K. RAMASWAMY, J.

( 1 ) THE appeal and the Cross-objections reflect the dissatisfaction by the Requisitioning Authority as well as the claimants in determining the compensation in respect of the lands situated in Block No. 4 of Waltair Ward in Visakhapatnam Municipality. , By notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894 ). (for short, "the Act",) dated June 23, 1966, an extent of Ac. 5. 37897 sq. "feet in T S No 44 was acquired for planned development of Visakhapatnam municipality. By award dated November 23, 1968, the appellant determined compensation at Rs. 2. 22ps. per sq. yard. He deducted 1/3rd therefrom towards developmental expenses. Rs. 1. 48 Ps. per sq. yard was ultimately awarded, though the claimants laid claim at Rs. 16/- per sq. yard. Dissatisfied there with, the claimants sought for a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Civil Court. The respondents adduced oral and documentary evidence. Exs. A-1 to A-6 are the sale-deeds. P. Ws. 1 to 3 were examined. The Land acquisition Officer was examined himself as R. W. 1 but adduced no documentary evidence. The lower court rejected the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondents. He relied on item No. 6 of the sales statistics collected by R. W. 1 in the Award ex. B-1. It reflects the highest price at Rs 6. 81 Ps. per sq. yard and the lower court determined compensation accordingly at that rate and deducted 1/3rd therefrom and finally awarded compensation at Rs. 4. 54 ps. per sq. yard with usual solatium and interest. Thus, the appeal and the cross-objections".

( 2 ) SRI G. V. L. Narasimha Rao, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower Court having rejected the entire evidence adduced by claimants, committed error of law in placing reliance on item No. 6 of the sales statistics. It is not evidence. Therefore, it is inadmissible. It cannot be looked into. In support thereof, he relied on Collector, Raigarh v. Harisingh thakur (1) AIR 1979 SC 472 In the absence of acceptable evidence the price fixed in the award is to be accepted. He also contended, relying on S. M. Hadi Jaffery v. Special Deputy Collector, l A (2) 1975-11 An. W R 28 that the lower Court should have deducted 50 per cent of the market value towards developmental expenses. The deduction of 1/3rd by the lower Courtis illegal.

( 3 ) SARVASRI N V Ranganadnan, mangu Venkatarao and C Poornaiah, learned counsel for the respondents respectively, resisted, contending inter alia, that Exs. A-1 to A-4 and A-6 were admittedly without any objection thereby the need to examine either the vendors or vendees thereunder has been dispensed with. Having admitted the same, they cannot be rejected unless it is found that they are not genuine documents. That is not the case of the appellant. In support thereof, Sri ranganadhan relied on Srinivasulu v. L A Officer (3) AIR 1963 A P 279 If it is held that the view of the decisions in Harisingh Thakur s case (1) (supra) and Srinivasulu s case (3) (supra) is not good law, the appeal may be remanded for fresh evidence, to examine either the vendor or vendee of the sales concerned. Sri Poornaiah, learned counsel further contended that th sale-deeds having been marked, they must be deemed to have been proved and objection cannot be taken subsequently. He has relied on Haji Mohd. v. State of West Bengal (4) AIR 1959 s C 488 and also a passage in Circar s evidence. The evidence of PW 3 and rw 1 shows that the plans Exs. A-7 and b-8 are admitted to be correct. They reflect the existence of the lands covered by Exs. A-1 to A-4 and A-6 and the finding of the Court below that the respective distances are not established, is illegal. Sri Mangu Venkatarao, learned counsel contended that Ex. A-5 is the sale-deed executed by P W 2, the claimant himself. It was of the year 1960; the lower Court though accepted it to be genuine, committed error in not relying upon that document. However, the lower Court also found that the land possessed of potential value as house sites. Relying upon Ex. A-5, the price fetched in the year 1960 is at Rs. 5/ -. Six years have elapsed from the date of sale till date of notification; there was upward rise in the prices; therefore the award of compensation by the lower Court is clearly illegal and the claim at Rs. 16/- per sq. yard is quite reasonable.

