2001 JTR(SC) 441
2001 AIR(SC) 1310 ; 2001 2 Crimes(SC) 30 ; 2001 CrLJ 1695 ; 2001 1 JCC 296 ; 2001 3 JT 495 ; 2001 4 SCC 224 ; 2001 2 SCJ 398 ; 2001 2 Supreme 371
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.T.Thomas : R.P.Sethi
State Of Maharashtra
Versus
Ritesh S/0 Vasudeo Wanjari
Case No. : 297 of 2001
Date of Decision : 3/5/01
Advocates Appeared: Arora T.S. : Daga M.R. : Deshpande S.V. : Deshpandey S.V. : Shinde S.S. : Sontakke P.S.
High Courts should not prematurely evaluate the merits of a conspiracy charge based on circumstantial evidence to grant bail once a final charge-sheet is filed, unless exceptional grounds exist, as the accused should generally face trial to determine innocence or guilt.
Act
Referred
:CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
: S.439
(A) The impugned order granting bail was passed by the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with Sections 302, 109, 120-B, 364, 397, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in relation to an offence punishable under these provisions. The appeal questioned the legality of the order on the ground that the High Court, at the initial stage of the proceedings, ventured to refer to the merits of the case and held that there was no material on record to establish the involvement of the accused in the conspiracy, thereby exercising discretion in an unfettered manner and ignoring the circumstantial evidence connecting the accused with the offence. The High Court also failed to afford the prosecution an opportunity to lead evidence on the issue of conspiracy and treated the fact of the accused moving to a different location as inconclusive, which is not a valid ground to defeat the process of judicial reasoning at the bail stage.
(B) The core legal principles include that the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC is an extraordinary power exercisable only on just and special grounds and not as a matter of right. The High Court, while considering bail, cannot normally go into the merits of the case or assess the evidence in detail at the threshold stage. The burden of proof for denying bail is on the prosecution, and the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficient prima facie case of guilt. The order granting bail cannot be allowed to be influenced or diluted by subsequent observations made while determining the plea of bail. The trial court is the proper forum to determine guilt or innocence once the charge-sheet is filed.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was arrested in connection with Crime No. 129 of 1999 for offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 120-B, 364, 397, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The allegations included a love affair between the respondent and the deceased Shubhangi, who belonged to a Scheduled Caste, while the respondent belonged to a higher caste. The respondent was alleged to have hatched a conspiracy to eliminate Shubhangi, and acts were attributed to him including traveling to Baramati, telephonic discussions with co-accused, hiring a contract killer, and ultimately murdering Shubhangi on 15-12-1999 and attempting to conceal the identity of the victim. The respondent filed an application for bail which was dismissed by the trial court, but was allowed by the High Court on revision under Section 439 CrPC.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that there was no material on record to establish the involvement of the respondent in the criminal conspiracy and that the accused was not aware of the conspiracy. It relied on the circumstantial nature of evidence and the fact that the respondent had gone to Baramati, observing that it was difficult to infer conspiracy, especially without exact telephone talks. The Single Judge of the High Court was not justified at the initial stage to comment on the merits or to undermine the prosecutions case. The appeal court noted that once the final charge-sheet is filed, the High Court should ordinarily permit the accused to seek his discharge from the trial court and not depart from the established procedure without exceptional grounds.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in venturing into the merits of the case and in holding that there was no material on record to establish conspiracy at the bail stage? Whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC in the present case? Whether the order granting bail can be predicated on observations that should have been reserved for the trial court?
Ratio Decidendi:
The High Court cannot, at the initial stage of the proceedings, go into the merits of the case or assess the material on record in detail to determine the existence of conspiracy. The grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC must be based on the threshold test of a prima facie case and the burden of proof for denying bail lies on the prosecution. Once a charge-sheet is filed, the trial court is the appropriate forum to determine guilt or innocence, and the High Court must not usurp its function unless there are exceptional grounds. Observations on the merits made at the bail stage cannot be a ground in favor of the accused.
Result:
The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The respondent is directed to be at liberty to urge grounds for his discharge before the trial court, which shall not be influenced by the observations made in the impugned order.
(A) The impugned order granting bail was passed by the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with Sections 302, 109, 120-B, 364, 397, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in relation to an offence punishable under these provisions. The appeal questioned the legality of the order on the ground that the High Court, at the initial stage of the proceedings, ventured to refer to the merits of the case and held that there was no material on record to establish the involvement of the accused in the conspiracy, thereby exercising discretion in an unfettered manner and ignoring the circumstantial evidence connecting the accused with the offence. The High Court also failed to afford the prosecution an opportunity to lead evidence on the issue of conspiracy and treated the fact of the accused moving to a different location as inconclusive, which is not a valid ground to defeat the process of judicial reasoning at the bail stage.
(B) The core legal principles include that the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC is an extraordinary power exercisable only on just and special grounds and not as a matter of right. The High Court, while considering bail, cannot normally go into the merits of the case or assess the evidence in detail at the threshold stage. The burden of proof for denying bail is on the prosecution, and the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficient prima facie case of guilt. The order granting bail cannot be allowed to be influenced or diluted by subsequent observations made while determining the plea of bail. The trial court is the proper forum to determine guilt or innocence once the charge-sheet is filed.
