1920 JTR(SC) 74
1921 AIR(PC) 25 ; 1920 48 LawReportsInd.App. 31 ; 1921 13 LW 321 ; 1921 25 CWN 630 ; 1921 MWN 119
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BUCKMASTER, LORD PHILLIMORE, SIR JOHN EDGE, MR. AMEER ALI, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
RADHAKRISHNA AYYAR - Appellant
Versus
SWAMINATHA AYYAR - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Dec. 3. 1920.
A certificate for leave to appeal must clearly and unambiguously specify the grounds upon which it is based, such as the monetary value of the subject matter or the specific nature of the dispute, to be considered competent.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
: S.110, S.109(c)
MADRAS ESTATES LAND ACT: S.52
(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Sections 109 and 110, Order xlv, r. 3 - Estates Land Act, 1908 - Requirements for certificate of appeal - To appeal to the highest council, it is essential that the petitioners satisfy the Court that the subject matter of the suit is Rs. 10,000, or that the case falls under specific categories such as religious rights, caste, family rights, or questions of wide public importance under Section 109(c) - It is of the utmost importance that the certificate should show clearly upon which ground it is based; an ambiguous certificate that does not indicate the nature of the question involved or the exercise of discretion is insufficient to make an appeal competent.
(B) Special leave to appeal - Special leave may be granted on the ground that an important question of law is raised, but such a question must be of sufficient weight to justify the grant of leave.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted for the recovery of rent. The High Court held that the terms of a puttah decreed under a previous rent recovery act were binding under the estates land act. The appellants sought to appeal the decision, but the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the certificate granted by the High Court was insufficient and ambiguous, as it did not clearly specify whether the appeal was based on the value of the subject matter or the nature of the question involved.
Findings of Court:
The certificate was found to be ambiguous as it provided no indication of the nature of the question involved nor showed that the discretion under Section 109(c) of the procedural code was invoked. The value of the subject matter was below the required threshold for a standard appeal. The contention regarding the interpretation of the term "decreed" in the land act was not considered to be of sufficient weight to justify the granting of special leave.
Issues: Whether the certificate granted by the High Court was sufficient to render the appeal competent and whether special leave should be granted based on a question of law regarding the interpretation of the estates land act.
Ratio Decidendi: Certificates for leave to appeal must be explicit and unambiguous regarding the grounds upon which they are based to ensure the rights of litigants are not adversely affected. If the monetary value is insufficient and the certificate is ambiguous, the appeal is incompetent unless special leave is granted for a question of significant legal weight.
Result: Appeal dismissed as incompetent and special leave to appeal not granted.
(B) Special leave to appeal - Special leave may be granted on the ground that an important question of law is raised, but such a question must be of sufficient weight to justify the grant of leave.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted for the recovery of rent. The High Court held that the terms of a puttah decreed under a previous rent recovery act were binding under the estates land act. The appellants sought to appeal the decision, but the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the certificate granted by the High Court was insufficient and ambiguous, as it did not clearly specify whether the appeal was based on the value of the subject matter or the nature of the question involved.
Findings of Court:
The certificate was found to be ambiguous as it provided no indication of the nature of the question involved nor showed that the discretion under Section 109(c) of the procedural code was invoked. The value of the subject matter was below the required threshold for a standard appeal. The contention regarding the interpretation of the term "decreed" in the land act was not considered to be of sufficient weight to justify the granting of special leave.
Issues: Whether the certificate granted by the High Court was sufficient to render the appeal competent and whether special leave should be granted based on a question of law regarding the interpretation of the estates land act.
Ratio Decidendi: Certificates for leave to appeal must be explicit and unambiguous regarding the grounds upon which they are based to ensure the rights of litigants are not adversely affected. If the monetary value is insufficient and the certificate is ambiguous, the appeal is incompetent unless special leave is granted for a question of significant legal weight.
Result: Appeal dismissed as incompetent and special leave to appeal not granted.
Certificate - Established the principle that as an initial condition to appeal to His Majesty in Council, the subject matter of the suit must be Rs. 10,000, and in certain cases, a substantial question of law must be present.
Certificate - Used to support the principle regarding the necessary conditions and requirements for granting certificates for leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
Solicitor for appellants : Douglas Grant.
Solicitors for respondent: Chapman- Walker & Shephard.
Judgement
Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 4, 1916) varying a decree of the
31 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 31 ( 1920- 1921)
Radhakrishna Ayyar V. Swaminatha Ayyar 132
District Judge of Tanjore, which decree varied a decree of the Revenue Divisional Officer of Kumbakonam.
