1987 JTR(SC) 95
1987 2 AICLR 205 ; 1987 AIR(SC) 860 ; 1987 BLJR 372 ; 1987 CriLR 198 ; 1987 1 Crimes(SC) 385 ; 1987 CrLJ 775 ; 1987 1 CurLJ 596 ; 1988 1 CurLJ 25 ; 1987 1 DMC 162 ; 1987 1 HinduLR 169 ; 1987 JLJ 351 ; 1987 1 JT 280 ; 1987 PLJR(SC) 39 ; 1987 1 Scale 167 ; 1987 2 SCC 32 ; 1987 SCC(Cri) 254 ; 1987 1 UJ 484 ; 1987 KHC 896
G.L. OZA AND M.M. DUTT, JJ.
Criminal Appeal No. 364 of 1986,
D/-27-1-1987.
Suresh, Appellant
Versus
State of M.P., Respondent.
Act
Referred
:EVIDENCE ACT : S.32
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.300, S.302
(A) The Indian Penal Code sections 300 and 302, read with Section 32 of the Evidence Act, govern the classification of homicide and the admissibility of dying declarations in murder trials. Section 300 defines the offence of murder, requiring intent to cause death or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, while Section 302 prescribes the punishment for murder. Section 32 of the Evidence Act validates the recording of dying declarations, permitting statements made by a deceased person concerning the cause of their death, provided they were made while the declarant was in a fit state of mind and the circumstances inspire confidence in their reliability. In this case, the accused was charged under Section 302 for murdering their mistress following a quarrel where they allegedly poured kerosene and set the victim on fire. The victims dying declaration, recorded under Section 32 of the Evidence Act by a medical professional, became critical evidence linking the accused to the homicide.
(B) Key legal principles include the requirement that a dying declaration must be recorded when the declarant is conscious and capable of speaking, and that such evidence can be relied upon even if the victim was in a sinking state, provided the declaration was made before the onset of coma. The burden of proof in murder cases is high, demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt, and appellate courts interfere only if the finding is perverse or without evidence.
Facts of the case:
The accused and the victim, who had been living together as mistress and partner for 15 to 16 years, engaged in frequent quarrels. On June 8, 1983, a quarrel occurred, and the following day, the accused poured kerosene on the victim and set her on fire using a matchstick. The victim sustained 100 percent second-degree burns, was conscious when the dying declaration was recorded, and later succumbed to the injuries. The accused claimed the allegations were false and that the victim was attempting to break off the relationship by threatening suicide.
Findings of Court:
The trial court and the High Court both found the dying declaration admissible and credible, believing the medical professional who recorded it. The courts held that the victim was in a fit state to depose and that the evidence proved the accused guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues:
Whether a dying declaration recorded while the victim was sinking and sustaining severe burns is admissible and reliable, and whether the conviction can stand on such evidence.
Ratio Decidendi:
A dying declaration recorded by a medical professional, stating the victim was conscious and capable of speaking before slipping into coma, is valid evidence. When corroborated by the circumstances of the act and the severity of injuries, it can support a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld.
(A) The Indian Penal Code sections 300 and 302, read with Section 32 of the Evidence Act, govern the classification of homicide and the admissibility of dying declarations in murder trials. Section 300 defines the offence of murder, requiring intent to cause death or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, while Section 302 prescribes the punishment for murder. Section 32 of the Evidence Act validates the recording of dying declarations, permitting statements made by a deceased person concerning the cause of their death, provided they were made while the declarant was in a fit state of mind and the circumstances inspire confidence in their reliability. In this case, the accused was charged under Section 302 for murdering their mistress following a quarrel where they allegedly poured kerosene and set the victim on fire. The victims dying declaration, recorded under Section 32 of the Evidence Act by a medical professional, became critical evidence linking the accused to the homicide.
(B) Key legal principles include the requirement that a dying declaration must be recorded when the declarant is conscious and capable of speaking, and that such evidence can be relied upon even if the victim was in a sinking state, provided the declaration was made before the onset of coma. The burden of proof in murder cases is high, demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt, and appellate courts interfere only if the finding is perverse or without evidence.
