2004 JTR(SC) 1507
2005 25 AIC 82 ; 2005 1 AICLR 537 ; 2005 AIR(Jhar)(R) 961 ; 2005 AIR(SC) 1248 ; 2004 AIR(SCW) 6563 ; 2005 1 ALD(Cri)(SC) 329 ; 2004 AllLJ 4127 ; 2005 AllMR(Cri)(SC) 236 ; 2005 1 BBCJ(SC) 403 ; 2005 2 CalLT(SC) 92 ; 2005 1 CriCC 387 ; 2004 CriLR 923 ; 2005 CrLJ 331 ; 2005 1 EastCrC(SC) 187 ; 2004 3 JCC 1872 ; 2005 1 JT 153 ; 2005 4 KLT(SN) 40 ; 2005 1 MPWN 319 ; 2005 1 RCR(Cri) 404 ; 2004 10 Scale 147 ; 2005 3 SCC 594 ; 2005 SCC(Cri) 780 ; 2004 SCR 585 ; 2005 1 WLC 309 ; 2005 KHC 495 ; 2004 8 Supreme 956
2004(8) Supreme 656
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
State of U.P. -Appellant
versus
Pappu @ Yunus & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 1382 of 2004
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 134/2004)
Decided on 1-12-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Mrs. Alka Agrawal and Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Goodwill Indeevar, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of offence of rape is not an accomplice and there is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars.
Act Referred :INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.376
(A) The offences alleged against the accused are punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines and prescribes punishment for the crime of rape. This provision is engaged when there is an unlawful sexual intercourse without the consent of the woman. The present case revolves around the interpretation of such consent in the context of alleged rape where the defence sought to characterise the victim as a person of easy virtue, thereby attempting to negate the offence. The appellate scrutiny examines whether the trial court correctly applied the principles of evidence, particularly regarding the credibility of the prosecutrix and the relevance of her past sexual behaviour, within the framework of Section 376 read with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(B) Key legal principles include: The character or previous sexual experience of the prosecutrix is irrelevant to determining the offence of rape; she is not treated as an accomplice and her testimony requires no mandatory corroboration; the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove lack of consent; and an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial court's findings without a reasoned analysis of the evidence.
Facts of the case:
The prosecutrix, alone at home, was forced by two respondents into sexual intercourse. The incident was reported to the police, and medical evidence was collected. The trial court found the accused guilty, noting the victim was a minor and that consent was not a valid defence. The accused appealed, arguing the victim was of easy virtue and the medical evidence undermined the prosecution case, leading to an acquittal by the High Court.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held the High Court's acquittal to be unreasoned and indicative of a lack of application of mind. It noted that the High Court misread the evidence of the victim's mother and improperly placed reliance on the victim's character. The court emphasised that the victim's past sexual history does not absolve the accused and that the trial court's factual findings should not be disturbed without a proper analysis of the evidence.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused based on the victim's alleged character and medical evidence; and whether the appellate court's interference was valid in the absence of a detailed examination of the trial evidence.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that the character of the victim is legally irrelevant to the charge of rape, and that an appellate court must meticulously examine the evidence and record reasoned findings before interfering with a trial court's conviction. The absence of such analysis by the High Court warranted the setting aside of the acquittal.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside, and the case is remitted to the High Court for a fresh hearing.
(A) The offences alleged against the accused are punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which defines and prescribes punishment for the crime of rape. This provision is engaged when there is an unlawful sexual intercourse without the consent of the woman. The present case revolves around the interpretation of such consent in the context of alleged rape where the defence sought to characterise the victim as a person of easy virtue, thereby attempting to negate the offence. The appellate scrutiny examines whether the trial court correctly applied the principles of evidence, particularly regarding the credibility of the prosecutrix and the relevance of her past sexual behaviour, within the framework of Section 376 read with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(B) Key legal principles include: The character or previous sexual experience of the prosecutrix is irrelevant to determining the offence of rape; she is not treated as an accomplice and her testimony requires no mandatory corroboration; the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove lack of consent; and an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial court's findings without a reasoned analysis of the evidence.
Facts of the case:
The prosecutrix, alone at home, was forced by two respondents into sexual intercourse. The incident was reported to the police, and medical evidence was collected. The trial court found the accused guilty, noting the victim was a minor and that consent was not a valid defence. The accused appealed, arguing the victim was of easy virtue and the medical evidence undermined the prosecution case, leading to an acquittal by the High Court.