( 4 ) IN view of these facts, it is apparent that neither the claimants no r the requisitioning authority are satisfied with the determination of compensation to the lands under acquisition. The question is, what is the real market value? the "acid, test" now got crystalised from catena of decisions starting from the locus classicus popularly known as VIJi s casegajapathiraju v. Revenue Divisional officer (5) AIR 1939 PC. 98 that compensation for compulsory acquisition governed by Section 23 (1) of the Act is the market value of the land at the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act "what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from willing purchaser". The function of the Court in awarding compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act and the method of valuation may be: (1) opinion of experts; (2) the price paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transaction of purchase of the land acquired or the lands; adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similer advantages; and (3) a number of years purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired (Vide S L A. Officer v. T A. Setty (6) A I R 1959 S C. 429 at 432. These methods, however, do not preclude the Court from taking any other special circumstances into consideration including potential value, the requirement being always to arrive as near as possible at an estimate of the market value. In arriving at a reasonable correct market value, it may be necessary to take even "two or all of those methods into account inasmuch as the exact valuation is not always possible as no two lands may be the same cither in respect of the situation or the extent or the potentiality not is it possible in all cases to have reliable material from which -that valuation can be accurately determined. " (Emphasis supplied ). (Vide Tribeni Devi v. Collector, Ranchi (7) A I R 1972 S C. 1417 at 1420.

( 5 ) THE question, therefore, is what is the market value the lands under acquisition would fetch? In a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the burden of proving that the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector is inadequate lies upon the claimant, and he must show affirmatively that the collector had proceeded upon a wrong basis. The nature and the burden of establishing that he was wrong, depending on the nature of the enquiry held by him. When the proceedings before the Collector discloses that the award was not reasonably supported by the material before him, or when the basis was the application of a multiple, which would not be justified on any rational ground, the burden can be discharged by a slight evidence. It is equally weell settled that where the claimant leads no evidence to show that the conclusions reached in the award were inadequate, or, that it offered unsatisfactory compensation, the award has to be confirmed. (Vide Collector, raigarh v. Harisingh Thakur (1) (supra ). It is thereby laid that the claimant stands in the position of the plaintiff and the burden lies on him to establish as to what is reasonable market value by adduction of acceptable evidence and the referring officer has to rebut the same by adducing evidence

( 6 ) UPON compulsory acquisition of the property, the owner is entitled to the value of the property in its actual conditions at the time of appropriation with all its advantages and with all its possibilities excluding any advantage, due to the carrying out of the claim for the purpose for which the property is acquired. Therefore it is incumbent upon the claimant to adduce satisfactory evidence (1) to demolish that the compensation awarded by the collector is inadequate and (2) that the lands would fetch a compensation at the price prevailing as on the date of the notification. (Vide Hari Singh Thakur s case (1) (supra ). The basis to determine compensation of the market value of the land acquired is the value of the land to the owner. Only such transactions which can fairly be said to afford a fair criterion of the value of the property as at the date of notification would be relevant. An actual transaction with respect to the specific land of recent date is a guide book that Courts may not neglect when called upon to fix the price compensation. The best evidence of the value of the property is the sale to which the claimant is a party. If the sale is of the recent date, then all that need normally be proved is that the sale was between a willing purchaser and a willing seller, that there has not been any appreciable rise or fall since that date nothing has been done on the land during the short interval to raise its value Price paid to the owner recently represents an expression of the market value, as bona fida evidence of value, subject to such matters as (a) the relationship of the parties; (b) the market conditions and the terms of the sale; and (c) the date of sale. It may be not end the enquiry, but goes a long way to solve the problem. (Vkie doller Company v. Collector, Madras (7) a I R 1375 E C 1670. When the lands are situated in a developing locality, the court would fake note of the steady increase in price (Vide A I T and T Co. v. Collector of Darrang (8) A I R 1971 S C 1254 at 1254. The underlying principles to fix the market value with reference to comparable sales is to reduce the element of speculation. In a comparable sale, the features are; (1) It must be within a reasonable time of the date of notification under Section 4 (1); (ii) it should be a bona fide transaction; (iii) it should be a sale of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired; and (iv) it should possess similar advantages. Before such instances of sales can be considered there must be material evidence either by production of the sale-deeds or by examining the parties to the deeds or persons having knowledge of the sales, to prove that the transactions are genuine (Vide Harisingh Thakur s case (1) (supra),

