1925 JTR(SC) 18
1925 AIR(PC) 155 ; 1925 22 LW 246 ; 1925 27 BomLR 872 ; 1926 30 CWN 459
Privy Council
Ameer Ali, Sir John Edge, Carson, Justice Atkinson, JJ.
Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal and others -Appellant
Versus
The Dakore Temple Committee and others -Resopndent
Privy Council Appeal No. 95 of 1923
Decided On : 30-03-1925
Parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court through consent or acquiescence. A court must exercise its power according to the specific legal authority granted; treating an application for modification as an appeal without a legal basis renders the resulting judgment incompetent.
Act
Referred
:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
: S.47
(A) Jurisdiction - Conferment of jurisdiction - Parties cannot by acquiescence or consent confer upon a Court a jurisdiction which it does not possess. (Para 10)
(B) Civil Procedure - Appeal vs. Application - Where a scheme provides for the modification of rules upon application to a High Court, such power is distinct from the power to hear an appeal from the sanction of such rules given by a lower court. (Para 10)
(C) Letters Patent - Definition of "judgment" - In civil cases, the term "judgment" in the Letters Patent of a High Court refers to a decree and not a judgment in the ordinary sense. (Para 11)
Facts of the case:
A scheme for the management of a public temple was confirmed by an Order in Council. The scheme empowered a committee to frame rules subject to sanction by a district court and provided that the High Court could alter, modify, or add to the scheme upon an application. Following the sanction of rules by the district court, an application for modification was filed in the High Court. The High Court erroneously treated the sanction given by the district court as an order under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and proceeded to hear the matter as an appeal rather than an application for modification.
Findings of Court:
The High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the matter as an appeal. The power conferred by the scheme was limited to modifying the rules upon a properly made application. Because the High Court failed to exercise its specific power under the scheme and instead acted as an appellate court without jurisdiction, the resulting judgments and decrees were incompetent.
Issues: Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to treat an application for modification of rules under a sanctioned scheme as an appeal, and whether the resulting judgment was competent.
Ratio Decidendi: Jurisdiction cannot be created by the consent or acquiescence of the parties. A court must exercise its authority strictly within the scope of the power granted to it; treating an application for modification as an appeal when no statutory or schematic right of appeal exists renders the judgment incompetent.
Result: Appeal allowed.
(B) Civil Procedure - Appeal vs. Application - Where a scheme provides for the modification of rules upon application to a High Court, such power is distinct from the power to hear an appeal from the sanction of such rules given by a lower court. (Para 10)
(C) Letters Patent - Definition of "judgment" - In civil cases, the term "judgment" in the Letters Patent of a High Court refers to a decree and not a judgment in the ordinary sense. (Para 11)
Facts of the case:
A scheme for the management of a public temple was confirmed by an Order in Council. The scheme empowered a committee to frame rules subject to sanction by a district court and provided that the High Court could alter, modify, or add to the scheme upon an application. Following the sanction of rules by the district court, an application for modification was filed in the High Court. The High Court erroneously treated the sanction given by the district court as an order under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and proceeded to hear the matter as an appeal rather than an application for modification.
Findings of Court:
The High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the matter as an appeal. The power conferred by the scheme was limited to modifying the rules upon a properly made application. Because the High Court failed to exercise its specific power under the scheme and instead acted as an appellate court without jurisdiction, the resulting judgments and decrees were incompetent.
Issues: Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to treat an application for modification of rules under a sanctioned scheme as an appeal, and whether the resulting judgment was competent.
Ratio Decidendi: Jurisdiction cannot be created by the consent or acquiescence of the parties. A court must exercise its authority strictly within the scope of the power granted to it; treating an application for modification as an appeal when no statutory or schematic right of appeal exists renders the judgment incompetent.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Downer and Johnson, E. Dalgado, T.L. Wilson and Co., E. B. Raikes, G.R. Lowndes, W. Wallach, A.M. Dunne, J.M. Parikh, L. DeGruyther
Sir John Edge :-
This case has come before their Lordships in the form of an appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of the High Court of Bombay. On the 31st March, 1920, the High Court certified that the appeal involved a sub stantial question of law and was other wise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council, and on the 26th July, 1920, the High Court admitted the appeal and ordered notice to be given to the respon dents. The question which their Lord ships have to consider is whether the appeal lay. For that purpose it is neces sary to refer as briefly as possible to the history of the case to see if any appeal in this case to His Majesty in Council arose or was admissible.
