1996 JTR(SC) 1102
1996 3 AICLR 644 ; 1996 AIR(SC) 2512 ; 1996 AIR(SCW) 3120 ; 1997 34 AllCriC 370 ; 1996 CriLR 769 ; 1996 CrLJ 3586 ; 1996 Supp JT 481 ; 1997 1 RCR(Cri) 14 ; 1996 5 Scale 444 ; 1996 5 SCC 495 ; 1996 SCC(Cri) 1034 ; 1996 SCR 787 ; 1996 KHC 1737 ; 1996 2 KLT(Online) 1189
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S.Anand : S.B.Majmudar
State Of Punjab
Versus
Kesar Singh
Case No. : .
Date of Decision : 7/22/96
Advocates Appeared: Banerjee Ujjwal : Puri H.K. : Srivastava Rajesh : Suri R.S.
The power to commute a life sentence or order premature release under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests exclusively with the government. The High Court cannot order such release directly but may only direct the government to consider the convict's application.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
: S.433(a)
(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 433, 433(b) and 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302 and 34 - Premature release of convict - Power to commute sentence of life imprisonment to a term not exceeding 14 years or fine vests with the government - High Court cannot order premature release of a convict under its inherent powers - It can only direct the government to consider the case for premature release in accordance with established rules and principles. (Para 3)
Facts of the case:
A respondent was convicted for an offence under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. After serving slightly more than 8 years, the respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking premature release. The High Court allowed the petition and directed the immediate release of the respondent.
Findings of Court:
The direction given by the High Court was not permissible in law as the power to commute sentences and order premature release under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests solely with the government. Since the respondent had not completed 14 years of the sentence, the order for immediate release was unsustainable.
Issues: Whether the High Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can order the premature release of a convict sentenced to life imprisonment.
Ratio Decidendi: The mandate of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the government to commute sentences. The High Court cannot substitute its own order for the government's discretion in matters of premature release; it may only direct the government to consider the application on its merits.
Result: Impugned order set aside.
Facts of the case:
A respondent was convicted for an offence under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. After serving slightly more than 8 years, the respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking premature release. The High Court allowed the petition and directed the immediate release of the respondent.
Findings of Court:
The direction given by the High Court was not permissible in law as the power to commute sentences and order premature release under Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vests solely with the government. Since the respondent had not completed 14 years of the sentence, the order for immediate release was unsustainable.
Issues: Whether the High Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can order the premature release of a convict sentenced to life imprisonment.
Ratio Decidendi: The mandate of Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the government to commute sentences. The High Court cannot substitute its own order for the government's discretion in matters of premature release; it may only direct the government to consider the application on its merits.
Result: Impugned order set aside.
(1) SPECIAL leave granted.
(2) THE respondent was convicted for an offence under S. 302/34 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the judgment and order dated 28/5/1987. After he had undergone a little more than 8 years of sentence he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh seeking premature release. The High court by the impugned order dated 18/1/1996 considered the case on its merits and allowed the petition directing the release of the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved by the order dated 18/1/1996, hence this appeal.
(3) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion the direction given by the High court was not at all appropriate or permissible in law. The mandate of Section 433 Criminal Procedure Code enables the government in an appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts. Clause (b) of Section 433 Criminal Procedure Code provides that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code seeking premature release. The direction of the High court therefore to prematurely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even if the High court could give such a direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature release by the government and could not have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under Section 433 Criminal Procedure Code vests in the government and has to be exercised by the government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The impugned order of the High court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set aside.
(4) THIS order shall, however, not come in the way of the respondent for approaching the government for commutation of his sentence and premature release in terms of the order issued by the governor of Punjab on 6/3/1985. As and when such an application is made, the State government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this order or by the observations made by the High court in the impugned order.