2005 JTR(SC) 1085
2005 33 AIC 52 ; 2005 AIR(SC) 3581 ; 2005 AIR(SCW) 4508 ; 2005 3 AllCJ 1847 ; 2005 60 AllLR 862 ; 2005 4 AWC 3657 ; 2006 1 CivCC 255 ; 2005 4 CivLJ 836 ; 2005 4 CTC 688 ; 2005 3 DNJ 806 ; 2006 1 ICC 4 ; 2006 2 JCR(SC) 56 ; 2005 7 JT 624 ; 2005 4 MLJ 126 ; 2005 4 RCR(Civ) 25 ; 2005 4 RCR(Civ) 26 ; 2005 6 Scale 730 ; 2005 6 SCC 745 ; 2005 6 SCJ 479 ; 2005 Supp2 SCR 969 ; 2005 2 WBLR 702 ; 2005 KHC 1312 ; 2005 6 Supreme 52
2005(6) Supreme 52
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
S.N. Variava & Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.
Mandir Shree Sitaramji @ Shree Sitaram Bhandar —Appellant
versus
Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5273 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2356 of 2004)
Decided on 24-8-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General, T.R. Andhyarujina, K.K. Venugopal, Bhaskar P. Gupta, Sr. Advocates, Prabhjit Jauhar, S.S. Jauhar, Saurabh Kirpal, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya, Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Sanjay Poddar, Ajatshatru, Raghunath Kapur, Vijay K. Verma, Abhijit Chatterjee, S. Sukumaran, M.P. Singh, K. Rajeev, Advocates.
Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.41, S.40, S.39, S.6, S.48, S.4
(A) The Land Acquisition Act provisions referencedSections 4, 6, 39, 40, 41, and 48govern the validity of executive notifications, objections, compensation frameworks, and the nonwithdrawal of acquisitions. Section 4 empowers the government to declare public purpose acquisitions via notification, while Section 6 provides for objections and inquiries, particularly regarding whether land belongs to religious institutions. Sections 39, 40, and 41 outline special provisions for acquisitions in Part VII areas, and Section 48 restricts withdrawal of acquisition once possession is taken. Here, these provisions frame the challenge to a 1959 Notification and a subsequent 1975 Notification concerning approximately 35,000 acres for Delhis planned development, where Appellants 68 acres were initially exempted as religious land but later reacquired. The validity of the acquisition hinged on compliance with Part VII, the scope of planned development, and whether later communications amounted to a binding withdrawal.
(B) Key legal principles include that acquisition for planned development of Delhi is not invalid merely because land is later allotted to cooperative societies; Part VII applies only where the acquisition is directly for a company; postpossession withdrawal is barred under Section 48; and mere ministerial recommendations or internal notes do not create a binding obligation to withdraw. The court also reaffirmed that broadbased acquisitions need not specify exact purposes, and that objections raised under Section 5A must be honored through proper inquiry.
Facts of the case:
In 1959, a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act proposed acquisition of approximately 35,000 acres for the planned development of Delhi, with Clause 2(d) exempting religious institutions. Appellants land of approximately 68 acres was initially exempted. This Notification was challenged, and this Court, in Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, held that Appellants had not been heard under Section 5A and quashed the Section 6 Notification, directing an inquiry. Subsequently, the Government issued a fresh Section 4 Notification in 1975 for approximately 300 bighas, again for planned development of Delhi. The Appellants challenged this anew, arguing the acquisition was actually for a cooperative society under a 1972 agreement, and that Part VII requirements were not met. Reliance was also placed on internal communications suggesting possible withdrawal of acquisition, which the court examined closely.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the 1975 Notification was a continuation of the 1959 acquisition, which remained for the planned development of Delhi and not for a cooperative society. It held that the Delhi Development Authority could not develop such a vast area without allocating portions to societies, but this did not convert the acquisition into one for a society. The court noted that the 1972 Agreement did not specifically identify Appellants land for allotment, and even if allotted postacquisition, this did not alter the publicpurpose character of the acquisition. Internal communications regarding denotification or development schemes were considered mere recommendations and did not constitute a binding decision to withdraw. The court also held that once possession was taken, Section 48 barred withdrawal. Thus, the challenge to the acquisition was rejected.
