1994 JTR(SC) 114
1995 AIR(SCW) 393 ; 1995 AllLJ 363 ; 1996 32 ATC 76 ; 1995 1 CurCC(SC) 474 ; 1994 7 JT 304 ; 1996 2 LLJ 697 ; 1995 1 RRR 272 ; 1994 4 Scale 755 ; 1995 Supp4 SCC 76 ; 1996 SCC(L&S) 147 ; 1994 Supp4 SCR 646 ; 1995 8 SLR 787 ; 1996 8 SLR 787
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.L.Hansaria : K.Ramaswamy
U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
Versus
Rajendra Bahadur Srivastava
Case No. : 575 of 1994
Date of Decision : 1/24/94
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.226
(A) The constitutional provision Article 226 read with the facts of this case governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court to issue writs for enforcement of rights or for other purposes. The interplay between the respondent's undertaking in the form of a consent letter, the impugned termination order, and the subsequent writ petition determines the scope of judicial review available under this Article in matters involving service termination, reinstatement, and consequential benefits.
(B) Key legal principles include: the binding nature of an unequivocal consent undertaking affecting subsequent rights; the limited scope of revisiting set terms by unilateral action; the High Court's inherent powers under Article 226 being subject to structured exercise and circumspection; and the consequences of an illegal reversion to original position on computation of service benefits.
Facts of the case:
A lower division clerk was terminated in 1971, later obtained conditional reinstatement through a 1977 representation, gave unequivocal consent for fresh appointment with terms waiving past benefits, joined anew in 1986, and filed a writ petition in 1991 challenging the 1971 termination and seeking arrears and consequential benefits. The High Court allowed the petition, quashed the termination order, and directed payment of arrears and promotion benefits.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in allowing the writ petition in the terms stated; the respondent's unequivocal consent and fresh appointment precluded him from claiming set terms; the challenge after acceptance was an attempt to overreach; and the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 was exercised without necessary caution.
Issues:
Whether a respondent who has given unequivocal consent for reinstatement on specified terms can subsequently claim that the earlier termination order was illegal and obtain consequential benefits; and whether the High Court was justified in directing arrears and promotion benefits under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi:
An unequivocal undertaking to serve afresh waives prior irregularities; subsequent challenge to the original termination after fresh appointment is not maintainable; extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must be exercised circumspectly; benefit of past service is confined to pensionary computation from the date of actual resumption, not full consequential benefits.
Result:
Appeal allowed; High Court order set aside; respondent entitled only to pensionary benefit computation from the date of resumption (3/5/1986) with no further directions for payment.
(A) The constitutional provision Article 226 read with the facts of this case governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court to issue writs for enforcement of rights or for other purposes. The interplay between the respondent's undertaking in the form of a consent letter, the impugned termination order, and the subsequent writ petition determines the scope of judicial review available under this Article in matters involving service termination, reinstatement, and consequential benefits.
(B) Key legal principles include: the binding nature of an unequivocal consent undertaking affecting subsequent rights; the limited scope of revisiting set terms by unilateral action; the High Court's inherent powers under Article 226 being subject to structured exercise and circumspection; and the consequences of an illegal reversion to original position on computation of service benefits.
Facts of the case:
A lower division clerk was terminated in 1971, later obtained conditional reinstatement through a 1977 representation, gave unequivocal consent for fresh appointment with terms waiving past benefits, joined anew in 1986, and filed a writ petition in 1991 challenging the 1971 termination and seeking arrears and consequential benefits. The High Court allowed the petition, quashed the termination order, and directed payment of arrears and promotion benefits.
Findings of Court:
The High Court erred in allowing the writ petition in the terms stated; the respondent's unequivocal consent and fresh appointment precluded him from claiming set terms; the challenge after acceptance was an attempt to overreach; and the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 was exercised without necessary caution.
Issues:
Whether a respondent who has given unequivocal consent for reinstatement on specified terms can subsequently claim that the earlier termination order was illegal and obtain consequential benefits; and whether the High Court was justified in directing arrears and promotion benefits under Article 226.
