2005 JTR(SC) 892
2006 2 AllMR(SC) 4 ; 2006 1 LLJ 1 ; 2006 1 LLN 54 ; 2006 1 MhLJ(SC) 705 ; 2005 7 SCC 40 ; 2006 3 SLJ 1688 ; 2005 2 WBLR 1032 ; 2006 1 WLC 564 ; 2005 KHC 1357 ; 2005 8 Supreme 430
2005(8) Supreme 430
Supreme Court of India
D.M. Dharmadhikari and Arun Kumar, JJ.
Modi Telefibres Ltd. & Ors. —Appellants
versus
Sujit Kumar Choudhary & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3712 of 2005
Decided on 15-7-2005
Act Referred :CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT : S.19
(A) Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order of a High Court exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, specifically from a Single Judge to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the same Court. In this case, the impugned order of the Division Bench wrongly denied the right of appeal to the appellant employer despite the order being passed by a Single Judge on matters of alleged contempt for non-compliance with a Labour Court award. The provisions of Section 19(1)(a) and Section 19(2) read with sub-section (3) and (4) clearly contemplate an appeal as of right and allow for suspension of execution, bail, and hearing the appeal even if the contemnor has not purged the contempt, thus forming the direct statutory basis for challenging the impugned order.
(B) The key legal principles are: (i) an appeal lies as of right from a Single Judges order in contempt of court proceedings under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; (ii) a Division Bench cannot deny the right of appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge; (iii) the finding of contempt based on non-payment of dues under a Labour Court award is subject to the appellate remedy under Section 19; and (iv) pending appeal, the appellate court may suspend execution of punishment, grant bail, and permit the appeal even if contempt has not been purged.
Facts of the case:
Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 were initiated for the alleged non-compliance with a Labour Court award in relation to payment of full dues including variable dearness allowances to workmen. A Single Judge recorded that the employer had not paid the full dues and committed contempt, directing the employers officer to remain present with bank drafts for payment. The employer appealed to the Division Bench, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge. The Division Benchs order was impugned.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench committed a gross error in overlooking the Single Judges finding that the employer committed contempt by not paying full dues. The Single Judges order could not be treated as interlocutory to deny the right of appeal. The right of appeal under Section 19 cannot be denied merely because the Single Judge adjourned the proceedings to enable the alleged contemnor to purge contempt or to decide the quantum of punishment.
Issues:
Whether an appeal lies as of right to the Division Bench from a Single Judges order in contempt of court proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and whether the Division Bench was correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers an unqualified right of appeal from a Single Judges order in contempt matters to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court, and the Division Bench cannot deny this right on the ground of pendency or nature of the order, especially when the Single Judge has found contempt based on non-compliance with an award.
Result:
The impugned order dated 29.4.2003 is set aside, and the case is sent back to the Division Bench to decide the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
(A) Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order of a High Court exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, specifically from a Single Judge to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the same Court. In this case, the impugned order of the Division Bench wrongly denied the right of appeal to the appellant employer despite the order being passed by a Single Judge on matters of alleged contempt for non-compliance with a Labour Court award. The provisions of Section 19(1)(a) and Section 19(2) read with sub-section (3) and (4) clearly contemplate an appeal as of right and allow for suspension of execution, bail, and hearing the appeal even if the contemnor has not purged the contempt, thus forming the direct statutory basis for challenging the impugned order.
(B) The key legal principles are: (i) an appeal lies as of right from a Single Judges order in contempt of court proceedings under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; (ii) a Division Bench cannot deny the right of appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge; (iii) the finding of contempt based on non-payment of dues under a Labour Court award is subject to the appellate remedy under Section 19; and (iv) pending appeal, the appellate court may suspend execution of punishment, grant bail, and permit the appeal even if contempt has not been purged.
Facts of the case:
Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 were initiated for the alleged non-compliance with a Labour Court award in relation to payment of full dues including variable dearness allowances to workmen. A Single Judge recorded that the employer had not paid the full dues and committed contempt, directing the employers officer to remain present with bank drafts for payment. The employer appealed to the Division Bench, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge. The Division Benchs order was impugned.
Findings of Court:
The Division Bench committed a gross error in overlooking the Single Judges finding that the employer committed contempt by not paying full dues. The Single Judges order could not be treated as interlocutory to deny the right of appeal. The right of appeal under Section 19 cannot be denied merely because the Single Judge adjourned the proceedings to enable the alleged contemnor to purge contempt or to decide the quantum of punishment.
Issues:
Whether an appeal lies as of right to the Division Bench from a Single Judges order in contempt of court proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and whether the Division Bench was correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Single Judge.
Ratio Decidendi:
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers an unqualified right of appeal from a Single Judges order in contempt matters to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court, and the Division Bench cannot deny this right on the ground of pendency or nature of the order, especially when the Single Judge has found contempt based on non-compliance with an award.
Result:
The impugned order dated 29.4.2003 is set aside, and the case is sent back to the Division Bench to decide the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties finally on the merits of the case.
3. For the alleged non-compliance with the award of the Labour Court in favour of the respondent workmen, proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 were initiated. The learned Single Judge by an order passed on 5.3.2003 followed by a subsequent order dated 22.5.2003 has clearly recorded his conclusion that all dues of the workmen including variable dearness allowances have not been paid by the appellant employer and thus the contempt was committed. The learned Single Judge directed the officer of the employer to remain present with bank drafts to be paid to the workmen. It is in these circumstances that the appellant employer approached by way of an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 29.4.2003 has dismissed the appeal on the short ground that the matter arising out of the contempt proceedings was still pending before the Single Judge.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned order, we find that the Division Bench has committed gross error in overlooking the contents of the order of the learned Single Judge in which the finding has been recorded that the employer has committed contempt by not paying full dues of the workmen under the award.
5. Such an order of the learned Single Judge could not have been treated to be an interlocutory order and the right of appeal denied to the appellant employer merely because the learned Single Judge had adjourned the contempt proceedings to enable the alleged contemnor to purge the contempt or else for deciding the quantum of punishment.
6. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 gives a right of appeal against the order of learned Single Judge of the High Court to the Division Bench of the High Court. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads thus:
“19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt—
(a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that—
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).
(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed—
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.”
7. In view of the above provisions, the Division Bench was clearly wrong in refusing the right of appeal to the appellants.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 29.4.2003 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Division Bench to decide the appeal preferred by the appellants on merits.
9. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Appeal allowed accordingly.
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