Issues:
Whether the acquisition for planned development of Delhi can be characterized as being for a cooperative society merely because land may be allotted to such a society after acquisition. Whether Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act applies to the Appellants land in this scenario. Whether internal government communications and schemes regarding withdrawal of acquisition create a binding obligation. Whether the 1975 Notification is a valid continuation of the 1959 acquisition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core reasoning is that an acquisition for planned development of Delhi remains a publicpurpose acquisition even if portions are later allotted to cooperative societies, and such allotment does not trigger Part VII requirements. The court held that the 1975 Notification was a proper continuation of the 1959 acquisition, that internal recommendations did not amount to a decision to withdraw, and that once possession was taken the government could not unilaterally withdraw the acquisition under Section 48.
Result:
The Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act provisions referencedSections 4, 6, 39, 40, 41, and 48govern the validity of executive notifications, objections, compensation frameworks, and the nonwithdrawal of acquisitions. Section 4 empowers the government to declare public purpose acquisitions via notification, while Section 6 provides for objections and inquiries, particularly regarding whether land belongs to religious institutions. Sections 39, 40, and 41 outline special provisions for acquisitions in Part VII areas, and Section 48 restricts withdrawal of acquisition once possession is taken. Here, these provisions frame the challenge to a 1959 Notification and a subsequent 1975 Notification concerning approximately 35,000 acres for Delhis planned development, where Appellants 68 acres were initially exempted as religious land but later reacquired. The validity of the acquisition hinged on compliance with Part VII, the scope of planned development, and whether later communications amounted to a binding withdrawal.
(B) Key legal principles include that acquisition for planned development of Delhi is not invalid merely because land is later allotted to cooperative societies; Part VII applies only where the acquisition is directly for a company; postpossession withdrawal is barred under Section 48; and mere ministerial recommendations or internal notes do not create a binding obligation to withdraw. The court also reaffirmed that broadbased acquisitions need not specify exact purposes, and that objections raised under Section 5A must be honored through proper inquiry.
Facts of the case:
In 1959, a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act proposed acquisition of approximately 35,000 acres for the planned development of Delhi, with Clause 2(d) exempting religious institutions. Appellants land of approximately 68 acres was initially exempted. This Notification was challenged, and this Court, in Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, held that Appellants had not been heard under Section 5A and quashed the Section 6 Notification, directing an inquiry. Subsequently, the Government issued a fresh Section 4 Notification in 1975 for approximately 300 bighas, again for planned development of Delhi. The Appellants challenged this anew, arguing the acquisition was actually for a cooperative society under a 1972 agreement, and that Part VII requirements were not met. Reliance was also placed on internal communications suggesting possible withdrawal of acquisition, which the court examined closely.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the 1975 Notification was a continuation of the 1959 acquisition, which remained for the planned development of Delhi and not for a cooperative society. It held that the Delhi Development Authority could not develop such a vast area without allocating portions to societies, but this did not convert the acquisition into one for a society. The court noted that the 1972 Agreement did not specifically identify Appellants land for allotment, and even if allotted postacquisition, this did not alter the publicpurpose character of the acquisition. Internal communications regarding denotification or development schemes were considered mere recommendations and did not constitute a binding decision to withdraw. The court also held that once possession was taken, Section 48 barred withdrawal. Thus, the challenge to the acquisition was rejected.
Issues:
Whether the acquisition for planned development of Delhi can be characterized as being for a cooperative society merely because land may be allotted to such a society after acquisition. Whether Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act applies to the Appellants land in this scenario. Whether internal government communications and schemes regarding withdrawal of acquisition create a binding obligation. Whether the 1975 Notification is a valid continuation of the 1959 acquisition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The core reasoning is that an acquisition for planned development of Delhi remains a publicpurpose acquisition even if portions are later allotted to cooperative societies, and such allotment does not trigger Part VII requirements. The court held that the 1975 Notification was a proper continuation of the 1959 acquisition, that internal recommendations did not amount to a decision to withdraw, and that once possession was taken the government could not unilaterally withdraw the acquisition under Section 48.
Result:
The Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Judgment
S.N. Variava, J.—Leave granted.
Heard parties.
2. This Appeal has been filed against the Judgment dated 21/22 August, 2003 passed by the High Court of Delhi.
3. Briefly stated the facts as follows:
On 13th November, 1959 a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued for acquisition of app. 35,000 acres of land. The said acquisition was for “planned development of Delhi”. Amongst the lands, sought to be acquired, were Appellants’ land of app. 68 acres. Clause 2(d) of the said Notification exempted lands of “Religious Institutions”.
