SUBBA RAO, CJ.

( 1 ) THESE are appeals against the judgment of our learned brother bhimasankaram, J,, in a batch of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the various appellants for the issue of writs of mandamus or other appropriate writs directing the responent to forbear from enforcing the orders directing the appellants to quit the State within a prescribed date.

( 2 ) THE material facts are similar in all the appeals. It would be sufficient therefore, as the learned Judge did, to state the facts in Writ Appeal No. 53 of 1957. The appellant was born on 5th October, 1912, in the Village of Thukhayi, Tehsil barshore, Taluk Pishin, Quetta District in Baluchistan, which was formerly a part of British India. In 1940, he left his native place and settled down at Kowur, which was then part of Madras State and is now part of Andhra Pradesh. He started business in that place and was eking out his livelihood. He married at Kowur one Amirunnisa, whose father was a permanent resident of that place and was employed in Government service, and his two children weie born and bred up there. He purchased a site and constructed a house worth about Rs. 10,000 and he has also been doing lorry transport business. He alleges that, after the division of india, under pressure from the local Police and without proper guidance and appreciation of his citizenship rights, he applied for a passport and received one bearing no. 070443 unde the seal of the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, New delhi, dated 7th March, 1953, valid upto 6th March, 1958. He also states that he was required by the local Police to make an application for visa to regularise his tay in India but the respondent refused to grant visa. By an older, dated 7th April, 1955, the respondent directed him to quit the State by 30th April, 1955. The affidavits filed by the other appellants in the connected appeals also contain silmilar allegations. They were also directed by the respondent by separate orders to quit the state. On the basis of the above facts, the aforesaid writs were filed and they were disposed of by a common order by Bhimasankaram, J. Before Bhimasankaram, J. , it was contended that the appellants were citizens of india within the meaning of Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution of India, that the mere obtaining of a passport from Pakistan, which was not a foreign State within the meaning of the Constitution, did not have the effect of depriving them of their citizenship and that they applied for the passpoit under the mistaken impression that persons born in the area now forming part of Pakistan were not citizens of India. Bhimasankaram, J. , found that the appellants were citizens of India and that they did not voluntarily acquire citizenship of Pakistan by the time of the commencement of the Constitution. But the learned Judge held that there was an automatic statutory cesser of citizenship by virtue of section 9 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which came into force on 30th December, 1955. On that basis, he dismissed the petitions but presumably because the said Act came into force only after the petitions were filed, he did not make any order as to the costs of the petitions. The petitioners have preferred the above appeals.

( 3 ) THE arguments of the learned advocates for the appellants could be better appreciated if the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India, the Citizenship act, 1955 and the rules made thereunder are lead at this stage. The said provisions, omitting the immaterial portions thereof, are as follows :"constitution of India. Article 5 -At the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the territory of India and (a) who was born in the territory of India or (b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India or (c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India. Article 6.-Notwithstanding anything in Article 5, a person who has migrated to the territory of India from the territory now included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of this Constitution if (a) he or either of his parents or any of his grand-parents was born in India as defined in the government of India Act, 1935 (as originally enacted) : and (b) (i) in the case where such person has so migrated before the nineteenth day of July, 1948, he has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India since the date of his migration. Article 7.-Notwithstanding anything in Articles 5 and 7, a person who has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India. Article 8.-Notwithstanding anything in Article 5, any person who or either of whose parents or any of whose grand-parents was born in India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 (as orginally enacted) and who is ordinarily residing in any country outside India as so defined shall be deemed to be a citizen of India if he has been registered as a citizen of India by the diplomatic or consular representative of India in the country where he is for the time being residing on an application made by him therefor to such diplomatic or consular representative, whether before or after the commencement of this Constitution, in the form and manner prescribed by the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of India. Article 9.-No person shall be a citizen of India by virtue of Article 5, or be deemed to be a citizen of India by virtue of Article 6 or Article 8 if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign State. Article 10.-Every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India under any of the foregoing provisions of this Part shall subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by Parliament continue to be such citizen. Article 11.-Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Part shall derogate from the power of parliament to make any provision With respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. Citizenship Act, 1955. Section 8.- (i) If any citizen of India of full age and capacity, who is also a citizen or national of another country, makes in the prescribed manner a declaration renouncing his Indian citizenship, the declaration shall be registered by the prescribed authority, and upon such registration that person shall cease to be a citizen of India. Section 9.- (1) Any citizen of India who by naturalisation, registration or otherwise voluntarily acquires, or has at any time between the 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of this Act voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India. (2) If any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship, of another country, it shall be determined by such authority, in such manner, and having regard to such rules of evidence, as may be prescribed in this behalf. Section 18.- (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. (a) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for (A) the authority to determine the question of acquisition of citizenship of another country, the procedure to be followed by such authority and rules of evidence relating to such cases. Rules made under the Citizenship Act, 1955. 30. (1) If any question arises as to whether, when or bow any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, the authority to determine such question shall, for the purposes of section 9 (2) be the Central Government. (2) The Central Government shall in determining any such question have due regard to the rules of evidence specified in Schedule III. SCHEDULE III. 1. Where it appears to the Central Government that a citizen of India has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any other country, it may require him to prove within such period as may be fixed by it in this behalf that he has not voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country; and the burden of proving that he has not so acquired such citizenship shall be on him. 2. For the purpose of determining any question relating to the acquisition by an Indian citizen of the citizenship of any other country, the Central Government may make such reference as it thinks fit in respect of that question or of any matter relating thereto, to its Embassy in that country or to the Government of that country and act on any report or information received in pursuance of such reference. 3. The fact that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the Government of any other country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country before that date. 4. In determining whether a citizen of India has or has not voluntarily acquired tht citizenship of any oher country, the Central Government may take the following circumstances into consideration namely :- (a) whether the person has migrated to that country with the intention of making it his permanent home ; (b) whether he has in fact taken up permanent residence in that country ; and (c) any other circumstances relevant to the purpose. "