The suit was instituted by the respondent in the Revenue Court under the Madras Estates Land Act (I. of 1908), s. 77, to recover from the appellants, occupancy ryots, Rs. 4560 as rent for three years. The appellants had refused to accept puttahs which had been tendered to them ; they disputed the basis upon which the rent was provided for and denied that they were bound to accept puttahs in the terms decreed in a former suit brought against the predecessors of the appellants under the Madras Rent Recovery Act (Mad. Act VIII. of 1865). Issues were framed with regard to the basis upon which the rent was payable.
The Revenue Court gave the respondent a decree for Rs. 4367 ; upon appeal to the District Court the amount was reduced to Rs. 3953 ; but upon a further appeal to the High Court the decree of the Court of first instance was restored. The High Court held that under s. 53, sub-s. 3, of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. the terms of the puttah which had been decreed under Mad. Act VIII. of 1865 were binding upon the appellants.
The appellants, having presented a petition to the High Court under Order xlv., r. 3, praying for the grant of a certificate to enable them to appeal to His Majesty in Council, the High Court made an order in the terms set out in their Lordships judgment.
1920. Dec. 3. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondent took a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal, contending that the certificate was insufficient ; they referred to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 109 and 110, Order xlv., r. 3, and the two cases mentioned in their Lordships judgment.
Kenworthy Brown for the appellant contended that, having regard to the nature of the dispute, the value of the subject matter was over Rs. 10,000, further, that there was involved a substantial question of law ; and that the certificate was intended to cover both classes of requirements referred to in ss. 109 and 110. He further prayed that if the certificate were insufficient the appellants should have special leave to appeal upon the ground stated in the judgment.
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD BUCKMASTER. In this case a preliminary objection is taken to the appeal on behalf of the respondent based upon the ground that no proper certificate of appeal has been granted, and that the appeal is consequently incompetent.
The conditions that regulate the granting of certificates for leave to appeal have been clearly stated in the cases referred to by counsel for the respondent, namely, Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (( 1900) L. R. 28 I. A. 11.) and Radha Krishen Das v. Rai Krishen Chand . (( 1901) L. R. 28 I. A. 182.) It is not necessary to examine them again for the principle which they establish is plain and cannot be questioned. That principle is this ; that as an initial condition to appeal to His Majesty in Council, it is essential that the petitioners should satisfy the Court that the subject matter of the suit is Rs. 10,000, and in addition that in certain cases there should be added some substantial question of law. This does not cover the whole grounds of appeal, because it is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute ; there are questions, as for example, those relating to religious rights and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject matter in dispute cannot be reduced into
31 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 31 ( 1920- 1921)
Radhakrishna Ayyar V. Swaminatha Ayyar 133
actual terms of money. Sub-s. (c) of s. 109 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that such a state of things exists, and r. 3 of Order xlv. regulates the procedure. It is there provided that the petition for appeal should state the grounds of appeal, and pray for a certificate that either as regards amount or value and nature, the case fulfils the requirements of s. 110, or that it is otherwise, i.e., under s. 109, sub-s. (c), a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council. When any certificate is granted under that Order, it is in their Lordships opinion of the utmost importance that the certificate should show clearly upon which ground it is based, and they regret to find that the certificate in this case is at least ambiguous. It runs in these terms " It is hereby certified that, as regards the value of the subject matter and the nature of the question involved, the case fulfils the requirements of ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council."
There is no indication in the certificate of what the nature of the question is that it is thought was involved in the hearing of this appeal, nor is there anything to show that the discretion conferred by s. 109 (c) was invoked or was exercised. Their Lordships think it should be brought to the attention of the Indian Courts that these certificates are of great consequence, that they seriously affect the rights of litigant parties, and that they ought to be given in such a form that it is impossible to mistake their meaning upon their face.
Counsel for the appellants has asked that even though the amount in value in this suit is beneath the proper appealable amount, as it undoubtedly is, his clients should be granted special leave to appeal upon the ground that an important question of law affecting the whole community is raised under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, a question which has not hitherto been the subject of judicial interpretation. That question was this s. 52, sub-s. 3, provides that " puttahs and muchalkas accepted, exchanged or decreed for any revenue year shall remain in force until the commencement of the revenue year for which fresh puttahs or muchalkas are accepted, exchanged or decreed ; provided that where a puttah or muchalka has continued in force for more revenue years than one, no fresh puttah or muchalka for the same holding shall take effect until the commencement of the revenue year next succeeding that in which it is tendered, accepted, exchanged or decreed." He desires to contend on behalf of the appellants that " decreed " in that section means decreed under that Act, and that no former decree could have any operation. Their Lordships have considered this contention, but they do not think it of sufficient weight to justify granting special leave to appeal.
They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs as incompetent, and that special leave to appeal should not be granted.