1929 JTR(SC) 105
1930 AIR(PC) 64 ; 1929 57 LawReportsInd.App. 100 ; 1930 31 LW 431 ; 1930 32 BomLR 522 ; 1930 34 CWN 289 ; 1930 57 ILR(Cal) 1148 ; 1930 AllLJ 126 ; 1930 MWN 577
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT DUNEDIN, LORD DARLING, LORD TOMLIN, AND SIR GEORGE LOWNDES.
PRAMATHA NATH MULLICK - Appellant
Versus
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Calcutta.
Decided On : Dec. 6. 1929.
The jurisdiction of a court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is strictly limited to the specific objection raised in the application for reference. If the objection is limited to the amount of compensation, the court cannot consider objections regarding the measurement of the land.
Act
Referred
:LAND ACQUISITION ACT
: S.18(1)
(A) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 18, 20 and 21 - Reference to Court - Scope of inquiry - Whether a reference for determination of proper compensation allows the court to consider objections to the measurement of land - The Act specifies four distinct grounds of objection: (1) measurement of land, (2) amount of compensation, (3) persons to whom it is payable, and (4) apportionment - Jurisdiction of the Court is special and strictly limited by the terms of these sections - It arises only when a specific objection has been taken to the award and is confined to a consideration of that objection - Once it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the "matter" referred, and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it.
Facts of the case:
Land was acquired for a public purpose. The owner did not object to the measurements during the initial statutory process. Subsequently, the owner applied for a reference to the Court for the determination of proper compensation. During the proceedings, the owner later sought to challenge the measurements of certain plots and requested a remeasurement. The lower courts refused this request, holding that the inquiry was confined to the specific objection raised in the application for reference.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the objection was manifestly only to the amount of compensation and the reference was correctly described as such. The court cannot entertain objections to measurements if they were not part of the original reference application.
Issues: Whether the inquiry upon a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is confined to the specific objection raised by the applicant in the application for reference.
Ratio Decidendi: The jurisdiction of the Courts under the Act is special and strictly limited. Since Section 18 distinguishes between objections to measurement and objections to the amount of compensation, and Sections 20 and 21 restrict the inquiry to the specific objection, the Court has no power to consider matters beyond the specific objection referred.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Facts of the case:
Land was acquired for a public purpose. The owner did not object to the measurements during the initial statutory process. Subsequently, the owner applied for a reference to the Court for the determination of proper compensation. During the proceedings, the owner later sought to challenge the measurements of certain plots and requested a remeasurement. The lower courts refused this request, holding that the inquiry was confined to the specific objection raised in the application for reference.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the objection was manifestly only to the amount of compensation and the reference was correctly described as such. The court cannot entertain objections to measurements if they were not part of the original reference application.
Issues: Whether the inquiry upon a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is confined to the specific objection raised by the applicant in the application for reference.
Ratio Decidendi: The jurisdiction of the Courts under the Act is special and strictly limited. Since Section 18 distinguishes between objections to measurement and objections to the amount of compensation, and Sections 20 and 21 restrict the inquiry to the specific objection, the Court has no power to consider matters beyond the specific objection referred.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Jurisdiction - The High Court followed this decision to hold that the inquiry upon reference is confined to the particular objection raised by the applicant.
Jurisdiction - The High Court relied on this case to limit the scope of the inquiry to the specific objection raised in the application.
Scope - Cited by the appellant to argue that the reference under the Act refers the award as a whole for determination.
Scope - Cited by the appellant to support the contention that the inquiry upon reference is not confined to the specific objection raised.
Obiter - Referred to during arguments, but the appellant's counsel noted that the observations in the case were obiter.
Collector - Cited by the appellant to argue that the Collector does not act judicially when making an award, implying the whole award should be open to review.
Solicitors for appellant:Clarke, Rawlins & Co. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.
Judgement
Appeal (No. 98 of 1928) from a decree of the High Court (August 3, 1926) varying a decree of the Land Acquisition Judge of 24 Parganas.
An award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, having been made in respect of land of which the appellant was owner, he applied for and obtained a reference to the Court under s. 18, sub-s.1, of the Act. The only question arising upon the appeal was whether upon that reference the appellant could object to the measurement of the land stated in the award. The appellant by his written application prayed for a reference "for determination of proper com pensation and valuation for the lands acquired."
The High Court, affirming on this point the decision of the Land Acquisition Judge, held that the inquiry was confined to the particular objection raised by the appellant upon his application for the reference.
B. B. Ghose J. (with whose judgment Cammiade J. agreed), after referring to cases in other High Courts in which a different view had been taken, said that the Court was bound by its own decisions in Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohan Mukherji (( 1907) I. L. R. 34 C. 451.) and British
Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 100 ( 1929- 1930)
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Secretary of State 249
India Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (( 1910) I. L. R. 38 C. 230.), as well as three cases reported at 12 C. W. N. 98, 985, 987. Further the question had been decided against the applicant by another Division Bench in the present proceedings.