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held the High Court's acquittal to be unreasoned and indicative of a lack of application of mind. It noted that the High Court misread the evidence of the victim's mother and improperly placed reliance on the victim's character. The court emphasised that the victim's past sexual history does not absolve the accused and that the trial court's factual findings should not be disturbed without a proper analysis of the evidence.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused based on the victim's alleged character and medical evidence; and whether the appellate court's interference was valid in the absence of a detailed examination of the trial evidence.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court determined that the character of the victim is legally irrelevant to the charge of rape, and that an appellate court must meticulously examine the evidence and record reasoned findings before interfering with a trial court's conviction. The absence of such analysis by the High Court warranted the setting aside of the acquittal.
Result:
The appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside, and the case is remitted to the High Court for a fresh hearing.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.
2. The State of U.P. has questioned in this appeal correctness of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow directing acquittal of the respondents (hereafter referred to as the accused ). The respondents were charged for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC ). The Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sitapur found them guilty and sentenced each to undergo RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.
3. The factual position in a nutshell is that while the prosecutrix was alone in her house, at about 11.00 a.m. on 21.5.1987 since her mother had gone out to market for purchasing vegetables, the respondents who belonged to her locality came to her house, knocked the door. The prosecutrix asked them as to who they were and they disclosed their identity. The prosecutrix refused to open the door as her mother was not at home. But both the accused persons went to the neighbouring house and came to the roof of her house and jumped into the courtyard and showed her a tamancha . She was first raped by accused respondent Mannoo and thereafter by accused respondent Pappoo. After some time her mother came home and knocked the door and hearing the voice of knocking, the accused persons ran away and climbed over the roof. While they were climbing, the mother had seen them and she started shouting and hearing it one Vimalesh Kumar Verma of the locality came there and he also saw both the accused persons running away. Written report of the incident was lodged at the Police Station at 3.10 p.m.. Investigation was undertaken. The prosecutrix was sent to the District Hospital for medical check up. The accused persons were also sent for medical examination and their clothings were sent for chemical examination. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed and accused persons were sent up for trial. The accused persons pleaded innocence. In the additional statements submitted during examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code ) respondent Pappoo stated that the prosecutrix was not having a good character and since her house was in front of his house, he and his family members asked them to leave that place and hence the false case was foisted. To similar effect was the plea of accused Mannoo.
4. Placing reliance on the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother who were examined as PWs 1 and 2 respectively learned trial Judge found accused persons guilty, convicted and sentenced them as afore-noted.
5. The plea that she was a girl of easy morale was found to be of no consequence. There was some dispute as regards the age of the victim. The trial Court on consideration of the evidence came to hold that she was a minor at the time of commission of the offence and the question of any consent being there was really of no consequence.
6. The conviction and the sentence were questioned by the accused persons by filing an appeal before the High Court and as noted above the High Court directed their acquittal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the High Court has disposed of the appeal in the most laconic and casual manner. There is not even any discussion on the evidence adduced, and practically on the sole ground that the mother of the prosecutrix accepted that the victim was of easy virtues, the acquittal has been directed.
8. Learned counsel for the accused-respondent on the other hand submitted that the High Court noticed that the prosecutrix was not having a good character and she was a girl of easy virtues. The medical evidence showed that she was habitual to sexual intercourse and there was no injury on her body. Accordingly, prosecution case was wholly doubtful. That being so, the order of acquittal does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
9. We find that the High Court s judgment is practically un-reasoned and its approach in dealing with the appeal is rather causal, disclosing non-application of mind.
10. There appears to be some mis-reading of the evidence of PW-2, the mother of the prosecutrix. The trial Court had noticed as to how even in the absence of any external injury an offence could have been committed after analysing the doctor s evidence. The evidence of PW-2 has been read out of context by the High Court. As noticed by the trial Court, she had categorically denied that the character of her daughter was not good and had also denied suggestion that her character being not good, they have been forcibly extricated from the mohalla. But at another place, she has accepted that character of her daughter was not good. Even if that be so, that does not dilute the offence.
11. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone.
12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would do.
13. Above being the position, the High Court s view that the girl being of loose morale and easy virtues the accused were entitled to acquittal is indefensible. Without indicating reasons or basis the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court. It is incumbent upon the appellate Court, if it takes a contrary view, to analyse the evidence and to record its own conclusions. That has not been done in the instant case. This is a fit case where the matter needs to be re-heard by the High Court. Accordingly the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh hearing. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case except indicating as to how the character of the victim is really of no consequence while adjudicating the question as to whether any rape was committed on her or not. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that since the respondents were acquitted by the High Court, the bail which was originally granted to them should be continued. It shall be open to the respondents to move the High Court for bail which shall be considered on its own perspective.
14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Appeal allowed accordingly.
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