( 7 ) IT is notorious that the Land acquisition Officers ot persons responsible to adduce evidence in variably seldom adduce any relevant evidence though available. Despite this Court pointing out this serious lapse time and again, it is unfortunate that this depierable and inexorable apathy to adduce relevant evidence is still found persisting impinging upon public exchequer resulting in avoidable undue burden on the tax payer. It is common experience that even appeals are needlessly filed in this Court normally after an inordinate delay with an explanation of the reasons of administrative routine with no ghost of success but wasting heavy court-fee etc. This is what Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench ssid in state of andhra Pradesh Through the spl. Dy. Collector. . Land Acquisition manjira Water scheme, Patancheru vs. Malla Prasad and Others (9) A S No 454 /69 and batch, dated 17-12-1970 thus :"this is yet another batch of appeals, needlessly filed by the State government. In the lower Court the government made no effort to seriously contest the case of the claimants. No witness was examined arid no document was filed on behalf ot the Government while the claimants examined thirt n witness an fild none document. The case of the claime\ants was unrebutted. And yet as mary as 62 appeals have been filed. in the High Court. It is difficult to fathom the attitude of the concerned authorities in filing appeals after doing nothing to contest the claims in the lower Court. We may mention that in the last three or four months, we had occasion to deal with several hundreds of such appeals involving a waste of several lakhs of rupees of public funds. "the agony of the judicial conscience of this Court, though was brought to the notices of me anthorities concerned to take remedial steps, it is not in sight to evoke any response from the responsible quarters for redressal. The case on hand demonstrates the sad reflection.