Facts of the case:
The accused and the victim, who had been living together as mistress and partner for 15 to 16 years, engaged in frequent quarrels. On June 8, 1983, a quarrel occurred, and the following day, the accused poured kerosene on the victim and set her on fire using a matchstick. The victim sustained 100 percent second-degree burns, was conscious when the dying declaration was recorded, and later succumbed to the injuries. The accused claimed the allegations were false and that the victim was attempting to break off the relationship by threatening suicide.
Findings of Court:
The trial court and the High Court both found the dying declaration admissible and credible, believing the medical professional who recorded it. The courts held that the victim was in a fit state to depose and that the evidence proved the accused guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues:
Whether a dying declaration recorded while the victim was sinking and sustaining severe burns is admissible and reliable, and whether the conviction can stand on such evidence.
Ratio Decidendi:
A dying declaration recorded by a medical professional, stating the victim was conscious and capable of speaking before slipping into coma, is valid evidence. When corroborated by the circumstances of the act and the severity of injuries, it can support a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
Result:
The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld.
Judgement
DUTT, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court affirming the order of the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, convicting the appellant under S. 302, IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the murder of his mistress Lachhibai.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, was that Lachhibai was the mistress of the appellant and they had been living together for a period of 15/16 years. There used to be frequent quarrels between them. It is not disputed that the appellants married wife was living separately from him. In the night of June 8, 1983 there had been a quarrel between the appellant and Lachhibai. On the next day, that is, on June 9, 1983 at 10.45 a.m., the appellant poured kerosene oil on her and thereafter set fire to her with the help of a lighted matchstick, in consequence of which the whole body of Lachhibai got burnt externally. She was removed to the hospital at the instance of Station House Officer, Manohar Lal Bhandari (P.W. 10).
3. Dr. Smt. Asha Bhargava (P.W. 1) examined Lachhibai and found that the whole of her body had sustained hundred per cent burns of second degree. She was conscious but her condition was serious. At the request of P.W. 10, Dr. Bhargava recorded her dying declaration (Ex. P-5). In her dying declaration it was stated by Lachhibai that after a quarrel the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her and burnt her. At about 12.45 p.m. she succumbed to her injuries on the same day. The post-mortem examination was also conducted by Dr. Bhargava and she found that Lachhibai died on account of hundred per cent burns of second degree. In her opinion, these burns were ante-mortem and were sufficient to cause death. After the conclusion of investigation, the appellant was prosecuted on a charge under S. 302, IPC for murdering Lachhibai.
4. The defence of the appellant was that as he had married one Shardabai, the deceased used to quarrel with him in order to sever his relation with Shardabai on the threat of committing suicide and false implication. It was alleged by him that in the morning of June 9, 1983, he was at the radio-shop of his friend, Ramesh (D.W. 1), and on an information given to him by one Raj Bhanwar that Lachhibai had sustained burns, he had reached home and found Lachhibai lying in an unconscious burnt state.
5. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence and particularly the dying declaration overruled the defence plea and held that the charge against the appellant was proved beyond any reasonable doubt. The appellant was, accordingly, convicted under S. 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, The High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence this appeal.
6. The only point that has been urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the dying declaration which was recorded by Dr. Bhargava should not be relied upon inasmuch as at the time when the dying declaration was stated to have been recorded by her, Lachhibai was sinking and was unable to make any statement. Our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel to the post-mortem report of Dr. Bhargava. It is submitted that in view of the serious injuries sustained by Lachhibai on account of the burns, she must be in an unconscious state at the time her dying declaration was stated to have been recorded.
7. We are unable to accept the contention. Dr. Bhargava had examined Lachhibai. According to her Lachhibai was in a fit state of health to make a declaration. Indeed, her evidence is that when she recorded the dying declaration of Lachhibai, she was capable of deposing and was in her senses. She further stated that when she was recording her dying declaration, "she had started going into coma".
8. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court have believed the evidence of Dr. Bhargava and have placed reliance upon the dying declaration in convicting the Appellant. We do not find any reason not to believe the evidence of Dr. Bhargava. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the courts below were justified in convicting the appellant under section 302 of IPC. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellant.
9. There is, therefore, no substance in the appeal. It is accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.