1995 JTR(SC) 1102
1996 AIR(SCW) 131 ; 1995 3 CCC(SC) 173 ; 1995 4 CurCC(SC) 173 ; 1995 8 JT 494 ; 1996 1 RRR 420 ; 1995 6 Scale 485 ; 1996 1 SCC 311 ; 1995 Supp4 SCR 787 ; 1995 KHC 3327 ; 1996 1 KLT(Online) 927
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and B.N. Kirpal, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 10498 of 1995 Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1674 of 1995
Decided On: 06.11.1995
Market Committee, Hodal Appellants
Vs.
Krishan Murari and Ors. Respondent
Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.18, S.23, S.17(4), S.16, S.5(a)
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (referred via S.18, S.23, S.17(4), S.16, S.5(a)) governs the acquisition procedure, including declaration, possession, award, compensation, and enforcement mechanisms. Section 5(a) relates to preliminary notices, Section 16 addresses vesting of land free from encumbrances upon award, Section 17(4) empowers the appropriate government to dispense with enquiry, Section 18 provides for recovery of compensation, and Section 23 covers timeframes and appeals. Here, the notification and declaration were published in January 1981, possession was taken in April 1981, and an award was made in April 1984. The writ petition filed in December 1984 challenged the validity of dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A, which the High Court held invalid. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal at a belated stage, upholding the vesting under Section 16 and the exercise of power under Section 17(4). The appellants filed a Special Leave Petition after a long delay, explained by the intervention of the Central Agency, which the Court accepted as just and rational.
(B) Key legal principles include: the finality of acquisition proceedings once compensation is awarded and possession taken; the vesting of land free from encumbrances under Section 16; the discretionary power under Section 17(4) to dispense with enquiry; the permissibility of condoning delay in appeals if explained rationally; and the nonretroactive application of such powers, preventing reopening past entitlements.
Facts of the case:
Notification under Section 4(1) was published on January 22, 1981, and declaration under Section 6 on January 23, 1981. Possession was taken on April 29, 1981 (claimed by respondents). An award was made on April 19, 1984, and compensation offered under Section 31 was received under protest. A writ petition was filed on December 19, 1984, and the High Court allowed it on February 16, 1985, holding that dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A was invalid. The Special Leave Petition was filed on May 30, 1994, after a delay of approximately 9 years, with explanation that the Central Agency had not pursued the matter.
Findings of Court:
The Court accepted the explanation for the delay and condoned it. It held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of power under Section 17(4) at a belated stage, as the award was valid, possession had been taken, and lands had vested absolutely under Section 16. However, the Court directed an enquiry into the construction of the oil mill to determine whether it was built before or after the relevant dates, affecting compensation or exgratia liability.
Issues:
Whether the delay in filing the appeal affects the validity of the acquisition proceedings; whether the High Court erred in holding that dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A was invalid; and whether respondents are entitled to compensation or exgratia for oil mill construction.
Ratio Decidendi:
The acquisition process was validly completed through notification, declaration, possession, and award. The vesting of land under Section 16 was conclusive, and the exercise of power under Section 17(4) to dispense with enquiry was lawful when exercised at a late stage. Delay was condoned on rational grounds, and the matter warranted appellate interference to restore the acquisition process. Subsequent construction enquiries were left to the District Judge to determine liabilities.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. No costs awarded. The District Judge is directed to enquire into the construction timeline of the oil mill and determine compensation or exgratia liability accordingly.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (referred via S.18, S.23, S.17(4), S.16, S.5(a)) governs the acquisition procedure, including declaration, possession, award, compensation, and enforcement mechanisms. Section 5(a) relates to preliminary notices, Section 16 addresses vesting of land free from encumbrances upon award, Section 17(4) empowers the appropriate government to dispense with enquiry, Section 18 provides for recovery of compensation, and Section 23 covers timeframes and appeals. Here, the notification and declaration were published in January 1981, possession was taken in April 1981, and an award was made in April 1984. The writ petition filed in December 1984 challenged the validity of dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A, which the High Court held invalid. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal at a belated stage, upholding the vesting under Section 16 and the exercise of power under Section 17(4). The appellants filed a Special Leave Petition after a long delay, explained by the intervention of the Central Agency, which the Court accepted as just and rational.
(B) Key legal principles include: the finality of acquisition proceedings once compensation is awarded and possession taken; the vesting of land free from encumbrances under Section 16; the discretionary power under Section 17(4) to dispense with enquiry; the permissibility of condoning delay in appeals if explained rationally; and the nonretroactive application of such powers, preventing reopening past entitlements.
