P. KODDANDA RAMAYYA, J.

( 1 ) THE Plaintiffs are the appellants in this appeal. The suit is laid for declaration of title of the plaint schedule property and recovery of possession and also for declaration of the rights of the plaintiffs to irrigate the suit lands with the water of Timmai Cheru and Ekkaldevi Kunta and for permanent injuction restraining the defendants from causing obstruction to the enjoyment of the irrigation channels of above two sources of irrigation in the suit lands and for mandatory injunction to restore the irrigation channel that was destroyed by the defendants and to restore to its original condition and for recovery of profits, both past and future.

( 2 ) THE Plaintiff averments can be divided into two parts. One relating to title, and another relating to easementary rights. Now, it is agreed by both the counsel that the question of title may be decided in this appeal and the claim regarding the easementary rights may be left out to be decided either by the revenue authorities, or the civil court afresh. It is enough to state the averments in the plaint, regarding the title. The plaintiffs case is that they are the brothers and they are the protected tenants in respect of the plaint schedule property, which is a part of Acs. 62-03 guntas along with other joint protected tenants, and the suit land is fed by irrigation sources of Timmai Cheru and Ekkaladevi Kunta and the defendant No. 1, who is the owner of the property, agreed to sell this property to them and having received the consideration, the authorities under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (Hereinafter referred to as the Act) issued the sale certificate under Section 38 (6) of the act and however in the month of March, 1968 defendants 1 to 3, with the help of other defendants, forcibly took possession of the property and deprived their possession, and hence the the suit for declaration and for possession.

( 3 ) THE first defendant is the father of defendants 2 and 3. Defendants 4 to 9 are co-sharers and defendants 11 to 24 are supporters of defendants 1 to 3.

( 4 ) THE Suit was resisted on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the protected tenants of the suit holding, they were not in possession of the property and the certificate proceedings are vitiated by fraud and the suit land being a seri inam land no certificate can be issued, without prior sanction of the Government and hence the certificates of sale issued are invalid. It is also stated that the source of irrigation is not Ekkaladevi Kunta and the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 41 of 1967 operate as res judicata and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed.

( 5 ) THE court below framed the issues, as found in paragraph 9 and held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to possession of the suit land and they have no title or possession and the plaintiffs cannot establish the two sources of irrigation mentioned in the plaint and hence dismissed the suit though a separate issue was not framed regarding the truth and validity of the certificates issued under Section 38 (6) of the Act, it was held that the plaintiffs have not proved that they are the protected tenants and hence no title has passed, as per the certificates issued by the revenue authorities under the Act. It had also held that the certificates are invalid as there is no prior sanction of the Government, as contemplated by the Act.

( 6 ) IN this appeal the learned counsel for the appellants concentrated on the question of title seeking permission to agitate his easementary rights afresh before the Revenue authorities, or in the civil Courts. His main argument is that the Court below misdirected itself in holding that the sale certificates Exs. A-9 and A-10 are not true and valid and the plaintiffs are not proved to be protected tenants. He further urged that the Court below failed to draw the statutory presumption under the Act and put the burden on the plaintiffs to show that they are the protected tenants. This is refuted by the learned counsel for the defendants stating that the conclusiveness of the presumption under Sec. 38 (6) of the Act is only rebuttable and the plaintiffs are not the protected tenants at all and hence the certificates issued by the authorities under the Act, are void and they are not binding on the defendants. It is further urged that, irrespective of the truth of the certificate proceedings, they are invalid and in-operative as no prior sanction of the State Government was given for the alienation in question as the lands are admittedly inam lands and hence the judgment under appeal is clearly sustainable.