( 8 ) THE object of the enquiry is to bring on record the price fetched, or capable of fetching the relative situations of the lands under acquisition and the subject of the sale transaction, their fertility,-suitability, nature of the use to which they are put to income derived or other special distinctive features possessed of, by the respective lands either single or some or all relevant to the facts in issue. In this process the Courts are not mere- umpires but to take intelligent participation and to see whether the counsel on either side are directing towards this goal or the Court itself to intervene in this regard. It is precisely for this reason it is pointed out by their lordships of the Supreme Court in chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector, Raigarh (10) AIR 1969 S C 255 in paragraph No. 6 thus :"it is true that the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also fue that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal; but that does not* mean that the court is bound to accept their evidence. The judges are not computers. In assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are bound to call into aid their experience of life. As Judge of fact it was open to the appellate Judges to test the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities. "therefore, it is the duty of the Court to evaluate the evidence on its proper consideration thero of in correct perspective to arrive at fair market value on an objective assessment of the facts and circumstances available in each case. In this case, the parties laid evidence before the Court. It consists of oral evidence of P Ws 1 to 3 the documentary evidence, Exs. A-1 to A-6. The Land acquisition Officer did not place any documentary evidence except the Award ex. B-1 and his oral evidence as R. W. 1. The lower Court has rejected Exs. A-1 to A-4 and A-6 sale-deeds on the ground that neither the vendor nor the vendee has been examined. There is no evidence of the comparable features in those sale-deeds with the lands under acquisition. Ex. A-5 was not expressly relied, on account of the lapse of time, but placed reliance on the statistical data and potential value as building house sites. In Collector, Raigarh vs. Dr. Harisingh thakur (1) (supra) it was held thus :"moreover the sale statement by itself without examining either the vendors or the vendees or the persons attesting the sale-deeds, is not admissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon. "in view of this law the basis on which the market value was determined is knocked down to the bottom. The contention of the claimants as adumbrated earlier is that Exs. A-1 to A-4 and a-6 having been marked as evidence the recitals therein regarding payment of consideration must be proved to have been admitted. The question, therefore, is whether the recitals therein is evidence and whether it is admissible and could be relied upon without examining either the vendor or the vendee or the person having knowledge regarding the sale. Under Sec. 3 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, evidence means and includes all statements which the Court permits or requires in be made before it by witnesses, in region to matters of fact under enquiry. The fact in issue is what it the price that fetched under the sale transactions in Exs. A-1 to A-4. The object of determining the compensation with reference to comparable sales of the land adjacent to the land acquired is to find the fertility, the quality, the probable price which the land under acquisition is likely to fetch and the actual price paid by the vendees to the vendors under those transactions as a prudent vendee and is not actuated with any other special features. It is to ascertain these facts the sale deeds are sought to be produced. The question is whether the sale deeds by themselves are evidence? under Sec. 9 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact which supported an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact so far as they are necessary for that purpose. Under sect/on 11 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 facts not otherwise relevant are relevant- (2) if by themsleves or in connection with other facts they make the existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable. Under Section 17 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, an admission is a statement oral or documentary which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue are admissions. As stated earlier, the fact in issue is the market value of the property and the relative features referred to earlier The best way to determine the market value is to find the price paid for a similar land in the vicinity or adjacent to the land in the course of normal sales (genuine transaction between a willing vendor and a willing vendee and the absence of special circumstances or accommodating sales) at or about the same time. On admitting the documents what transpires is that there is a proof of valid transfer of title but on many an occasion it does not automatically go that the recital regarding price therein may reflect the actual price under the transaction. It is notorious that for avoiding payment of stamp duty and registration charges, prices actually paid would be reduced in the sale transactions and a lesser value would be shown. Therefore, proof of execution of the sale-deed would be not a relevant fact for the purpose of enquiry but what is relevant is what is the actual price paid because the object is to find what the willing vendee had paid to the willing vendor as a prudent purchaser in a bona fide transaction in the normal course. The recital of consideration in the sale transaction is nothing more than a previous statement by the person subscribing to it. If that person gives evidence in the court then the recital can be used to corroborate or to contradict him or for purpose of refreshing his memory. But the recital in the document is not substantive evidence unless it amounts to an admission or falls within section 32 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872. Substantive evidence as to price paid would be the testimony of the persons who have actual personal knowledge of the matter viz. , the buyer and the seller or the persons present at the time of settlement of the bargain or payment. The recitals in the sale-deed can be the evidence of the matter only if they are relevant as admissions. The non-objection for the reception of the document evidenced cannot be regarded as tantamounting to an admission by the respondent that the prices mentioned in the document were the prices really paid though of course it was open to them to have admitted that and dispensed with proof thereof. At the most it can be said that the appellant did not dispute that the documents were in fact executed by the persons whom they purported to have been executed and nothing more. We hasten to add that we are not to be understood that we intend to lay down that parties are to adduce legal evidence in tricto sensu but we empasise the need to place facts relevant to the issue and be reliable and acceptable. We are aware that even hear-say evidence emanating from reliable source would lend valuable assistance to arrive at the truth. The quality of evidence always depends on facts of each case.