( 4 ) THE right to be a citizen of any country is a basic one, for on that depends his political rights and privileges in his State and that right gives him protection in foreign States. Articles 5 to 11of the Constitution lay down some temporary criteria for the ascertainment and acquisition of citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution. Article 5 prescribes citizenship by birth, descent and acquisition. Article 6 regulates the right of citizenship of persons who have migrated from Pakistan to India before and after July, 1948. Article 7 deals with the rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan from India after the 1st day of March, 1947. Article 8 enables a person of Indian origin residing outside India to get himself registered as a citizen of India by diplomatic or consular heads of India in that country. Article 9 postulates that a person, who had voluntarily acquired citizenship of any foreign State, would not be a citizen of India, notwithstanding the provisions of articles 5 and 6. Article 10 envisages the continuance of the said citizenship subject to the provisions of any law made by the Parliament. Article 11 preseives the power of the Parliament to regulate the rights of citizenship by law. In 1955, in the exercise of the power-preserved to the Pailiament under Article 11, the Citizenship Act, 1955) was passed by Parliament and it received the assent of the President on 30th December, 1955. This Act places on a firm ground the acquisition and termination of sights of citizenship in India. It provides five modes of acquiring citizenship : (1) Citizenship by Birth (Section 3) ; (2) Citizenship by descent (Section 4) ; (3) Citizenship by registration (Section 5) ; (4) Citizenship by naturalisation (Section 6) ; and (5) Citizenship by incorporation of territory (Section 7) ; sections 8, 9 and 10 provide for renunciation of citizenship, termination of Citizenship and deprivation of Citizenship. A citizen may renounce his Indian citizenship by making a declaration in the prescribed manner. He can be deprived of citizenship acquired by him under clause (c) of Article 5 of the Constitution or clause (b) of Article 6 or clause (a) of section 5 (1) of the Act by an order of the Central government for any one of the reasons mentioned in sub-section (2) in the manner prescribed by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 10. Section 9, with whith we are now concerned, says that any citizen of India who by naturalisation, registration or otherwise voluntarily acquires or has at any time between the 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of this Act voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India and under sub-section (2) if any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority in such manner, and having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in this behalf. Under section 18 of the Act, the Central Government has power to make rules providing for the authority to determine the question of acquisition of citizenship of another country, the procedure to be followed and the rules of evidence relating to such cases. It is, therefore, clear from the scheme of the aforesaid provisions that section 9 provides for the termination of citizenship if a citizen of India voluntarily acquires the citizenship of any other country and when the question arises whether he has voluntarily acquired it, it can be determined by such authority that may be prescribed by the Central Government in accordance with the procedure and the rules of evidence prescribed for such determination.

( 5 ) THE first argument of the learned advocates for the appellants is that this provision puts an arbitrary and unregulated power in the hands of the Central Government and, therefore, is violative of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the constitution of India, which reads : "the States shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India ".