4. This acquisition was challenged by a number of parties including the Appellants. The Writ Petition filed by the Appellants was allowed by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on the ground that the Appellants were not heard in respect of their objections filed under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed the Appeal and dismissed the Writ Petition. The Appeal filed by the Appellants in this Court was allowed by the Judgment reported in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. (1975) 1 SCR 597. This Court held that there had been no enquiry as to whether or not the Appellants’ land belonged to a religious institution. Therefore, this Court quashed the Section 6 Notification and remitted the matter back to the Land Acquisition Collector to enquire into the objection of the Appellants.
5. It appears that the Government then decided not to pursue the earlier Section 4 Notification in respect of the Appellants’ land. Another Notification dated 13th March, 1975 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, proposing to acquire app. 300 bighas for “planned development of Delhi” was issued. The Appellants again challenged the proposed acquisition by filing a Writ Petition. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the impugned order.
6. On behalf of the Respondents, it has been submitted that the Appellants are not entitled to maintain this Appeal as they have already sold off the land to a third party. It is submitted that the Appellants no longer have any right, title or interest in the said land. This has been denied by the Appellants who claim that they have only entered into a development agreement. In our view, it is not necessary for us to go into this controversy. It is preferable to decide the challenge to the acquisition proceedings on their own merits. We have, therefore, left this question open and heard the parties on the challenge to the acquisition.
7. On behalf of the Appellants, it was submitted that the acquisition is not for “planned development of Delhi”. It was submitted that on 9th May, 1972 an Agreement has been entered into between the President of India on one hand and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Cooperative Housing Building Societies on the other. It is submitted that the Agreement is to allot to this Cooperative Society app. 217 bighas and 8 biswas of land. It is submitted that this is the land of the Appellants. It is submitted that in pursuance of this Agreement a sum of Rs. 26,37,245 has been received from the society. It is submitted that the acquisition is actually for the society yet it purports to show as if it is for “Planned development of Delhi”. It is submitted that as the acquisition is for a cooperative society, the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and particularly Sections 39, 40 and 41 should have been complied with. It is submitted that those provisions have not been complied with and therefore the acquisition is bad and should be set aside.
8. On the other, on behalf of the Respondents it is submitted that the acquisition was effectively of 35000 acres of land in pursuance of Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959. It was submitted that because of the orders of this Court, the Appellants’ land got excluded from the earlier Notification. It was submitted that land all around Appellants’ land was acquired in pursuance of the earlier Notification. It was submitted that in order to avoid any further complication and delay the second Notification under Section 4 was issued on 13th March, 1975. It was submitted that the acquisition of Appellants’ land was for purposes of “planned development of Delhi” and not for any Co-operative Society. It is submitted that acquisition for “planned development of Delhi” has been upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975) 4 SCC 285]. It is pointed out that the Constitution Bench has in this Judgment upheld acquisition inter alia on the ground that when there is acquisition of such a large area of land, it is not possible to specify in detail what the exact purpose of acquisition is. It was pointed out that an argument identical to the one now made has been negatived in that Judgment. Reliance was placed on para 24 of the Judgment which reads as under:
“24. It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the acquisition was really for the co-operative housing societies which are companies within the definition of the word `company’ in Section 3(e) of the Act, and, therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view that the acquisition was not for company. We see no reason to differ from their view. The mere fact that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property acquired for development to the co-operative housing societies would not make the acquisition one for `company’. Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit in the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from the consideration paid by the co-operative societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was co-operatives which provided the fund for the acquisition. Merely because the Government allotted a part of the property to co-operative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for co-operative societies and, therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted.”
9. It is submitted that the Delhi Development Authority, for whom the land has been acquired, cannot develop 35000 acres on its own. It was submitted that it, therefore, becomes necessary to give various portions of land to various societies for the purposes of development. It was submitted that merely because land is given to societies does not mean that the acquisition is for the purposes of those societies. It was submitted that the Agreement dated 9th May, 1972 does not specify that the land to be allotted to that society is the Appellants’ land. It was submitted that the Agreement is merely to allot some land out of the 35,000 acres being acquired. It is submitted that the Constitution Bench of this Court has approved such a course of action.
