K. RAMASVVAMY, J.

( 1 ) THE age old acrimony between the civil Court and the statutory authorities to have exclusive jurisdiction over suits of civil nature, has once again erupted in this prolonged litigation claiming adjudication and reeking quietus. The defendant is the appellant. The respondent deiry laid the suit in 1957 for a declaration that the plaint schedule property is an in am land: for delivery of possession thereof and for meane profit or damages for use and occupation at a specified rate.

( 2 ) INITIALLY the suit was decreed on July 28, 1962. On appeal in a. S. 176/62, the appellante Court by its judgment dated July 16, 1965 remanded the matter to the trial Court but was set nought by this Court in c. M. A. 42/66 directing the appellate Court to dispose of the matter on merits. Thereafter, the appeal met with dismissal, confirming the decree, by its judgment dated May, 1, 1969. The appellant filed S. A. No, 729/69. In the interregnum, proceedings under Section 15 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Abolition and Conversion into Ryoiwari Act, 26 of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) was initiated by the Sulement Officer culminating in the first instance under the proceedings in Ex. B-49 and thereafter under the proceedings in Ex. B-50, granting patta under Section 11 of the Act. They were filed as additional evidence in C. M. P. No. 12507/70, and this Court received those documents; remitted to the trial Court to reconsider afresh. By judgment dated September 30, 1972, the matter was again considered by the trial Court and the suit wai decreed which was- affirmed in A. S. No. 14/73 by the judgment dated April 11, 1977 of the appellate Court. Against this second round of litigation, the present second Appeal has been filed.

( 3 ) THIS Second Appeal came up before our learned brother madhava Rao, J. and in view of the importance of the question to be decided, our learned brother referred the matter to a Division Bench for adjudication, "whethre the civil Court has got the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide the question relating to the nature of the tenure of the land and also the title". Thus, this Second Appeal has come up before us.

( 4 ) THE material facts to resolve the tangle in this lis are that the respondent set up claim to the lands as owner thereof on the ground that these lands are enfranchised pre-sttlement inam lands and they are not governed by the provisions of the Act but by the provisions of the Andhra pradesh (Andhra Area) (inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) act, 156, (for short, inams Act ). It is their case that the defendant has no right whatever hut a mere trespasser into the proprrty and that, therefore, he is liable to be ejected there from. Pending suit, the deity obtained patta under Ex A-18, under Section 3 of the Inams Act. The appellant resisted the claim contending that the suit property is situated in Madugula, a zamindari estate. The Zamindar granted paltas to the predecessors-in-tiile of the the appellant. When there was a dispute between the Zamindar and tenants, the Zamindar executed a surrender deed Ex. B-l dated August 5, 1929 wherercunder certain lands were taken over by the Zamindar and the ether lands including the plaint schedule properties were given up to chinchilada people. Thus, the Zamindar has conferred title on these lands to those people. From them the father of the appellant purchased the plant scheduled lands on different dates under registered sale-deeds for consideration, viz. , Ex. B-2 dated September 2, 1941 and Exs. B-7, the last of which is dated Janury 5, 1952 and thereby he acquired titla. After tho estate was notified under Section 1 (4) of the Act on March l8, 1953 and taken over, on and from the above date it is the case of the abpellant, that proceedings were initiated before the Settlement Officer, in the first instance under Section 15 of the ACL and orders in Ex. B 49 were passed declaring the lands to be an estate and directing him to claim patta under Section 11 of the Act and he was granted pattas under Section ll of the Act through ex. B-50 proceedings. They became final and conclusive. Thereby the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted.

( 5 ) IN view of these adverse claims made by the parties, on one of the issues, the trial Court went into this question and held that despite the grant of pattas by the respactive authorities, the civil Court has jurisdiction to grant declaration of title Accordingly, the trial Court held that the respondent has got title to the plaint schedule lands and decreed the suit which was affremed on appeal Thus, the question before us in this Second appeal is whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction to go into the dispute with regard "to the nature of the plaint schedule property and grant declaration of title thereof.