( 7 ) NOW, it is necessary to see whether the certificates issued to the plaintiffs under Exs. A-9 and A-10 are valid and binding on the defendants. . It is no doubt true that Section 38 of the Act pre-supposes that the persons, who seek to purchase the property under the provisions of the Act, are the protected tenants. If they are not the protected tenants, the proceedings are liable to be attacked as being void. However, in view of the presumption enacted under Sec. 38 (6) of the Act that the certificate shall be the conclusive evidence of the sale as against the land-holder and all persons claiming thereunder, it is for the defendants to show that those proceedings are vitiated by fraud. The grounds urged in attacking the certificate, are : 1. The Plaintiffs are not the protected tenants. 2. The sale certificate proceedings are vitiated by fraud. 3. The certificate proceedings are void, as there is no prior sanction as contemplated by proviso to Section 38 (6) of the Act. The Court below held that there is no proof that the plaintiffs are the protected tenants. It wrongly threw the burden on the plaintiffs. It no doubt found in Ex. A. 15 relating to the year 1961-62 P. W. 1 s name is shown as the protected tenant, in respect of the suit survey numbers. It felt a doubt that the plaintiffs may not be the protected tenants as the subsequent pahanies did not show their names. It failed to appreciate the evidence adduced in this case and the cross-examination of D. W. 1, in particular. The first defendant, who is the owner of the property, was not examined. D. W. 1, who is the son of the first defendant, was cross-examined stating that he is working as a clerk in the Tahsil office at Hyderabad, and a suggestion was made to him that he got made the wrong entries in the cultivation columns of the pahanies for the subsequent years. He admitted that his father, plaintiffs and others have filed a joint petition (Ex. A-8) before the Revenue Divisional officer for issue of a sale certificate. He further admitted that "at that time Parvathiah ( I Plaintiff ) prepared a fair copy of the petitioner in which he had added three more survey numbers. My father signed in it not knowing the fact. That petition was filed in the office of Revenue Divisional officer. " He also admitted that he filed a Writ Petition in the High Court, challenging the order of the Collector, issuing the certificate proceedings but subsequently it was withdrawn as the present suit was filed.