( 6 ) IT is said that the Central Government may frame a rule to enable it or the authority appointed by it to arbitrarily deprive the citizenship rights of a person or class of persons. Such a power to provide a machinery for depriving a person of his cherished right of citizenship, the argument proceeds, has all the potentialities of arbitrariness and therefore, must be struck down. We cannot accept this argument. The Parliament has not entrusted any such unregulated and naked power to the central Government. The Act itself postulates the circumstance under which a person loses his citizenship, namely, when he voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country. The modes of voluntary acquisition have been narrated in section

( 7 ) THE question to be decided by the authority to be prescribed by the Central government is formulated in clear and precise terms, namely, whether a citizen of india voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any other country. . The determination of such a question is entrusted to an authority prescribed and the said authority is directed to decide the question judicially in the manner prescribed. The power to prescribe such an authority and the manner of such determination is put in the hands of the highest executive authority in the country, namely, the Central Government. It may be presumed that the Central Government would prescribe the machinery objectively to carry out the intention of the Legislature. To state it differently, the Act itself enunciates its policy and the object and the manner of achieving it, and what is entrusted to the Central Government is only to bring into existence the machinery pursuant to the directions given by the statute to implement its object. In the words of Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. , delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, (1956)1 M. L. J. (S. C.) 79 : (1956) S. C. J. 110 : 1956 An. W. R. (S. C.) 79, "the discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. " here, the regulatory power is vested in the Central Government and it cannot, therefore, be assumed that the Central Government would make a rule in derogation of the power conferred on it or in excess of it. We cannot, therefore, hold that an unregulated and naked arbitrary power was conferred by section 9 constituting a denial of the equal protection of laws.

( 8 ) IT is then contended that section 9 constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Under that Article, all citizens shall have the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The argument is that, by reason of the provisions of the constitution, the appellants are citizens of India and section 9, by authorising the central Government to constitute an authority to decide the question formulated therein in the prescrided manner and to deprive them of their right, constitutes an infringement of that right. There are two answers to this argument. One is that the fundamental rights under Article 19 are given only to a citizen of India, and if he ceases to be a citizen he loses those rights. If, as we have held, the section prescribing the machinery to deprive him of his citizenship is not violative of the equality clause the person deprived of his citizenship in the manner provided by that section is not a citizen of India and, therefore, he cannot complain of any infringement of his fundamental rights. Even if Article 19 applies, the section operates as a reasonable, restriction on the exercise of the appellant s fundamental rights, being conceived in the interests of the general public within the meaning of the several clauses of Article 19. That no one can be a citizen of two independent States is a a rule of International law and section 9 recognises that prohibition, and provides for the cesser of citizenship of India on a citizen s voluntarily acquiring the citizenship of another country. This prohibition, which is also laid down in Article 9 of the constitution of India, and is an established principle governing citizenship of other foreign countries, cannot be stated to be an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a citizen of this country. But what is contended is that the manner of deciding the factum of cesser of Indian citizenship provided by the section is so arbitrary as to exceed the permissible limits of reasonableness. The naked power entrusted to the authority prescribed by the Central Government, the argument proceeds, may exhaust the content of the right itself. This is the same argument in a different garb advanced by the learned counsel to bring the case within the mischief of the equality clause. For the same reasons, we hold that the section is not vitiated by the conferment of any arbitrary or naked power on the Central Government. We also hold that the provisions of section 9 of the Act constitute a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the appellants within the meaning of article 19 of the Constitution.

( 9 ) IF is then contended that the rule framed by the Central Government is in excess of the power conferred by section 9 on the Central Government. To appreciate this contention, the material portion of section 9 and the impugned rule may be put in juxtaposition. Section 9. Rule 3. Any citizen of India who by naturalisation, registration or otherwise voluntarily acquires or has at any time between the 26th January 1950 and the commencement of this Act voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country shall upon such acquisition or, as the case may be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India. The fact that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the Government of any country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country before that date. Under the section, the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign country operates as a cesser of the citizenship of this country, while under the rule the obtaining of a passport from the Government of any other country is conclusive proof of the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of that country, i. e, if he obtained a passport from a foreign country, he is precluded from proving that he has not voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country.

