2006 JTR(SC) 60
2006 39 AIC 98 ; 2006 AIR(SCW) 434 ; 2006 2 AllMR(SC) 34 ; 2006 2 AWC 1353 ; 2006 2 BomCR(SC) 563 ; 2006 1 BomLR 311 ; 2006 108 BomLR 311 ; 2006 108 FLR 1175 ; 2006 1 JKJ(SC) 13 ; 2006 2 JLJR(SC) 78 ; 2006 2 JT 330 ; 2006 LIC 954 ; 2006 1 LLJ 860 ; 2006 2 LLN 28 ; 2006 1 PLJR(SC) 503 ; 2006 1 Scale 558 ; 2006 2 SCC 471 ; 2006 SCC(L&S) 329 ; 2006 1 SCR 558 ; 2006 1 SCT 488 ; 2006 1 SLJ 445 ; 2006 2 SLR 620 ; 2006 1 UJ 387 ; 2006 KHC 113 ; 2006 1 Supreme 384
2006(1) Supreme 384
Supreme Court of India
(From Bombay High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
LIC of India —Appellant
versus
Sushil —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 719 of 2006
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 26572 of 2004)
Decided on 23-1-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : G.E. Vahanavati, SG, A.V. Rangam, A. Ranganadhan and Buddy A. Ranganathan, Advocates.
For the Respondent : U.U. Lalit, Sr. Advocate, Mrs. Sarla Chandra Advocate.
Important Point
In the service matter relief granted in Milind’s case by Supreme Court was in peculiar facts of the case and filing of an under taking in that case could not be treated as ratio of judgment.
Act Referred :SERVICE LAW : .
(A) The relevant service law provisions governing the validity of employment based on Scheduled Tribe claims, when scrutinized by a designated Committee, come into play where an employees caste was recorded as Halba and a Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims held the claim to be wrong, unfounded, and fraudulent. The High Courts reliance on the principles laid down in a prior decision concerning the protection of long-serving employees, including doctors, was evaluated in light of whether those principles extend to an LIC employee who had rendered 14 years of service and filed an undertaking, with the ultimate applicability of such protection determined in light of the statutory scheme and the specifics of the case.
(B) Key legal principles include that non-genuine certificates for Scheduled Tribe claims do not automatically confer protection, the merits of each case must be examined without being overshadowed by prior observations, and the filing of an undertaking does not, of itself, bring a case within the scope of earlier rulings that were based on distinct factual matrices.
(C)
Facts of the case:
A respondent secured employment in a public sector entity on the basis of a claimed Scheduled Tribe status recorded as Halba; a Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims rejected the claim as fraudulent; a writ petition followed, wherein an undertaking was filed seeking to preserve service benefits; and the High Court, relying on a prior decision, held that the services were not to be terminated despite the invalidation of the claim. (D)
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the protection afforded in the earlier case was limited to its peculiar facts, the respondent did not appear before the Scrutiny Committee despite opportunities, the Committee appropriately proceeded to decide on the material on record, and the High Court erred in treating the earlier decision as laying down a universal principle. (E)
Issues:
Whether the principles from a prior long-service employee protection case extend to an employee with a non-genuine Scheduled Tribe certificate, and whether mere filing of an undertaking suffices to invoke that protection. (F)
Ratio Decidendi:
The earlier decisions observations were limited to its facts and do not create a universal rule; protection is not automatic where statutory scrutiny has found the claim fraudulent, and the High Court must reconsider the merits without being constrained by the earlier ruling. (G)
Result:
The appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration on its merits, without prejudice as to costs.
(A) The relevant service law provisions governing the validity of employment based on Scheduled Tribe claims, when scrutinized by a designated Committee, come into play where an employees caste was recorded as Halba and a Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims held the claim to be wrong, unfounded, and fraudulent. The High Courts reliance on the principles laid down in a prior decision concerning the protection of long-serving employees, including doctors, was evaluated in light of whether those principles extend to an LIC employee who had rendered 14 years of service and filed an undertaking, with the ultimate applicability of such protection determined in light of the statutory scheme and the specifics of the case.
(B) Key legal principles include that non-genuine certificates for Scheduled Tribe claims do not automatically confer protection, the merits of each case must be examined without being overshadowed by prior observations, and the filing of an undertaking does not, of itself, bring a case within the scope of earlier rulings that were based on distinct factual matrices.