( 6 ) THE preamble of the Act avows that the Act is to provide for the repeal of the permanent settlement, the acquisition of the rights of tho landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the State of andhra Area and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. Under Section I (4) of the Act, the Government is empowered to issue a notification abolishing the estate and on issua of such notification, section 3 enumerates consequences ensued thereof. Section 3 (b ). provides that the totality of the estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances. Section 3 (c) declares that all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date "shall cease and deterimine" as against the Government. Section 3 (d) proviso accoids protection from dispossession declaring that "the parson in possession of the lands shall not be dispossessed when the Government considered him to be prima facia, ontitled to a ryotwari patta," until the question. whether he is actually entitled to such patta is decided by the Settlement officer appointed under S. 5 thereof, in the case of a ryot or the Settlement officer and the Tribunal, on appeal, in case of the landholder. The other consequences have also been provided for, which are not germane for the purpose of this appeal.

( 7 ) UNDER Section 9, the Settlement Officer either suo motu or on application, shall enquire and determine whether any inam village or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam is an estate or not. Section 10 gives right to the landholder of an under-tenure estate or any person interested, to apply for a decision as to whether such estate was created before or after the date on which the principal estate was permanently settled.

( 8 ) SECTION 11 which is material for the purpose of this case, reads thus:"ii. Lands in which ryot is entitled to ryotwari patta: Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of (a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act;. . . (Clause (b) and sub-section (2) and the proviso are not necessary for the purpose of this case. Hence omitted ).

( 9 ) THUS, Section 11 postulates that the land shall be a ryoti land before the notified date and that the property shall be properly included in his holding or ought to be properly included in his holding. The ryot in possession shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect thereof. Until then he shall not be liable to be dispossessed. Sections 12 to 14 enumerated the landholders entitled to patta and Section 15 provides the forum to adjudicate "the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims a roytwari patta" thereof and a right of appeal has been provided against the decision under Section 15 of the Act to the Tribunals constituted under the Act, in respect of the orders either granting patta or refusal thereof. In respect of the matters covered under Section 11, the government have framed statutory rules called the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Grant of ryotwari Patta Rules, amended from time to time, last being G. O. Ms. No. 50, Rev. Dt. January 16, 1974, to follow the procedure to grant patta; and rules have also been made in G. O. Ms. No. 36, Revenue dated November, 21, 1956 creating revisional forums viz. , the Director of Settlements and the board of Revenue to consider the correctness and legality of the order passed by the Settlement Officer prescribing the period of limitation.

( 10 ) THUS, as far as the grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is concerned, Section 11 read with the Rules referred to above, envisages a complete Code in itself to determine the nature of land; proper inclusion thereof in the holding and the persons entitled to grant of a ryotwari patta thereunder.

( 11 ) IN this case, it is not in dispute that the Government issued the notification under Section 1 (4) of the Act, notifying Madugula village in chodavaram Taluk is a zamin estate and it was taken over by the Collector on and from March 18, 1953. In the proceedings marked under Ex. B-49, the respondent deity claimed before the Settlement Officer in the enquiry under Section 15 of the Act the nature of the lands i. e:, the plaint schedule property is an enfranchised pre-settlement inam lands whereat the appellant as well as the respondent placed all the material evidence and the Settlement Officer went into that question and considered the evidence. He held in Ex. B-49 that:"as seen from documents Ex. P-l to Ex. P - 15 the land is an estate land and the land holder was exorcising every right over it before he could concede to grant a patta as seen from the agreement in Ex. P-8". It may be mentioned here that Ex. P-8 filed therein is equivalent to Ex. B-l in this case. He further held :"the land is within the estate and unless it is set up that it is the one that docs not come within the provisions of the Act, it should be deemed that it is an estate land. The land therefore cannot be held to be the one that never falls within the provisions of the E. A. Act. "after giving the said finding, the Settlement Officer has held that the enquiry under Section 15 (1) does not lie, therefore he relegated the parties to take appropriate action under Section 11 of the Act. This order become final, in pursuance thereof, the appellant initiated action under section 11 and after consideration of the evidence again, the Settlemement officer, in his proceedings dated December 26, 1969 (Ex. B-50) held :"the petitioner is therefore a ryot admitted to the possession of tenants as early as in 1929 and continued to be so till the estate was notified. The claimant is therefore, entitled to get a patta for the schedule lands under Section 11 (a) of the E. A. Act. His claim is accordingly allowed. "this order too has become final.

