2006 JTR(SC) 619
2006 45 AIC 548 ; 2006 AIR(SC) 2550 ; 2006 AIR(SCW) 3396 ; 2006 AIR(SCW) 3846 ; 2006 2 CurLJ 399 ; 2006 3 RCR(Civ) 745 ; 2006 7 Scale 146 ; 2006 7 SCC 271 ; 2006 Supp3 SCR 569 ; 2006 KHC 1090 ; 2006 6 Supreme 189
2006(6) Supreme 189
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
M/s Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Anr. — Appellants
versus
State of Haryana & Ors. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 3453 of 2002
With
SLP (C) No. 10003/2004, SLP (C) No. 10007/2004, SLP (C) No. 10156/2004, SLP (C) No. 10164/2004, SLP (C) No. 10167/2004, SLP (C) No. 10206/2004, SLP (C) No. 10381/2004, SLP (C) No. 10391/2004, SLP (C) No. 10404/2004, SLP (C) No. 10417/2004, SLP (C) No. 10501/2004, SLP (C) No. 10563/2004, SLP (C) No. 10568/2004, SLP (C) No. 10571/2004, SLP (C) No. 11012/2004, SLP (C) No. 11271/2004, SLP (C) No. 11326/2004, T.C. (C) No. 13/2004, SLP (C) No. 14380/2005, Civil Appeal Nos. 2608/2003, 2637/2003, 2769/2000, 3144/2004, 3145/2004, 3146/2004, 3314/2001, 3381-3400/1998, 3454/2002, 3455/2002, 3456-3459/2002, 3460/2002, 3461/2002, 3462-3463/2002, 3464/2002, 3465/2002, 3466/2002, 3467/2002, 3468/2002, 3469/2002, 3470/2002, 3592/1998, 4471/2000, 4476/2000, 4651/1998, 4954/2004, Writ Petition No. 512/2003, Civil Appeal Nos. 5141/2004, 5143/2004, 5144/2004, 5145/2004, 5147/2004, 5148/2004, 5149/2004, 5150/2004, 5151/2004, 5152/2004, 5153/2004, 5156/2004, 5157/2004, 5158/2004, 5159/2004, 5160/2004, 5162/2004, 5163/2004, 5164/2004, 5165/2004, 5166/2004, 5167/2004, 5168/2004, 5169/2004, 5170/2004, Writ Petition (C) No. 574/2003, C.A. Nos. 5740/2002, 5858/2002, 6331/2003, 6383-6421/1997, 6422-6435/1997, 6436/1997, 6437-6440/1997, 7658/2004, 8241/2003, 8242/2003, 8243/2003, 8244/2003, 8245/2003, 8246/2003, 8247/2003, 8248/2003, 8249/2003, 8250/2003, 8251/2003, 8252/2003, 918/1999, SLP (C) No. 9496/2004, SLP (C) No. 9569/2004, SLP (C) No. 9883/2004, SLP (C) No. 9891/2004, SLP (C) No. 9898/2004, SLP (C) No. 9904/2004, SLP (C) No. 9910/2004, SLP (C) No. 9911/2004, C.A. Nos. 997-998/2004, SLP (C) No. 9976/2004, SLP (C) No. 9993/2004, SLP (C) No. 9998/2004, SLP (C) No. 9999/2004, C.A. Nos. 1956/2003, 2633/2003, 2638/2003, 3720-
3722/2003, SLP (C) No. 10153/2004
Decided on 14-7-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Ajay Siwach, AAG, Aruneshwar Gupta, Addl. Advocate Genl. (Rajasthan), Shanti Bhushan, R.F. Nariman, Dr. J.N. Dubey, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Dinesh Dwivedi, T.L. Vishwanath Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, S. Ganesh, A.S. Garg, Sr. Advocates, Jayant Bhushan, Ejaz Maqbool, Vikas Singh, Ms. Taruna Singh, Abhijit Sinha, Anurag Dubey, K.B. Upadhayay, Meenesh Dubey, Manish Kumar, S.R. Setia, Dhruv Agarwal, Praveen Kumar, P.K. Bansal, Rajeev Agnihotri, K. Mishra, Rajeev Dubey, S.W.A. Qadri, Ms. Rashmi Singh, Gaurav Bhatia, S. Prasad, Gopalkrishnan, R.K. Virmani, Ms. Rashmi Virmani, L.R. Singh, Ankit Singhal, Nikhil Nayyar, M/s. Ravinder Narain, S. Sharma, Meghalee Barthakur, A. Aggarwal, Kanika