( 8 ) IN this connection, it is necessary to notice that the Plaintiffs relied upon the statements of the 1st defendant in Ex. A. 2. and Ex. A-8. Ex. A-2 is a certified copy of the compromise petition filed by 1st defendant and other tenants other than the plaintiff under Sec. 44 of the Tenancy Act. It contains a statement that the 1st defendant sold Acs. 6-00 of land in survey no. 137 to these plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 1200/ -. Similarly Ex. A-8 is a certified copy of the joint petition said to have been filed by the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant and other purchasers before the Revenue Divisional officer for the issue of a certificate under Sec. 38 of the Tenancy Act. In that petition also there is an admission by the 1st defendant about the sale of the suit land to the plaintiffs. These two documents were excluded from consideration by the Court below, relying on Akshoy Kumar vs. Sukumar dutta #1 wherein it was held that a written statement filed in a previous suit is not a public document and therefore a certified copy of it is not admissible in evidence without calling for the original. As the documents clearly contain an admission on the part of the 1 st defendant, it is necessary to see whether these docunments are admissible in evidence and if so, to what extent they can be used in evidence treating them as public documents, within the meaning of Sec. 74 of the Evidence Act. For these, I must advert to the provisions of the Act and the Judicial pronouncements on this question. See. 74 of the Evidence Act defines the public documents, enumerating them as documents forming the acts or records of the acts of the public authorities. It also includes public records kept in a state of private documents. Sec. 75 of the Evidence Act declares that the rest of the documents are private documents. Sec. 76 enjoins on the public officer who has the custody of such public documents to give certified copies of these documents if any person has a right to inspect these documents. Sec. 77 declares that the contents of the public documents can be proved by producing certified copies. We must note that the mode of proving the contents of the documents have been dealt with in Sees. 61 to 66 of the Evidence Act and the proof of the documents i. e. , the genuineness of the documents is dealt with in Secs. 67 to 73. So far the mode of proving the contents is concerned, Sec. 61 declares that it can be proved, either by primary evidence or secondary evidence, the primary evidence being the production of the document itself. Sec. 63 enumerates five types of secondary evidence, when the primary evidence cannot be adduced. But, before secondary evidence can be adduced, the conditions of sec. 65 must be satisfied. However, Sec. 65 (e) declares secondary evidence may be given of a document when the original is a public document, within the meaning of Sec. 74 of the Evidence Act. Hence the importance of a particular document, falling within the definition of Sec. 74, which enables the party to prove the contents of the document by producing the secondary evidence viz. , certified copy of the public document. Hence this provision assumes importance, as without any formal proof of the contents of the document, the production of certified copy of the document is sufficient, if it is a public document within the meaning of Sec. 74 of Evidence Act. So far the pleadings before a court viz. , Plaint and written statement are concerned, they are not public documents, prepared by any public officer. No doubt, they form the basis of the adjudication. The earliest judgment in this regard is Shahaboodeen vs. Wedgebarry #2, wherein it was held that a certified copy of a plaint was a public document, as it forms part of the record, but not the certified copy of the written statement. This judgement was criticised by subsequent text book writers and also by judicial authority on the ground that, if a plaint is a public document, written statement also must be. This view is consistently taken and accordingly the High Courts of Nagpoor. Oudh and Patna in Manbodu vs. Hirasat #3 Usaf vs. Rauwaq #4 and Tarakeshwar vs. Devendra #5 respectively held that plaint is not a public document and so it ought to be proved like any other private document. The same view was taken so far written statements are concerned by Calcutta and allahabad High Courts in Akshay Sukumar (1 Supra) and S. T. K. Chandramanjiu vs. Kanhayalal #6 respectively. No doubt, judgment or a decree of a court or a deposition recorded by the Court or a statement recorded by a. Judicial officer are considered as public documents. Accordingly, the earliest judgment in Bhagain Megh Ranee Kooer vs Gooroo Pershad Singh #7 held that a compromise petition, which is subject matter of an order passed, was part of the record in the suit. A full Bench of the Madras High Court in Narasimha rama Rao vs. Venkataramayya #8 held that a profit and loss statement and showing the details of net income, filed by an assesses in support of his return of income furnished under Sec. 22 of the Income Tax Act, are public documents, within the meaning of Sec. 74 of the Evidence Act. The learned judges, who made the reference to the Full Bench, adverting to the admissibility of the plaint and written statement as public documents observed. "if an income-tax return is not a public document, as being part of the record of the act of the assessing officer it is difficult to see how a plaint or written statement in a civil suit or a complaint in a criminal case can be deemed to be public documents such as can be proved by the production of certified copies. It is the almost universal practice of the Courts to grant certified copies of such documents and to admit them in evidence, though the admissibility of a certified copy of a plaint appears to have been successfully challenged in one or two cases not of this High Court. " leach, Chief Justice, while delivering the Full Bench judgment, also observed. "as the learned Judges who have made the reference have pointed out, a plaint or a Written statement has always been regarded by this court as forming part of the record of a case and a public document of which an interested party may obtain a certified copy. If the argument, that an income-tax return is not a public document, but that the order passed thereon is, were carried to its logical conclusion, it would mean that no part of the record of a civil suit could be regarded as constituting a public document except evidence recorded by the court or summonses or notices or interlocutory orders or the judgment in the case. " hence it is seen that the admissibility of a plaint and