( 12 ) IN view of these admitted facts, the question that emerges for consideration is whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to take cognizance and to go into the nature and history of the plaint schedule property and to declare title thereto. It is neither the trick of the pleadings nor the comofiouge of the reliefs sought that afford solution. We have to peep a deep look into the purpose. scope, ambit of the Act and the finality attached to the orders passed by the statutory authorities as envisaged and ascribed under the Act, as the guiding factors. The relevant provisions have alredy been adverted to. Theyare subject of consideration by this Court and the Supreme Court time and again.

( 13 ) AS early as about 25 years ago, a Division Bench of this Court, speaking through Subba Rao, CJ (as he then was) in Appana vs. Srirama murthy held that:"where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as it otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal s jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta. When a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act. "this view is now received approval from the Supreme Court and is the law of the land.

( 14 ) IN Desika Charyulu vs. State of A. P. the question that arose therein was whether the civil Court has got jurisdistion to declare that the suit lands arc Shrctriem land and if not an estate within the Rent Reduction act and for an injunction to restrain the State from taking action in pursuance thereof. One of the contentions, resisting the claim, was that the settlement Officer has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act to give the relief and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded by necessary implication. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, considered all the relevant provisions and speaking through Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. have held at page 814 thus :"the question therefore is whether this jurisdiction (under section 9 of the Act) is clearly barred, whether expressly or by necessary implication. It is true there is no provision in the abolition Act in terms debarring the civil Courts from entertaining sutis of this nature or trying them. But as the bar may arise by necessary implication it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Act for ascertaining whether the existence of the jurisdiction of civil Courts to decide the matter now in con- trevery is consistent with them. "accordingly, their Lordships have held that the suit is not maintainable and the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer is exclusive.

( 15 ) IN Hatti vs. Sunder Singh the same question arose under the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (8 of 1954 ). There the tenant obtained a declaration before the Revenue authorities that he is a Bhoomidar. Challenging that order, civil suit was filed for declaration by the plaintiff that he is the Bhoomidar and the order of the revenue authorities is not bindnig on him and for possession, etc. The contention xatscd by the defendant there also was, that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was excluded. While considering that question, their Lordsoips have held :"it is true that the declaration made by the revenue authorities without going through the judicial procedure ate subject to due adjudication of rights; but such adjudications must be by an application under item 4 of Schedule I of the Act and not by approach to civil Courts. If a Bboomidar seeks declaration of his right he has to approach the Revenue Assistant under item 4, while if a Gaon Sabha wants a clarification in respect of any person claiming to be entitled to any right in land it can institute a suit for declaration under item 28 and the Revenue Assistant can make a declaration of the right of such person. "therefore it was held that the civil Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit to give declaration of title.