Ratio Decidendi:
An unequivocal undertaking to serve afresh waives prior irregularities; subsequent challenge to the original termination after fresh appointment is not maintainable; extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must be exercised circumspectly; benefit of past service is confined to pensionary computation from the date of actual resumption, not full consequential benefits.
Result:
Appeal allowed; High Court order set aside; respondent entitled only to pensionary benefit computation from the date of resumption (3/5/1986) with no further directions for payment.
(1) LEAVE granted. We have heard both the counsel.
(2) WE are satisfied on the facts that it is a fit case for interference. The first respondent - Rajendra Bahadur Srivastava was appointed as a lower division clerk on 15/1 1/1966. He was promoted as an upper division assistant in the year 1970. By proceedings dated 31/12/1971 his services were terminated with immediate effect on payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. Thereafter, on 7/9/1977 he submitted a representation to the authorities. On 20/9/1977 the Housing Commissioner and secretary had stipulated in his order that the respondent should give consent for his appointment afresh and subject to that his case would be considered. Accordingly, the first respondent has submitted a consent letter (Annexure V to the Special Leave Petition paper-book) which reads thus :
"IN pursuance of the D.O. dated 7/9/1977 mentioned in the said letter I give my consent subject to the conditions contained therein, that my service tenure would start afresh and will not claim benefits of my past services. My joining w.e.f. 3/5/1986 may kindly be accepted."
(3) PURSUANT to that, it was treated that he had joined on 3/5/1986. Thereafter, the first respondent has filed W.P. No. 6644 of 1991 in the High Court stating that his termination in 1971 was illegal and that he should be granted all consequential benefits. The High court, by its order dated 7/7/1993, allowed the writ petition and passed the following order :
"IN view of the above facts and legal position the writ petition is liable to be, and is allowed to the extent and in the terms mentioned hereinafter. The impugned order of termination dated 31/12/1971 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) is quashed. The order dated 10/7/1992 (Annexure B to the counter-affidavit) is also quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to arrears of salary at the rate to which he would have been entitled, but for his termination, with effect from 28/9/1985. He shall also be entitled to and be given other benefits of his past services, including the benefit in regard to seniority, increments and promotion to which he would have been entitled, if his services had not been terminated. He shall be considered for promotion with effect from the date his next junior was promoted on the next higher post or posts and if necessary, the opposite parties shall create supernumerary post in order to give benefit of promotion to the petitioner in accordance with these directions. The conditions to the contrary in the order dated 6/5/1986 (Annexure 15 to the writ petition) is quashed. Appropriate orders in accordance with these directions shall be issued within four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the opposite parties."
The Housing Board is now impugning the said judgment in this appeal.
(4) IT is contended for the appellant that the first respondent having given his consent in an unequivocal terms in the letter, it is no longer open to him to claim all the benefits. For the respondent, it is contended that relying on the letters issued by the subordinate officers in the Accounts Department that the first respondent has got outstanding capacity to discharge duties and a capable officer and they themselves considered that in the event of his foregoing salary only all other benefits would be given, the High court therefore, would be justified in giving the directions in the impugned order as sought for.
(5) WE have considered the respective contentions. On. the facts of this case the High court has clearly erred in allowing the writ petition in the terms stated above. In view of the unequivocal undertaking given by the first respondent, it is no longer open to him to contend that his dismissal (sic termination) order of 1971 was illegal. He approached the High court in 1991 seeking to quash his termination order of 1971 after securing conditional reinstatement. His challenge after his appointment on his representation and acceptance of conditions subject to which he was to be appointed is an attempt to overreach his goal in a circuitous route. It is hard to accept that within a short period of five months he has shown such a remarkable capabilities in discharging duties as appeared to be commendable to the officers recommended in the letters relied on by the respondent. Be it as it may, we need not go into that question in detail. Suffice to state that would not be a ground for the respondent to claim the reliefs granted by the High court. The order of the High court is illegal and the High court would (sic should) be circumspect in its exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is set aside. However, the first respondent is entitled to the computation of the period from the date of his initial appointment for the purpose of his pensionary benefits only and no further. He is entitled to the salary only from the date on which he started discharging duties, namely, 3/5/1986. It is stated that he has already been paid. Under these circumstances, no further directions for payment is necessary.
(6) THE appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.