2006 JTR(SC) 918
2006 ACJ 2845 ; 2006 48 AIC 534 ; 2007 1 AIR(Jhar)(R) 598 ; 2006 AIR(SCW) 5432 ; 2006 2 AndhWR(SC) 398 ; 2006 4 AWC 4023 ; 2007 2 CivLJ 408 ; 2006 DNJ 985 ; 2006 111 FLR 704 ; 2006 LIC 4281 ; 2007 1 LLJ 5 ; 2006 4 LLN 803 ; 2006 9 Scale 675 ; 2006 11 SCC 692 ; 2007 1 SCC(L&S) 525 ; 2007 1 SCT 419 ; 2006 3 ShimLC 289 ; 2006 KHC 1928 ; 2006 8 Supreme 726
2006(8) Supreme 726
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
S.B. Sinha & Dalveer Bhandari, JJ.
Zila Sahakari Kendra Bank Maryadit - Appellant
versus
Shahjadi Begum & Ors. - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4328 of 2006
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 11014-11015 of 2005)
Decided on 29-9-2006
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Prakash Shrivastava, Advocate.
For the Respondents : M.P. Singh and B.S. Banthia, Advocates.
IMPORTANT POINT
Employer in terms of Section 2(e) of Workmen’s Compensation Act is not only a person who employs another either permanently or on temporary basis but also those who were in control of the workman temporarily lent or let on hire to them by the person with whom workman had entered into a contract of service.
Act Referred :WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT : S.2(e)
(A) Section 2(e) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, defines employer to encompass any body of persons, whether incorporated or not, as well as a managing agent, and, critically, extends to any other person while workmen are temporarily lent or hired to that person by their contractual employer. In the present case, the cooperative bank owned the jeep and placed its services, along with the deceased driver, at the disposal of the District Election Officer for election duty. The deceased was under the effective control of the District Election Officer and directed to perform tasks outside his regular duties, triggering the broader employer definition. This statutory framework is designed to ensure that compensation is secured from the entity exercising control, irrespective of formal hiring, when workmen are temporarily placed elsewhere. The Acts policy of providing no-fault compensation thus attaches to the authority in de facto control of the workman during the performance of the assigned task.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) the definition of employer is wide and captures a temporary hiring or lending authority; (ii) an employee acting under the directions of a senior officer or a requisitioning authority is deemed to be in the course of employment, even if the task differs from his regular duties; (iii) the death caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment attracts compensation; (iv) an authority in control of the workman at the time of accident is the employer liable for compensation; and (v) where the true employer is identified, the bank or entity that lent the workman is entitled to reimbursement from the actual liable authority.
Facts of the case:
The deceased was the driver of a jeep owned by a cooperative bank. The jeep was requisitioned by the District Election Officer for election duty, and the deceased was placed under the control of the District Election Officer. While performing his duties during election work, the deceased entered a septic tank on instructions to assist workers, suffered a gas leakage accident, and died. A claim petition was filed under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, against the bank and other authorities. The Commissioner held the death to be in the course of employment and passed compensation against the bank. The bank appealed, but the High Court dismissed the appeal for delay. The question before the appellate court was whether the compensation should be paid by the bank or reimbursed by the requisitioning authority.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the deceased was under the complete control of the District Election Officer, who was the requisitioning authority. The bank had no control over the deceased at the time of the accident. The death occurred in the course of employment while performing a task assigned by a senior official. The Commissioner was held to have committed a jurisdictional error in directing the bank to pay compensation, as the bank was not the employer. The court observed that the bank, having lent its services under a statutory requisition, was not the appropriate entity to bear the compensation liability.
Issues:
Whether the requisitioning authority or the bank that owned the jeep and initially placed the deceased on duty was the employer within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, and liable to pay compensation for a death occurring in the course of employment.
Ratio Decidendi:
Under Section 2(e) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, the employer includes the authority while the workman is temporarily lent or placed under its control. Where a workman is on duty under the control and direction of a requisitioning authority, that authority is the employer liable for compensation. The bank, having merely lent its vehicle and driver, is not the employer and is entitled to reimbursement from the actual liable authority.
Result:
The appeal is allowed to the extent that the bank is directed to be reimbursed by the requisitioning authority (the State of M.P.) for the compensation amount already paid by the bank, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of reimbursement.