( 16 ) NO doubt, a Full Bench of this Court in Chernkumar Muthayya vs. VG. Gopalakrishnayya has held that the patta granted under Section 11 of the Act is not conclusive and the civil Court has got jurisdiction to go into that question. This decision was referred to a larger Bench (consisting of Five Judges) and the larger Bench by its decision reported in T. M. naidu vs. R. Venkata Reddi reconsidered the matter. Therein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer under Section 56 (l) (c) is exclusive and the civil Court has no juridiction to go into the rival claims as to who is the lawful ryot. While considering that question the point relating to the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of the order of the Settlement officer under Section 11 and its conclusive nature was left open since that question did not arise directly for consideration. But a reading of the judgment of the Larger Bench clearly posits that even the question relating to the jurisdiction in respect of the matter arising under Section 11 was in fact, incidentally, gone into and recorded positive findings in that regard. The ratio, though obiter, is binding on us. As a result, the second principle in Muthayya s case as well was eroded. That apart, it is also eclipsed by the doctrine of per curium for non-consideration of Desikacharyulu s case and Hatti s case which are binding on us under Article 141 of the Constitution. Even several Bench decisions of this Court were also not considered. Chayanna vs. K. Narayana approving Appanna s case and T. M. Naidu s case completely rock to bottom and mangled with denudation of even the second principle in Muthayya s case as a binding precedent. These factors obviated our task to make reference to a larger Bench. Wo have already referred to Desikacharyulu and Hatti cases. The Fuller Bench of this Court in T. M. Naidu vs. R. Venkata Reddi in paragraph 8 of the judgment, Sambasiva Rao, J, (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the court held :"then taking up S. 11 it was pointed out that it does not indicate any procedure for the grant of a patta. It does not even postulate any application for that purpose. At the same time, it was noted that the enquiry under Sec. 11 can commence not only suo motu but also on an application by a ryot. What Sec. 11 empowers the Settlement Officer to decide is whether the land in question is a ryoti land and whether a particular ryot is entitled to a ryotwari patta for such a land. Section 11, unlike Sec. 15, does not make an order under that section final and does not prohibit that being questioned in a Court of law. Therefore, the Legislature s intention to clothe orders under S. 11 with finality is patent. . . . . . . . . "in paragraph 11, it was held :"it must necessarily follow that the Legislature has also intended to create the necessary machinery for implementing the purposes of the Abolition Act. To put it in other words, [the abolition Act has been intended to be a self contained Code and to be self-sufficient for carrying out all the purposes of the Abolition act. I" (Emphasis supplied) in paragraph 18, considering the provisions of Sees. 11 to 14 vis-a-vis Sec. 3 (d) of the Act, it was held that the provisions abundantly make clear that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to decide as to who is entitled to a ryotwari patta under Sees. 11 to 14, be he a ryot or a landholder. In paragraph 19, it is concluded :"therefore we have no doubt whatever that it is the Settlement officer that will have to declare the rights of ryots to get ryotwari pattas under S. 11. Moreover, right from 1949 it has been invariably accepted by all Courts that the Settlement Officer decides the questions which arise under S. 11. What is more, the Settlement Officer may adjudicate upon the questions not only on the application filed by a ryot but also suo motu. "thus, considering all the provisions of the Act and the decisions relevant thereto, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer is conclusive. In that case in respect of rival claims of ryots it was held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction. This view was upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in M, Chayanna vs. K. Narayana, Tharein, Chinnappa reddy, J. who has an intimate knowledge in the working of the Act speaking on behalf of the Court, held:"the Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act is a self-contained code in which provision is also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified, by specially constituted Tribunals. On general principles, the special tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication. "in paragraph 6, it was held:"it would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas, on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in S. 56 (1) (c) to discover who is the lawful ryot of a holding was, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provisions to the bounds of Secs. 55 and 55 (1) (a) and (b) on the grounds of contextual interpretation . Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. "further, it was held to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench decision in cherukuru Muthayya vs. Gadde Gopala Krishnayya would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and implementation of the Act would be "thrown into disarray. "

( 17 ) THIS view was further reaffirmed by the later judgment of the supreme Court in Chenchu lakshmamma vs. Subrahmanya Reddy.

