1995 JTR(SC) 1135
1996 AIR(SC) 709 ; 1995 AIR(SCW) 4735 ; 1995 4 CurCC(SC) 240 ; 1995 8 JT 328 ; 1996 1 RLW(Raj) 85 ; 1995 6 Scale 506 ; 1996 1 SCC 88 ; 1995 Supp5 SCR 173 ; 1996 1 UJ 348 ; 1996 KHC 599
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
JOSE ANTONIO CRUZ DOS R. RODRIGUESE
Vs.
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR
Decided on November 13, 1995
Act Referred :LAND ACQUISITION ACT : S.28(a), S.54, S.18, S.26
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1984, sections 28(a), 54, 18, and 26, govern the acquisition process, compensation determination, and appeals. A notification issued on 3-10-1969 led to multiple awards, with compensation fixed at varying rates per square meter. A petition under Section 28-A raises the question of whether the cause of action accrues from the initial award under Section 11, the subsequent award under Section 23(1), or from a later judgment or decree under Section 54 or Section 26 on reference under Section 18, especially where a higher compensation is awarded despite no initial application under Section 18. The interplay between Sections 28-A, 18, 26, 54, and 11 is central to determining the timeline for filing such an application. Section 28-A allows an application within three months from the date of the courts award, excluding the day of the award and the time to obtain a copy, and this must be distinguished from earlier limitations based on the first award under Section 18.
(B) Key legal principles include that the period for filing an application under Section 28-A commences from the date of the award or decree that first allows a higher compensation claim, and not from earlier awards; successive awards do not revive a limitation period if it has already expired; the language of Section 28-A is specific and does not implicitly extend the timeframe; and the reference courts award under Section 18 or the appellate courts judgment under Section 54 can trigger the three-month window if it results in a higher compensation being awarded.
Facts of the case:
The petitioners clients are plot holders whose land was acquired under a notification dated 3-10-1969. Initial compensation was awarded at a low rate, and successive increases were granted over time through multiple awards and judgments. The petitioners contend that each successive award, including the High Courts judgment and decree, provides a fresh cause of action under Section 28-A to claim higher compensation, while respondents argue that the limitation period based on the first award has expired.
Findings of Court:
The court acknowledges that any award or judgment under the relevant provisions, including the High Courts decree, could give rise to a cause of action for an application under Section 28-A, provided the application is made within three months from that award or decree. However, the court notes that the language of Section 28-A does not support extending the limitation period through successive awards and that the period begins to run from the first award under Section 18, with successive awards not reviving an expired limitation.
Issues:
1. Whether an award under Section 26 on reference under Section 18, including the appellate courts judgment under Section 54, constitutes a valid basis for an application under Section 28-A. 2. Whether each successive award or judgment provides a new cause of action under Section 28-A without violating the statutory three-month limitation. 3. Whether the construction of Section 28-A should align with its plain language when Parliament did not explicitly include references to successive awards.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court holds that while technically any award capable of granting higher compensation could trigger Section 28-A, the limitation period is strict and begins to run from the first award under Section 18; successive awards cannot circumvent the expiration of the three-month period as stipulated in Section 28-A, and the plain meaning of the statute must prevail over expansive interpretations.
Result:
The petitions are not permitted to proceed on the grounds that the limitation period based on the first award under Section 18 has expired, and successive awards or judgments do not provide a fresh cause of action for an application under Section 28-A.
(A) The Land Acquisition Act, 1984, sections 28(a), 54, 18, and 26, govern the acquisition process, compensation determination, and appeals. A notification issued on 3-10-1969 led to multiple awards, with compensation fixed at varying rates per square meter. A petition under Section 28-A raises the question of whether the cause of action accrues from the initial award under Section 11, the subsequent award under Section 23(1), or from a later judgment or decree under Section 54 or Section 26 on reference under Section 18, especially where a higher compensation is awarded despite no initial application under Section 18. The interplay between Sections 28-A, 18, 26, 54, and 11 is central to determining the timeline for filing such an application. Section 28-A allows an application within three months from the date of the courts award, excluding the day of the award and the time to obtain a copy, and this must be distinguished from earlier limitations based on the first award under Section 18.
(B) Key legal principles include that the period for filing an application under Section 28-A commences from the date of the award or decree that first allows a higher compensation claim, and not from earlier awards; successive awards do not revive a limitation period if it has already expired; the language of Section 28-A is specific and does not implicitly extend the timeframe; and the reference courts award under Section 18 or the appellate courts judgment under Section 54 can trigger the three-month window if it results in a higher compensation being awarded.