( 10 ) WHAT is the object of the section and what is the effect of the rule ? Does it implement the section or does it go beyond its scope ? Citizenship may be acquired by birth, by descent or by voluntary acquisition. The section deprives a citizen of this country of his citizenship if he voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country. Does the rule, by stating that the issue of a passport is conclusive proof of acquisition carry into effect the object of the section or does it directly or indirectly enlarge its scope ? It makes the holding of a passport conclusive proof of the voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign country. The legal incidents of the passport are well understood in International Law. In Urtetiqui v. D arcy, Law. Ed. 276 at p. 279, the supreme Court of America decided that a passport was not legal evidence to establish the fact of citizenship. Thompson, J. , says that it "is to be considered rather in the character of a political document by which the bearer is recognised in foreign countries as an American citizen. " a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J. , and Venkatarama Aiyar, J. , in V. G. Row v. The State of Madras, (1953) 2 M. L. J. 413, considered the legal effect of a passport having regard to American and English law on the subject. Rajamannar, C. J. , who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench summarised the law at page 419 thus :"all that may be said is that a passport gives a person certain facilities to travel in foreign countries. The Governent issuing the passport requests the foreign Government to allow the bearer free passage and also to afford every assistance and protection necessary. No citizen can compel the State to make such a request on his or her behalf. In the absence of legislation, it would be open to the Government to decide on each application whether or not to make such a request in respect of the concerned individual. If the Government think that it would not be in the best interest of the country that such a request should be made on behalf of ,anyfparticular individual, it would be open to them to refuse to issue a passport".

( 11 ) THE aforesaid summary is correct statement of the incidents of a passport. It is, therefore, clear that a passport is not the basis of legal evidence to establish the fact of citizenship but it only embodies a request to a foreign Government to allow the bearer free passage and to afford him every assistance and protection. That a passport is issued only by a Government to a citizen does not make it a document of title or a piece of evidence in a Court of law to establish that fact. It is only a convenient link in the chain of international intercourse. Rule 3 makes the passport not only legal evidence but conclusive proof of acquisition of citizenship of a foreign country. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act defines conclusive proof thus :- " Where one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it ". Under this section, "an artificial probative effect is given by law to certain facts. Sarkar in his "law of Evidence" says that this device is ordinarily adopted when it is against the policy of the Government or the interests of society that a matter should be further open to dispute. Illustrations of such irrebuttable presumptions are found in section 114 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, section 132 of the Indian Companies act, 1956, section 371 of the Indian Succession Act, section 61 of the Christian marriage Act, section 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act, section 11 of the Indian oaths Act and sections 43 and 113 of the Evidence Act. But a scrutiny of those provisions shows that a document which is made conclusive proof is legal evidence of the fact recorded therein on the basis of the investigation of that fact. But no case has been brought to our notice wherein any statute made a document, which is not legal evidence of a fact, conclusive proof of that fact. Citizenship, as we have already pointed out, may be obtained by birth, descent, naturalisation, registration, etc. The acquiring of citizenship by birth or by descent cannot be voluntary acquisition of citizenship, and therefore, that fact will not deprive an Indian citizen of his citizenship. The mere fact that a passport is given to such a person, whether the passport is legal evidence or not, cannot lead to any irresistible inference that the said person has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, for it may well have been issued to a citizen by birth or descent. There may also be cases where a passport is obtained by fraud or mistake or as the appellants allege, we should not be understood to express any opinion on the validity of such an allegation, that a passport is taken by a citizen by fraud practised on him by a third party. In all such cases, though there was no voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign country, the rule deprives a citizen of his citizenship. Therefore, by framing this rule, a passport, which is not legal evidence of citizenship, is made the basis of irrebuttable presumption of the voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign country. Under the section, a citizen of India ceases to be a citizen of India by voluntary acquisition of citizenship of another country, while under the rule he is deemed to have voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, even though he acquired the foreign citizenship other wise than by voluntary acquisition. The same legal consequences will flow, even if he did not acquire the citizenship of a foreign country, for there may be cases where a citizen of India acquires the passport of another country by mistake or by fraud. The rule, therefore, enlarges the scope of section 9 and is, therefore, void. The same result would flow even if the question is approached from the standpoint of the infringement of the appellants fundamental right under Article 19 of the constitution. Admittedly, all the appellants were citizens of India on the date when the Constitution came into force and they continued to be so by reason of Article 10 of the Constitution of India. The Act deprived them of such right, if they voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign country. The rule, by the device adopted, completely bars the appellants from establishing that they have not acquired the citizenship of Pakistan. The irrebuttable presumption from a fact, which is not legal evidence of the fact of citizenship, much less of the fact of citizenship obtained otherwise than by voluntary acquisition, has certainly the effect of depriving the appellants right without the enquiry guaranteed by the section and, therefore, amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the appellants under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