Gomber, Rajan Narain, V.N. Koura, Ms. Paramjeet Banepal, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Mini N. Nair, Gopal Singh, Nishakant Pandey, P.V. Dinesh, U.A. Rana, Prashant Thakur (for M/s. Gagrat & Co.), Kuldeep Kumar Singh, Amit Mahajan, D.N. Ray, Mrs. Sumita Ray, Kavin Gulati, Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Rashmi Singh, T. Mahipal, B.V. Desai, Rahul Gupta, Ms. N. Kanungo, R.K. Khanna, Ms. R. Khanna, Jhanvi Warah, S. Kant, V.N. Koura, Paramjit Benipal, Ms. Aruna Mathur (for M/s. Arputham, Aruna & Co.), Pradeep Dahiya, Sandeep Sharma, T.V. George, Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal, Naveen Kumar Singh, Praveen Kumar, Roy Abraham, Mrs. Seema Jain, H. Lal, M.P. Vinod, Ajay K. Jain, P.K. Bansal, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Vinod K. Tiwari, K.L. Janjani, H.K. Puri, Ujjawal Banerjee, S.K. Puri, Priya Puri, V.M. Chauhan, Devashish Bharukha, Ramesh Chander Agarwal, Hans Bharukha, R.C. Kohli, Pramit Saxena, Ms. Anuradha Rustagi, Sandeep, Ms. Kaadambari, Vikas Tomar, Gaurav Agrawal, Prashant Kumar, Rajiv Tyagi, Himanshu Mehta, Balender, L.K. Bhushan, Ms. Jasleen Oberoi, Rahul Prasanna Dave, Devajyoti Bhattacharya, Ms. Indra Sawhney, Ms. Indu Malhotra, P.N. Puri, R.K. Maheshwari, Vinoo Bhagat, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, K.R. Sasiprabhu, K.V. Mohan, Rajesh Kumar, Tarun Johri, Vishwajit Singh, Nikhil Nayyar, Romy Chacko, Abhisth Kumar, C.N. Sree Kumar, Guntur Prabhakar, Sushil Kumar Jain, S.B. Upadhayay, Shrish Kumar Misra, Mrs. Kirti Renu Mishra, Shakil Ahmed Syed, K.S. Rana, B.K. Satija, Sanjay R. Hegde, Sanjay Kapur, Subramonium Prasad, Vinay Kumar Garg, Abhijit Sengupta, Ms. Kavita Wadia, R. Sathish, K.R. Nambiar, Ms. Baby Krishnan, B.V. Deepak and M.T. George, Advocates.
Act Referred :CONSTITUTION OF INDIA : Art.301
(A) The judgment interprets Article 301 of the Constitution in the context of impugned laws levying what are characterized as Compensatory Tax on activities related to trade and commerce. The Constitution Bench revisits the doctrine of direct and immediate effect from Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of AIR 1961 SC 232 and the test in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of AIR 1962 SC 1406, disapproving certain later elaborations in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce. It clarifies that when a levy is imposed as a regulatory measure on trade and commerce, its nature shifts toward a compensatory tax, hybrid in character and closer to a fee based on equivalence and reimbursement for measurable benefit. The Bench directs that where a statute does not itself disclose quantifiable data, the burden shifts to the State to prove the tax represents a reasonable, non-discriminatory reimbursement for a quantifiable benefit, assessed against Article 301, Article 302, Article 303, and Article 304(b), with Article 304(b) allowing State legislatures to impose reasonable restrictions subject to Presidential sanction and explicit reasonableness criteria.