( 18 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Venkata Subbao Rao vs. State of Andhra consisting of Chandra Reddy, C. J, and Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as he then was) held :"it is true that unlike in the case of land-holders in regard to whose claims for ryotwari patta adjudication has to be made under Sees. 21 to 15, there is no specific provision in the Act to determine the rights of the ryots to ryotwari patta for ryoti lands but, it is seen from Sec. 11 of the Act that the section envisages the issue of a ryotwari patta to a ryot in regard to lands which were included in his holding or ought to have been included. The intention of the Legislature in investing the Settlement Officer with jurisdiction to decide the question as to the ownership of the ryoti lands is manifest from the first clause of the proviso to Sec, 3 (d) of the Act. The clause makes it abundently clear that it is the Settlment officer that has to adjudicate upon the claims of the various ryots to a particular land. A combined reading of Sec. 3 (d) and Sec. 11 will result in the inescapable conclusion that jurisdiction was vested in the Settlement Officer to decide whether a ryot was entitled to a ryotwari patta to any ryoti land. As the grant of patta to a piece of land is conditional upon its being found to be a ryoti land, it is competent to the Settlement Officer to go into the question as to the nature of the land,"accordingly, the Division Bench has uphold the adjudication made by the Settlement Officer under Section 11. This case arose in a writ petition.

( 19 ) STATE of Madras vs. Swaminathan is also a cast) arising on a claim of patta under Section 11. The Madras High Court has held :"it is the Settlement Officer in the first instance who should decide in accordance with the statutory requirement of the madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. 1948 whether a person is entitled to a ryotwari patta, The Act cannot be circumvented by filing a plaint in a civil Court for a declaration that the lands in respect of which the plaintiff really wants a ryotwari under the new Act are ryoti lands. Such a plaint has to be dismissed as not maintainable in a civil Court/

( 20 ) IN Ratnasabapathi Servai vs. Sanyasi Ambalagaran kailasam, J. (as he then was) also took the same view. This was a case arising against an order of the Settlement Officer under Section 15 (1) of the act. Wo respectfully agree that the above is the correct legal position touching the subject in question.

( 21 ) IN view of the above position of law, the question that emerges for consideration is whether the reliefs the plaintiff sought for could be granted: Sri Adinarayana Raju, in support of his contention that civil Court has jurisdiction fairly did not rely on the Full Bench decision in Muthayya s case3 but sought strong support from. K, Ranga Reddy vs. M. Venkatrami reddi. In this regard it is of necessity to bear in mind that the Act is a social legislation. The ryots in estates were in a precarious insecure position not only of their tenure but also wore reeling under the ruins of economy. The Cogress Party in its resolution espoused their cause and the Legislative intervention was prime need of the time. When it came into power, brought on statute the Act. The Legislature interposed and determined the pre-existing rights and new rights were declared to be worked out. The Court can take judicial notice of these historical facts. Two years later the Constitution was heralded assuring to every citizen justice, social, economic and political. It enjoins on the State to strive, to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice. . . . . . . economic. . . shall inform of all the institution a of a national life. Though the Act is a pre-constitutional one, the animations of the national programme was to bring about the revolutionary changes in the land tenures; to remove intermediaries and conferment of ryotwari rights on the ryots in the state. Now it received protective umbrella from Schedule IX of the constitution high - lighting the primacy of the social imperative. Tho implementati on thereof has been charged to the Settlement Officer and the Tribunals constituted thereunder. In this regard it is apposite to recall what William a. Robson in his work,, "justice and Administrative Law", Third eidtion has said. At page 547 while quoting the law by Denning, L. J. the author says :"the social revolution of our time has rtsulted in the creation of a great number of new duties of a kind unknown beforepositive duties of the individual towards the State and of tho state towards the individual. . . . . . Why, he asks, has Parliament made this radical departure in the allocation of judicial functions? the reason is. . . . . . we must face it squarely that the ordinary courts are not suited to the task. . . . . . or, if you will, the disputes arc not suitable for decision by Courts. . . . . . "at page 5511 he also states :". . . IT has been the desire to provide a system of adjudication which should be at once cheap and rapid. "while pointing the relative merits and demerits of an adjudicatory process in a regularly constituted court and of the Tribunal under the Act, the author states :"the ordinary courts need not be jealous of the new tribunals, declares Lord Denning. It should be recognised that they are separate set of rights and duties. . . . . . So in our day, there are the new tribunals dealing with the rights and duties as between the man and tho State. Tho great need it to work out the principles and procedure which should govern these tribunals,"at page 558, he advocates that:"this is a matter of importance, when litigation is fantastically expensive. "while reminding of the tardeout litigation in a regularly constituted courts as fantastically expensive, he points out at page 559 :"rapidity is another advantage possessed by most administrative tribunals as compared with the judicial courts. The freedom which enables a Government department or tribunal to dispense with an oral hearing, to abandon the intricate procedure which attends pleading and trial in an action at law, to waive the elaborate rules as to the proof of facts and admissibility and relevance of evidence, which are rightly insisted upon in a court of law, results normally in an immense saving of time in the determination of controversies. "at pages 571 and 572, he says:"one further advantage possessed by administrative tribunals lies in the greater flexibility with which they are able to discharge their functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The greater flexibility of adminstrative tribunals as compared with courts of law is indeed an inherent characterstic of administrative law during the period of its growth. For administrative law is law in the making ; and law in the making is naturally less rigid than the law which is already made and administered in the formal Courts. "