(C)
Facts of the case:
A respondent secured employment in a public sector entity on the basis of a claimed Scheduled Tribe status recorded as Halba; a Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims rejected the claim as fraudulent; a writ petition followed, wherein an undertaking was filed seeking to preserve service benefits; and the High Court, relying on a prior decision, held that the services were not to be terminated despite the invalidation of the claim. (D)
Findings of Court:
The Supreme Court held that the protection afforded in the earlier case was limited to its peculiar facts, the respondent did not appear before the Scrutiny Committee despite opportunities, the Committee appropriately proceeded to decide on the material on record, and the High Court erred in treating the earlier decision as laying down a universal principle. (E)
Issues:
Whether the principles from a prior long-service employee protection case extend to an employee with a non-genuine Scheduled Tribe certificate, and whether mere filing of an undertaking suffices to invoke that protection. (F)
Ratio Decidendi:
The earlier decisions observations were limited to its facts and do not create a universal rule; protection is not automatic where statutory scrutiny has found the claim fraudulent, and the High Court must reconsider the merits without being constrained by the earlier ruling. (G)
Result:
The appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh consideration on its merits, without prejudice as to costs.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur. The respondent had secured employment in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘LIC’) the appellant in this appeal on the basis that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe. Undisputedly, his caste was recorded as Halba. Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims, Amaravati vide its order dated 30.4.2004 held that respondent’s claim of belonging to Scheduled Tribe was wrong, unfounded and was a fraudulent claim. The order was questioned by respondent before the High Court by filing a writ petition. Before the High Court, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the writ petitioner was willing to file an undertaking to the effect that he will not claim any benefit on the basis of his case as Halba either in his service or anywhere else at any time for himself as well as for his legal heirs. With reference to a judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind and Ors. (2001(1) SCC 4), the High Court held that in view of the undertaking the writ petitioner’s services were not to be terminated notwithstanding invalidation order passed by the Scrutiny Committee.
3. Learned counsel for the LIC submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. In Milind’s case (supra) this Court never laid down any principle of law having universal application. The observations in para 38 of the judgment were limited to the peculiar facts of the case. The High Court erroneously proceeded on the basis that the decision laid down a rule of universal application.
4. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent had already rendered about 14 years of uninterrupted and blemishless service and merely because he could not establish his Scheduled Tribe claim, the benefit already granted should not have been withdrawn. It was pointed out that undertaking in the lines noted by the High Court had already been filed.
5. This Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and Others (2004(2) SCC 105) and Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC and ST and Others, (2005(8) SCC 283) have considered the effect of non-genuine certificates in the case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes claims.
6. The protection under the Milind’s case (supra) cannot be extended to the respondent no. 1-employee as the protection was given under the peculiar factual background of that case. The employee concerned was a doctor and had rendered long years of service. This Court noted that on a doctor public money has been spent and, therefore, it will not be desirable to deprive the society of a doctor’s service. Respondent no. 1-employee in the present case is an LIC employee and the factor which weighed with this Court cannot be applied to him.
The above position was elaborated in Bank of India and Anr. v. Avinash D. Mandivikar and Ors. (2005(7) SCC 690).
7. It is noted that in spite of six opportunities the respondent No. 1 did not appear before the Scrutiny Committee. That being the position the Scrutiny Committee had no other option than to take a decision in the matter. We also find that the Scrutiny Committee referred to documents which were before it and came to the conclusion about the claim of respondent No. 1 being not genuine.
8. In Milind’s case (supra), filing of the undertaking was not to be treated as the ratio of the judgment. Before us it was urged on behalf of respondent No. 1 that in State of Maharashtra at the relevant time there were resolutions/Government Orders which made respondent believe that there was no fraudulent intention in claiming to be Halba. Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for respondent submitted that none of these aspects (including various G.Rs.) have been considered. The High Court in the present case proceeded on the basis as if mere filing of an undertaking in the line suggested by the writ petitioner was sufficient to bring the case under the umbrella of decision in Milind’s case (supra). That is clearly not so.
9. As the High Court has not considered the matter in its proper perspective, except relying on Milind’s case (supra) we think it appropriate to remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh consideration on merits of case on the grounds, if any, without influenced by any observation in this order.
10. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
Appeal allowed accordingly.
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