1929. Oct. 17. Sir Gerald Hurst K.C. and Dube for the appellant The terms of the appellants application for the reference were sufficiently wide to cover an objection to the measurement of the land. But in any case, upon the true construction of ss. 18 to 24, the inquiry upon the reference was not confined to the specific objection raised. By s.18, sub-s.1, it is "the matter" which is referred, and that means the award as a whole. That contention is directly supported by In re Rustomji Jijibhai (( 1905) I. L. R. 30 B. 341.), also by Gangadari Sastri v. Deputy Collector of Madras .(( 1912) 22 Mad. L. J. 379.)
[Sir George Lowndes referred to In re Land Acquisition Act .(( 1905) I. L. R. 30 B. 275, 287.)]
The observations in that case were obiter. The Calcutta decisions relied on in the High Court are distinguishable. They were cases of attempts by persons who had no locus standi in the reference to enlarge its scope, not cases in which the applicant merely wished to go beyond the objection raised in his application. The Collector in making an award under the Act merely determines the sum which the Government should offer; he does not act judicially Ezra v. Secretary of State for India .(( 1905) L. R. 32 I. A. 93.) It may therefore be presumed that the intention was that upon objection the whole award should be open to review by the Court.
Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent were not called upon.
Dec. 6. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
SIR GEORGE LOWNDES. This appeal arises out of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894). Certain lands of the appellant were required by Government for a public purpose. The usual formalities were gone through and awards were made by the Collector in eleven cases in which the appellant was concerned. At his request references were made to the Land Acquisition Judge, 24 parganas, who slightly increased the Collectors awards. The appellant carried the matter to the High Court, where a further and more substantial increase was allowed, and he has now appealed to His Majesty in Council. The appellants grounds of appeal to the High Court and his objections to the High Courts decree were voluminous, but only one question has been submitted on his behalf to the judgment of this Board.
It is contended that the measurements of four of the most valuable plots taken up, the compensation for which was fixed at Rs.1000 per cottah, are incorrect, and that the appellant has been denied by the Courts in India the opportunity of proving their correct area. Their Lordships are accordingly invited to send the case back for the remeasurement of these plots.
By s. 8 of the Act, after the intended acquisition has been notified, the Collector is to cause the land to be marked out and measured and a plan to be prepared. It is not disputed that this was regularly done and that the statutory notices were served on the appellant calling upon him to appear before the Collector and to state (inter alia) his objections (if any) to the measurements so made. The appellant did not admit the Collectors area, but he tendered no independent measurements of his own and seems to have made no attempt to show that the Collectors measurements were incorrect. Awards were made in all the eleven cases on March 10 and 11, 1921, and on April 14 following the appellant claimed references to the Land Acquisition Court on the ground in each case that the award was insufficient, and that it should be referred to the judge "for the determination of the proper
Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 100 ( 1929- 1930)
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Secretary of State 250
compensation." The awards were based on the Collectors measurements but no question as to their correctness was raised. The references were duly made by the Collector on various dates between July 18 and August 11, 1921. He stated in each case that objection was taken "to the valuation of the land" only. The cases dragged on for nearly three years, and it was not till April, 1924, that the appellant raised any objection to the measure ments. He then asked that Government should admit a larger area or in the alternative that there should be a fresh measurement. This was refused by the judge on the ground that the only objection before him was as to the amount of compensation. The appellant applied to the High Court for revision of this order but without success. The valuation proceedings then went on at considerable length before the Land Acquisition Judge, and on appeal from him in -the High Court, with the result stated above. In the High Court the question of measurement was again raised, but the learned judges, by whom the appeal was heard, upheld the previous decision. Their Lordships have now to consider whether it was right.
The material section of the Act under which the references were made to the Court is s. 18, which is in the following terms "18.—(1.) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested."
The section clearly specifies four different grounds of objection—namely (1.) to the measurement of the land; (2.) to the amount of compensation; (3.) to the persons to whom it is payable; and (4.) to the apportionment. The distinctions between objection to area and to amount of compensation are also borne out by other sections of the Act see ss. 9, 11, 19 (d), and 20 (c). The appellants objection was manifestly only to the amount of compensation, and was correctly so described by the Collector in making the references.
By s. 20 the function of the Court upon a reference being made is "to determine the objection," and only persons "interested in the objection" are to be summoned before it, and by»s. 21 the scope of the inquiry is to be "restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection."
Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collectors award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once there fore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the "matter" referred, and the Court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it.
For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the ruling of the Courts in India was right, and that this appeal fails, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that it should be dismissed. The appellant must bear the costs of the appeal.