2004 JTR(SC) 287
2004 16 AIC 62 ; 2004 AIR(SC) 1893 ; 2004 AIR(SCW) 1704 ; 2004 2 AllCJ 1079 ; 2004 55 AllLR 145 ; 2004 2 AWC 1784 ; 2004 4 BomCR(SC) 44 ; 2004 3 CHN(SC) 60 ; 2004 2 CivLJ 854 ; 2004 DNJ 401 ; 2004 2 GLH 677 ; 2004 2 GLR 1335 ; 2004 2 JCR(SC) 272 ; 2004 Supp2 JT 511 ; 2004 2 PLR(SC) 303 ; 2004 2 RCR(Civ) 276 ; 2004 RLR 265 ; 2004 3 Scale 172 ; 2004 3 SCC 376 ; 2004 2 SCR 918 ; 2004 2 WBLR 12 ; 2004 2 WLC 113 ; 2004 KHC 485 ; 2004 2 Supreme 618
2004(2) Supreme 618
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Gujarat High Court)
Ashok Bhan & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak and Ors. -Appellants
versus
Somnath Muljibhai Nayak and Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6432 of 1998
Decided on 9-3-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Ramesh Singh, Advocate for Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Advocate.
For the Respondents : R.P. Bhatt, Sr. Advocate, M.N. Shroff and Chirag M. Shroff, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
In cases of adverse possession, starting point of limitation does not commence from date when right of ownership arises to plaintiff but it commences from date when defendants possession became adverse.
Act Referred :LIMITATION ACT : Art.65
(A) The principles governing limitation and adverse possession under the Limitation Act, particularly Article 65, are central to this dispute where the applicability of limitation defenses and the consequences of statutory interpretation arise. The court examines the interplay between the doctrine of adverse possession, the nature of reversionary interests under Hindu law, and the effect of a registered partition deed on the calculation of the limitation period, ultimately holding that the right of a reversioner to recover property is not subject to limitation running from the death of a prior possessor when the adverse possession claim predates the reversioner's title.
(B) Key legal principles include: adverse possession requires open, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted possession for the requisite period; a reversioner's right is a status estate in expectancy not subject to limitation running from a prior life tenant; ouster must be proven by the defendant; and the right of a reversioner to recover is a species of spes successionis, independent of the possession of a life tenant, attracting the protection of explanation (a) to Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
Facts of the case:
The appellants filed a suit to recover possession of an ancestral land, claiming title through inheritance. The respondents counterclaimed, asserting title by adverse possession for over twelve years, that the appellants' suit was barred by limitation, and that the appellants had failed to prove their title. The trial court dismissed the suit on title grounds, which was reversed on appeal on title, but the High Court remanded the issues of adverse possession and limitation. The lower courts found that the respondents had been in possession since 1934/1941, paid revenue and taxes, and had permission for construction, leading to a finding of adverse possession and that the suit was filed after the limitation period.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the respondents proved all elements of adverse possession, including hostile intention, long and uninterrupted possession, and ouster. The court held that the limitation period commenced from the date the respondents' possession became adverse, not from the execution of the partition deed, and that the appellants' reversionary claim under the partition deed did not toll the limitation period.
Issues:
Whether a reversioner's right to recover possession is subject to limitation and whether limitation runs from the death of a prior possessor or from the date when the adverse possession became complete; whether the respondents proved adverse possession and ouster; whether the suit was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that under the principles of Hindu law and the Limitation Act, a reversioner's right is in the nature of spes successionis and is not subject to limitation running from the death of a life tenant. Adverse possession runs from the date the possession becomes adverse to the true owner, and the respondents' long uninterrupted possession, revenue payments, and ouster defeated the appellants' title, rendering the suit time-barred.
Result:
The civil appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(A) The principles governing limitation and adverse possession under the Limitation Act, particularly Article 65, are central to this dispute where the applicability of limitation defenses and the consequences of statutory interpretation arise. The court examines the interplay between the doctrine of adverse possession, the nature of reversionary interests under Hindu law, and the effect of a registered partition deed on the calculation of the limitation period, ultimately holding that the right of a reversioner to recover property is not subject to limitation running from the death of a prior possessor when the adverse possession claim predates the reversioner's title.