( 22 ) THE Act invested jurisdiction in the forums in respect of matters covered thereunder, declared new rights; and relegated the parties to approach the forums created thereunder to seek the rights conferred. It is the fundamental principle of the constitutional law that everything necessary or incidental to the exercise of power is included in the conferment of the power. The Court, when broaches to find whether the conferment of such jurisdiction on the Tribunals constituted under the Act is exclusive or limited, as held by Lord Diplock in REG vs. National Insurance Commissioner, exparate Hudson has to adopt "purposive approach towards the welfare legislation. " He observes thus :"the Act was one of several which together wrought that a major change in social policy and introduced the welfare state. To find out the meaning of particular provisions in social legislation of this character calls, in the first instance, for a purposive approach to the Act as a whole to ascertain the social ends it was intended to achieve and the practical means by which it was expected to achieve them. Meticulous linguistic analysis of words and phrases used in different contexts in particular sections of the Act should be subordinate to this purposive approach". Therefore, the dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the Court is to reflect contemporary needs and the prevailing values consistent with the constitutional and legislative declarations of the policy. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Chandrachud C. J. in Deena vs. Union of India that "law is a dynamic science the social utility of which consists in its ability to keep abreast of emerging trends in social and scientific advance and its willingness to re-adjust its postulates in order to accommodate those trends. Law is not static. The purpose of law is to serve the needs of life. " in this regard, the emphatic warning spelled out from their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in D. R Venkatachalam vs. Dy. Transport Commissioner is apposite to mention thus :" Public law in India, responding to the public needs and the State s functional role mandated by the Constitution, has evolved new approaches to old problems and given up dogmas which once prevailed during laissez-faire days but now have become obsolete because of the welfare economy which has been nurtured. This radical change in jaral perspective has its impact on canons of statutory construction. "the law would respond to the clarion calls of social imperatives evole in that process functional approach as means to subserve "social premises" set out in Part IV of the Constitution and the Act to render economic justice to ryots. The creative role of the judiciary is in the forefront, as it the need for a new functional approach to law based on sound theorising as to its purpose in our present age.