Facts of the case:
Notification under Section 4(1) was published on January 22, 1981, and declaration under Section 6 on January 23, 1981. Possession was taken on April 29, 1981 (claimed by respondents). An award was made on April 19, 1984, and compensation offered under Section 31 was received under protest. A writ petition was filed on December 19, 1984, and the High Court allowed it on February 16, 1985, holding that dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A was invalid. The Special Leave Petition was filed on May 30, 1994, after a delay of approximately 9 years, with explanation that the Central Agency had not pursued the matter.
Findings of Court:
The Court accepted the explanation for the delay and condoned it. It held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of power under Section 17(4) at a belated stage, as the award was valid, possession had been taken, and lands had vested absolutely under Section 16. However, the Court directed an enquiry into the construction of the oil mill to determine whether it was built before or after the relevant dates, affecting compensation or exgratia liability.
Issues:
Whether the delay in filing the appeal affects the validity of the acquisition proceedings; whether the High Court erred in holding that dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A was invalid; and whether respondents are entitled to compensation or exgratia for oil mill construction.
Ratio Decidendi:
The acquisition process was validly completed through notification, declaration, possession, and award. The vesting of land under Section 16 was conclusive, and the exercise of power under Section 17(4) to dispense with enquiry was lawful when exercised at a late stage. Delay was condoned on rational grounds, and the matter warranted appellate interference to restore the acquisition process. Subsequent construction enquiries were left to the District Judge to determine liabilities.
Result:
The appeal is allowed. No costs awarded. The District Judge is directed to enquire into the construction timeline of the oil mill and determine compensation or exgratia liability accordingly.
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. Having heard the learned counsel on both the sides we think that it is a case for our interference. Though there is an in ordinate delay of 3240 days, merely 9 years, from February 26, 1985 to May 30, 1994, the date of which S.L.P. was filed, there is proper explanation given by the appellants in this case for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. It was not in dispute that the matter was sent to the Central Agency and since the matter is of the State of Haryana, the Central Agency did not pursue the matter. When it was discovered that the Central Agency had not taken the steps in filing the appeal, the S.L.P. came to be filed on May 30, 1994. The explanation offered is just and rational and can be acceptable. It is accordingly accepted. Delay is accordingly condoned.
3. It is contended by Shri Datta, learned Senior counsel for the respondent that on account of the delay the appellants have constructed oil mill expending considerable money. Though they have received the compensation under protest the respondents are prepared to return the compensation with suitable interest as may be determined by the Court and that, therefore, it may not be a case warranting interference. We find that there is no justification for accepting the contention.
4. It is seen that the notification under S.4(1) of the L.A. 1 of 1994 for short the Act was published on January 22, 1981. Declaration under S.6 was published on January 23, 1981 and possession was taken on April 29, 1981, "though it is claimed that the possession was with the respondent". The award came to be made on April 19, 1984. Compensation was offered as required under S.31 of the Act and it now transpires, though it was not mentioned in the High Court, that the amount was received under protest. The Writ Petition was filed four months thereafter, namely, on December 19, 1984. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition on February 16, 1985 holding that dispensing with enquiry under S.5A is invalid. It would be seen that the award having been validity made on May 19, 1984 and possession of the lands having been taken, the lands vest in the Government under Section 16 absolutely free from all encumbrances. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(4) dispensing with the enquiry under S.5A at that belated stage. Under these circumstances the appeal is to be allowed.
5. However, since the respondents had claimed to have constructed the oil mill, on the facts and circumstances in this case, it would be proper that the District Judge, Faridabad is directed to have an enquiry made as to when the oil mill came to be constructed. It it was constructed between January 22, 1985 and December 19, 1984 or pending writ petition without permission of the Court, the respondents are not entitled to claim any equities by way of compensation. On the other hand, if the mill came to be constructed after February 16, 1985 i.e. after writ petition was allowed till date, then equity requires that the appellants shall have to make ex-gratia compensation for the value of the building. The learned District Judge also would cause an enquiry to be made with regard to the value of the construction that was made on. In the event of the finding that it was constructed after the judgment of the High Court, the appellant shall pay the compensation for the value of the construction of the mill within a period of four months from the date of the decision made by the leaned District Judge. If the respondents had not made any application for reference, it may be open to them to make the application under $.18 within one month from today.
6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.