(A) Section 2(e) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, defines employer to encompass any body of persons, whether incorporated or not, as well as a managing agent, and, critically, extends to any other person while workmen are temporarily lent or hired to that person by their contractual employer. In the present case, the cooperative bank owned the jeep and placed its services, along with the deceased driver, at the disposal of the District Election Officer for election duty. The deceased was under the effective control of the District Election Officer and directed to perform tasks outside his regular duties, triggering the broader employer definition. This statutory framework is designed to ensure that compensation is secured from the entity exercising control, irrespective of formal hiring, when workmen are temporarily placed elsewhere. The Acts policy of providing no-fault compensation thus attaches to the authority in de facto control of the workman during the performance of the assigned task.
(B) Key legal principles include: (i) the definition of employer is wide and captures a temporary hiring or lending authority; (ii) an employee acting under the directions of a senior officer or a requisitioning authority is deemed to be in the course of employment, even if the task differs from his regular duties; (iii) the death caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment attracts compensation; (iv) an authority in control of the workman at the time of accident is the employer liable for compensation; and (v) where the true employer is identified, the bank or entity that lent the workman is entitled to reimbursement from the actual liable authority.
Facts of the case:
The deceased was the driver of a jeep owned by a cooperative bank. The jeep was requisitioned by the District Election Officer for election duty, and the deceased was placed under the control of the District Election Officer. While performing his duties during election work, the deceased entered a septic tank on instructions to assist workers, suffered a gas leakage accident, and died. A claim petition was filed under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, against the bank and other authorities. The Commissioner held the death to be in the course of employment and passed compensation against the bank. The bank appealed, but the High Court dismissed the appeal for delay. The question before the appellate court was whether the compensation should be paid by the bank or reimbursed by the requisitioning authority.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the deceased was under the complete control of the District Election Officer, who was the requisitioning authority. The bank had no control over the deceased at the time of the accident. The death occurred in the course of employment while performing a task assigned by a senior official. The Commissioner was held to have committed a jurisdictional error in directing the bank to pay compensation, as the bank was not the employer. The court observed that the bank, having lent its services under a statutory requisition, was not the appropriate entity to bear the compensation liability.
Issues:
Whether the requisitioning authority or the bank that owned the jeep and initially placed the deceased on duty was the employer within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, and liable to pay compensation for a death occurring in the course of employment.
Ratio Decidendi:
Under Section 2(e) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, the employer includes the authority while the workman is temporarily lent or placed under its control. Where a workman is on duty under the control and direction of a requisitioning authority, that authority is the employer liable for compensation. The bank, having merely lent its vehicle and driver, is not the employer and is entitled to reimbursement from the actual liable authority.
Result:
The appeal is allowed to the extent that the bank is directed to be reimbursed by the requisitioning authority (the State of M.P.) for the compensation amount already paid by the bank, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of reimbursement.
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J. - Leave granted.
2. Appellant herein is a cooperative bank. It owned a jeep. The deceased was the driver of the said jeep. The jeep was requisitioned by Respondent No.2 for election duty. Respondent No.4 herein was the District Election Officer. The driver for all intent and purport was under his control. On 5.5.1999, the deceased while performing his duties stayed at the residence of Respondent No.2. The work of cleaning of septic tank at his house was going on. There was a leakage of gas from the said septic tank. The deceased allegedly on instructions of Respondent No.2 entered the septic tank to help the workers working therein. In the process, an accident tool place resulting in his death.
3. Respondent No.1 filed a claim petition claiming compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, ‘the Act’) before the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation. She had also filed an application for her employment in the Collectorate on compassionate ground. In the said application, apart from Appellant, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the District Election Officer were impleaded as parties.
4. In the said proceedings, inter alia, the following issue was raised:
“1. Whether Dara Khan died during the course of the employment due to the reason of becoming unconscious on account of the poisonous gas coming out from the latrine tank of the non-applicant no.2 and then felling down in the same?”
5. The said issue was answered thus :
“1. That Dara Khan, the husband of the applicant had been employed as a driver of the jeep under the control of the non-applicant No.1.
2. That on acquiring the vehicle by the District Election Officer for the election work, Dara Khan was working under the opposite party no.2 along with the jeep under the direction of the non-applicant no.1.”
