1995 JTR(SC) 883
1996 AIR(SC) 112 ; 1995 AIR(SCW) 3798 ; 1996 1 AllCJ 140 ; 1995 3 CCC(SC) 547 ; 1995 3 CurCC(SC) 547 ; 1995 7 JT 179 ; 1995 3 RRR 533 ; 1995 5 Scale 87 ; 1995 5 SCC 612 ; 1995 Supp3 SCR 172 ; 1995 WBLR 437 ; 1995 KHC 935
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.M. PUNCHHI AND FAIZAN-UDDIN, JJ.
Abubakar Abdul Inamdar (dead) by LRs. and others, Appellants
Versus Harun Abdul Inamdar and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2750 of 1977,
D/- 30-8-1995.
(A) The impugned properties in this matter were originally Inams subject to the Bombay merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, which abolished the Inam system and effected re-grant of the lands to the erstwhile Inamdar. The succession to these properties and the re-grant thereafter intersect with principles of inheritance, primogeniture, and the devolution of interests upon the extinction of the Inam, requiring an application of personal law and statutory rules governing such alienations and conversions of status. The adjudication further involves evaluating the scope of a re-grant to a single heir and the residual rights of other co-heirs under the reformed regime. The principles enunciated in prior decisions on Hindu joint family properties and partitions, while not directly determinative on the facts of this Mohammedan succession, provide a comparative backdrop to the interpretation of the re-grant and the attendant claims of partition and adverse possession.
(B) The core legal principles delineated in this judgment encompass the doctrine of impartibility and primogeniture in the context of Inam lands, the effect of abolition and re-grant on the devolution of interests, the scope of a re-grant vesting personal title in a Watandar, the applicability of rules of inheritance to Mohammedan succession upon the abolition of an Inam, the requirements for establishing a claim of adverse possession, and the hierarchy of pleadings and evidence in determining such claims.
Facts of the case:
The deceased Syed Abdulla Inamdar held agricultural lands as Inams and a dwelling house. Upon his death, the agricultural lands were assigned to the eldest son as Inams under the rule of primogeniture, while the house remained in his possession. After the abolition of Inams in 1955, the eldest son was re-granted the lands as Watandar. The other co-heirs claimed shares in the lands and partition of the house, leading to litigation.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the re-grant did not maintain impartibility of the estate, and the co-heirs were entitled to claim their respective shares under Mohammedan law of inheritance. It also found that the plea of adverse possession was not sustained on record due to lack of proper pleadings and evidence of hostile and exclusive possession.
Issues:
Whether the properties re-granted to the eldest son after abolition of Inams remained impartible and whether co-heirs could claim shares; whether the house property devolved by inheritance and partition; whether the plea of adverse possession was maintainable on the facts.
Ratio Decidendi:
Upon abolition of the Inam, the estate became divisible, and the co-heirs, being the heirs of the deceased, were entitled to their respective shares under Mohammedan law, irrespective of the earlier rule of primogeniture; the re-grant to a single Watandar did not create a joint family property or bar partition. Adverse possession could not be established due to insufficient pleadings and evidence of hostile and exclusive possession.
Result:
Appeal dismissed with no costs; the decrees of the lower courts were restored.
(A) The impugned properties in this matter were originally Inams subject to the Bombay merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, which abolished the Inam system and effected re-grant of the lands to the erstwhile Inamdar. The succession to these properties and the re-grant thereafter intersect with principles of inheritance, primogeniture, and the devolution of interests upon the extinction of the Inam, requiring an application of personal law and statutory rules governing such alienations and conversions of status. The adjudication further involves evaluating the scope of a re-grant to a single heir and the residual rights of other co-heirs under the reformed regime. The principles enunciated in prior decisions on Hindu joint family properties and partitions, while not directly determinative on the facts of this Mohammedan succession, provide a comparative backdrop to the interpretation of the re-grant and the attendant claims of partition and adverse possession.
(B) The core legal principles delineated in this judgment encompass the doctrine of impartibility and primogeniture in the context of Inam lands, the effect of abolition and re-grant on the devolution of interests, the scope of a re-grant vesting personal title in a Watandar, the applicability of rules of inheritance to Mohammedan succession upon the abolition of an Inam, the requirements for establishing a claim of adverse possession, and the hierarchy of pleadings and evidence in determining such claims.
Facts of the case:
The deceased Syed Abdulla Inamdar held agricultural lands as Inams and a dwelling house. Upon his death, the agricultural lands were assigned to the eldest son as Inams under the rule of primogeniture, while the house remained in his possession. After the abolition of Inams in 1955, the eldest son was re-granted the lands as Watandar. The other co-heirs claimed shares in the lands and partition of the house, leading to litigation.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the re-grant did not maintain impartibility of the estate, and the co-heirs were entitled to claim their respective shares under Mohammedan law of inheritance. It also found that the plea of adverse possession was not sustained on record due to lack of proper pleadings and evidence of hostile and exclusive possession.
Issues:
Whether the properties re-granted to the eldest son after abolition of Inams remained impartible and whether co-heirs could claim shares; whether the house property devolved by inheritance and partition; whether the plea of adverse possession was maintainable on the facts.