Facts of the case:
The petitioners clients are plot holders whose land was acquired under a notification dated 3-10-1969. Initial compensation was awarded at a low rate, and successive increases were granted over time through multiple awards and judgments. The petitioners contend that each successive award, including the High Courts judgment and decree, provides a fresh cause of action under Section 28-A to claim higher compensation, while respondents argue that the limitation period based on the first award has expired.
Findings of Court:
The court acknowledges that any award or judgment under the relevant provisions, including the High Courts decree, could give rise to a cause of action for an application under Section 28-A, provided the application is made within three months from that award or decree. However, the court notes that the language of Section 28-A does not support extending the limitation period through successive awards and that the period begins to run from the first award under Section 18, with successive awards not reviving an expired limitation.
Issues:
1. Whether an award under Section 26 on reference under Section 18, including the appellate courts judgment under Section 54, constitutes a valid basis for an application under Section 28-A. 2. Whether each successive award or judgment provides a new cause of action under Section 28-A without violating the statutory three-month limitation. 3. Whether the construction of Section 28-A should align with its plain language when Parliament did not explicitly include references to successive awards.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court holds that while technically any award capable of granting higher compensation could trigger Section 28-A, the limitation period is strict and begins to run from the first award under Section 18; successive awards cannot circumvent the expiration of the three-month period as stipulated in Section 28-A, and the plain meaning of the statute must prevail over expansive interpretations.
Result:
The petitions are not permitted to proceed on the grounds that the limitation period based on the first award under Section 18 has expired, and successive awards or judgments do not provide a fresh cause of action for an application under Section 28-A.
AMAN VACHHER, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Ahmed, S.K.MEHTA
( 1 ) SRI Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that Notification under Section 4 (1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short, the Act) was published on 3-10-1969 and the award under Section 11 was made in the case of his clients on 2/08/1972 determining compensation under Section 23 (1) at Rs. 1. 25 per sq. mt. for plot No. 23 admeasuring 24721 sq. mts. Subsequently, successive awards for other lands acquired under the same notification were made, on 4/06/1985 at Rs. 5. 00 pler sq. mt. , on 14/10/1985 at Rs. 9. 00 per sq. mt. and another judgment and decree on 31/08/1987 by the High Court in Appeal No. 11/86 uniformly fixing the compensation at Rs. 5. 00 per sq. mt. Yet another reference under Section 18 was decided on 27/07/1989 by the Reference Court at Rs. 5. 00 per sq. mt. Though he filed the application on 13-5-1987, in view of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736 : (1995 AIR SCW 1834) any one of the awards or each successive award including the judgment and decree of the High Court would give right and cause of action to the petitioner-claimant to make application under Section 28-A. So, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. The views of the Land Acquisation Officer and the High Court are wrong in law.
( 2 ) SECTION 28-A says that where in an award under this part, the Court allowed the aplplication under Section 18 and awarded higher compensation, notwithstanding that the claimant had not made an application under Section 18, he can make an application "within three months from the date of the award of the court" (emphasis supplied) requiring that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. The proviso prescribes the mode of computation of period of three months which says that :-
"the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded".
( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel is that any one of the successive awards including the Judgment and decree of the High Court would give right and cause of action to the petitioner to make an application under Section 28-A. therefore, there is no bar of limitation, A Bench of two Judges of this Court in Babu Ram v. State of U. P. , (1995) 2 SCC 689 : (1995 AIR SCW 65) has held that the period of limitation begins to run when the award on a reference under Section 18 was first made by the Reference Court and the limitation of three months requires to be computed from the date of the first award and successive awards do not save the limitation if it has already expired by efflux of time. The same view was reiterated in another judgment in Union of India v. Karnail Singh, (1995) 2 SCC 728. This view was subsequently overruled by a Bench of three judges.
( 4 ) IN view of the contention raised by Shri Mehta, the following questions are required to be considered :
1. Whether the award of the Court, i. e. , Civil Court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the Appllate Court under Section 54?
2. Whether each successive awards or judgment and decree (if answer on question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28-A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28-A; when the Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions?
( 5 ) THESE questions require examination by a larger Bench of five Judges as the interpretation of Section 28-A on the limitation of three months often arises in many a case throughout the country.
( 6 ) ISSUE notice to the respondents returnable in four weeks. Petitioner is permitted to take out notice by dasti service in addition.
( 7 ) WE direct the Registry to place the cases before Honble the Chief Justice of India to constitute a larger bench of five Judges. Since these questions are arising in number of matters frequently, instead of keeping them pending, it is desirable that they may be disposed of at an early date.
ORDER accordingly
.