2004 JTR(SC) 648
2004 19 AIC 32 ; 2004 AIR(SCW) 3765 ; 2004 56 AllLR 272 ; 2004 3 AWC 2380 ; 2004 4 BBCJ(SC) 49 ; 2004 3 CTC 549 ; 2004 4 ICC 36 ; 2004 3 JLJR(SC) 169 ; 2004 5 JT 513 ; 2004 3 PLJR(SC) 278 ; 2004 3 RCR(Civ) 250 ; 2004 5 Scale 811 ; 2004 6 SCC 800 ; 2004 Supp2 SCR 627 ; 2004 2 WLC 631 ; 2004 KHC 1473 ; 2004 4 Supreme 360
2004(4) Supreme 360
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Uttaranchal High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde & B.P. Singh, JJ.
State of Uttaranchal through Collector, Dehradun & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Ajit Singh Bhola & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3033 of 2004
(@ SLP (C) No. 19475 of 2003)
With
Civil Appeal No. 3034 of 2004
(@ SLP (C) No. 19476 of 2003)
Decided on 7-5-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Advocate, G. Venugopal and Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Anil Nauriya and Ms. Sumita Hazarika, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Having regard to the manner in which the District Magistrate took over possession of the premises for the residence-cum-office of the Director General of Police of the State of Uttaranchal, which appears to be high-handed, arbitrary and without any legal sanction, the Supreme Court is not to exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution to set aside the interim order passed by the High Court.
Act
Referred
:CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.136
UTTAR PRADESH ACCOMMODATION REQUISITION ACT : .
(A) The Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, read in conjunction with the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, governs the present dispute concerning the validity of the interim order passed by the High Court and the manner in which possession of the premises was effected by the State. The statutory framework is engaged to assess whether the requisition of the premises was lawful and whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to interfere with the interim order directing the State to either proceed under the requisition Act or vacate the premises. The interplay between the eviction decree, the subsequent requisition order, and the executive action of taking possession without a formal order from the District Magistrate is evaluated under this Act and the principles of administrative law.
(B) Key legal principles include that an interim order passed by a High Court in a writ petition cannot be treated as a final determination of the merits, and this Court will not exercise its discretion under Article 136 to quash an interim order if doing so would revive another illegal order. Furthermore, the executive action of taking possession of premises must be backed by a formal order and legal authority; arbitrary or high-handed action by a District Magistrate without recorded order or legal sanction is subject to judicial review and will not be condoned.
Facts of the case:
The premises were leased to a Wadia Institute as a guest house, with an eviction decree passed for part of the premises. While appeals were pending, the District Magistrate allotted the premises to the Director General of Police and, on 26.11.2000, took possession using police force. A subsequent application by the Institute led to the appeal being dismissed as withdrawn, and the State obtained an eviction decree. A notice under the Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 was issued, leading to a writ petition challenging the requisition and the possession order, resulting in an interim order from the High Court directing the State to vacate or proceed under the Act.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the interim order of the High Court cannot be treated as a final decision on merit, and the States contention that the writ petitions were concluded is not tenable. The Court noted the absence of a formal order from the District Magistrate and any legal authority for the manner in which possession was taken, characterizing the action as high-handed and arbitrary, while acknowledging that the writ petitions remain pending in the High Court.
Issues:
Whether the interim order of the High Court can be treated as a final determination of the writ petitions; whether the State is entitled to relief by way of setting aside the interim order; and whether the taking of possession by the State was legally authorized and supported by a formal order.
Ratio Decidendi:
This Court will not interfere with an interim order that appears to be illegal if refusing to do so would revive another illegal order, and will not exercise discretion under Article 136 to set aside such an interim order where the underlying writ petitions are still pending and the executive action lacked legal sanction or formal authorization.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, and the interim order passed by the High Court stands vacated.
(A) The Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, read in conjunction with the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, governs the present dispute concerning the validity of the interim order passed by the High Court and the manner in which possession of the premises was effected by the State. The statutory framework is engaged to assess whether the requisition of the premises was lawful and whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to interfere with the interim order directing the State to either proceed under the requisition Act or vacate the premises. The interplay between the eviction decree, the subsequent requisition order, and the executive action of taking possession without a formal order from the District Magistrate is evaluated under this Act and the principles of administrative law.