( 9 ) THIS question directly arose in state v. Mariamma (11) AIR 1969 Kerala 265. a Bench consisting of Raman Nayar J and V R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as he then was) and it was held that unless the persons connected with the execution of the document either the vendor or the vendee are examined they are not relevant facts and it is not proof of admission of the price paid there under When the learned advocate General tended to draw a presumption under Section 114 of the evidence ACT, 1872, the Bench held thus:"the prices mentioned in the sale deeds were the prices actually paid having regard to the common course of human conduct and business in relation to the sale and purchase of property. We doubt whether any such presumption can legitimately be drawn, for, it is notorious that as alleged by the plaintiffs, in order to save on stamp duty and registration charges, if for nothing else, parties often show a lower price in sale deeds than the price actually paid. Even if a presumption does not arise, it would be a very weak presumption sufficiently rebutted by a bare denial by the opposite side and we should think that, except in cases where parties accept that the prices mentioned in the sale deeds are the true prices, the sale deeds by themselves are of little value for proving the relevant fact, namely, the price paid. The proper course, we have no doubt, in the absence of such agreement (which in civil cases ought to be sought and ought to be readily forthcoming in respect of facts that are not really disputed but, unfortunately, rarely is with the result that a lot of time, trouble and money is wasted over proving facts which the opposite does not really dispute) is to examine either the buyer or the seller or some other person associated with the transaction as a witness, using the sale deed itself for corroborating the witness or refreshing his memory. (Unless the statement in the deed amounts to an admission or Section 32 of the Evidence act is attracted in which case, of course, the statement would be substantive evidence. "a similar question was also considered in m S Madansinghji v. State (12 ). AIR 1s69 Gujrat, 270. Shelat, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench held thus:"for proving the contents of the documents, it would be essential that a person who has knowledge of the contents thare of must appear before the Court to give evidence in that regard. The proof of any such contents of the deed or about the transaction relating to that property can best be offered by examining the parties to that deed or any person who knew about the came or brought about the transaction. The importance of such evidence is all-the more in cases of this cnaraster were not only one is required to prove any such transection having taken place in regard to land or property at a particular time and at a particular price, but that before it can serve as a good piece of evidence for determination of the market value of the lend under acquisition it must be further shown that transaction was between a prudent purchaser and a willing vendor and that the price given by the purchaser was the normal market price prevailing then. "same is the view taker, in P R Modi v. Collects Durg (13) AIR 1975 M P 57. and in Collector, Raigarh v. Chaturbhuj (14) AIR 1964 M P 196. We have already seen that the latest view of the Supreme court in Dr. Hari Singh s case (1) (supra ). Their Lordships emphasised that for the proof of payment of the price, the examination of either the vendor or the vendee or the person attesting the caledeed is mandatory. Bynon-examination, that statement becomes inadmissible in evidence. The need was further empliasised by AP Sen J. in the same judgment. Krishna lyer, J. while agreeing with Raman Nayar, J (as he then was) in state vs Mariamma (11) (supra), explained thus:"merc production of documents evidencing transactions of sale will not make the recitals regarding purchases admissible nor will the comparative features be manifest from the deeds themselves. It is a moot question as to whether a witness with a personal knowledge of the transaction would be cited in respect of every deed. Normally, that has to be done and specific evidence led regarding the price paid in which case the recitals in the deed may be good corroborative evidence. "

( 10 ) THOUGH Sri Poornaiah, learned counsel contended that objection regarding the admissibility cannot be raised at a later stage and relied on a decision in Haji Mohd. v. State of West bengal (4) (supra) the ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. Therein the admissibilitv was questioned for the first time in the Supreme Court In view of the above position this decision is of littie assistance to the respondents