10. In support of this submission, it was also pointed out that the planned development can only be in accordance with the Delhi Development Act and that this permitted the authority to allot land to various co-operative societies for the purposes of development.
11. We have considered the submissions of both the sides. In our view, there is no merit in the challenge to the proposed acquisition on the ground that the acquisition was for the purposes of the society covered by Agreement dated 9th May, 1972. The subsequent Notification is merely a follow up of the earlier Notification. The entire acquisition is for “planned development of Delhi”. To be remembered that Appellants’ land is in the midst of the 35000 acres which have been acquired pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959. The Agreement dated 19th May, 1972 does not specify that it is the Appellants’ land which is to be allotted to that Society. The Society is to be allotted some land and even if Appellants’ land is allotted to this Society, after acquisition, it will not mean that the acquisition was for this Society. Therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act need not have been complied with.
12. It was next submitted, on behalf of the Appellants, that the Government has formulated a scheme by which parties are permitted to develop their own land. It was submitted that the acquisition of land of such parties was to be withdrawn as per the policy. In this behalf, reliance was placed upon a letter dated 3rd March, 1987 from the office of the Prime Minister, wherein it is stated that the Appellants may be permitted to develop the land in accordance with the norms given by Delhi Development Authority. Reliance was also placed upon a letter dated 4th April, 1991 from the Director, Delhi Development Authority, to one Shri Acharya Arun Dev (whom the Appellants claim to be their power of attorney holder) wherein also the Appellants’ proposal to allot the land to them for development was stated to be approved. Reliance was also placed upon a letter dated 17th September, 1991 from the Additional Secretary to the Minister of Urban Development as well as minutes of a meeting held on 23rd September, 1991 in the chambers of the Lt. Governor to consider the Appellants proposal to develop the lands themselves. Relying on these documents, it was submitted that the Governments had decided to withdraw from the acquisition. It was submitted that the Government should be held bound by its commitment to so withdraw. It was submitted that for this reason also the acquisition should be quashed.
13. As against this, on behalf of the Respondents, it is pointed out that this very ground had been considered by the Delhi High Court on an earlier occasion. It was pointed out that after looking into the relevant records the Delhi High Court had recorded in paras 18 and 19 of its Judgments as follows:
“18. It also appears that there was a decision relating to denotification of land in favour of one Sita Ram Bhandar Trust. File thereof had been called for by the Prime Minister who ordered that no land was to be denotified without the previous approval of the Cabinet/Prime minister. When this file was sent to the Ministry, based on the decision contained in respect of Sita Ram Bahadur Trust, following noting was recorded in respect of the land in question on 17th June, 1999.
“Notes from page 38/N onwards may kindly be seen: The case of Denotification of village Kotla Mahigiran, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi was examined without calling a fresh report upto date position of the case from DDA. The then Minister (UD) has ordered (P-41/N) for the denotification of the land.
2. Subsequently, DDA has informed that out of 615 Bigha acquired by the Govt. physical possession of land measuring 600 Bigha has already been taken over by the DDA.
3. In the mean time the file relating to denotification of land in favour of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has been called for by the Prime Minister and the PM has ordered that no land is to be denotified without the previous approval of the Cabinet/PM. In view of this no further action is required in this case. Submitted please.
19. This file was placed before the Minister. It may be mentioned that in the meantime new incumbent had taken charge. This new Minister took the following decision on the basis of aforesaid noting dated 17th June, 1999.
“The file of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has since been received back from the PMO and PM’s instructions not to denotify the land have been noted.
2. On the Trust’s file, I have recorded my observations. These observations apply in this case as well. There is no justification for denotifying land, particularly when 600 bighas have already been acquired and taken over.”
14. This could not be denied by the Appellants. It is thus clear that letters and minutes relied upon are mere recommendations. No decision to release from acquisition had been taken. In any event the Prime Minister had turned out this proposal.
15. Even otherwise, we have seen the scheme sought to be relied upon. We find from the scheme that it only applies in respect of persons/agencies who own and possess the land. In this case possession of the land had already been taken. The scheme also categorically states that the scheme would not take away the rights of the Delhi Development Authority to acquire for development of Delhi. Thus the scheme was not applicable to lands of the Appellants. Even under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act once possession is taken the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. We thus see no substance in this contention also.
16. In view of the above, we see no merit in this Appeal. The Appeal stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.