(B) Key legal principles include that an interim order passed by a High Court in a writ petition cannot be treated as a final determination of the merits, and this Court will not exercise its discretion under Article 136 to quash an interim order if doing so would revive another illegal order. Furthermore, the executive action of taking possession of premises must be backed by a formal order and legal authority; arbitrary or high-handed action by a District Magistrate without recorded order or legal sanction is subject to judicial review and will not be condoned.
Facts of the case:
The premises were leased to a Wadia Institute as a guest house, with an eviction decree passed for part of the premises. While appeals were pending, the District Magistrate allotted the premises to the Director General of Police and, on 26.11.2000, took possession using police force. A subsequent application by the Institute led to the appeal being dismissed as withdrawn, and the State obtained an eviction decree. A notice under the Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 was issued, leading to a writ petition challenging the requisition and the possession order, resulting in an interim order from the High Court directing the State to vacate or proceed under the Act.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the interim order of the High Court cannot be treated as a final decision on merit, and the States contention that the writ petitions were concluded is not tenable. The Court noted the absence of a formal order from the District Magistrate and any legal authority for the manner in which possession was taken, characterizing the action as high-handed and arbitrary, while acknowledging that the writ petitions remain pending in the High Court.
Issues:
Whether the interim order of the High Court can be treated as a final determination of the writ petitions; whether the State is entitled to relief by way of setting aside the interim order; and whether the taking of possession by the State was legally authorized and supported by a formal order.
Ratio Decidendi:
This Court will not interfere with an interim order that appears to be illegal if refusing to do so would revive another illegal order, and will not exercise discretion under Article 136 to set aside such an interim order where the underlying writ petitions are still pending and the executive action lacked legal sanction or formal authorization.
Result:
The appeals are dismissed, and the interim order passed by the High Court stands vacated.
JUDGMENT
B.P. Singh, J.-Special leave granted.
2. In both these appeals, the State of Uttranchal has challenged the interim order passed by the High Court of Uttranchal at Nainital in Writ Petition Nos. 217 (M/B) of 2002 and 216 (M/B) of 2002 whereby in writ petitions filed by the respondents herein, the High Court noticing the facts of the case, passed an interim order directing the State of Uttranchal either to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act or vacate the premises within a week. The time granted to vacate the premises was extended by the Court, but the State is aggrieved by the interim order passed by the High Court. Its contention before us is that by the interim order, virtually the writ petitions themselves have been finally decided. We are informed that the writ petitions filed by the respondents are still pending before the High Court.
3. We wish to briefly narrate the facts of the case keeping in mind the fact that the writ petitions are still pending in the High Court and, therefore, any expression of opinion on the merit of the case may prejudice the case of the parties. However, some necessary facts must be noticed.
4. The premises in question belongs to respondents which had been leased out to Wadia Institute of Himalayan Geology, Dehradun on 7.2.1977 for use by them as Guest House. The said Wadia Institute is an autonomous institution of the Department of Science and Technology, Dehradun. The lease was initially for a period of 11 months, but later the tenure was extended by five years. In the year 1993, an eviction petition was filed by the respondents on the ground of bona fide personal need. The said suit was partially decreed on 25.4.1995 and a decree for eviction in respect of a part of the premises (only ground floor) was passed. Aggrieved by the eviction order, Wadia Institute preferred RCA No. 61/95, while the respondents aggrieved by a decree for partial eviction only, preferred RCA No. 70/1995. While the said appeals were pending before the appellate Court, the District Magistrate of Nainital purported to allot the said premises for residence-cum-office of the Director General of Police of the newly created State of Uttranchal. No letter of allotment passed by the District Magistrate has been brought on record, but all that has been produced is a letter addressed by the District Magistrate to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Dehradun dated 7.11.2000 informing him that the Guest House of the Wadia Institute has been allotted to the Director General of Police for Camp office/residential purpose until further orders. From the material on record, it further appears that on 26.11.2000 possession of the premises was taken by use of police force. The said fact was intimated to the appellate court by the Wadia Institute by their application dated 1.12.2000 in which it was stated that on 26.11.2000, the police force got vacated the entire property and evicted the officials/employees of the Wadia Institute from the property. It appears that on 5.2.2001, the Wadia Institute filed an application before the appellate court that it did not wish to pursue its appeal and prayed for permission to withdraw the appeal. There is a dispute whether the Wadia Institute also prayed for allowing the appeal of the landlord. According to the respondents, such a prayer was made, which is denied by the appellant. It, however, appears from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that such a request had been made to the appellate court by the Wadia Institute. In their counter-affidavit filed before the High Court in paragraph (xi), it was stated that the Wadia Institute had moved an application dated 5.2.2001 before the learned District Judge, Dehradun that they are no more interested in pursuing their Rent Control Appeal No. 61 of 1995 or Appeal No. 70 of 1995 and prayed to pass suitable orders thereon. This, according to the appellant, was a collusive application and was a result of collusion between the Wadia Institute and the landlord. Be that as it may, the appeal preferred by the Wadia Institute was dismissed as withdrawn on 20th March 2001. Since the order of the Court is not before us, it is not clear whether the appeal preferred by the landlord was also allowed.