(B) Key legal principles include: adverse possession requires open, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted possession for the requisite period; a reversioner's right is a status estate in expectancy not subject to limitation running from a prior life tenant; ouster must be proven by the defendant; and the right of a reversioner to recover is a species of spes successionis, independent of the possession of a life tenant, attracting the protection of explanation (a) to Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
Facts of the case:
The appellants filed a suit to recover possession of an ancestral land, claiming title through inheritance. The respondents counterclaimed, asserting title by adverse possession for over twelve years, that the appellants' suit was barred by limitation, and that the appellants had failed to prove their title. The trial court dismissed the suit on title grounds, which was reversed on appeal on title, but the High Court remanded the issues of adverse possession and limitation. The lower courts found that the respondents had been in possession since 1934/1941, paid revenue and taxes, and had permission for construction, leading to a finding of adverse possession and that the suit was filed after the limitation period.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the respondents proved all elements of adverse possession, including hostile intention, long and uninterrupted possession, and ouster. The court held that the limitation period commenced from the date the respondents' possession became adverse, not from the execution of the partition deed, and that the appellants' reversionary claim under the partition deed did not toll the limitation period.
Issues:
Whether a reversioner's right to recover possession is subject to limitation and whether limitation runs from the death of a prior possessor or from the date when the adverse possession became complete; whether the respondents proved adverse possession and ouster; whether the suit was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held that under the principles of Hindu law and the Limitation Act, a reversioner's right is in the nature of spes successionis and is not subject to limitation running from the death of a life tenant. Adverse possession runs from the date the possession becomes adverse to the true owner, and the respondents' long uninterrupted possession, revenue payments, and ouster defeated the appellants' title, rendering the suit time-barred.
Result:
The civil appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
Kapadia, J.-Appellants (Plaintiffs) filed a suit bearing No. 116 of 1968 in the court of Civil Judge, Narol for a declaration that they were owners of ancestral house site land bearing G.P. No. 497 in Sarkhej, district Ahmedabad and for recovery of possession thereof from the respondents (defendants) and also for permanent injunction restraining respondents from interfering with their possession over the disputed land. According to the appellants, the suit land was ancestral property belonging to father-in-law of Vasantiben (appellant No.1) and after his death the property came in possession of her husband. According to the appellants, in the lifetime of the husband of appellant No.1, the respondents used to tell the husband of appellant No.1 to allow them to make construction on the land. According to appellant No.1, her husband did not permit the respondents to make construction till his death, i.e. six years prior to the institution of the suit. That even before his demise, the respondents used to tell appellant No.1 to donate the land to the community which she refused and soon thereafter the respondents started constructing a compound wall without her permission. In the circumstances, she filed a suit on 25th March, 1968 to prevent the respondents from disturbing her possession.
2. The respondents inter alia denied in the suit that the husband of appellant No.1 was in possession of the suit land till he died or that after his demise, the appellants were in possession of the suit land. In the suit, they contended that they were in possession of the suit land for more than twelve years and that they were owners by adverse possession. They also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. In the suit, there was a dispute regarding the identity of the land. In the suit, there was a dispute regarding title of the appellants over the suit land. By the judgment and order dated 10th November, 1975, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellants have failed to prove their title over the suit land. Being aggrieved, the appellants went by way of civil appeal No. 133 of 1976 to the District Court, Ahmedabad which came to the conclusion that the appellants had identified the suit land. Further, the District Court came to the conclusion that the appellants had proved their title to the suit land. Consequently, the appeal was allowed vide judgment and order dated 27th March, 1978.