Facts of the case:
The respondent was arrested in connection with Crime No. 129 of 1999 for offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 120-B, 364, 397, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The allegations included a love affair between the respondent and the deceased Shubhangi, who belonged to a Scheduled Caste, while the respondent belonged to a higher caste. The respondent was alleged to have hatched a conspiracy to eliminate Shubhangi, and acts were attributed to him including traveling to Baramati, telephonic discussions with co-accused, hiring a contract killer, and ultimately murdering Shubhangi on 15-12-1999 and attempting to conceal the identity of the victim. The respondent filed an application for bail which was dismissed by the trial court, but was allowed by the High Court on revision under Section 439 CrPC.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that there was no material on record to establish the involvement of the respondent in the criminal conspiracy and that the accused was not aware of the conspiracy. It relied on the circumstantial nature of evidence and the fact that the respondent had gone to Baramati, observing that it was difficult to infer conspiracy, especially without exact telephone talks. The Single Judge of the High Court was not justified at the initial stage to comment on the merits or to undermine the prosecutions case. The appeal court noted that once the final charge-sheet is filed, the High Court should ordinarily permit the accused to seek his discharge from the trial court and not depart from the established procedure without exceptional grounds.
Issues:
Whether the High Court was justified in venturing into the merits of the case and in holding that there was no material on record to establish conspiracy at the bail stage? Whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC in the present case? Whether the order granting bail can be predicated on observations that should have been reserved for the trial court?
Ratio Decidendi:
The High Court cannot, at the initial stage of the proceedings, go into the merits of the case or assess the material on record in detail to determine the existence of conspiracy. The grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC must be based on the threshold test of a prima facie case and the burden of proof for denying bail lies on the prosecution. Once a charge-sheet is filed, the trial court is the appropriate forum to determine guilt or innocence, and the High Court must not usurp its function unless there are exceptional grounds. Observations on the merits made at the bail stage cannot be a ground in favor of the accused.
Result:
The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The respondent is directed to be at liberty to urge grounds for his discharge before the trial court, which shall not be influenced by the observations made in the impugned order.
R.P.SETHI, J.
(1) LEAVE granted.
(2) THE respondent was arrested in connection with Crime No. 129 of 1999 registered by Police Station Goregaon for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 120-B, 364, 397, 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. He has been granted bail pending trial vide the order impugned in this appeal on the ground that there was no material on record to establish the involvement of the respondent in the commission of the crime and that the accused was not aware of the criminal conspiracy, in execution of which, the deceased Shubhangi was killed.
(3) ACCORDING to the prosecution, the respondent had a love affair with the deceased Shubhangi. The deceased was insisting for marriage to which the respondent and his mother were not agreeable as the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Caste and the respondent belonged to Teli community which is considered as a higher caste. The respondent is alleged to have hatched a conspiracy to get rid of Shubhangi by eliminating her. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to create evidence in his favour, the respondent went to Baramati on 25-11-1999. On 11-12-1999 one Ms Vanita contacted the deceased, who was working at Nagpur, and took her to market on the pretext of making preparations for marriage of the deceased with the respondent. In the evening, the other accused, namely, Ashish, Dinesh and Ajay came in a Maruti car and picked up the deceased along with Ms Vanita and took her to Ramtek. A contract killer is alleged to have been hired by the accused to murder the deceased. As the alleged contract killer did not reach on that day, the criminal conspiracy hatched by the accused could not be implemented. Again on 13-11-1999 the accused Ms Vanita took the deceased on the pretext of solemnising her marriage with the respondent. To the misfortune of the accused, the killing was not accomplished even on that day as their car had met with an accident in which Ms Vanita, the accused had sustained some injuries. The task of murdering the deceased was accomplished on 15-12- 1999. The deceased was inflicted injuries with knife and stone and was also strangulated. In order to conceal the identity of the victim, the accused persons took away her purse, bag and other articles from the dead body and later on burnt the same.
(4) AFTER his arrest the respondent filed an application for bail in the trial court which was dismissed on 24-4-2000 on finding that his complicity in the criminal conspiracy was established. Being aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the respondent filed a revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court which was allowed vide the impugned order.
(5) FOR releasing the respondent on bail, the High Court has ventured to refer to the merits of the case and prematurely held that there was no material on record to show that the respondent was guilty of conspiracy, in execution of which, Shubhangi, once his beloved, was murdered. Despite observing that the case was based on circumstantial evidence, the High Court did not afford the prosecution an opportunity to lead evidence for establishing the existence of conspiracy and wrongly held that it was difficult to infer the existence of a conspiracy particularly when the respondent had gone to Baramati. The factum of the respondent going to Baramati was relied upon by the prosecution as one of the circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the crime particularly when it was alleged that while at Baramati he used to have telephonic talks with the other accused persons about the alleged conspiracy. In the absence of "exact talks", the High Court found that the allegation of conspiracy was not established. The Single Judge of the High Court was not justified, at the initial stage, to observe:
"... it is difficult to say that after the conspiracy was hatched the applicant had been to Baramati and from there he used to have talks with the other accused on phone regarding the alleged conspiracy."
(6) ONCE the final charge-sheet has been filed in the trial court, the High Court, under the normal circumstances, should have permitted the respondent to get a verdict of his innocence or involvement from that court under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No exceptional ground has been made out, in the instant case, to depart from such usual established procedure. The order impugned being contrary to law is liable to be set aside.
(7) UNDER the circumstances the appeal is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. The respondent would be at liberty to urge grounds, if there are any, for his discharge before the trial court and the trial court shall not be influenced by any of the observations made by us in this order while deciding his plea of bail. We make it clear that no observation made by the High Court in the order impugned shall be made a ground in favour of the accused for deciding such a plea.