5. Pursuant to the eviction decree passed, an application for execution was filed on 23.4.2001. Objections filed by the appellant-State were overruled on 25.1.2002, aggrieved by which the State of Uttranchal filed a writ petition and obtained an order of stay on 30.1.2002.
6. A notice under section 3(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Accommodation Requisition Act 1947 was issued proposing to requisition the premises in question. Since, there was no response to the notice, the order of requisition was passed on 4.4.2002. However, in view of the order of requisition, the writ petition filed by the State was dismissed as infructuous on 22.5.2002.
7. Two writ petitions were filed by the landlady and her two sons challenging the order of requisition as well as the order dated 7.11.2000 pursuant to which possession of the premises was taken by the State. In the aforesaid writ petition, the impugned interim order was passed on 8.5.2003.
8. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Uttranchal submitted that by passing the interim order, the High Court has virtually allowed the writ petition. He further submitted that in any event, the eviction order only related to the ground floor premises and, therefore, eviction of the State from the remaining part of the premises is not justified.
9. Having noticed the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not consider it appropriate to pass an order interfering with the interim order passed by the High Court. We notice that possession of the premises was taken by use of police force by the State of Uttranchal under orders of the District Magistrate dated 7.11.2000. It is immaterial whether police force was or was not used for the purpose. The fact which is not disputed is that possession was taken over of the entire premises on 26.11.2000 purportedly for the residence-cum-office of the Director General of Police, Uttranchal. Since, the order issued by the District Magistrate dated 7.11.2000 was not placed before us, we adjourned the matter to enable the counsel for the State to seek instructions and to produce before us the formal order passed by the District Magistrate and also to bring to our notice any law or rule which authorized the District Magistrate to take possession of the premises in this manner. Learned counsel for the State has neither been able to produce the order passed by the District Magistrate in this regard nor has he been able to point out any law or rule which authorizes the District Magistrate to take possession of any premises in the manner it has been done in the instant case. We are really surprised that the District Magistrate chose to act in such a high-handed manner. Counsel for the State fairly stated before us that he is unable to produce any formal order passed by the District Magistrate in this regard and the letter dated 7.11.2000, which is in the nature of communication by the District Magistrate to the Superintendent of Police is the only document on which he can place reliance. He has also not shown us any law or rule which authorizes the District Magistrate to take over possession in the manner done in the instant case. We do not wish to say anything more at this stage because we are conscious of the fact that the writ petitions are still pending before the High Court. Having regard to the manner in which the District Magistrate took over possession of the premises, which appears to us as at present advised, to be high-handed, arbitrary and without any legal sanction we are not persuaded to exercise our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to set aside the interim order passed by the High Court. It is well-settled that this Court will not exercise its discretion and quash an order which appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive another illegal order.
10. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, we refrain from exercising our discretion and dismiss these appeals. The interim order passed by this Court stands vacated.
Appeals dismissed.
***************
00035