1927 JTR(SC) 11
1927 AIR(PC) 110 ; 1926 54 LawReportsInd.App. 126 ; 1927 26 LW 70 ; 1927 31 CWN 495
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT DUNEDIN, LORD DARLING, SIR JOHN WALLIS, AND SIR LANCELOT SANDERSON.
RAGHUNATH PRASAD SINGH - Appellant
Versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PARTABGARH - Respondents
Appeal to Privy Council.
Decided On : Feb. 17. 1927.
Under Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a "substantial question of law" required for an appeal does not need to be of general importance; it is sufficient if the question is substantial as between the parties involved in the litigation.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
: S.109(a), S.110
(A) Code of Civil Procedure - Section 110 - Appeal - "Substantial question of law" - Meaning and scope - Where a decree affirms the decision of the court immediately below, the requirement that the appeal involve a "substantial question of law" does not imply that the question must be of general importance or affect parties outside the litigation - It refers to a substantial question of law as between the parties involved in the specific case.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted claiming title to an estate based on the construction of a will. The lower court held that the will conferred an absolute interest and dismissed the suit. This decision was affirmed on appeal. An application for a certificate to appeal to the higher court was dismissed on the ground that the construction of a document, which only interests the parties to the litigation, does not constitute a "substantial question of law" under the statutory requirements for appeals where the lower court's decision is affirmed.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the interpretation of the phrase "substantial question of law" used by the lower court was incorrect. The requirement is satisfied if there is a substantial question of law between the parties, regardless of whether it has general importance.
Issues: Whether the term "substantial question of law" under the Code of Civil Procedure requires the question to be of general importance or whether it suffices if the question is substantial as between the parties to the suit.
Ratio Decidendi: The phrase "substantial question of law" in the context of statutory appeals does not mean a question of general importance; rather, it means a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved.
Result: Leave to appeal granted.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted claiming title to an estate based on the construction of a will. The lower court held that the will conferred an absolute interest and dismissed the suit. This decision was affirmed on appeal. An application for a certificate to appeal to the higher court was dismissed on the ground that the construction of a document, which only interests the parties to the litigation, does not constitute a "substantial question of law" under the statutory requirements for appeals where the lower court's decision is affirmed.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the interpretation of the phrase "substantial question of law" used by the lower court was incorrect. The requirement is satisfied if there is a substantial question of law between the parties, regardless of whether it has general importance.
Issues: Whether the term "substantial question of law" under the Code of Civil Procedure requires the question to be of general importance or whether it suffices if the question is substantial as between the parties to the suit.
Ratio Decidendi: The phrase "substantial question of law" in the context of statutory appeals does not mean a question of general importance; rather, it means a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved.
Result: Leave to appeal granted.
Interpretation - Used by the lower court to support the view that a substantial question of law must be of general importance.
Prerogative - Cited regarding the grant of leave under prerogative rather than the meaning of words in the Code.
Distinction - Recognized the distinction between leave granted under prerogative and statutory leave.
Interpretation - Adopted the view that a substantial question of law refers to a question of general importance.
Solicitors for the petitioners:Barrow, Rogers & Nevill. Solicitor for the respondents: Solicitor, India Office.
Judgement
Petition for special leave to appeal from a decree of the Chief Court of Oudh (April 27, 1926) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh (April 22, 1924).
In 1922 Jagdeo Singh, the father of the petitioners, instituted a suit against the respondents, claiming title to a large estate in Oudh. The plaintiff claimed under the will of Raja Ajit Bahadur Singh, upon the death in 1921 of Raja Partab Bahadur Singh, whom the plaintiff contended took only a life estate under the will. The defendants represented transferees and devisees of Raja Partab, whom they contended took an absolute interest under the will.
The Subordinate Judge held that the will conferred an absolute interest on Raja Partab, and dismissed the suit.
On appeal the Chief Court affirmed the decision. The learned judges in their judgments discussed at length the legal effect of the dispositions made by the will, considering the principles laid down in various decisions.
The plaintiff applied to the Chief Court for a certificate to enable him to appeal to the Privy Council.
Law. Rep. 54 Ind. App. 126 ( 1926- 1927) Raghunath Prasad Singh V. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh 13
As the Chief Court had affirmed the lower Court, it was necessary under s. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the appeal should involve "some substantial question of law."
During the pendency of the application the plaintiff died, and the present petitioners were substituted for him.
The application was dismissed. The learned judges, after pointing out that the only question of law arising was as to the true construction of the will, said "That, to our minds, is not a substantial question of law, though it is a question of law. It is not alleged that any recognized principle applicable to the construction of a document of the nature of the present will has been misunderstood or misused by this Court, nor does our decision lay down any general principle of construction. The construction which we have placed upon the will in question is of no interest to any person outside the parties to this litigation. The old Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, to which this Court has succeeded, consistently adhered to the view that the words 1 substantial question of law means a question of general importance, and do not include the construction of a document in which the parties alone are interested." The learned judges referred to Udairaj Singh v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh ({ 1907) 10 Oudh Cases, 308.), which they stated was supported by two decisions of the Board —namely, a decision merely noted at 11 Cal. W. N. ccxviii., and Moti Chand v. Ganga Prosad (( 1901) L. R. 291. A. 40.), which however was in relation to the grant of leave under the prerogative not to the meaning of the words in the Code. (The distinction appears to have been recognized in Thillai Chetty v. Shanmuganathan Pillai [ 1922] W. N. 7, and has been given effect on many unreported applica tions for special leave.—A. M. T.) The learned judges added that the same view had been adopted by the High Court at Allahabad in Bishambhar Nath v. Muhammad Ubaidullah Khan . (( 1923) I. L. R. 46 A. 227.)
The petition was for special leave to appeal, that being, according to the practice of the Judicial Committee, the proper procedure, although it was contended that the Court in India had wrongly refused a statutory right to appeal to the Privy Council.
1927. Feb. 17. Dunne K.C. and Jopling for the petitioners.
De Gruyther K.C. and Wallach for the respondents.
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
VISCOUNT DUNEDIN. This petition for special leave to appeal really turns on whether the matter falls within the last clause of s. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that where, as here, the stake is over Rs. 10,000, then " where the decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law." Admittedly here the decision of the Court affirmed the decision of the Court immediately below, and, therefore, the whole question turns upon whether there is a substantial question of law. There seems to have been some doubt, at any rate in the old Court of Oudh, to which the present Court succeeded, as to whether a substantial question of law meant a question of general importance. Their Lordships think it is quite clear —and indeed it was conceded by Mr. De Gruyther—that that is not the meaning, but that " substantial question of law " is a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved.
Mr. De Gruyther has really tried to show the Board that there is no substantial question of law by more or less taking up the merits of the case and showing that the decision is quite obviously right. Their Lordships do not think that they would be quite safe in taking that view in a
Law. Rep. 54 Ind. App. 126 ( 1926- 1927) Raghunath Prasad Singh V. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh 14
case which certainly occupied the Court below for a very long time, and on which there is a very elaborate judgment; they think that upon the face of the matter there is, as between the parties, a substantial question of law.
Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that leave to appeal should be granted in this case.