Ratio Decidendi:
Upon abolition of the Inam, the estate became divisible, and the co-heirs, being the heirs of the deceased, were entitled to their respective shares under Mohammedan law, irrespective of the earlier rule of primogeniture; the re-grant to a single Watandar did not create a joint family property or bar partition. Adverse possession could not be established due to insufficient pleadings and evidence of hostile and exclusive possession.
Result:
Appeal dismissed with no costs; the decrees of the lower courts were restored.
Judgement
JUDGMENT :- This appeal having arisen from the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court relates to two properties which belonged to one Syed Abdulla Inamdar. On his death, he was succeeded by six children; four of whom are sons and two daughters. The eldest son is Abubakar.
2. On the death of Syed Abdulla, agricultral lands which were Inams in his hands, were assigned to Abubakar, the eldest son, by certain orders passed by the Ruler of Kolhapur as Inams of two kinds. It is the admitted case of the parties that these Inams were impartible and had to devolve upon the eldest son by the rule of primogeniture. The other porperty was a dwelling unit which was owned by Sayed Abdulla and remained in possession of Abubakar.
3. On the abolition of the Inams under the provisions of the Bombay merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, Abubakar was regarded as a Watandar on re-grant of the properties. His brothers and sisters, on the one side, laid claims to those lands as co-heirs of Abubakar, taking the plea that by virtue of inheritance, they had a share in that property; the bar of impartibility and the rule of primogeniture having gone. Regarding the house property, they laid claims to partition it as heirs. Abubakar resisted the suit by laying claim that the landed properties which were erstwhile Inams became on re-grant personal in his hands and therefore the other heirs of Syed Abdulla had no share in those. Regarding the house he put up the plea of adverse possession, even though, avowedly, he had a Will in his favour from his father. The trial Court partly decreed the suit against him insofar as the Inam lands were concerned but dismissed the suit insofar as the house was concerned ; and the lower appellate Court affirmed that decision. Before the High Court the appeal of Abubakar as also the cross-objections of his opponents were taken up together. The appeal of Abubakar was dismissed and the cross-objections on the contrary were allowed with the result that the entire suit stood decreed, rejecting the claim of Abubakar of the Inam lands being personal to him and the house being in his adverse possession, maturing in his ownerships.
4. We have heard Mr. Ganpule, learned senior counsel for the appellant-Abubakar, at great length and pointedly with regard to the nature of regrant after the abolition of the Inam. It stands conceded by him that the terms of the grant are not in any manner peculiar to the facts emerging in this case but rather are the usual ones which find mention in such grants. He was frank enough to concede before us that had the parties been Hindus then the two decisions of this Court, namely, (i) Nagesh Bisto Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai, (1982) 3 SCP 341 : (AIR 1982 SC 887) and (ii) Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant (dead) by Lrs and heirs, (1995) 2 SCC 543 :(1995 AIR SCW 709) would have taken over the field to hold that the properties in the hands of the Watandar were joint family properties and partible after the regrant. He tried in vain to convince us that principally it would make a difference if the parties were Mohammedans, as presently they are. If we come to analyse the proposition convassed, Syed Abdullas estate should normally have devolved upon his six children in accordance with the shares as defined by the Shariat Law. But, since the properties were Inams and impartible and the services to the Ruler due from the members of the family were expected to be taken from the eldest son by the rule of primogeniture, then the heirs of Syed Abdulla, even though not forming a joint Hindu family as is known to Hindu Law, would still be a group of people, the representative of which was Abubakar in order to hold the Inam. Once that Inam was abolished and regrant given to Abubakar, impartibility of the estate vanished and thus this group of people were difinitely entitled to claim their respective shares in accordance with the law of Shairat. All the three courts below have taken such a view and we see no impelling reasons to draw a line of distinction qua the aforesaid two cases in Nagesh Bisto Desai and Annasaheb Bapusaheb (supra) so as to carve out an exception to the principle for Mohammedans. The prime reason for such interpretation is that the Ruler while drawing up the Inam initially and conferring it again on Abubakar did not intend to create any distinction between his subjects, be it Muslims or Hindus. Uniformity of tradition in that regard would be a good rule of reason so as to set the matter at rest here.
5. With regard to the plea of adverse possession, the appellant having been successful in the two Courts below and not in the High Court, one has to turn to the pleadings of the appellant in his written statement. There he has pleaded a duration of his having remained in exclusive possession of the house, but nowhere has he pleaded a single overt act on the basis of which it could be inferred or ascertained that from a particular point of time his possession became hostile and notorious to the complete exclusion of other heirs, and his being in possession openly and hostilely. It is true that some evidence, basically of Municapal register entries, were inducted to prove the point but no amount of proof can substitute pleadings which are the foundation of the claim of a litigating party. The High Court cought the appellant right at that point and drawing inference from the evidence produced on record, concluded that correct principles relating to the plea of adverse possession were not applied by the courts below. The finding, as it appears to us, was rightly reversed by the High Court requiring no interference at our end.
6. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Appeal dismissed.