Nagpur)
N. Santosh Hegde & B.P. Singh, JJ.
State of Maharashtra -Appellant
versus
Gajanan and Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1506-1507 of 2003
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2336-2337 of 2003)
Decided on 18-12-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Advocate.
For the Respondents : R.S. Lambat, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
It is only in very exceptional cases that appellate court should exercise power of stay of conviction also in the matter arising out of Prevention of Corruption Act.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE : S.389
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT : S.7
(A) The proceedings involve the interplay of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, where an order of conviction recorded by a Special Court was challenged. The High Court, while entertaining a criminal appeal, stayed not only the sentence but also the conviction, allowing the respondent public servant to continue in civil office despite the conviction. This Court held that such an order could not be sustained in view of the law declared in earlier decisions under the Act.
(B) The core legal principles are that the power to suspend an order of conviction under Section 389(1) is not alien but must be exercised only in very exceptional cases. A mere appeal does not justify staying the conviction, and the court has a duty to consider the ramifications of keeping the conviction in abeyance, especially in cases involving public servants convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Facts of the case:
A respondent public servant was convicted by a Special Court under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court, on appeal, stayed the conviction and allowed the respondent to continue holding a civil post. The State raised an objection, and a prior judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen was distinguished by the High Court.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in distinguishing the earlier judgment and in staying the conviction without identifying any exceptional facts. It failed to consider the duty to examine the ramifications of suspending the conviction and did not apply the law as laid down by this Court.
Issues:
Whether a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be stayed on appeal merely because the accused has filed an appeal, and whether the High Court had the facts to justify staying the conviction under the doctrine of exceptional cases.
Ratio Decidendi:
The power to stay a conviction under Section 389(1) is strictly limited to exceptional cases. In offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, staying the conviction undermines the appellate process and is not permissible unless truly exceptional, which was not shown here.
Result:
The impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed.
(A) The proceedings involve the interplay of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, where an order of conviction recorded by a Special Court was challenged. The High Court, while entertaining a criminal appeal, stayed not only the sentence but also the conviction, allowing the respondent public servant to continue in civil office despite the conviction. This Court held that such an order could not be sustained in view of the law declared in earlier decisions under the Act.
(B) The core legal principles are that the power to suspend an order of conviction under Section 389(1) is not alien but must be exercised only in very exceptional cases. A mere appeal does not justify staying the conviction, and the court has a duty to consider the ramifications of keeping the conviction in abeyance, especially in cases involving public servants convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Facts of the case:
A respondent public servant was convicted by a Special Court under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court, on appeal, stayed the conviction and allowed the respondent to continue holding a civil post. The State raised an objection, and a prior judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen was distinguished by the High Court.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in distinguishing the earlier judgment and in staying the conviction without identifying any exceptional facts. It failed to consider the duty to examine the ramifications of suspending the conviction and did not apply the law as laid down by this Court.
Issues:
Whether a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be stayed on appeal merely because the accused has filed an appeal, and whether the High Court had the facts to justify staying the conviction under the doctrine of exceptional cases.
Ratio Decidendi:
The power to stay a conviction under Section 389(1) is strictly limited to exceptional cases. In offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, staying the conviction undermines the appellate process and is not permissible unless truly exceptional, which was not shown here.
Result:
The impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed.
Conviction - The court reaffirms that the power to stay a conviction, especially for public servants under the PC Act, should be limited to very exceptional cases.
JUDGMENT
Santosh Hegde, J.-Leave granted.
2. By the impugned judgment the High Court while entertaining a criminal appeal against an order of conviction recorded by the Special Court against the respondents herein for an offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (the Act) not only stayed the sentence imposed by the trial court but also proceeded to stay the conviction which could facilitate the respondent public servant to continue to hold the civil post in spite of the conviction recorded against him. While doing so the High Court rejected the objection of the State as also distinguished the judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh (2001 (6) SCC 584) on facts.
3. Having perused the impugned order as also the judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen (supra), we find the High Court had no room for distinguishing the law laid down by this Court in K.C. Sareen s case (supra) even on facts. This Court in the said case held:
"The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter." (emphasis supplied)
4. In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen (supra), this Court held that it is only in very exceptional cases that the court should exercise such power of stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not taken into consideration any of the above factors while staying the conviction. It should also be noted that the view expressed by this Court in K.C. Sareen s case (supra) was subsequently approved followed by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Atar Singh & Anr. [JT 2001 (10) SC 212].
5. For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed. The impugned orders are set aside and the appeals are allowed.
Appeal allowed.
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