6. It was further held that the employee being bound by the orders of the senior officers and had been staying in the jeep as a part of his duty, the allegations made in the application under the Act proved stating:
“....That it is the duty of the employee to follow the order of his superior. That if any senior official gives the direction for doing the work other than the work allotted to him then the said defence would not be an acceptable one that the worker is not on the duty. That an account of the accident been occurred in the work other than the allotted work the defence would not be acceptable that the accident of the worker is not the result of the employment. Whereas on doing the other work on the direction of the senior official if an employee met with an accident then the same would also be considered as the part of the employment.”
7. However, on the premise that it was Appellant who had placed his services with Respondent No.2, the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation opined :
“That has his duty been not there then the question of his going to Rewa does not arise at all and then the question of his going to the latrine tank and meeting with an accident and death also would not have been arisen. In this way the death of the worker Dara Khan after meeting with an accident on date 5.5.99 during the course of his employment under the non-applicant no. 1 and also as a result of his death in the employment is proved. The death of Dara Khan is the result of his employment. The accident which has taken place during the course of the employment related to the Workman Compensation Act and on the basis of the interpretation of the presumptive detail the worker Dara Khan died during the course and as a result of his employment under the non-applicant no. 1 and the said fact is proved. That after the aforesaid interpretation the disposal of the suit issue no. 1 has been decided in `Yes’. That in the order of exhibit D-5 proved by the Witness of the Opposite party no. 1 he himself has accepted that Dara Khan died on 5.5.99 in Rewa in an accident due to the reason of been felling down in the Septic tank. That Dara Khan died during the course of his working for the bank..”
8. Appellant preferred an appeal under Section 30 of the said Act in the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur. The said appeal was numbered as Misc. Application No. 1797 of 2003. It is not in dispute that there was some delay in filing the application. The deposit of the amount in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Act was also made after some delay. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment did not go into the merit of the matter and dismissed the said appeal holding :
“.....The Bank was very much aware of passing of the award. It was not an ex parte award. Thus, we find that reason assigned is incorrect. The reason that officer-in-charge came to know on 12.8.2003 is prima facie incorrect and shows lack of diligence. Apart from that deposit has not been made of amount at the time of filing of the appeal U/s 33 of the Act. It has been deposited subsequently on 20.8.2003. We are not satisfied that there is any sufficient cause shown for condoning the delay in the instant case. The “deceased Dara Khan” was assigned the duty by the Bank in connection with election is not in dispute. He was paid salary by the bank for the period in question; hence award had been passed by Commissioner. We find no sufficient ground to condone the delay.”
Appellant is, thus, before us.
9. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 and consequently the State should be directed to reimburse Appellant so far as the amount of compensation payable to Respondent No. 1 is concerned.
10. The Act was enacted to provide for payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident. The term ‘Employer’ has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act in the following terms:
“ “employer” includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the workman is working for him;”
11. However, the term ‘employee’ has not been defined in the Act. The definition of employer, therefore, embraces within its fold not only a person who employs another either permanently or on temporary basis but also those who were in control of the workman term temporarily lent or let on hire to them by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service. It is, therefore, a broad definition.
12. Indisputably, the owner of the jeep was bound to comply with the order of requisition of a vehicle when the same is required to be placed on election duty. If the deceased was under the control of the Bank herein and in effect and substance under the control of Respondent No. 2, the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation committed jurisdictional error in directing Appellant to deposit the amount of compensation. The High Court, in that view of the matter, should have, in our considered view, taken a liberal view in the matter and condoned the delay in filing the appeal as also depositing the awarded amount in Court. If the order passed by the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation was wholly without jurisdiction, the same was a nullity. It was a coram non judice. It has been found as of fact by the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation that the deceased was under the complete control of the workman. He would, therefore, be the employer. As the jeep was requisitioned under a statute, the bank had no other option but to put the same under the services of the requisitioning authority. In terms of requisition, the services of the deceased, thus, were also placed. The employer, thus, would be the requisitioning authority, namely, the State of M.P.
13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the requisitioning authority is liable to pay the amount of compensation. Although the State of M.P. is not a party before us, keeping in view the fact that Respondent No. 2 was its employee and a jeep was requisitioned under the authority of the District Election Officer, interest of justice would be subserved if Appellant herein is directed to be reimbursed in respect of the amount which has already been deposited by him in terms of the order of the Commissioner of Workmen Compensation. The amount deposited by Appellant shall be returned to it within eight weeks from today failing which the same carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the said date till the actual payment.
This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.
Appeal allowed.
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