( 23 ) KEEPING these perspectives in view, the question is, whether the Settlement Officer has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the nature and history of the land, the tenure and the grant of ryotwari patta. The Lcgislature has empowered the Settlement Officer either suo motu or on an application, to enquire into and adjudicate upon the nature and history of the land included or ought to have been included in the holding of a ryot and the entitlement and issue a ryotwari patta. The hierarchy of Tribunals, viz. , director of Settlements and the Board of Revenue have been conferred with revisional powers. One of the tests repeatedly laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and this Court is whether the forums created under the statute could give adequate relief to the parties. It is common knowledge that the rights and claims are fought before the Settlement Officers, director of Settlements or the Board of Revenue only through their lawyers. Bereft of trappings of the regular court they address full dressed arguments on questions of fact and law and the orders are reasoned one. Thus the tribunals adhere to and meet out the fundamental principles of justice viz. , fair play in action. That appears to be the intention of the Legislature. Therefore, the mere fact that the Tribunals constituted under the Act are not functioning like civil Courts, is no ground to say that the orders of the settlement Officer are not intended to bs given finality under the Act. It is therefore the function of the Court to unravell the trick of the pleadings and the camouflage of the relief sought for under the gar of a plaint in a properly constituted Court and to find out the root of the matter as to whether the relief sought for could adequately be determined and granted by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. On enquiry from a resume of the relevant provisions of the statute, the Court finds that the relief sought for could be granted by the Tribunal, it is not proper for the plaintiffs to circumvent the same nor the court justified to embark on an enquiry into the questions by itself, denuding the exclus ve jurisdiction of the Tribunals created by the statute viz, the Settlement Officer under the Act and to record findings thereof and to grant relief. In other words, it is but a naked usurpation of the power and jurisdiction which the Legislature had divested the civil Court and vested in new forums created under the Act. Assertion thereof and confrontation, in the language of Chinnappa Reddi, J- in Chayanna s case is "to throw into disara" the working of the Act. Yet another principle deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is that the civil Court has jurisdicti on to consider whether the orders of the special tribunals are in conformity with the essential judicial principles. The Act was brought on statute in 1948 and we are at the end of 1983. In the interregnum ryotwari pattas creating new rights in pursuance of the statutes to countless ryots were made and became indefeasible. The extension of the above principle gives impetus to let loose flood gates of litigeous disputations to destabilise the settled vested rights. Cognizant of this practical reality, we are refrained to extend the principle, though salutory, to the claims under the Act.

( 24 ) FROM the above discussion, the conclusions that could safely be reached are : (1) "pre-existing rights were ceased and determined by legislative action. (2) The Settlement Officer is the statutory authority created under the Act, a new forum to adjudicate and declare new rights and conferment of ryotwari patta to a ryot or landholder : (3) He has the power and jurisdiction either on application or suo motu to enquire into the nature and history of the lands including the nature of inams under Section 9 and to decide whether the same is included or ought to have been included in the holding of a ryot ; (4) The ryot is entitled to the grant of a ryotwari patta ; (5) The hierarchy of the Tribunals, viz , Director of Settlements and Board of Revenue ore given the revisional powers to revise the orders of the Settlement Officer ; (6) The matters arising under the Act including all incidental or consequential could be decided exclusively by these tribunals. Thereby, the Act intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer and the Tribunals constituted under the Act, including the one under Section 11. "thus, the inevitable conclusion that could be drawn from the above perspective, by necessary inference, is that though there is no express provision under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court under Section 9 of CPC is ousted to agitate the matters covered under the Act, including the grant of ryotwari patta under Sec. 11 of the Act. It is conclusive and not liable to question in a civil suit. In this view, with great respect to the learned single judge, we are unable to share the view of the law laid in K. Rangareddy vs. M Venkatarami Reddi.

( 25 ) APPLYING the above law to the facts in this case, it is no doubt true that the repondent claimed the relief of declaration, possession and mense profits. Since the lands being situated in Madugula estate which was notified and taken over by the Government, the pre-existing rights ceased and new rights have to be granted under the Act. The ryot in possession is protected under proviso to Sec. 3 (d) so long as the patta proceedings are not corapleated. The relief of possession is only incidental to the grant of rilief of declaration of title. It is not the main nor independent relief. If it is found on enquiry under Section 11 that the appellant is entitled to a ryotwari patta, then his possession cannot be held to be illegal. Therefore the relief of possession and mesne profits are solely consequential to the first relief of declaration that it is an inam land and the deity had title to it as sought for. Since it is htld that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted, the civil Court, as a necessay corollary, cannot grant any of the reliefs. As a result, the suit is not maintainable. No other points indeed arise nor argued across the bar. In this view, it is not necessary to go into and decide the binding nature of Exs. B. 49 and B-50 on the respondents and Ex. A-18 on the appellant. Accordingly, we hold that the suit is not maintainable and direct the trial court to return the plaint.

( 26 ) THE appeal is accordingly allowed and the decree of the trial court, confirmed by the appellate court, is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs throughout.