(B) Key principles include: (i) Article 301 governs restrictions on inter-State and intra-State trade and commerce; (ii) Laws affecting trade must be examined for their direct and immediate effect; (iii) Compensatory tax is a hybrid levy justified only when tied to a measurable benefit and proportionality; (iv) The direct and immediate effect doctrine from Atiabari Tea Co. remains applicable; (v) The test of some connection from Bhagatrams case is disapproved; (vi) State legislative power under Article 304(b) is broader than Parliaments under Article 302 but must still satisfy reasonableness; (vii) Where statutory language is ambiguous or silent on quantifiable benefit, the onus is on the State to prove compensation nature; (viii) All such matters must be decided in light of Article 301, 302, 303, and 304(b).
Facts of the case:
Multiple appeals and connected matters involving local enactments were initially heard by a two-Judge Bench, which referred them to a larger Constitution Bench due to doubts following earlier decisions on compensatory tax. The central issue across the appeals concerned the constitutional validity of tax laws characterized as compensatory, with High Courts having applied the earlier precedents without properly re-examining the principles. No specific factual matrix or commercial details are elaborated beyond the conceptual dispute over the nature and validity of the levies.
Findings of Court:
The Constitution Bench disapproves the reasoning in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar and Bihar Chamber of Commerce, holding that the some connection test is not good law. It reaffirms the doctrine of direct and immediate effect from Atiabari Tea Co. and directs that the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments be reassessed in light of the clarified parameters. The Bench emphasizes that if an enactment invades trade and commerce, the State must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed by taxation are reasonable and in public interest under Article 304(b). It further mandates that High Courts examine whether the impugned levy is compensatory in nature, requiring either explicit statutory indication of quantifiable benefit or credible State evidence.
Issues:
Whether the concept of Compensatory Tax as interpreted in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar and Bihar Chamber of Commerce is correct law. Whether the direct and immediate effect doctrine and the some connection test remain applicable. Whether Article 301 prohibits levies that impede trade and commerce unless the State can show reasonable, quantifiable compensatory justification under Article 304(b). How existing compensatory tax adjudications should be reviewed in light of the Constitution Benchs clarified parameters.
Ratio Decidendi:
The true nature of a compensatory tax must be assessed against Article 301, distinguishing between a general tax, a regulatory fee, and a compensatory charge hybrid. Where a law directly and immediately restricts trade and commerce, the State must prove by clear evidence that the levy represents a reasonable, proportionate reimbursement for a measurable benefit, failing which the restriction is invalid. The earlier some connection test is discarded, and the precedents emphasizing direct and immediate effect continue to govern analysis.
Result:
The appeals and connected matters are set aside for reconsideration by the High Courts within the prescribed timeframe, applying the clarified test that compensatory taxes must be justified by quantifiable benefit and reasonable restrictions under Article 301 read with Article 304(b), with the burden on the State to substantiate the compensatory character of the levy.
(A) The judgment interprets Article 301 of the Constitution in the context of impugned laws levying what are characterized as Compensatory Tax on activities related to trade and commerce. The Constitution Bench revisits the doctrine of direct and immediate effect from Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of AIR 1961 SC 232 and the test in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of AIR 1962 SC 1406, disapproving certain later elaborations in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce. It clarifies that when a levy is imposed as a regulatory measure on trade and commerce, its nature shifts toward a compensatory tax, hybrid in character and closer to a fee based on equivalence and reimbursement for measurable benefit. The Bench directs that where a statute does not itself disclose quantifiable data, the burden shifts to the State to prove the tax represents a reasonable, non-discriminatory reimbursement for a quantifiable benefit, assessed against Article 301, Article 302, Article 303, and Article 304(b), with Article 304(b) allowing State legislatures to impose reasonable restrictions subject to Presidential sanction and explicit reasonableness criteria.
(B) Key principles include: (i) Article 301 governs restrictions on inter-State and intra-State trade and commerce; (ii) Laws affecting trade must be examined for their direct and immediate effect; (iii) Compensatory tax is a hybrid levy justified only when tied to a measurable benefit and proportionality; (iv) The direct and immediate effect doctrine from Atiabari Tea Co. remains applicable; (v) The test of some connection from Bhagatrams case is disapproved; (vi) State legislative power under Article 304(b) is broader than Parliaments under Article 302 but must still satisfy reasonableness; (vii) Where statutory language is ambiguous or silent on quantifiable benefit, the onus is on the State to prove compensation nature; (viii) All such matters must be decided in light of Article 301, 302, 303, and 304(b).