3. Being aggrieved, the respondents herein went by way of second appeal under section 100 CPC to the High Court being appeal No. 360 of 1978. By judgment and order dated 22nd January, 1997, the High Court came to the conclusion that the lower appellate court could not have passed the decree for possession in favour of the appellants without deciding the issue of limitation and adverse possession. Consequently, keeping the Second Appeal pending before it, the High Court called for the findings on the above two issues from the District Court, Ahmedabad. On remand of the above issues, the District Court found that the respondents were in possession since 1934 as indicated by the books of accounts and revenue receipts for payments made to its revenue assessment. The District Court further found that the respondents have been paying land revenue from 1940. The District Court further found that the gram panchayat had even permitted the respondents to construct the compound wall vide a resolution (Ex. 132). In the circumstances, the District Court came to the conclusion that the respondent had acquired title by way of adverse possession. On the point of limitation, the District Court found that the respondents were in possession from 1935 or in any event from 1941 whereas the suit has been filed only on 25th March, 1968 for possession and consequently the suit was barred by law of limitation. Therefore, both the issues were decided in favour of the respondents herein by the District Court vide judgment dated 30th April, 1997. The High Court which was seized of the second appeal No. 360 of 1978 after hearing the parties confirmed the findings of the District Court on above two issues and accordingly disposed of the second appeal vide impugned judgment dated 28th April, 1998. Hence, the original plaintiffs have come by way of civil appeal to this Court.
4. Shri Ramesh Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the appellants became owners of the suit land as reversioners under registered deed of partition dated 29th November, 1965 and consequently the suit filed by the appellants was neither barred by limitation nor by adverse possession. He contended that the High Court had erred in holding that adverse possession in respect of suit land begin to run against the appellants prior to 29th November, 1965. In this connection, he has placed reliance on explanation (a) to Article 65 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). In support of his above argument, learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Kisto Mandal & Anr. v. Dhankisto Mandal reported in [(1969) 1 SCR 342].
5. We do not find merit in the above argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. In the case of Ram Kisto Mandal & Anr. v. Dhankisto Mandal (supra), it has been held by this Court that the right of the reversioner to recover possession of the property within twelve years from the death of the widow is not only based on provisions of the limitation act but on the principles of Hindu Law and the general principles that the right of a reversioner is in the nature of spes successionis (estate in expectancy) and such reversioner does not trace his title through the widow. Under the common law, there are two types of estates namely, estates in possession and estates in expectancy. Estates in remainder/reversion are estates in expectancy as opposed to estates in possession. Consequently, adverse possession against a life-tenant will not bar the reversioner/remainder from succeeding to the estate on the demise of the life-tenant. This is the reason for enacting explanation (a) to Article 65 of the said Act, which has no application to the facts of this case.
6. At this stage, it is important to bear in mind that partition is really a process by which a joint enjoyment of the property is transformed into an enjoyment severally. In the case of partition, each co-sharer has an antecedent title and, therefore, there is no conferment of a new title. (See Transfer of Property Act by Mulla 9th Edition Page 77). In the circumstances, the appellants cannot be heard to say that they became the owners of the property only when the partition deed was executed on 29th November, 1965. Lastly, the facts above-mentioned show that the appellants had asserted not only their own possession, they had also asserted the possession of Prahladji (husband of appellant No.1 and father of remaining appellants) prior to his death. In the case of Hanamgowda v. Irgowda reported in [AIR 1925 Bom. 9], it has been held that in cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but it commences from the date when the defendants possession became adverse. Therefore, in the present case, the starting point of limitation for adverse possession cannot be taken as 29th November, 1965 and one has to take the date when the respondents possession became adverse. For all the above reasons, there is no merit in the above arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants.
7. Shri Ramesh Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants next contended that in the present case the respondents have failed to prove the ouster along with other three circumstances, namely, hostile intention; long and uninterrupted possession; and exercise of the right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the owner. We do not find any merit in this argument. It is correct to say that the defendants have to prove three elements mentioned above to establish ouster in cases involving claim of adverse possession. However, in the present case, there is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below to the effect that the respondents are in possession of the suit land from 1935 or in any event from 1941; that they have paid revenue cess from 1940; that they have paid property taxes; that their names were recorded in the revenue records and they were granted permission by the panchayat to construct compound wall. Moreover, in her deposition before the trial Court, appellant No.1 had deposed that her husband had died six years prior to the institution of suit; that the suit land was in possession of her father-in-law and after his death it came in possession of Prahlad (husband); that during the life time of Prahlad, the defendants had told Prahlad to allow them to construct a building on the land which he refused and that the respondents constructed the compound wall without their permission. In view of the above concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below on the issue of adverse possession, we do not see any reason to interfere in the matter.
8. For the aforestated reasons, civil appeal stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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