written statement by production of the certified copies and admitting them in evidence appears to be universal practice in courts. No doubt, by filing a private document into court, it cannot be converted into a public document. In England, the pleadings in an action may be proved either by producing the originals or by means of copies filed with the officer of the Court under Or. 41 Rule 1 of the rules of the Supreme Court. The earliest judgment in R. vs. Scott #9 this rule, similarly, in that country, under Or. 37 Rule 4 of the rules, office copies of all writs, records, pleadings, and documents filed in the High Court of justice shall be admissible in evidence in all causes and matters and between all persons or parties, to the same extent, as the original would be admissible. The editors of the latest edition Sarkar on Evidence (Thirteenth Edition) while adverting to Shahaboodeen vs. Wedgebarry (2 Supra) state that the view in that case cannot be treated as altogether erroneous though it is difficult to make a distinction between a written statement and a plaint as the Written statement stands on the same footing as plaint. It is true that the Plaint and written statement are not public documents in the sense that they are not prepared by a public officer. But the test is whether they are documents forming an act or the record of an act or acts of the judge and if so to what extent. The plaint is the basis of adjudication. Or. 4 Rule 1 C. P. C. says that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf and Rule (2) of the said order says that thr Court shall cause the particulars of every suit to be entered in a book to be kept for the purpose, called the register of civil suits. If the court is satisfied that the requirements of law are complied with, it will register the suit by admitting the plaint. Similarly, under Or. 8 the court has power to permit the defendant to file his written statement. No doubt, the court has power to reject the plaint without adjudication, as contemplated under Or. 7 rule 11 CPC but once the suit is registered, the plaintiff cannot ask the plaint to be returned to him as his remedy is only to withdraw the suit if so he wants, in which event the court will dismiss the suit as withdrawn and the plaint filed by him will be allowed to form part of the record. Thus, it is seen though the plaint and written statement are not public documents in the sense they are not prepared by an officer and cannot be treated as forming the act of the officer. But it, is undoubtedly records of the acts of the officer, as he has to admit the plaint and permit the defence to be raised and adjudicate the matter on the basis of the pleadings. It is necessary to bear in mined that a person can obtain a certified copy from a court of these pleadings provided he has right to inspect those documents. A person, who is not a party to the proceedings, has no such right. In fact, the Civil Rules of practice and Circular orders issued by the High Court, consistent with Sec. 76 of the Evidence Act, coafers right to apply for the copies of the proceedings only to the party to the preceedings. If he is not a party, he must take permission of the Court by filing an affidavit. It may be necessary to refer to Old Rule 127 (2) that correspondents to the present Rule 192. "an application for copy of a plaint, written statement, Memorandum of appeal judgment, decree or other proceeding of or in the custody of, the High Court, may be made by any party to such proceeding to the Court of first instance, or to the lower appellate court and shall be transmitted by the said court to the High Court for disposal. The copy, if granted, shall be transmitted by the High court to the former court, and on payment of the prescribed fees, shall be delivered to the apolicant. No copy of any proceeding of the High Court shall be granted by a subordinate court. An application by a person not a party to the proceeding shall be made directly to the High Court. ". Further, as already noticed, Section 65 (a) Evidence Act only permits secondary evidence of a public document to prove its contents. But, it does not dispense with the proof that a particular person has subscribed to the statement, be it a plaint or a written statement, and hence proof of a mere statement is not enough until subscription to that statement is proved to have been made by a particular person. The cases above referred holding that the plaint and the written statement are not public documents cannot be construed to mean that the certified copies of those documents are not admissible to prove the factum of filing the particular suit against the particular person. Tn fact, in those cases the parties wanted to rely on contents of those documents as proof of the very statements contained therein, and hence those learned Judges rejected such contention stating a formal proof is necessary. However, if those judgments are construed to mean that the certified copies of the plaint and written statement are not admissible even to prove the factum of filing a particular suit against a particular person (between the parties), I respectfully disagree with the said view. Even in England where proof of the pleadings are admissible by producing copies under the rules of the Supreme Court as given above, they are not admissible as proof of the truth of the facts stated in them even between parties. (Vide para 195, Vol. 17, Forth Edition Halsbury s Laws of England ). No doubt, in the Full Bench Judgment referred to above, their Lordships simply observed that they are admissible in evidence but to what extent the pleadings in the above case between the parties can be proved was not examined. I find support in Lakshan Chandra Mandal vs. Takhim Dhali. #10 wherein Mookerjee, J, held that a plaint is admissible to prove the factum of suing and held : "the distinction between the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and the admissibility of a document in proof of a statement contained therein is of a refined but of a fundamental character and is yet frequently overlooked. " once the certified copies of plaint or written statement are admissible to prove the factum of proving proceedings between the parties one can make use of those documents for contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Hence admitting certified copies of plaint and written statement are universally adopted for the purpose of contradicting the witness on his earlier statement. Further it is necessary to remember that the plaint is not admissible to prove the statement itself, if the party who is the author of the plaint is alive, unless the conditions of Sec. 32 of the Evidence act are satisfied.