( 11 ) NO doubt, a Division section of this Court in Achyutam vs. Annapurnamma (15) AIR 1963 A P 277 has held that:"nothing was elicited in the cross- examination to show that the sales were bogus sales or that the consideration referred to therein was not paid. Sri venkataramana, the learned counsel for the State contended that no reliance is sought to be placed upon Exs. B-3 to B-5 on the ground that neither the vendor nor the vendee has been examined. We are not inclined to accept this contention. The Land Acquisition Officer proceeded on the footing that all the lands acquired are dry lands and that there is no distinction in the quality between those lands and the other lands covered by the sale deeds. "no doubt the learned counsel for the claimants may be justified in placing reliance thereon but in view of the illumination shed from march of law and the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and the obvious need to examine the persons concerned, we feel inclined to hold that the Bench did not intend to conclusively hold that in no case the venders or the vendees need be examined and the recitals are conclusive. No express finding in that regard was recorded Of course in a given case where it was conceded or admitted that the price paid under those transanctions under the sale deeds marked or the actual price paid, to that extent it can be taken as an admission under Sec. 17 of the evidence ACT, 1872 and the need to examine either the vendor or the vendee would be redundant and the document cannot be rejected in such circumstances. But when there is no such admission mere marking the document does not amount to prove that the consideration recited under that document is the actual consideration paid thereunder. In this case while cross-examining p W 3 the learned Government pleader expressly put a question whether he was examining the vendor or the venders under Exs, A-1 to A-4 and A-6. He stated that he is not examining them. In this view, it must be held that the lower Court has correctly rejected Exs. A-1 to A- 5 and A-6. In view of the stand taken by the claimant, we are not inclined to accede to the contention of sri Ranganadham to remand the case for adduction of further evidence.

( 12 ) THE next question is whether ex. A 5 could be relied upon. It is already seen that the best evidence of the value of property is the sale of the very property to which the claimant is a party and price paid to the owner recently represents an expression of market value, as bonafide evidence of value, subject to the qualifications referred to earlier. In Dollar company v. Collector, Madras (7a) (Supra) the claimant having mentioned a particular price, songht to rely on comparable sales of neighbouring lands that fetched higher value. While rejecting the attempt, accepted his sale and fixed the market value based thereon. Admittedly pw 2 is the vendor of the sale deed under Ex A-5 dated August 10. 1960. It was sold for Rs. 750/ -. The extent sold thereunder is 153 sq. yards It worked out at the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq. yard. The notification is of the year 1966. Therefore the sale took place nearly six years preceding the notification thereby it can safely be concluded that it is a bonafide transaction between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser. The lower court though gave this finding, quite rightly, appears to be not inclined to place implict reliance obviously on account of lapse of time and instead, placed reliance on item six of the sales statistics which we hold is impermissible. The Supreme court has already held in Tribeni Devi v. Collector, Ranch! (7) (supra) that the court can take two or all those methods into account to evaluate the price. The lower court relied upon the potential value. The lower Court held that the lands are situated just near the village of maddilapalem by the side of the grand trunk road and that there are some houses in between the grand-trunk road and the lands under acquisition and that the village Peethalavanipalem exists to the south of the land under acquisition. Pithapuram lay out in T No. 46 is to the south of Peethalavanipalem village. The lands are to the v. of the Grand Trunk road, Maddilapa is a developing locality which is situated at 100 yards to the lands under acquisation. The Land acquisition Officer admitted that the lands can be treated to be a developed locality. On these facts the lower Court held that the lands are situated in an area where there are building activities. We too considered the entire evidence and we hold that the lower Court has rightly recorded the above finding. The question then is, whether Ex. B-5 can be relised upon and potential value as building house site could also he taken into account. In Gajapathiraju v. Rev Divi Officer (5) (supra) Lord Romer has he d that the value of the potentiality must be ascertained by the arbitrator on such materials as are available to him and without indulging the feats of the imagination. In Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of U P (16) AIR 1-867 SC 465. their Lordships of the Suprerne Court speaking through Shelat, J. extracted the doctrine of potential value stated in N B jeejabhoy v. District Collector: Thana (17) C A Nos. 313 to 315/63 d/30-8-65 (SC) thus :"a Vendor willing to sell his land at the market value will take into consideration a particular potentiality or special adaptability of the land in fixing the price. It is not the fancy or the obsession of the vendor that enters the market value but the objectivity factor, namely, whether the said potentiality can be turned to account within a reasonably near future. . . . . . . . . The question therefore turns upon the facts of each case. In the context of building potentiality many questions will have to be asked and answered : whether there is pressure on the land for building activity, whether the acquired land is suitable for building purposes, whether the extension of the said activity is towards the land acquired, what is the pace of the progress and how far the said activity has extended and within what time, whether buildings have been put up on lands purchased for building purposes, what is the distance between the built-in-land and the land acquired and similar other questions will have to be answered. It is the overall picture drawn on the said relevant circumstances the affords the solution". This view was reiterated in the recent decisions in Collector. Raigarh v. Harising thakur (1 ). (supra) In view of this settled position and the findings recorded we hold that the lands are possessed of potential value as building house sites, it is already held that Ex. A-5 is a genuine transaction though the extent sold thereunder is very negligible one viz. , 153 sq. yards in comparison with che total extent of the land under acquisition is Acs. 5. 37897 sq. feet, therefore the gradual rise in the area also may be considered. It is true that in determining the reasonable market value wide discretion is left to the Court. But as held by the Supreme Court in Dollar company v. Collector, Madras (7a) (supra) approving a statement of law in american Jurisprudence, 2nd edition paragraph 66, page 53 of Vol. 27, thus:"it is the duty of the State or federal government, in the conduct of the inquest by which compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it. "this principle was further re-enforced by a P Sen, J in Dr. Harisingh s (1) (supra) thus:"while it is not suggested that unfairly low value should be offered, on the other hand the temptation to over-generosity must be qually resisted. Such generosity at the public expense reacts against the development and against the prosperity of the country and imposes an unnecessary burden on the tax-payer. "