The case relates to the management of a public Hindu temple at the village of Da kore which is within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge of Ahmedabad. In the temple is installed the Idol of Shri Ranchhod Raiji, which is much re vered by Hindus. Disputes arose as to the management of the temple and at least two suits were brought in respect of the management, one of which came on ap peal to His Majesty in Council as to a scheme for the management which had been sanctioned by the High Court of Bombay. On the 14th May, 1912, the Board having made some alterations in the scheme and having advised that the scheme, as altered should be affirmed, His Majesty with the advice of His Privy Council, confirmed the scheme, as altered by the Board, and made an order in Coun cil accordingly.
The Dakore Temple scheme so confirm ed by His Majesty's Order in Council of the 14th May, 1912, provided, amongst other things, for the appointment of The Dakore Temple Committee to consist of five members who should be Hindus pro fessing faith in Shri Ranchhod Baiji, and empowered the Committee to take the Temple property into their custody and to make rules for the guidance of their business and for the management of the Temple and for other purposes. The pur poses for which such rules might be made were specified in Cl. 12 of the scheme, and it was provided that the rules, when sanctioned by the District Court of Ahme dabad, should have the same force as if they were part of the scheme.
Clause 20 of the scheme, as confirmed by His Majesty's Order in Council, is as follows :-
"20. The provisions of this scheme may be altered, modified or added to by an ap plication to His Majesty's High Court of Judicature at Bombay." The Temple Committee, having been duly appointed, framed a body of rules, as the Committee was empowered to do, and those rules came before Mr. B. C. Kennedy, as the District Judge of Ahme dabad, for the sanction of his Court, and he, on the 5th December, 1914, made certain alterations in the rules, and, as altered by him, sanctioned the rules. On the 23rd March, 1915, certain members of the Trawadi Mewada Brahmin caste, who had exercised certain rights in the temple or were otherwise interested in the management of the temple, presented to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay an "Application under Cl. 20 of the scheme for modification of the rules sanctioned by the District Judge." To that application the managing member of the Temple Committee and another were made respondents. The sanction given by the District Judge to the rules was apparently considered in the High Court, although erroneously, to be an Order made under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and appeals from it were presented to the High Court at Bombay. The appeals, and the application, came before a learned Judge of the High Court for disposal, and he, obviously doubting that the appeals lay, said in his Judgment of the 22nd September, 1919, as follows :-
These appeals and applications relate to the rules which have been framed under Cl. 12 of this scheme and sanctioned in 1914, by Mr. Kennedy the District Judge of Ahmedabad. The appeals have been filed as appeals from Orders in execution passed under Cl. 12 (7) of the scheme by the District Judge of Ahmedabad. We think we ought to deal with them as such as no objection has been taken. No orders need therefore be passed on the applica tions filed ex majors cautela as applica tions under Cl. 20 of the scheme reserving general power of interference to the High Court.
Thereupon the learned Judge wrote and delivered a judgment in which he expres sed his views as to the rules which had been sanctioned by the District Judge. The appeals to the High Court did not lie and should have been rejected.
The learned Judge should have remem bered that parties cannot by acquiescence or consent confer upon a Court a jurisdic tion which it has not got. The High Court at Bombay had power conferred upon it by Cl. 20 of the scheme confirm ed by His Majesty's Order in Council upon an application made to it with that object to alter, modify or add to the rules sanctioned by the District Judge, but it had no other power, and that power it did not exercise ; it may, however, still be exercised upon application properly made to it.
There was no right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from the judgments of the High Court of the 11th April, 1919, and 22nd September, 1919, or from any decrees which were drawn up, except on the sole ground that the judgments or decrees were incompetent. The term "judgment" in the Letters Patent of the High Court means in civil cases a decree and not a judgment in the ordinary sense
This appeal to His Majesty in Council should not have been admitted.
Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be al lowed and the judgment or decrees be set aside, as these judgments appealed from were incompetent. There will be no costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.