Facts of the case:
Multiple appeals and connected matters involving local enactments were initially heard by a two-Judge Bench, which referred them to a larger Constitution Bench due to doubts following earlier decisions on compensatory tax. The central issue across the appeals concerned the constitutional validity of tax laws characterized as compensatory, with High Courts having applied the earlier precedents without properly re-examining the principles. No specific factual matrix or commercial details are elaborated beyond the conceptual dispute over the nature and validity of the levies.
Findings of Court:
The Constitution Bench disapproves the reasoning in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar and Bihar Chamber of Commerce, holding that the some connection test is not good law. It reaffirms the doctrine of direct and immediate effect from Atiabari Tea Co. and directs that the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments be reassessed in light of the clarified parameters. The Bench emphasizes that if an enactment invades trade and commerce, the State must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed by taxation are reasonable and in public interest under Article 304(b). It further mandates that High Courts examine whether the impugned levy is compensatory in nature, requiring either explicit statutory indication of quantifiable benefit or credible State evidence.
Issues:
Whether the concept of Compensatory Tax as interpreted in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar and Bihar Chamber of Commerce is correct law. Whether the direct and immediate effect doctrine and the some connection test remain applicable. Whether Article 301 prohibits levies that impede trade and commerce unless the State can show reasonable, quantifiable compensatory justification under Article 304(b). How existing compensatory tax adjudications should be reviewed in light of the Constitution Benchs clarified parameters.
Ratio Decidendi:
The true nature of a compensatory tax must be assessed against Article 301, distinguishing between a general tax, a regulatory fee, and a compensatory charge hybrid. Where a law directly and immediately restricts trade and commerce, the State must prove by clear evidence that the levy represents a reasonable, proportionate reimbursement for a measurable benefit, failing which the restriction is invalid. The earlier some connection test is discarded, and the precedents emphasizing direct and immediate effect continue to govern analysis.
Result:
The appeals and connected matters are set aside for reconsideration by the High Courts within the prescribed timeframe, applying the clarified test that compensatory taxes must be justified by quantifiable benefit and reasonable restrictions under Article 301 read with Article 304(b), with the burden on the State to substantiate the compensatory character of the levy.
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J. — These appeals and certain connected matters were initially heard by a two-Judge Bench of this Court. The matters were referred to a larger Bench by order dated 26.9.2003 as the Bench hearing the matters doubted the correctness of the views expressed in M/s. Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. and Others [1995 (Suppl.) 1 SCC 673] which was relied on in a subsequent decision in State of Bihar and Others v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Others [1996(9) SCC 136]. The matters were dealt with by a Constitution Bench to decide with certitude the parameters of the judicially evolved concept of “Compensatory Tax” viz-a-viz. Article 301 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the `Constitution’).
2. The Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors. [2006(4) SCALE 300] speaking through one of us (Kapadia, J) concluded as follows :
49. In our opinion, the doubt expressed by the referring Bench about the correctness of the decision in Bhagatram’s case 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 673 followed by the judgment in the case of Bihar Chamber of Commerce (1996) 9 SCC 136 was well-founded.
50. We reiterate that the doctrine of “direct and immediate effect” of the impugned law on trade and commerce under Article 301 as propounded in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 232 and the working test enunciated in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 1406 for deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not vide para 19 of the report, will continue to apply and the test of “some connection” indicated in para 8 of the judgment in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 673 and followed in the case of State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce (1996) 9 SCC 136, is, in our opinion, not good law. Accordingly, the constitutional validity of various local enactments which are the subject matters of pending appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions will now be listed for being disposed of in the light of this judgment.
3. In all these appeals and connected matters the basic issue revolves round the concept of “Compensatory Tax”. In all these matters the concerned High Courts do not appear to have examined the issue in the proper perspective, as they were bound by the judgments in Bhagatram’s case (supra) and Bihar Chambers of Commerce’s case (supra).
