1919 JTR(SC) 6
1919 AIR(PC) 155
Privy Council
Wrenbury, Parmoor , Justice Lords Finlay, JJ.
Wijeyesekera -Appellant
Versus
Festing -Resopndent
On Appeal from The Supreme Court of Ceylon
Decided On : 06-02-1919
The decision of the executive authority that land is required for a public purpose under the relevant acquisition ordinance is final and conclusive, and cannot be challenged in court, as the court's jurisdiction is limited to the assessment of compensation.
Act
Referred
:LAND ACQUISITION ACT
: S.4
(A) Ordinance No. 3 of 1876 - Sections 4 and 6 - Acquisition of land for public purpose - Finality of executive decision - Whether the decision of the executive authority in Council regarding the necessity of land for a public purpose is conclusive - The decision of the executive authority that land is wanted for public purposes is final and cannot be questioned in any court - The role of the court is limited to the assessment of compensation.
(B) Statutory Construction - Interpretation of provisions granting power to acquire land - Where an enactment provides that it shall be lawful for the executive authority to direct the acquisition of land upon receipt of a report, such a provision indicates that the decision is intended to be binding and conclusive.
Facts of the case:
Land was ordered to be acquired for a public purpose following the procedure prescribed under the relevant Ordinance. The affected party challenged the decision of the executive authority in Council, contending that the decision regarding the public purpose of the acquisition was not conclusive and could be questioned in court.
Findings of Court:
The decision of the executive authority in Council, making an order for the acquisition of land, is final and conclusive. No proceeding, including a preliminary application to stay proceedings on the ground that the condition precedent of public purpose was not fulfilled, is competent.
Issues: Whether the decision of the executive authority in Council that land is needed for a public purpose is final and conclusive, or if it can be challenged in court.
Ratio Decidendi: The framework of the Ordinance indicates that the court's jurisdiction is limited to the assessment of compensation. The specific wording of the statute, granting the executive authority the power to direct acquisition upon receipt of a report, demonstrates an intention that the decision be binding and not subject to judicial review.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
(B) Statutory Construction - Interpretation of provisions granting power to acquire land - Where an enactment provides that it shall be lawful for the executive authority to direct the acquisition of land upon receipt of a report, such a provision indicates that the decision is intended to be binding and conclusive.
Facts of the case:
Land was ordered to be acquired for a public purpose following the procedure prescribed under the relevant Ordinance. The affected party challenged the decision of the executive authority in Council, contending that the decision regarding the public purpose of the acquisition was not conclusive and could be questioned in court.
Findings of Court:
The decision of the executive authority in Council, making an order for the acquisition of land, is final and conclusive. No proceeding, including a preliminary application to stay proceedings on the ground that the condition precedent of public purpose was not fulfilled, is competent.
Issues: Whether the decision of the executive authority in Council that land is needed for a public purpose is final and conclusive, or if it can be challenged in court.
Ratio Decidendi: The framework of the Ordinance indicates that the court's jurisdiction is limited to the assessment of compensation. The specific wording of the statute, granting the executive authority the power to direct acquisition upon receipt of a report, demonstrates an intention that the decision be binding and not subject to judicial review.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Finality - Held that the Governor's decision on whether land is needed for a public purpose is final and the District Court has no power to entertain objections to such decisions.
Burchells, Cooke, Freeman , Giveen, Tomlin , Dighton Pollock, Erle Richards
Lord Finlay :-
This appeal raises a short point upon the construction of the Ceylon Ordinance No. 3 of 1876. The two sections which are material in that Ordinance are Sections 4 and 6. Section 4 provides :-
"Whenever it shall appear to the Governor that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the Surveyor-General or other officer generally or specially authorized by the Governor in this behalf, to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose."
The section then goes on to confer certain powers upon the Surveyor-General with regard to entering upon the land and doing certain acts upon it. Section 6 provides :-
"The Surveyor-General, or other officer so authorized as aforesaid, shall then make his report to the Governor, whether the possession of the land is needed for the purposes for which it appeared likely to be needed as aforesaid. And upon the receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, to direct the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land"
The procedure prescribed by the Act in the sections which have been read was followed, and an order was made by the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, directing the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land.
The whole point in the case is whether the decision of the Governor in Council is conclusive on the point that the land is wanted for a public purpose. It is now contended that it is open to the person whose land is affected to challenge the decision of the Governor in Council upon this point, as embodied in the order directing the Government Agent to take order for the acquisition of the land. This question has already been raised in the Courts of Ceylon. In the case of the Government Agent v. Perera, 7 Ceylon N. L. R. 313. The very point now under consideration was raised and decided in the Supreme Court of Ceylon. It is enough to read the first two paragraphs of the head note :
"In the acquisition of a private land for a public purpose, the Governor is not bound to take the raport of the Surveyor-General as to its fitness for such a purpose. His decision on the question whether a land is needed or not for a public purpose is final, and the District Court has no power to entertain objections to His-Excellency's decisions."
It appears to their Lordships that that decision was manifestly right. The whole frame of the Ordinance shows that what the District Court is concerned with is the assessment of compensation, but their Lordships do not desire to rest their opinion that the decision of the Governor is final merely upon the question of the Court before which the question is raised. It appears to their Lordships that the decision of the Governor that the land is wanted for public purposes is final, and was intended to be final, and could not be questioned in any Court. The nature of the objection is such that it would be obviously unsuitable for the District Court, which is concerned with questions of compensation which would arise if the land is to be taken. But the question might also be raised in a preliminary way, as was suggested by Lord Wrenbury in the course of the argument. It might be raised by an application to the Court to stay the further proceedings on the ground that, although the Governor in Executive Council has made the order, it was not a case where the condition precedent of the Ordinance was really fulfilled - namely, that the land was wanted for a public purpose.
In their Lordships' opinion no such proceeding would be competent in such a case, and the decision of the Governor in Council, making an order under the latter part of Section 6 of the Ordinance, is final and conclusive.
Reference has been made to cases dealing with similar questions arising under statutory enactments in India. Their Lordships do not refer to those cases because the wording of the enactment is not the same, and their discussion might, to some extent, complicate what appears to their Lordships to be a very simple issue.
The whole case is decided, in the opinion of their Lordships, in the last three lines of Section. 6 of the Ordinance :
"And upon the receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor, with the advice of the Executive in Council, to direct the Government agent to take order for the acquisition of the land"
When you have an enactment of that kind, it shows that it was intended that the decision of the Governor in Executive Council on the point should be binding.
For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.