( 13 ) IN this view, though the court has been invested with wide discretion in fixing the market value, it is on the premise that the discretion would be wisely and carefully exercised with circumspection, taking into consideration the totality of the facts of the case and the evidence on record would determine the market value of the land to be just and fair both to the claimant as well as to avoid undue burden on the public exchequer. In this view the question is what is the reasonable market value which the lands under acquisition are capable to fetch on the date of the notification. Ex A-5 itself reflects the prevailing value as in 1960 at Rs. 5/- but when a large tract of land is to be sold it would be unlikely to fetch the same price even in the year 1960. It is already held that the land is situated in a developing area having building potentials and therefore, there will be a gradual rise in the prices. In Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (18) AIR 1984 SC 1767. it was held that the constitutional courts are not only a court of law but a court of equity as well. The Court has to take into consideration various shades and aspects of the case and as a court of equity, equitable consideration also would weigh in regard to the acquisition case. Keeping the legal position and the facts and circumstances, we have no hesitation to conclude that the lands would fetch Rs. 7/- per sq. yard. In kausalya Devi v. Land Acquisition Officer aurangabad (19) AIR 1984 SC 892. Ranganath Misra, J. speaking for the court held that"when large tracts are acquired, the transactions in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline therefore, the valuation in transactions in regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the compensation for larger tracts of property for determining the market value of a large property on the basis of sale transaction for smaller property a deduction should be given. "the Land Acquisition Officer as well as the lower Court have noted that the lands require development to lay the roads, levelling of the same and providing other amenities and in that regard 1/3rd was deducted. In the same decision i. e. , kausalya devi v. Land Acquisition Officer (19) (supra) it was held that a deduction of 1/3rd would be reasonable. Though a division Bench of this Court deducted 50% towards developmental expenses as relied on by the counsel for the appellant on the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that deduction of 1/3rd would be reasonable and the court below has rightly deducted 1/3rd. We are informed that in all the acquisition cases relating to Vizag Municipality the reduction of 1/3rd is upheld. Accordingly giving deduction of Rs. 2/- we fix the compensation at Rs. 5/- per sq. yard and it would reflect the correct market value as on the date of notification and the claimants are entitled to the said payment. They are also entitled to the usual solatium at 15% and interest at 4% on the enhanced compensation and also interest on the solatium as held by this Court in b Ravinder v. Spl. Dy, Collector.

( 14 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objections are allowed in part, but the parties are directed to bear their own costs.