( 9 ) HENCE I hold that the plaint and written statement form part of record of the acts of the judge, who is a judicial officer, and to the extent of its proving the factum of filing a particular suit against a particular person the said document constitutes a public document, wilhin the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act, and the same can be used for the limited purpose of contradicting the party in evidence, if those proceedings are shown to be between the same parties. As the plaint and the written statement are not public documents in the sense that they are not prepared by a public officer and they cannot be said to form the acts of the public officer but to the extent they form the records of acts of the public officer they are admissible by producing the certified copies to the extent of showing the existence and the condition of such documents within the meaning of Section 65 of the Evidence Act, though not their contents as envisaged by that section. Hence the plaint and writtenv statement are admissible to the extent of proving that a particular suit is filed against a particular individual and to show the proceedings between the parties.

( 10 ) APPLYING the said principle, let us see whether the Court below is right in excluding Exs. A-2 and A-8. So far Ex. A-2 is concerned, the plaintiffs are not parties. So far Ex. A-8 is concerned, the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant are parties and the plaintiffs are not merely relying on the certified copy of ET. A-8, but the same is supported by oral evidence and was proved by the evidence of P. W. 1. D. W. 1 admitted that his father filed such statement and hence the court below is not right in excluding ex. A-8 on the simple theory that it is not a public document and the same is not admissible. There is clear proof of contents of Ex. A-8 by the evidence of P. W. 1, read with the admission of D. W. 1.

( 11 ) IT may also state that the 1st defendant agreed to sell the property not only to the plaintiffs but to other tenants and the certificates of those tenants were produced as Exs. A-11, A-12 and A-13. The sale considerations for those transactions are borne out by Exs. X-1 and X-2. Hence it is difficult to hold that these proceedings of sale in favour of the plaintiffs are not true.

( 12 ) IT is to be remembered that the plea of fraud must be proved as in a criminal case. Far from that, D. W. 1 admitted that his father signed a joint memo and that forms the basis of issuing the certificate under Exs. A-9 and A-10. Thus; I hold that the presumption under Section 38 (6) of the act is not rebutted and the defendants failed to prove that the plaintiffs are not the protected tenants of these lands and there is absolutely no evidence to show tha. t the proceedings under Sec. 38 are vitiated by fraud. Hence, I hold that the plaintiffs arc the protected tenants in respect of the plaint schedule property and the certificates issued under Section 38 (6) are true and binding on the defendants.

( 13 ) THERE remains the question of validity of the certificate issued for want of sanction by the Government. It is necessary to look to Section 38 (6) proviso, which reads as follows : section 38 (6) : " (a) On deposit of recovery of the entire amount of the reasonable price being made, the tribunal shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the protected tenant declaring him to be the. purchaser of the land and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the sale as against the landholder and all persons interested therein and Tribunal shall also direct the reasonable price deposited or recovered shall be paid to the land-holder. Provided that if the application of the protected tenant relates to an inam the Tribunal shall not issue such certificate unless previous sanction of Government has been obtained therefor".

( 14 ) NOW, it is urged by the learned counsel for the defendants that proviso is mandatory and any certificate issued, contrary to the previous sanction of the Government, is void, In this connection, the learned counsel for the defendants drew my attention to the Full Bench Judgment in k. Parvathamma vs. Excise Commissioner #11, wherein it was held that "according to Section 47 of the Act (Before its repeal) the prior sanction must be made before the sale is confirmed when the property is sold in a public auction". No doubt, the above observation clearly discloses that, without the prior sanction, no title will pass. Now Section 47 was deleted from the statute book. I am not persuaded to accept the analogy under Section 47. The proviso in question is intended to protect the interest of the Government, prohibiting any alienation in respe. it of inam lands, without prior sanction of the Government. The true effect of the proviso is that the sale would be inoperative, in respect of the inam lands, unless the sanction was recorded by the State Government. The proviso, in the context in which it has occurred, does not permit the construction that the sale is a nullity if prior sanction is not taken. It only prohibits the authority to issue a certificate till sanction of the Government is obtained. No machinery is provided to validate the sale. Hence the sale is only inoperative till the sanction is granted and subsequent sanction granted by the Government will make the sale perfect.

( 15 ) IF I apply this principle to the facts of this case, it is seen that the sale was effected under Sees. A-9 and A-10 on 31-3-61. The Government has granted sanction on 10-9-1971 as per Ex. A-14. It appears the application were filed before the Government on 23-8-1971 as it was realised such sanction was necessary and the Government passed orders on 10-9-1971, according the sanction. The said order was challenged by the defendants, by filing the Writ Petition No. 4573 of 1971 and this Court on 28-2-1975 allowed the Writ Petition, directing the Government to give the opportunity to the defendants and accordingly opportunity was given to the defendants and the Government passed fresh orders, sanctioning the sale in Memorandum no. 3034-F1/71-30, dated 27-10-1977 and the same was filed as additional evidence in CMP No. 13860 of 1986. Thus, it is seen that the government has sanctioned the sale afresh. I see no infirmity in these proceedings simply because the Government did not accord sanction, prior to the sale.

