WAZIR, C. J.

This is a revision application against the order of the City Judge, Jammu, dated 8-8-1959, and arises out of the following circumstances.

(2) M/s.- Khairati Lal and Sons plaintiffs instituted a suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,000 from M/s. Cold Storage and General Mills Ltd., Jammu on 15-4-1959. The plaintiff firm was not registered under the Partnership Act on the date when the suit was instituted. The defendants in their written statement pleaded that the plaintiffs suit could not proceed in view of the plaintiff firm not being registered on the date the plaint was filed. It appears that the plaintiff firm got the partnership registered on 30-5-1959, and it was averred by them that the firm had already been registered!. The question for consideration before the trial Court was whether the registration of the firm after it had filed the suit could cure the defect.

The learned trial Judge following a Full Bench decision of this Court reported as Ghulam Mohd. v. Ghulam Mohd., 7 J and K LR 120, held that the subsequent registration cured the defect and the suit was maintainable. Against that order the defendants came up in revision to this Court and the) case was put up for hearing before a Single Judge of this Court on 2-12-1959. In view of the conflict of decisions on this point the case was referred to the Full Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

(3) It was argued that the view taken by the trial Court based on the Full Bench decision was not correct. Relying on Dwijendra Nath Singh v. Govinda Chandra. AIR 1953 Cal 497, Prithvi Singh v. Hasan Ali, AIR 1951 Bom 6 and AIR 1954 Punj 233 (sic) it was argued that the suit which was not maintainable by reason of non-compliance with S. 69 could not become maintainable at a later, stage by reason of subsequent registration. In the Full Bench judgment of this Court which was delivered! in 1946 reliance was placed on Radha Charan Saha v. Matilal Saha, 41 Cal WN 534 and Varadarajulu Naidu v. Rajamanika Mudaliar, AIR 1937 Mad 767 and it was held that if the firm was not registered on the date of the institution of the suit but the registration was effected during the pendency of the suit, the suit may be considered to have been instituted on the date when the firm was registered if it was not otherwise barred on that date.

(4) It appears that the later decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts and of other High Court were not brought to the notice of their Lordships at that time. The cases relied upon by the Full Bench have been overruled subsequently by the decisions of the same High Courts. AIR 1937 Mad 767 is a Single Bench judgment by Horwill J. and in that case an unregistered firm had instituted a suit and during the course of the proceedings had registered itself in accordance with the Partnership Act.

On objection being raised that the firm was not registered on the date of the institution of the suit, the suit was dismissed though registration had taken place before the hearing. Horwill J. held that it would be most inequitable for the firm to have its suit dismissed and be forced to file another after paying fresh court-fee. The suit was. therefore, treated as instituted on the date when the firm was registered. This case was overruled by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. Pannuchami Goundar v. Muthusami Goun-dar, AIR 1942 Mad 252 in which it was held that

"a suit is instituted when the plaint is filed in a Court of competent jurisdiction. The registration of the firm is a condition precedent to the right to institute the suit and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial when the condition precedent has not been fulfilled. Registration after the filing of the suit cannot cure defect."

(5) A Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court, Mitter J., in 41 Cal WN 534 took the view that the suit ought not to have been dismissed merely on the ground of non-registration of the firm but ought to to have been deemed to have been instituted on the date when the firm was registered, but subsequently a Division Bench of the same High Court in AIR 1953 Cal 497, took a contrary view holding that a suit by the firm not registered on the date of the institution of the suit but registered on a later date before the suit came to be heard, did not become maintainable by the subsequent registration.

(6) Section 69 cl. (2) of the Partnership Act! provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm has been registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. The provisions of S. 69, cl. (2) are mandatory and the registration of the firm is a condition precedent to the right to institute the suit and if on the date of the institution of the suit the firm is not registered, the suit cannot proceed.

The view taken by this Court in an earlier Full Bench case that if the partnership is subsequently registered the suit may be considered to have been instituted on the date the firm was registered if it was not otherwise barred on that date, does not appear to be correct as there is no provision of law nor is there any case cited which permits the Court to treat the plaint as filed on a date which is other than the date on which it was actually filed.

(7) In Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secy, of State, AIR 1927 PC 176, their Lordships considered the provisions of S. 80 of the C. P. C. and laid down that they were explicit and mandatory and if the permission to sue was not sought before the institution of the suit, the suit was not maintainable. The provisions of S. 80, C. P C., have very much in common with S. 69 of the Partnership Act and if the condition precedent is not fulfilled, i.e., if the partnership is not registered on the date of the institution of the suit, the subsequent registration could not validate the suit. The only option left to the Court is to dismiss it.

(8) There is no doubt that it is hard on the plaintiffs if their suit is dismissed merely because of the defect of non-registration which is subsequently removed by registration; but as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the above case that the Act must be construed in accordance with the natural and plain meanings of its words; it is not open to the Courts in trying to save the plaintiffs from hardship to construe the Act by going behind the plain meanings of its words.

(9) The Allahabad High Court in Finn Dan-mal Parshotam Dass v. Firm Babu Ram Chhotelal, ILR 58 All 495: (AIR 1936 All 3), the Patna High Court in Firm Laduram Sagarmal v. Jamuna Prasad Chaudhuri, ILR 18 Pat 114: (AIR 1939 Pat 239) and the Lahore High Court in Firm Kishen Lal Ram Lal v. Abdul Ghafur Khan, ILR 17 Lah 275: (AIR 1935 Lah 893), have all held that subsequent registration of the firm will not allow the suit to proceed. The weight of authority on this point is, therefore, clearly to the effect that subsequent registration will not validate the suit.

(10) For, the reasons given above, we allow this revision application and set aside the order of the City Judge allowing the suit to proceed. We should not however be understood as saying that the plaintiffs are not entitled to withdraw the suit if they are so advised. In view of the special circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court.

(11) S. MURTAZA FAZL ALI, J.: I agree.

(12) GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, J.: I agree.