( 12 ) A few other contentions advanced by the learned advocates for the appellants remain to be considered. It is argued that the rule appointing the Central Government as an authority to decide the question of voluntary acquisition of citizenship of a foreign country in effect constitutes the Government as a judge in its own cause and, therefore, offends the principles of natural justice. Reliance is placed upon a passage in Broom s Legal Maxims (8th Edition) found at page 98. It reads : "hobart, G. J. is reported to have said that even an Act of Parliament made against natural, equity as to make a man a judge in his own cause, is void in itself, for jura naturae sunt immutabilia and they are leges legum. " but the learned author proceeds to observe :-"but although it is contrary to the general rule to make a person judge in his own cause the legislature, can, and no doubt in a proper case would, depart from the general rule, and an intention to do so being clearly expressed, the Courts give effect to their enactment. And if a particular relation be created by statute between A and B, and a duty be imposed upon A, to investigate and decide upon charge preferred against B, the maxim nemo sibi esse judex vet suis jus dicere debet would not apply. "in this case; the statute regulated the rights of citizenship, their acquisition and their termination. Section 9 read with section 18 of the Act expressly empowered the central Government to prescribe the authority to determine the question of the acquisition of the citizenship of another country. Though the Central Government could have appointed an independent tribunal to investigate the said question, the power conferred on it is wide and comprehensive enough to enable it to appoint itself as the authority to determine the question. We cannot, therefore, say that the central Government exceeded its powers in constituting itself the authority to determine the question.

( 13 ) THE learned counsel then contends that the Legislature abdicated its function in conferring on the Government the power of prescribing the authority to determine the question and also the rules of evidence and the manner of its disposal. A Division Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member in Krishnan v. . Secretary, R. T. A. , Chittoor, 1 Ohio. St. 88, considered the scope of the power of delegation by the Legislature having regard to decided cases. The conclusion was expressed thus at page 155 :-"the Legislature cannot abdicate its functions and delegate them to others. But it can always delegate its power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the operation of the law made would depend. . . . . The Act clearly and definitely prescribed the powers to be exercised by the Regional Transport Authority. It authorised them to delegate such powers to such authority as prescribed by the rules. The Government under the rule-making power only nominates the authority to whom the prescribed power can be delegated. Therefore, there is no abdication on the part of the Legislature of its legislative functions".

( 14 ) THE following passage from the Judgment of Ranney, J. , of the Supreme Court of ohio in Cincinnati W and Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County Commissioners, (1956) Andn. W. R. 142 brings out the limits of the power of delegation :"the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of law. The first cannot be done ; to the latter no valid objection can be made". The following passage from Locke s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491 also defines the limits of delegated legislation :- "the Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of Government". In the present case, the Legislature did not delegate its power to make a law but only conferred a power on the Central Government to implement the law in the manner prescribed. As we have stated in a different context, the Legislature laid down its policy and object, propounded the question to be decided and only entrusted to the Central Government the power to nominate the authority for deciding the question and for laying down the manner of its disposal. It cannot be said that the legislature in the circumstances has abdicated its function. The delegation, therefore, is within the limits permissible by law.

( 15 ) FINALLY, learned counsel for the appellants contend that the order of the respondent directing the appellants to leave the State is bad inasmuch as the question raised was not decided by the Central Government under section 9 of the Act read with the rules made thereunder. Under section 9, if any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority in such manner and having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in that behalf. Under Rule 30 (2), the central Government is the authority to determine such a question in accordance with the rules specified in Schedule III. The Act and the Rules framed thereunder created a special Tribunal, namely, the Central Government for deciding the said question and a duty is cast on it to do so whenever that question is raised. The respondent, therefore, before making the orders expelling the appellants, should have raised the question before the Central Government and obtained its decision. The orders, therefore, made ignoring the said provisions are not valid. The view expressed by us in these appeals will not preclude the Central Government from determining the question whether the appellants have voluntarily acquired citizenship of another country within the meaning of section 9 (1) of the Act in the manner prescribed under the rules ignoring rule 3 of Schedule III, which we have already held, is beyond its rule-making power.

( 16 ) IN the result, we allow the appeals with costs and issue writs of mandamus directing the respondent to forbear from enforcing the orders directing the appellants to leave the country. Advocate s fee only two sets in all the appeals which we fix at Rs. 100. Writ Appeals allowed.