( 16 ) THE question can be examined from another angle. The lands are admittedly inam lands, governed by the provisions of the Andhra pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act 8 of 1955 (hereinafter called Abolition Act ). As per Section 3 of the said Act, the inams will be deemed to have been abolished and shall vest in State with effect from 20th July, 1955. No doubt, for implementing fully the provisions of the act, the second notification under Section 1 (3) (b) was issued on 1-11-1973. However, as per Section 3 (1) of the Act, the inam tenure is put an end to with effect from 20-7-1955 and the State Government has become the owner of the property. It is clear that, when the inam tenure came to an end, and the State Government who is the absolute owner of the property gave consent for the alienation, the objection of non-compliance of Section 38 (6) of the Act is no longer sustainable.

( 17 ) THE last contention urged by the learned counsel for the defendants, Sri Siva Rama Sastry, is that one the Inams Abolition Act came into force, the civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the parties and the remedies must be worked out within the four corners of the act and hence the present suit is not mintainable. It is necessary to look into the provisions of the Abolition Act. This Act as indicated in the preamble provides for the abolition of inams with certain exceptions. The ablition of the tenure took place in two stages, as provided in Section 1 (3) (a) and (b ). It is necessary to look to the said sanction. "section 1 (3) (a); This section, Section 2, Section 3 except clauses (d), (g), (h) and (i) of sub-section (2), Sections 30 to 34 (both inclusive), Section 35 to the extent to which it enables rules to be made for the purposes of the aforesaid Sections, Section 36 and section 37, shall come into force on the date of publication of this act in the official Gazette. (b) the rest of this Act shall come into force on such date as the government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf". It is seen, as per the above clause (a) of Section 1 (3), certain sections alone come into force on 20th July, 1955, and the rest of the provisions come into force on the date of notification issued under Sec. 1 (3) (b) which was made on 1-11-1973. On the date of coming into force of this Act, the inams stand abolished and vest in the Government but Section 3 (2) (b) (g) (h) and (i) and sub-section (3) of the said Section would not come into force. One of the effects of excluding those provisions is the jural relationship of land-holder and tenant continues and the liability of the tenant to pay the rent to the land-holder subsists. No doubt, on the subsequent notification on 1-11-1973 the jural relationship of inamdar and protected tenant shall be extinguished. Further, on the date of the publication of the Act in the Official gazette (date of coming into force of the Act) Sections 30 to 34 also shall come into force. It is necessary to look to Section 33 which is in the following terms: "section 33 Savings :nothing in this Act shall in any way be deemed to affect the application of the provisions of the A. P. (T. A.) tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 to any inam or the mutual rights and obligations of an inamdar and his tenants, save in so far as the said provisions are in any way inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act. " it is seen that, nothwithstanding the provisions of the Abolition Act vesting the inam in the Government, the provisions of the A. P. (Telangana Area) tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 are allowed to prevail in so far those provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of the Abolition Act 8 of 1955. The provisions, Permitting alienation in favour of protected tenant under Section 38 (6) are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of section 3 of the Ablition Act and also the enquiry contemplated under rule 5 of the A. P. (Teleagana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules for the purpose of registering the claims of the inamdars and other tenure holders as occupiers. Hence, the operation of the Inams Abolition Act will not affect the application of the provisions of the Tenancy Act, in view of the saving clause embodied under Section 33 of the Abolition Act.

( 18 ) ONCE I hold that the plaintiffs are the protected tenants and the certificates issued on the defendants, the dispossession by the defendants is clearly illegal and the possession must be restored to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of their title in respect of plaint schedule property and also the possession as prayed for. Further there shall be a direction for enquiry into profits from the year 1969-70. The other reliefs, regarding the easementary rights, are rejected and the plaintiffs are directed to work out their rights before the Revenue authorities or before the Civil Court, if necessary, on the strength of their title.

( 19 ) C. M. P. NO. 14697/86 for additional evidence is dismissed as the plaintiffs are not parties to the proceedings in question and none of the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. , are satisfied.

( 20 ) THE appeal is allowed in part and I make no order as to costs. Addl. Evidence Filed by the Appellants: ex. A-42 Memo. No. 3034-F1/71-30, dt. 27-10-77 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh (Revenue Department) Vide order, dated 2-12-1986 in c. M. P. NO. 13160/86 ).