4. At this juncture, it is necessary to take note of what has been stated in paragraphs 42 to 45 of the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench, which read as follows :
42. To sum up, the basis of every levy is the controlling factor. In the case of “a tax”, the levy is a part of common burden based on the principle of ability or capacity to pay. In the case “a fee”, the basis is the special benefit to the payer (individual as such) based on the principle of equivalence. When the tax is imposed as a part of regulation or as a part of regulatory measure, its basis shifts from the concept of “burden” to the concept of measurable/quantifiable benefit and then it becomes “a compensatory tax” and its payment is then not for revenue but as reimbursement/recompense to the service/facility provider. It is then a tax on recompense. Compensatory tax is by nature hybrid but it is more closer to fees than to tax as both fees and compensatory taxes are based on the principle of equivalence and on the basis of reimbursement/recompense. If the impugned law chooses an activity like trade and commerce as the criterion of its operation and if the effect of the operation of the enactment is to impede trade and commerce then Article 301 is violated.
BURDEN OF THE STATE :
43. Applying the above tests/parameters, whenever a law is impugned as violative of Article 301 of the Constitution, the Court has to see whether the impugned enactment facially or patently indicates quantifiable data on the basis of which the compensatory tax is sought to be levied. The Act must facially indicate the benefit which is quantifiable or measurable. It must broadly indicate proportionality to the quantifiable benefit. If the provisions are ambiguous or even if the Act does not indicate facially the quantifiable benefit, the burden will be on the State as a service/facility provider to show by placing the material before the Court, that the payment of compensatory tax is a reimbursement/recompense for the quantifiable/measurable benefit provided or to be provided to its payer(s). As soon as it is shown that the Act invades freedom of trade it is necessary to enquire whether the State has proved that the restrictions imposed by it by way of taxation are reasonable and in public interest within the meaning of Article 304(b) [See : para 35 of the decision in the case of Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Assam reported in AIR 1964 SC 925.
SCOPE OF ARTICLES 301, 302 & 304 VIS-@-VIS COMPENSATION TAX :
44. As stated above, taxing laws are not excluded from the operation of Article 301, which means that tax laws can and do amount to restrictions on the freedom guaranteed to trade under Part-XIII of the Constitution. This principle is well settled in the case of Atiabari Tea Co. AIR 1961 SC 232. It is equally important to note that in Atiabari Tea Co. AIR 1961 SC 232, the Supreme Court propounded the doctrine of “direct and immediate effect”. Therefore, whenever a law is challenged on the ground of violation of Article 301, the Court has not only to examine the pith and substance of the levy but in addition thereto, the Court has to see the effect and the operation of the impugned law on inter-State trade and commerce as well as intra-State trade and commerce.
45. When any legislation, whether it would be a taxation law or a non-taxation law, is challenged before the court as violating Article 301, the first question to be asked is : what is the scope of the operation of the law? Whether it has chosen an activity like movement of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India, as the criterion of its operation? If yes, the next question is : what is the effect of operation of the law on the freedom guaranteed under Article 301? If the effect is to facilitate free flow of trade and commerce then it is regulation and if it is to impede or burden the activity, then the law is a restraint. After finding the law to be a restraint/restriction one has to see whether the impugned law is enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature. Clause (b) of Article 304 confers a power upon the State Legislature similar to that conferred upon Parliament by Article 302 subject to the following differences :-
(a)While the power of Parliament under Article 302 is subject to the prohibition of preference and discrimination decreed by Article 303(1) unless Parliament makes the declaration under Article 303(2), the State power contained in Article 304(b) is made expressly free from prohibition contained in Article 303(1) because the opening words of Article 304 contains a non-obstante clause both to Article 301 and Article 303.
(b)While the Parliament’s power to impose restrictions under Article 302 is not subject to the requirement of reasonableness, the power of the State to impose restrictions under Article 304 is subject to the condition that they are reasonable.
(c)An additional requisite for the exercise of the power under Article 304(b) by the State Legislature is that previous Presidential sanction is required for such legislation.
5. Since relevant data do not appear to have been placed before the High Courts, we permit the parties to place them in the concerned Writ Petitions within two months. The concerned High Courts shall deal with the basic issue as to whether the impugned levy was compensatory in nature. The High Courts are requested to decide the aforesaid issue within five months from the date of receipt of our order. The judgment in the respective cases shall be placed on record by the concerned parties within a month from the date of the decision in each case pursuant to our direction.
6. Place these matters for further hearing in third week of January, 2007.
Order accordingly.
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